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Mēnēs and the Sōthic Cycle

BY

II. BRUCE HANNAH

Glancing back through previous investigations, and seeking to be somewhat more precise than heretofore, let us now assume, as a working hypothesis, that in Khem astronomically recorded Civilisation, so far as it is traceable, commenced in true B. C. $4459\frac{8}{9}$ (=conventional B. C. $4311\frac{1}{3}$; taking the 28th degree of Constellation Piscēs, $118\frac{5}{9}$ years from Conventional *zero* at 30 Piscēs-1 Ariēs, as the opening-point of the Christian Era); and that, though it was the period of $71\frac{7}{9}$ years commencing with True B. C. $3885\frac{4}{9}$ —the era of the so-called Eighth Hāthōr—which really marked the close of The Reign of Ptāh, *as recognised calendrically in Khem*, and the beginning of The First Reign of Rā, yet it was in True B. C. $3956\frac{81}{90}$ that the Ptāh *régime* was actually, by way of anticipation, abandoned, and the *régime* of First Rā was adopted, by the ancient Romiū, or original inhabitants of Khem before the names “Egypt” and “the Egyptians” arose.

At that epoch (True B. C. $3956\frac{81}{90}$) the Celestial Vernal Equinox, in course of Precession, entered the 23rd degree of Constellation Taurus (Mes-Rā, Vrishabha, or Khar-Sidi=“The Young Bull”). Hence the Celestial Autumnal Equinox was just entering 23 Constellation Scorpio (Vrischika, or Apin-am-a); the Celestial Winter Solstice was entering 23 Constellation

Aquarius (Kūmbha, or As-a-an); and the Celestial Summer Solstice was entering 23 Constellation Leo (Sekhet, Āb-āb-gār, or Simha = "The Place of the Production of Fire," or "Fire that makes Fire," or "The Lion").

That same Summer Solstice remained in Leo for $2155\frac{2}{3}$ years, counting from True B. C. $4459\frac{8}{9}$ (when the Vernal Equinox was in 30 Taurus), *i.e.*, till True B. C. $2304\frac{2}{9}$ (when the Vernal Equinox was in 30 Ariēs), when it entered 30 Constellation Cancer (Karka, or Sū-kūl-na); and it did not arrive at 30 Constellation Gemini (Mithūna, or Kas = "The Twins.") till the opening of the Christian Era at *zero* aforesaid on the Conventional Zōdiacal Diagram as usually drawn. Even to-day 30 Gemini-1 Cancer is conventionally regarded as the approximate point of the Celestial Summer Solstice, though actually that Solstice lies now in or about 30 Constellation Taurus!

In True B. C. $3956\frac{81}{90}$, moreover, a very important Calendrical reform was effected in Khem. Up till then—*i.e.*, throughout the Ptāh régime, dating from True B. C. $4459\frac{8}{9}$ aforesaid—the Calendrical Year had been officially and sacerdotally regarded as opening at the *Celestial Summer Solstice*; New Year's Day, or let us say 1 Thoth, having probably been celebrated at that Solstice's *oldest* recorded position on the outer Spheroid, *i.e.*, say 30 Constellation Leo, then approximately corresponding, terrestrially, *i.e.*, on the small inner revolving Epicycle, to what we now call 22 June, or thereabouts, but to-day corresponding to *circa* conventional 22 August, = *circa* actual present-day 22 September.

Possibly, however, in True B. C. $3885\frac{4}{90}$ (the epoch of the so-called Eighth Hāthōr), and throughout the first half of the period of $71\frac{77}{90}$ years which began there, New Year's Day was celebrated at 22 Leo = 8 days

earlier in the same terrestrial months as those just mentioned. But from then onwards the opening of the Calendrical Year was officially changed from the Celestial Summer Solstice to the *Celestial Autumnal Equinox*—New Year's Day, or 1 Thoth, being celebrated at say 30 Constellation Scorpio, then approximately corresponding to what we now call 22 September. It may, however, have been celebrated later, *i.e.*, at 22 Scorpio.

Perhaps, therefore, it is in allusion to this ancient *régime* of the First Reign of Rā that we are told by George St. Clair that—

“Mr. R. S. Poole finds a symbol of the autumnal equinox as one of the divinities of the first month, and of the vernal equinox as the seventh”(*Creation Records*, p. 156).

But it might equally well have been in allusion to the seeming fact that at *Memphis* the Calendrical Year was always regarded as opening at the *Autumnal Equinox* (*Ibid*, pp. 303, 376, 380).

Of course, wherever the Year opened calendrically—whether at Spring, at Summer, at Autumn, or at Winter—Cyclically and Super-Cyclically considered, it remained unaffected. Only internally, as it were, there was a difference of $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, or at most $\frac{3}{4}$ ths, of the Spheroid, regarded as an *annual* period.

If, now, we deduct $35\frac{167}{180}$ (half of $71\frac{77}{90}$) years from True B. C. $3956\frac{81}{90}$, we arrive at True B. C. $3920\frac{175}{180}$ as the close of The First Reign of Rā and the beginning of The Osirian *régime*, when the Calendrical Opening of the Year was officially transferred from the Celestial *Autumnal Equinox* to the Celestial *Vernal Equinox*.

From this, again, we have to subtract Plutarch's 23 years; whereby we are brought down to True B.C. $3892\frac{175}{180}$ as the end of The Osirian *régime* and the beginning of The Second Reign of Rā—at some time during which latter *régime* Rā is said to have been

"lifted up." By this, it seems, we are to understand that the Calendrical Opening of the Year was officially transferred back again to the *Celestial Summer Solstice*, at least in Thebes, though apparently not in Memphis, where, as already noticed, the priesthood and court are said to have preferred the *Celestial Autumnal Equinox*.

From True B. C. $3892\frac{175}{180}$ we have now to deduct a further period of 365 years, being one full quadrature, or G. P. Y., of the Spheroidal Cycle of 1460 years, founded on the Year of 365 days. This brings us down to True B. C. $3527\frac{175}{180}$ as the close of The Second Reign of Rā. During the period of $71\frac{77}{90}$ years commencing with this epoch, the Celestial Vernal Equinox lay for a short while in 18 Constellation Taurus (Mes-Rā, or Vrishabha="The Bull"); but then it passed into, and for the greater part of the period remained in, 17 Taurus. Hence we may take it that, when Rā was "lifted up," New Year's Day, or 1 Thoth, began to be celebrated at say 17 Constellation Leo—then approximately corresponding to what, terrestrially, we now conventionally call late June. Thus was ushered in the so-called Reign of Horus.

With the advent of this *régime* the age-long problem regarding the harmonization of the artificial Calendrical Year with the Natural Year was definitely and finally solved. Nevertheless, there is reason to hold that at no time throughout the various preceding *régimes* or eras had the ancient Romic priesthood been ignorant of the true length of the Natural Year, as consisting of about $365\frac{1}{4}$ days—even in the eras when they based, or appeared to base, their Calendrical arrangements on a conventional and (even to them) remotely traditional Spheroid of only 360 degrees.

At the same time, this very fact that a solution of their seeming difficulties had been reached, puts us now in a somewhat disconcerting quandary: for it deprives us

of the means we otherwise might have had of computing the period for which this so-called Reign of Horus endured. During each of the preceding *régimes* the Calendrical Year had been imperfect; and this in such a manner that, after the lapse of a certain period, in each case dependent on the length of the Cycle attaching to the particular Year-form, the priests were enabled, some considerable time ahead, to foresee the exact stage when the Calendar would reveal a complete reversal as compared with the Natural Seasons or *Samvatsara*: and thus, far in advance of necessity, they found themselves in a position to decide upon the advisability of abolishing the current Calendar and constructing a new one. Now, however, under the Horus *régime*, with a Calendrical Year that exactly coincided with the length of the Natural Year, there seemed to be no reason why that particular Time-System should ever come to an end or require re-modelling!

Hence, *along this line of enquiry*, we are without any data, such as have helped us hitherto, from which to infer the approximate close of the Horus *régime*. In other words, from this point of view, there is nothing chronologically indicative of the epoch at which Mēnēs ascended the throne. Accordingly, in this connection we are thrown back on another line of research—one which I adopted as long ago as 1916, when I published my first tentative booklet on this recondite and elusive subject (*The Secret of Egyptian Chronology*).

The ancient Romiū were accustomed to celebrate various Festivals, or *Hebs*, which, in later “Egyptian” days (*i.e.*, after the Mykenacan and Hellenic influence had been established) were styled *Panegyrics*. If, now, we take the Spheroid of $365\frac{1}{4}$ degrees as evolving a Cycle of 1461 years, we find that each of the Cycle’s quadratures represents a stretch of $365\frac{1}{4}$ ordinary years=360

Spheroidal years of $1\frac{7}{480}$ ordinary years each. This stretch the Hellenised Egyptians used to call a "Great Panegyrical Year," which we may abbreviate into "G. P. Y." Further subdividing the Cyclic Spheroid, we get—

- | | | |
|---|---|----------------------------------|
| 1. Great Panegyrical
Month (G. P. M.)
<i>Sed Heb.</i> | } | $30\frac{7}{16}$ ordinary years. |
| | | |
| 2. Quadruple G. P. M.,
or <i>Hunti Heb.</i> | } | $121\frac{3}{4}$ „ |
| | | |
| 3. A $\frac{1}{30}$ th part of the
G. P. M. | } | $1\frac{7}{480}$ „ |
| | | |
| 4. The last multiplied
by 4, being the
period for which
an annual Rising
of Sirius (Alpha
<i>Canis Majoris</i>)
occurred on a
particular date as
shown in the Pro-
gressive Year Calen-
dar, and before
passing on to the
next date. | } | $4\frac{28}{480}$ „ |
| | | |

Here it becomes necessary to determine the nature of the Cycle with which we are now dealing—to decide,

N.B.—Since writing my last contribution to the *Arts' Journal* I have consulted Mr. N. K. Majumdar, M.A, an expert in Astronomy connected with Calcutta University, and have learnt that Sirius is associable with about the middle of *Nakshatra Pūnarnasū*, and therefore "manifests" near the end of Constellation Gemini (*Mithūna*)—not near the end of Constellation Taurus (*Ṛishabha*), as I have hitherto been wrongly assuming.

if possible, (1) whether it was what is commonly called the Sōthic Cycle, *i.e.*, a recurrent period of 1,460 (1,461) years stretching between two Extraordinary Hēliacal Risings of Sirius, or (2) whether the fact that it was a Cycle of 1,461 years was simply based on the further known fact that the Natural Year consisted of about $365\frac{1}{4}$ days, and therefore that the Spheroid had to be regarded as consisting of $365\frac{1}{4}$ degrees—the Cycle itself, however, having had no connection whatever with the idea of the “Sōthic Period,” as eventually in vogue, but commencing from an independent *zero* of its own.

I submit that the latter is the correct view, and that the idea of the so-called “Sōthic Cycle”—though intellectually the priests must have anticipated it long before the opening of the Christian Era, when, and when only, Sirius began to herald the initial rising of the Nile waters at the time of the Celestial Summer Solstice, then associated with the Spheroidal point 30 Gemini, or thereabouts—was not kosmically realised by any coincidental phenomenal occurrences till about the epoch which marked the opening of that Era, *i.e.*, when the Celestial Vernal Equinox lay in *zero* on the Zōdiacal Diagram as conventionally placed at 30 Piscēs-1 Ariēs.

Next, the question arises, when did the first of these pre-Sōthic and non-Sōthic Spheroidal Cycles, of 1,461 years each, begin? For, starting from the *zero*-point just mentioned—or, for that matter, from any other point that we care to select arbitrarily—we can go right round the Spheroid, at the rate of $2,155\frac{2}{3}$ (really $2,155\frac{1\frac{1}{6}}{67}$) years for each of the 12 Zōdiacal Signs or Constellations, and so arrive at the conception of a *Super-Cycle* of $25,868\frac{4}{167}$ (generally called 25,868) years!

Of course, all our old-fashioned Victorian ideas regarding a Creation-Epoch assignable to conventional B.C. 4004, have gone completely by the board.

We now know that Man has been on the Earth for millions of years, and we even acknowledge the probability, nay, as some aver, the certainty, that many successive, and doubtless also contemporaneous, civilisations, more or less mighty, brilliant, and long-enduring, rose and flourished and passed away in various latitudes on the many different continental areas that have succeeded each other from time to time, ages upon ages before our now ridiculously insignificant little B.C. 4004. Nevertheless, actual records of Antiquity fail us beyond a vaguely definable stage ; memories and traditions concerning earlier stages have their limitations ; and as for still remoter times, all we have to rely upon are our powers of inference and imagination, and the assertions of those who claim to be able to extract credible information from the archives of our *Akūshic* environment.

In Khem alone (so far as we have investigated hitherto) do we seem to find anything chronologically solid whereon to build up a conception more or less definite regarding the remote past : though even there, apparently, we cannot get farther back than the nearer stretches of the so-called Tauric Era.

The foregoing considerations seem to be in practical accord with certain of the views of the late Mr. R. S. Poole, who tells us that—

“ Neither the Egyptian monuments, nor ancient writers of authority, afford us any single argument in favour of the supposition that there were Sothic Cycles, or even that there was one Sothic Cycle, before that which commenced in the year B.C. 1322 (*Horæ Aegytiacæ*, p. 37).

What the Romiū (whom Poole calls the “ ancient Egyptians ”) did possess was, he says—

“ a series of chronological periods commencing in the year B.C. 2717,”

and he proceeds thus—

“ these periods were independent of any Sothic Cycles, although one of them was a cycle, similar in character and length to the

Sothic. A comparison of my system of Egyptian Chronology with the statements of ancient writers will be seen to show that the Egyptians had no historical chronology before the year B.C. 2717 ; that this date, which is less than the length of a Sothic Cycle before the Era of Menophrēs " (1460 years + B.C. 1322 would take us back to B.C. 2782), " is the date of the commencement of their existence as a nation."

And again—

" No ancient writer of the least authority, none but the imposteors who composed such works as the 'Book of Sothis,' and the 'Old Chronicle,' and their followers, speak of Sothic Cycles before the year B.C. 1322 ; and the very name of the Era of Menophrēs seems to point to a new institution, and not to the renewal of a cycle" (*Ibid*, pp. 36, 37).

On this my only comment is that if, as seems likely, the Sōthic Cycle only really came into existence and vogue when an Extraordinary Hēliacal Rising of Sirius heralded the initial swelling of the Nile waters at the time of the Celestial Summer Solstice (which was only possible when, in course of Precession, the Celestial Vernal Equinox was passing out of Constellation Ariēs and into Constellation Piscēs, *i.e.*, at conventional 0 on the Zōdiacal Diagram, at the opening of the Christian Era), *then even Poole's B.C. 1322 did not mark the beginning of the first, or any Sōthic cycle, properly so called.* In fact, regarded in this light, there could have been *no Sōthic cycle at all till the opening of the Christian Era*, though doubtless the old Romic priests *foresaw* it intellectually long before it actually eventuated as a kosmic phenomenon.

Thus we are forced back to the conclusion that, at least in the remote times of the pre-Egyptian Romiū, chronology in Khem worked with a Cycle which had nothing whatever to do with the idea of Sōthis and its "Manifestations," but which nevertheless, just like the eventual Sōthic Cycle, was a period of 1461 years, because it was based on the fact that the artificial

Spheroid consisted of $365\frac{1}{4}$ degrees, so corresponding with the equally well known fact that the Natural Year really consisted of about $365\frac{1}{4}$ days.

These remarks are naturally in modification and supersession of my arguments in previous publications regarding the true nature of the Sōthic Cycle, as recognised (as I then thought it was) by the ancient pre-Egyptian Romiū.

The question, therefore, for which we still have to find an answer is, At what point on the Spheroidal Super-Cycle of 25,868 years did the first of the Chronological Periods, or pre-Sōthic Cycles, of 1,461 years each, recognised by the old Romiū, commence?

In this quest we must once more resort for assistance to *Horæ Aegyptiacæ*. There, we learn that—

“In the commencement of the First Year of the First G. P. M., and the First Division of the G.P.M., that is, in the commencement of a Great Panegyric Year,”

offerings were made by an individual living in the time of a king whom we may take to have been Khūfū of the 4th Dynasty, *i.e.*, according to my reckoning in *Ancient Romic Chronology*, Conventional B. C. 2541 $\frac{473}{480}$ -2519 $\frac{319}{480}$ (p. 61).

Further, in the year B.C. 2005 (=A.M. 1999), in what Poole calls the reign of Amenemha II (Amenemhat II) of the 12th Dynasty ruling from Thebes, but which in fact was 251 $\frac{426}{480}$ years after the demise of Amenemhat II in B.C. 2256 $\frac{426}{480}$ and about 137 years after the close of the dynasty itself in B. C. 2142 $\frac{115}{480}$ and therefore some time early in the age of the Hyksōs Dominance, Poole finds an event (the beginning of the so-called “Tropical Cycle”) occurring “in the course of the Twelfth Division of the Twelfth Great Panegyric Month” (p. 62). Then, by a process of reasoning which need not be detailed here, he concluded that the commencement of the G. P. Y.

whose 12th G. P. M was current at the epoch referred to (B. C. 2005), fell in the year 2352 B. C. This would mean A. M. 1652, if (as is quite legitimate for purposes of exposition), we take A. M. 0 as equating with Conventional B.C. 4004.

Next, Poole speaks of the G. P. Y. commencing in B. C. 2717 (*i.e.*, 365 years, or 3 *Hunti Heb* periods of $121\frac{2}{3}$ years each, before B. C. 2352)=the G. P. Y. commencing in A. M. 1287, as the First G. P. Y., and identifies its commencement as the *Commencement of the Era of Mēnēs* (p. 63). Hence, for him, the G. P. Y. beginning in B. C. 2352 was the Second G. P. Y.; and the commencement of this he identifies as the *Commencement of the Era of Khūfū*.

According therefore to Poole, the G. P. Y. current in A.M. 1999, or B. C. 2005 aforesaid (which he wrongly thought was the age of Amenemhat II), was also this same Second G. P. Y.. Thus, in Poole's mind, Amenemhat II's reign is assignable to a time within 365 years (the length of a G. P. Y.) from the Era of Khūfū: to be exact, 347 years from it. As a matter of fact, however, the interval between the two regnal periods was from $250\frac{289}{480}$ to $262\frac{463}{480}$ years—since Amenemhat II actually reigned during A. M. $1712\frac{996}{480}$ - $1747\frac{54}{480}$ =Conventional B. C. $2291\frac{184}{480}$ - $2256\frac{336}{480}$, *i.e.*, more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ centuries before B.C. 2005, and only from $60\frac{296}{480}$ to $95\frac{144}{480}$ years after B.C. 2352.

And what about Poole's Cycles? He puts both the Era of Mēnēs and the Era of Khūfū in one and the same Cycle—and that, as we shall see, Cycle II! The former Era he assigns to the first G. P. Y. of Cycle II, and the latter Era he assigns to the second G. P. Y. of the same Cycle!

Obviously this is wrong. Even from Poole's own point of view we are here concerned with *two* Cyclic periods of 1,461 years each—presumably the first of their kind;

at any rate the first known to chronological history. Moreover, they must have been Cycles of the sort which we are now calling pre-Sōthic and non-Sōthic. Arbitrarily equating A. M. 0 with Conventional B. C. 4004, in order to speak in terms of our own modern reckoning, we may set these 2 Cyclic Periods down thus—

CYCLE I.

1st	G. P. Y.	=	$365\frac{1}{4}$ years	=	A.M. 0—	$365\frac{1}{4}$	=	B.C. 3638 $\frac{3}{4}$
						$365\frac{1}{4}$		
2nd	„		„			<hr/>		
						$730\frac{1}{2}$	=	„ 3275 $\frac{1}{2}$
3rd	„		„			$365\frac{1}{4}$		
						<hr/>		
						$1095\frac{3}{4}$	=	„ 2908 $\frac{1}{4}$
4th	„		„			$365\frac{1}{4}$		
						<hr/>		
						A. M. 1461	=	„ 2543

CYCLE II.

1st	G. P. Y.	=	$365\frac{1}{4}$ years	=	A.M. 1461—	$1826\frac{1}{4}$	=	B.C. 2177 $\frac{3}{4}$
2nd	„		„			$365\frac{1}{4}$		
						<hr/>		
						$2191\frac{1}{2}$	=	„ 1812 $\frac{1}{2}$
3rd	„		„			$365\frac{1}{4}$		
						<hr/>		
						$2556\frac{3}{4}$	=	„ 1447 $\frac{1}{4}$
4th	„		„			$365\frac{1}{4}$		
						<hr/>		
						A.M. 2922	=	„ 1082

Clearly Poole's B. C. 2005 must have fallen in the 2nd G. P. Y. of Cycle II; and his B. C. 2352 must have fallen in the 1st G. P. Y. of the same Cycle.

As clearly also, however, $365\frac{1}{4}$ years (the length of a G. P. Y.) before Poole's B. C. 2352, takes us back to the 4th or last G. P. Y. of Cycle I.

But that 4th G. P. Y. began *from* B. C. 2908 $\frac{1}{4}$; and the 1st G. P. Y. of Cycle II began *from* B. C. 2543.

Thus, *not the Commencement of the 1st G. P. Y. of the 2nd Cycle, as stated by Poole, but the Commencement of the 4th G. P. Y. of the 1st Cycle*, must have been the true Commencement of the Era of Mēnēs: and consequently, *not the Commencement of the 2nd G. P. Y. of the 2nd Cycle, as stated by Poole, but the Commencement of the 1st G. P. Y. of that Cycle*, must have been the true Commencement of the Era of Khūfū.

The first year, therefore, of the Era of Mēnēs, starting from A. M. 1095 $\frac{3}{4}$, was B. C. 2908 $\frac{120}{480}$ -2907 $\frac{113}{480}$; and consequently the first year of the Era of Khūfū, starting from A. M. 1461, was B. C. 2543-2541 $\frac{473}{480}$.

It follows that the period of the *régime* known as the Reign of Horus was True B. C. 3527 $\frac{175}{480}$ (=Conventional B. C. 3379 $\frac{75}{180}$)-Conventional B. C. 2908 $\frac{120}{480}$: *i.e.*, it lasted for 470 $\frac{75}{480}$ years.

Our final results, then—which even now, however, are only provisional, and in no way put forward as beyond question—may be tabulated thus—

Reign of Ptāh began...	Conventional B.C.	4311 $\frac{30}{96}$
„ Rā I „ ... „	„	3808 $\frac{31}{90}$
„ Osiris „ ... „	„	3772 $\frac{75}{180}$
„ Rā II „ ... „	„	3744 $\frac{75}{180}$
„ Horus „ ... „	„	3379 $\frac{75}{180}$
„ Mēnēs „ ... „	„	{ 2908 $\frac{120}{480}$ -2907 $\frac{113}{480}$

We have thus approached the problem of the epoch of Mēnēs from two opposite directions. Both methods, based partly on facts and partly on reasonable inferences, have brought about practically the same result. This, I submit, is as satisfactory as can be expected in the circumstances.

Further Notes on Ancient Romic Chronology

BY

H. BRUCE HANNAH

Since writing *Ancient Romic Chronology* I have reconstructed my Zōdiacal Diagram, or Spheroidal Clock—the Clock then used having proved in several respects inaccurate—and this necessitates certain modifications in some of the statements contained in the pamphlet just mentioned.

The principal alteration in the Clock is that, now, I have set the Celestial Equinoxes (and therefore the Celestial Solstices) in their proper places, not only on the large outer Spheroid, but also in relation to the Terrestrial Seasons—*i.e.*, the Celestial Autumnal Equinox now appears on the left hand side, and the Celestial Vernal Equinox now appears on the right hand side, of the Diagram.

On the small inner revolving Epicycle, which represents the Terrestrial Seasons, or *Samvatsara*, the months for our own modern system of reckoning, starting with 21st March, begin on the left, at the Equinoctial point, and continue downwards, and so round the circle in the direction followed by the planets in their revolution round the Sun, thus succeeding each other in a direction exactly contrary to that of the Precession movement.

For the Ptāh *régime*, the Rā II *régime*, and the Horus *régime*, the months also start with Thoth, but at the point on the Epicycle which lies exactly opposite the Celestial

Summer Solstice, on the other side of the Diagram. For the Osirian *régime* they also start with Thoth, but at the point on the Epicycle which lies opposite the Celestial Vernal Equinox, on the other side of the Diagram. But for the Râ I *régime*, and the system in vogue at Memphis, starting with Thoth, they begin on the right, at the Equinoctial point on the Epicycle, and continue upwards, and so right round. On the old Clock all this was wrongly and inadequately represented.

Of course, as regards these old *régimes*, it would be still more correct to say that they opened calendrically at the various Celestial Equinoxes and Solstices *actually in operation, as such, for the time being*—not the present conventionally recognised ones.

Another important alteration in the Clock has reference to Sirius and to the spheroidal point at which it “manifests” annually. Hitherto I have wrongly been assuming that this Rising took place at 30 Taurus, or thereabouts. I now put it at 30 Gemini, or thereabouts. When, at the opening of the Christian Era, the Celestial Summer Solstice reached 30 Constellation Gemini, the months, I suggest, were made to begin at that Solstice with Epiphi, instead of with Thoth. Of course the old Romic Priests may have anticipated, and doubtless did anticipate, intellectually, the above mentioned coincidence of the Summer Solstice with the “Manifestation” of Sirius—even then thinking out the whole conception of the eventual Sôthic Cycle, and inventing the mystic legends connected with the name of the goddess Isis, who, it will be remembered, declares upon her monuments: “I am in the Constellation of the Dog.” If so, it is not impossible that the Calendar-change from Thoth to Epiphi was effected considerably before the epoch of the actual coincidence. For instance, it *may* have occurred fairly early in the period when Greek or even

Mykenaeen influences began to be active in Khem. This suggested change affords an opening for speculation. On the Epicycle, Epiphi, in that association, lies in *Sign* Cancer; hence, from 30 Paōni to 1 Thoth, on that month-line, there is a stretch of 2 months: and so, from 1 Epiphi to 30 Mesorē, there is a stretch of exactly 1 month 28 days, which perhaps explains why the "Egyptianised" Priests seem to have adopted that period in connection with the fixing of their Feasts held in celebration of the Hēliacal Risings of Sōthis, as reported on the monuments, etc.

The Celestial Season, then, is always to be looked for on the outer Spheroid, at the point directly opposite the point of its corresponding Terrestrial Season on the Epicycle, and is therefore seen across the Diagram, from Terrestrial to Celestial, looking as it were through the Sun, which is supposed to be at the centre of the Spheroid.

Unfortunately, up to the present, it has not been found possible to print the Diagram or Clock above referred to. Hence the necessity for all these descriptive details. Perhaps this is just as well: as our investigations are still tentative, and our results provisional.

For expositive purposes, moreover, I adopt the system which is said to have always obtained at Memphis, where the Calendrical Year was regarded as opening on the left hand side at the *Celestial Autumnal Equinox*. Hence, for each pre-Sōthic and non-Sōthic Cycle of 1,461 years, as used by the old Romiū, *Zero* is to be found at that point; and from thence the years proceed, downwards, and right round the outer circle, back to the same point.

This, however, need not affect the system whereby, for the Super-Cycle of $25,868\frac{44}{187}$ years, *Zero* is conventionally placed on the right hand side of the outer

Spheroid at the point known as 30 Piscēs-1 Ariēs (the place of the Celestial Vernal Equinox), whence the years proceed upwards, and so right round the circle, back to the same starting-point.

Nor does it affect the fact that, during the Ptāh *régime*, and also during the *régime* of Rā II and the Horus *régime*, the Calendrical Year opened at the Celestial Summer Solstice for the time being; or the further fact that, during the Osirian *régime*, the Year opened calendrically at the Celestial Vernal Equinox. During the *régime* of Rā I, it opened, as at Memphis, at the Celestial Autumnal Equinox.

Of course, as regards all these ancient *régimes*, we must remember, as already pointed out, at what points on the outer Spheroid the Celestial Equinoxes and Solstices actually stood at particular periods of each era. For instance, take say the *régime* of Rā I. That was in the 3rd 1461-Years' Cycle before the opening of the Christian Era. Where was the Celestial Autumnal Equinox at the commencement of that *régime* in Conv. B.C. $3808\frac{3}{8}$? It was entering 23 Constellation Scorpio—not at our present conventional point for the Celestial Autumnal Equinox.

Take, again, the epoch of the Accession of Mēnēs—Conv. B.C. $2908\frac{1}{8}$ - $2907\frac{1}{8}$. At that time the Celestial Vernal Equinox lay in 11 Constellation Taurus. Hence the Celestial Autumnal Equinox must have been lying in 11 Constellation Scorpio. It was there that the Year must have opened calendrically at Memphis in Mēnēs's day. Therefore, as we now know that every Annual Sōthic Rising happened at the point now conventionally styled 30 Constellation Gemini, or thereabouts, it follows that, in the time of Mēnēs, those Risings must have occurred 7 months and 19 days after the opening of the Calendrical Year, at the then Celestial Autumnal

Equinox = 11 Constellation Scorpio = the then *Zero* for the Year. Counting, however, from *Zero* at the present conventional point for the Celestial Autumnal Equinox, the Annual Risings of Sirius occur 9 full months after the Calendrical Opening of the year.

These remarks are made with reference to, and in modification of, the statement at the foot of p. 3 of the pamphlet, to the effect that the Risings in question occur *10 months* after the Calendrical Opening—which, of course, is now seen to be inaccurate.

A word or two more respecting my statements on the same page regarding the procedure adopted by the Priests when reporting the celebration of the Feasts connected with these Sōthic Risings. There, I said that the Priests looked upon Progressive 1 Thoth as starting, not from the Autumnal Equinox, or *Zero* (which I was then wrongly placing on the right hand side of the Spheroid), but at the point which I called 1 Epiphi, 2 months earlier on the old inaccurate Clock, thus making Official Time exactly 2 months ahead of Cyclical or True Time. And I added that nevertheless the Priests—for the purposes of their own exclusive reckoning—went on the basis of 1 month 28 days ahead; apparently, I surmised, because what they were reporting was, not the Risings themselves, but the Feasts held in celebration of them. I have already made a passing comment on this obscure point. Another point of view now occurs to me. At what I have assumed to be the commencement of recorded Civilisation in Khem, *i.e.*, at the opening of the Ptāh *régime* in Conv. B.C. 4311 $\frac{1}{3}$, when the Priests possibly inaugurated their system of officially reporting the Feasts held in celebration of the annual hēliacal Risings of Sirius, there was a difference of exactly 2 months—or perchance it *may* have been 1 month 28 days—between the date of the Rising at 30 Constellation Gemini, or thereabouts, and the date

of the Celestial Summer Solstice, which then (*i.e.*, in Conv. B.C. 4311½) lay in 30, or perhaps 28, Constellation Leo (in those days associated with the *lion*-headed goddess Sekhet) : and ever since, following religiously in the footsteps of their predecessors, the priestly scribes may possibly have accepted that fact as a permanent datum which it would have been impious to alter. I cannot say that I am satisfied with this as an explanation ; but I mention it for what it may be worth. Certainly Priesthoods have ever been proverbially slow to effect any changes in those systems, whether of belief or of practice, which they have inherited from a remote past. We see yet another—perhaps the most noticeable—evidence of this mentality, in the almost fanatic devotion wherewith, for many succeeding centuries, the same Priesthood refused to abandon altogether the old traditional conception of the Year, as consisting of 360 days—dating, of course, from the times when Blond Humanity (from a division of whom the ancient Romiū were presumably descended, culturally at least, if not physically, but perhaps both physically and culturally) were dwelling at, or in the near vicinity of, the North Pole.

The following is a List of all actual and possible *SED* and *HUNTI DEBS*, up to modern times, on the basis of periods of $30\frac{7}{8}$ years and $121\frac{3}{4}$ years respectively, *i.e.*, of a Year of $365\frac{1}{4}$ days. First I give them as they fell prior to the epoch when Mēnēs ascended the throne = A.M. 1095½, or Conv. B.C. 2908½—2907½ :—

A.M.	A.M.	A.M.	A.M.	A.M.
0				
30 7/16	273 15/16	517 7/16	760 15/16	1004 7/16
60 14/16	304 6/16	547 14/16	791 6/16	1034 14/16
91 5/16	334 13/16	578 5/16	821 13/16	1065 5/16
121 12/16	365 4/16	608 12/16	852 4/16	1095 12/16

A.M.	A.M.	A.M.	A.M.
152 3/16	395 11/16	639 3/16	882 11/15
182 10/16	426 2/16	669 10/16	913 2/16
213 1/16	456 9/16	700 1/16	943 9/16
243 8/16	487	730 8/16	974

N.B.—The years underlined are *Hunti Hebs.* A double line henceforth marks the close of each Cycle of 1,461 years.

After the Era of Mēnēs began in Conv. B.C. 2908 $\frac{120}{480}$ —2907 $\frac{413}{480}$, this List continued thus, the first *Heb* in the new era being *Sed Heb* for A.M. 1126 $\frac{3}{16}$ —

A.M.	A.M.	A.M.	A.M.	A.M.
1126 3/16	1491 7/15	1856 11/16	2221 15/16	2587 3/16
1156 10/16	1521 14/16	1886 2/16	2252 6/16	2617 10/16
1187 1/16	1552 5/16	1916 9/16	2282 13/16	2648 1/16
1217 8/16	1582 12/16	1947	2313 4/16	2678 8/16
1247 15/16	1613 3/16	1977 7/16	2343 11/16	2708 15/16
1278 6/16	1643 10/16	2007 14/16	2374 2/16	2739 6/16
1308 13/16	1674 1/16	2038 5/16	2404 9/16	2769 13/16
1339 4/16	1704 8/16	2069 12/16	2435	2800 4/16
1369 11/16	1734 15/16	2100 3/16	2465 7/16	2830 4/17
1400 2/16	1765 6/16	2130 10/16	2495 14/16	2861 2/16
1430 9/16	1795 13/16	2161 1/16	2526 5/16	2891 9/16
1461	1826 4/16	2191 8/16	2556 12/16	2922

A.M.	A.M.	A.M.
2952 7/16	4048 3/16	5143 15/16
2982 14/16	4078 10/16	5174 6/16
3013 5/16	4109 1/16	5204 13/16
3043 12/16	4139 8/16	5235 4/16
3074 3/16	4169 15/16	5265 11/16
3104 10/16	4200 6/16	5296 2/16
3135 1/16	4230 13/16	5326 9/16
3165 8/16	4261 4/16	5357
3195 15/16	4291 11/16	5387 7/16
3226 6/16	4322 2/16	5417 14/16
3256 13/16	4352 9/16	5448 5/16
3287 4/16	4383	5478 12/16

A.M.	A.M.	A.M.
3317 11/16	4413 7/16	5509 3/16
3348 2/16	4443 14/16	5539 10/16
3378 9/16	4474 5/16	5570 1/16
3409	4504 12/16	5600 8/16
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
3439 7/16	4535 3/16	5630 15/16
3469 14/16	4565 10/16	5661 6/16
3500 5/16	4596 1/16	5691 13/16
3530 12/16	4626 8/16	5722 4/16
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
3561 3/16	4656 15/16	5752 11/16
3591 10/16	4687 6/16	5783 2/16
3622 1/16	4717 13/16	5813 9/16
3652 8/16	4748 4/16	5844
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
3682 15/16	4778 11/16	5874 7/16
3713 6/16	4809 2/16	5904 14/16
3743 13/16	4839 9/16	5935 5/16
3774 4/16	4870	5965 12/16
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
3804 11/16	4900 7/16	5996 3/16
3835 2/16	4930 14/16	6026 10/16
3865 9/16	4961 5/16	6057 1/16
3896	4991 12/16	6087 8/16
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
3926 7/16	5022 3/16	
3956 14/16	5052 10/16	
3987 5/16	5083 1/16	
4017 12/16	5113 8/16	
<hr/>	<hr/>	

N.B.—B.C. years are obtainable by subtracting the above figures, when less than 4004, from Conventional B.C. 4004.

The last traceable *Heb*, actually celebrated in Khem, is that which fell in A.M. $3317\frac{11}{16}$ = Conv. B.C. $686\frac{5}{16}$, in the reign of Taharqa of the 25th Dynasty: but *Heb* observance practically ceased in Khem $182\frac{1}{16}$ years before then, with the celebration by Ūsarkon II of the 22nd Dynasty of the *Sed* which fell in A.M. $3135\frac{1}{16}$ = Conv. B.C. $865\frac{15}{16}$. This is all-important, as revealing approximately when old Khem proper finally broke up.

I now give a List of all SŌTHIC RISINGS throughout the 1461-Years' Cycle, commencing from *Zero*. It is

really made up in quartettes, or sets of 4 years. The first, appearing as $4\frac{7}{480}$, is analysable thus—

$$\left. \begin{array}{r} 0-1 \quad 7/480 \\ 1 \quad 7/480 \\ 1 \quad 7/480 \\ 1 \quad 7/480 \\ \hline 4 \quad 28/480 \end{array} \right\} = \begin{array}{r} \text{A.M. } 0-1 \quad 7/480 \\ 2 \quad 14/480 \\ 3 \quad 21/480 \\ 4 \quad 28/480 = 4 \quad 7/120 \end{array}$$

So, the second—which in the first instance is really another $4\frac{28}{480}$, and to be added to its predecessor—is analysable thus—

$$\begin{array}{r} \text{A.M. } 5 \quad 35/480 \\ 6 \quad 42/480 \\ 7 \quad 49/480 \\ 8 \quad 56/480 = 8 \quad 14/120 \end{array}$$

The figures appearing for each date in the Calendar indicate the *last year* in the quartette of years for that date.

Of course, the List may be started either from F. 1 Thoth, at the Celestial Autumnal Equinox (where I am starting it now), or from F. 1 Epiphi (our 20th July, on the Conventional Diagram)—F. 1 Epiphi, as marking the Celestial Summer Solstice for the Egyptian priests after the opening of the Christian Era, being where these priests started their own priestly Year.

0-1	Thoth=0-	4	7/120	18	Thoth	...	73	6/120
2	...	8	14/120	19	77	13/120
3	...	12	21/120	20	81	20/120
4	...	16	28/120	21	85	27/120
5	...	20	35/120	22	89	34/120
6	...	24	42/120	23	93	41/120
7	...	28	49/120	24	97	48/120
8	...	32	56/120	25	101	55/120
9	...	36	63/120	26	105	62/120
10	...	40	70/120	27	109	69/120
11	...	44	77/120	28	113	76/120
12	...	48	84/120	29	117	83/120
13	...	52	91/120	30	121	90/120
14	...	56	98/120					
15	...	60	105/120	1	Paōphi	...	125	97/120
16	...	64	112/120	2	129	104/120
17	...	68	119/120	3	133	111/120

4	Paōphi	...	137	118/120	23	Athyr	...	336	101/120
5		...	142	5/120	24		...	340	108/120
6		...	146	12/120	25		...	344	115/120
7		...	150	19/120	26		...	349	2/120
8		...	154	26/120	27		...	353	9/120
9		...	156	33/120	28		...	357	16/120
10		...	162	40/120	29		...	361	23/120
11		...	166	47/120	30		...	365	30/120
12		...	170	54/120					
13		...	174	61/120	1	Khoiak	...	369	37/120
14		...	178	68/120	2		...	373	44/120
15		...	182	75/120	3		...	377	51/120
16		...	186	82/120	4		...	381	58/120
17		...	190	89/120	5		...	385	65/120
18		...	194	96/120	6		...	389	72/120
19		...	198	103/120	7		...	393	79/120
20		...	202	110/120	8		...	397	86/120
21		...	206	117/120	9		...	401	93/120
22		...	211	4/120	10		...	405	100/120
23		...	215	11/120	11		...	409	107/120
24		...	219	18/120	12		...	413	114/120
25		...	223	25/120	13		...	418	1/120
26		...	227	32/120	14		...	422	8/120
27		...	231	39/120	15		...	426	15/120
28		...	235	46/120	16		...	430	22/120
29		...	239	53/120	17		...	434	29/120
30		...	243	60/120	18		...	438	36/120
					19		...	442	43/120
1	Athyr	...	247	67/120	20		...	446	50/120
2		...	251	74/120	21		...	450	57/120
3		...	255	81/120	22		...	454	64/120
4		...	259	88/120	23		...	458	71/120
5		...	263	95/120	24		...	462	78/120
6		...	267	102/110	25		...	466	85/120
7		...	271	109/120	26		...	470	92/120
8		...	275	116/120	27		...	474	99/120
9		...	280	3/120	28		...	478	106/120
10		...	284	10/120	29		...	482	113/120
11		...	288	17/120	30		...	487	
12		...	292	24/120					
13		...	296	31/120	1	Tybi	...	491	7/120
14		...	300	38/120	2		...	495	14/120
15		...	304	45/120	3		...	499	21/120
16		...	308	52/120	4		...	503	28/120
17		...	312	59/120	5		...	507	35/120
18		...	316	66/120	6		...	511	42/120
19		...	320	73/120	7		...	515	49/120
20		...	324	80/120	8		...	519	56/120
21		...	328	87/120	9		...	523	63/120
22		...	332	94/120	10		...	527	70/120

11	Tybi	...	531	77/120	1	Phamenoth	734	67/120
12		...	535	84/120	2	...	738	74/120
13		...	539	91/120	3	...	742	81/120
14		...	543	98/120	4	...	746	88/120
15		...	547	105/120	5	...	750	95/120
16		...	551	112/120	6	...	754	102/120
17		...	555	119/120	7	...	758	109/120
18		...	560	6/120	8	...	762	116/120
19		...	564	13/120	9	...	767	3/120
20		...	568	20/120	10	...	771	10/120
21		...	572	27/120	11	...	775	17/120
22		...	576	34/120	12	...	779	24/120
23		...	580	41/120	13	...	783	31/120
24		...	584	48/120	14	...	787	38/120
25		...	588	55/120	15	...	791	45/120
26		...	592	62/120	16	...	795	52/120
27		...	596	69/120	17	...	799	59/120
28		...	600	76/120	18	...	803	66/120
29		...	604	83/120	19	...	807	73/120
30		...	608	90/120	20	...	811	80/120
					21	...	815	87/120
1	Mekhir	...	612	97/120	22	...	819	94/120
2		...	616	104/120	23	...	823	101/120
3		...	620	111/120	24	...	827	108/120
4		...	624	118/120	25	...	831	115/120
5		...	629	5/120	26	...	836	2/120
6		...	633	12/120	27	...	840	9/120
7		...	637	19/120	28	...	844	16/120
8		...	641	26/120	29	...	848	23/120
9		...	645	33/120	30	...	852	30/120
10		...	649	40/120				
11		...	653	47/120	1	Pharmūthi	856	37/120
12		...	657	54/120	2	...	860	44/120
13		...	661	61/120	3	...	864	51/120
14		...	665	68/120	4	...	868	58/120
15		...	669	75/120	5	...	872	65/120
16		...	673	82/120	6	...	876	72/120
17		...	677	89/120	7	...	880	79/120
18		...	681	96/120	8	...	884	86/120
19		...	685	103/120	9	...	888	93/120
20		...	689	110/120	10	...	892	100/120
21		...	693	117/120	11	...	896	107/120
22		...	698	4/120	12	...	900	114/120
23		...	702	11/120	13	...	905	1/120
24		...	706	18/120	14	...	909	8/120
25		...	710	25/120	15	...	913	15/120
26		...	714	32/120	16	...	917	22/120
27		...	718	39/120	17	...	921	29/120
28		...	722	46/120	18	...	925	36/120
29		...	726	53/120	19	...	929	43/120
30		...	730	60/120	20	...	933	50/120

21	Pharmūthi...	937	57/120	9	Paōni	... 1132	33/120
22	...	941	64/120	10	...	1136	40/120
23	...	945	71/120	11	...	1140	47/120
24	...	949	78/120	12	...	1144	54/120
25	...	953	85/120	13	...	1148	61/120
26	...	957	92/120	14	...	1152	68/120
27	...	961	99/120	15	...	1156	75/120
28	...	965	106/120	16	...	1160	82/120
29	...	969	113/120	17	...	1164	89/120
30	...	974		18	...	1168	96/120
				19	...	1172	103/120
1	Pakhons	978	7/120	20	...	1176	110/120
2	...	982	14/120	21	...	1180	117/120
3	...	986	21/120	22	...	1185	4/120
4	...	990	28/120	23	...	1189	11/120
5	...	994	35/120	24	...	1193	18/120
6	...	998	42/120	25	...	1197	25/120
7	...	1002	49/120	26	...	1201	32/120
8	...	1006	56/120	27	...	1205	39/120
9	...	1010	63/120	28	...	1209	46/120
10	...	1014	70/120	29	...	1213	53/120
11	...	1018	77/120	30	...	1217	60/120
12	...	1022	84/120				
13	...	1026	91/120				
14	...	1030	98/120	1	Epiphi	1221	67/120
15	...	1034	105/120	2	...	1225	74/120
16	...	1038	112/120	3	...	1229	81/120
17	...	1042	119/120	4	...	1233	88/120
18	...	1047	6/120	5	...	1237	95/120
19	...	1051	13/120	6	...	1241	102/120
20	...	1055	20/120	7	...	1245	109/120
21	...	1059	27/120	8	...	1249	116/120
22	...	1063	34/120	9	...	1254	3/120
23	...	1067	41/120	10	...	1258	10/120
24	...	1071	48/120	11	...	1262	17/120
25	...	1075	55/120	12	...	1266	24/120
26	...	1079	62/120	13	...	1270	31/120
27	...	1083	69/120	14	...	1274	38/120
28	...	1087	76/120	15	...	1278	45/120
29	...	1091	83/120	16	...	1282	52/120
30	...	1095	90/120	17	...	1286	59/120
				18	...	1290	66/120
1	Paōni	1099	97/120	19	...	1294	73/120
2	...	1103	104/120	20	...	1298	80/120
3	...	1107	111/120	21	...	1302	87/120
4	...	1111	118/120	22	...	1306	94/120
5	...	1116	5/120	23	...	1310	101/120
6	...	1120	12/120	24	...	1314	108/120
7	...	1124	19/120	25	...	1318	115/120
8	...	1128	26/120	26	...	1323	2/120

27	Epiphi	...	1327	9/120	15	Mesorē	...	1400	15/120
28		...	1331	13/120	16		...	1404	22/120
29		..	1335	23/120	17		...	1408	29/120
30		...	1339	30/120	18		...	1412	36/120
					19		...	1416	43/120
1	Mesorē	...	1343	37/120	20		...	1420	50/120
2		...	1347	44/120	21		...	1424	57/120
3		...	1351	51/120	22		...	1428	64/120
4		...	1355	58/120	23		...	1432	71/120
5		...	1359	65/120	24		...	1436	78/120
6		...	1363	72/120	25		...	1440	85/120
7		...	1367	79/120	26		...	1444	92/120
8		...	1371	86/120	27		...	1448	99/120
9		...	1375	93/120	28		...	1452	106/120
10		...	1379	100/120	29		...	1456	113/120
11		...	1383	107/120	30		...	1461.	
12		...	1387	114/120					
13		...	1392	1/120					
14		...	1396	8/120	360				

These figures are themselves the actual figures for Risings in the first Cycle, or whatever Cycle we choose to regard as the first. Thus they would apply to any Rising in the Era of Mēnēs—in connection with which period, however, the only Rising we know about is the Extraordinary Hēliacal Rising which ushered in that king's accession in Conv. B.C. $2908\frac{120}{480}$ - $2907\frac{113}{480}$. Thus, that particular Rising took place in A. M. $1095\frac{90}{120} = 1095\frac{360}{480} = 1095\frac{3}{4}$, and therefore, we see, it occurred on the 30th day of Pakhons.

For Risings in the 2nd Cycle, or whatever Cycle we choose to regard as such, we first take the figures in the foregoing List which answer to the reported date of the Rising. Thus, dealing with the Rising which is reported to have occurred in the 7th regnal year of Senwosri III of the 12th Dynasty, and the 120th year of the Dynasty, let us still assume that it happened on 17th Athyr. By the foregoing List that means A.M. $312\frac{50}{120}$. To this we must add 1461 years, as we are now in our 2nd Cycle. That gives us A.M. $1773\frac{50}{120}$ as the last year of a quartette

of Risings which took place on 17th Athyr. Hence we get—

A.M.	
{	1770 215/480
	1771 222/480
	1772 229/480
	1773 236/480

Elsewhere I show that, out of these 4 years, the particular year that we happened to want, is A.M. 1771 $\frac{222}{480}$. These figures, however, need revision. I shall recur to the matter shortly.

For the 3rd Cycle, if we choose to regard it as such, we again begin with the figures in the above List. But this time we add 2,922 years, *i.e.*, twice 1,461 years. Thus, dealing with the Rising which is reported to have occurred in the 11th regnal year of Thakalath II of the 22nd Dynasty, *i.e.*, in A.M. 3174 $\frac{240}{480}$ = Conv. B.C. 829 $\frac{240}{480}$, let us assume that its True Time date was 3 Athyr. On the above List that gives us A.M. 255 $\frac{31}{480}$. Add 2,922 to this, and we get A.M. 3177 $\frac{324}{480}$, as the last of the quartette, which must have been—

A.M.		Conv. B.C.	
...	3174 303/480		829 177/480
...	3175 310/480	=	...
...	3176 317/480		828 170/480
...	3177 324/480		827 163/480
			826 156/480

With these Lists students may now make their own calculations from the data supplied by the monuments, etc.

This brings us to a consideration of those very special phenomenal occurrences which we may call the EXTRA-ORDINARY HĒLIACAL RISINGS of SIRIUS. The stretch of 1,461 years lying between any two of these events—one of which occurred but once in each 1461 Years' Cycle—is what Egyptologists commonly call the Sōthic Cycle. I submit that it could only have come into existence physically with the opening of the Christian Era: and I suggest that thereupon the month with which the

Year opened there calendrically was no more called Thoth, but Epiphi, because of the "Manifestation."

Owing to the fact that the Annual Hēliacal Risings took place, not at 30 Taurus, as I formerly wrongly thought, but at the middle of *Nakshatra Pūnarvasū*, and therefore at 30 Constellation Gemini, or thereabouts—a piece of information for which I am indebted to Mr. N. K. Majumdar, M.A., Lecturer in Astronomy at Calcutta University—the following amended List of such Extraordinary Risings will now have to be substituted for the List set forth on pp. 5 and 6 of *Ancient Romic Chronology*.

A.M.				Conventional B.C.		
...	1092	339/480	=	...	2911	141/480
...	1093	316/480		...	2910	134/480
...	1094	353/480		...	2909	127/480
...	1095	360/480		...	2908	120/480
...	2553	339/480		...	1450	141/480
...	2554	346/480		...	1449	134/480
...	2555	353/480		...	1448	127/480
...	2556	360/480		...	1447	120/480

(N.B.— $91\frac{15}{180}$ Spheroidal sub-divisions—the difference between 1 Thoth at the Autumnal Equinox and the later priestly date 1 Epiphi at the Summer Solstice—taken as years, and subtracted from the last quartette, would give us the following quartette, which may be compared with the conventional figures represented by Poole's B.C. 1322—

A.M.	2645	9/480		B.C.	1358	471/480
	2646	16/480			1357	444/480
	2647	25/480	=		1356	457/480
	2648	34/480			1355	456/480).

A.M.		A.D.	
4014	339/480 =	15 346/480 (fr. 23 Sept.)—	16 353/480 (to 22
4015	346/480	16 353/480	17 360/480 Sept.)
4016	353/480	17 360/480	18 367/480
4017	360/480	18 367/480	19 374/480
5475	339/480 =	1476 346/480	— 1477 353/480
5476	346/480	1477 353/480	1478 360/480
5477	353/480	1478 360/480	1479 367/480
5478	360/480	1479 367/480	1480 374/480

6936 339/480 = 2937 346/480	— 2938 353/480
6937 346/480	2939 360/480
6938 353/480	2940 367/480
6939 360/480	2941 374/480

(And so on, at intervals of 1,461 years).

The old List, which I am now discarding, had the *appearance* of being more correct, because it happened to harmonise very nearly with the familiar figures of our modern conventional reckoning. For example, see *Conv. B.C.* 1322 $\frac{212}{480}$ (p. 6 of my pamphlet) and Poole's *B.C.* 1322. This new List seemingly does *not* so harmonise. Nevertheless, we must now stand by it, on principle.

A few words in elucidation of the Extraordinary Hēliacal Risings may here be acceptable. During say the Rā II *régine*, when the year of 365 days was in vogue, as that artificial Calendar-year was shorter by $\frac{1}{4}$ of a day than Natural Time, as recorded permanently on the outer Spheroid, or Fixed Clock, nominally of 360 but really of $365\frac{1}{4}$ degrees, or Spheroidal sub-divisions, Progressive 1 Thoth (the Indicator of the small inner revolving Epicycle, or Calendrical Clock), as it travelled round the Fixed Clock in its journey through the 1460 (1461)-Years' Cycle, got back $\frac{1}{4}$ of a day too soon to its annual starting-point (wherever we elect to place this latter), *i.e.*, it lost $\frac{1}{4}$ of a day every year, or a whole natural year of $365\frac{1}{4}$ days, every Cycle of 1,461 years.

Indeed, it was owing to this fact that the so-called annual "Manifestation" or Rising of Sōthis (Sirius) occurred 4 times successively for each Calendar-date (representing $4\frac{1}{18}$, or more precisely $4\frac{28}{480}$, ordinary days) on the Fixed Clock. Thus, not till Progressive 1 Thoth had made the complete tour of the Spheroid 4 times, did it come round again to its original starting-point, in unison with Nature, as revealed in the movements and positions of the Celestial kosmos. That is to say, once,

and only once, during every Cycle of 1,461 years ($365\frac{1}{4} \times 4$), did Progressive 1 Thoth, the Indicator, reach and equate with the Spheroidal point 30 Constellation Gemini $= 1095\frac{3}{4} = F. 30$ Pakhons, at the moment of the actual Hēliacal Rising there. This place of "manifestation" it may be remembered, I used to think was at 30 Taurus, and therefore I used to call it F. 1 Epiphi on the old discarded Clock. For the purposes of exposition the "Manifestation" may be said to have always occurred on the same date (30 Pakhons) by the Fixed Clock, or Clock of Natural Time: though, as a matter of fact, it ceaselessly side-stepped by virtue of the Precession movement. But the Romiū did not go by that Clock. Their Calendar was the small inner revolving Epicyclical Clock. This gradually diverged from the Fixed Clock, with which it once more found itself in unison only at the end of a 1461-Years' Cycle, though it had lost a Year in the process. For example: in A.M. O-1 the Year started with F. 1 Thoth and P. 1 Thoth falling together. That year the Rising occurred 9 months afterwards, at 30 Constellation Gemini $= 1095\frac{3}{4}$ on the Spheroid $= 30$ Pakhons on the Fixed Clock. But, after the lapse of another year, the 365-days Revolving Calendrical Year had come to an end $\frac{1}{4}$ of a day earlier than the Fixed Calendar. Hence, for 4 years in succession (*i.e.*, during a space of $4\frac{28}{80}$ Spheroidal sub-divisions), the Rising occurred on the same date (30 Pakhons), judged by both Clocks. But in the 5th year, when the actual Rising took place, the Revolving Clock, having by then lost a whole day, showed no longer 30 Pakhons, but 1 Pañni $= 1$ Constellation Cancer $=$ Spheroidal point $1096\frac{367}{480}$; though, of course, by the Fixed Clock, the real date was still 30 Pakhons $= 30$ Constellation Gemini $= 1095\frac{369}{480}$. This also happened 4 times; and the 9th year, when the Rising occurred, the

Revolving Clock, having lost yet another day, *i.e.*, in all 2 days, showed the date as 2 Paōni=2 Constellation Cancer=Spheroidal point $1097\frac{374}{480}$. In this manner it advanced gradually all round the Spheroid, *i.e.*, Progressive 1 Thoth (the ever-shifting Indicator) pointed for 4 years running to 1 Thoth on the Fixed Clock; and so on, right round the circle.

When, in course of this career, P. 1 Thoth arrived at 30 Gemini= $1095\frac{360}{480}$ =30 Pakhons on the Fixed Clock, there took place, within the quartette of Risings then due, what I am calling an Extraordinary Hēliacal Rising or "Manifestation" of Sirius (Sōthis), *i.e.*, an event that only occurred once in every Cycle of 1,461 years. It was the stretch of time that lay between any two of these which, after the opening of the Christian Era, really constituted the so-called "Sōthic Cycle."

Hence, one of these rare events, if carried back, may be said to have distinguished A.M. $1095\frac{3}{4}$ =Conv. B. C. $2908\frac{120}{480}$ =the zero-point of the epochal year when Mēnēs ascended the throne at Memphis. We have seen that this year was also remarkable in that a *Иунти Иеб*, in celebration of a completed Spheroidal period of $121\frac{3}{4}$ years, fell in it. Thus the first Extraordinary Hēliacal Rising in the Mēnēs Era itself must really have been the one that occurred in A.M. $2556\frac{360}{480}$ =Conv. B.C. $1447\frac{120}{480}$, or at least in some one of the years of the quartette of Risings that ended with that year; and the first *Сед Иеб* of the Mēnēs Era must have fallen in A.M. $1126\frac{90}{480}$ =Conv. B.C. $2883\frac{390}{480}$.

Now let us see how these modifications work in their application to actual Romic history, *i.e.*, speaking more specifically, to the data we get from the monuments, etc., in the shape say of priestly reports of Feasts held in celebration of Sōthic Risings, whether ordinary, *i.e.*, annual, or extraordinary, *i.e.*, cyclical.

One test will suffice: so let us see whether the Rising reported as having occurred in the 7th regnal year of Senwosri III of the 12th Dynasty works out all right, i.e., whether the year A.M. $1771\frac{222}{480}$ falls in at its proper place in association with 17th Athyr—the date which we have hitherto been assuming to be True or Spheroidal Time for this Rising.

After Extraordinary Heliacal Rising on 30 Pakhons in A.M. $1095\frac{366}{480}$, or Conv. B.C. $2908\frac{120}{480}$, Ordinary Annual Risings ought to have occurred regularly. Well they do, thus—

	A.M.
	1095 $\frac{366}{480}$
1—30 Paōni at 1.28/480 per day	... 121 $\frac{366}{480}$
	1217 $\frac{240}{480}$
1—30 Epiphi	... 121 $\frac{366}{480}$
	1339 $\frac{120}{480}$
1—30 Mesorē	... 121 $\frac{366}{480}$
	1461 $\frac{120}{480}$
1—30 Thoth	... 121 $\frac{366}{480}$
	1582 $\frac{366}{480}$
1—30 Paōphi	... 121 $\frac{366}{480}$
	1704 $\frac{240}{480}$
1—17 Athyr	... 68 $\frac{476}{480}$
	1773 $\frac{236}{480}$

This A. M. $1773\frac{236}{480}$ is therefore the last year of a quartette of years, which must have been—

$$\begin{cases} 1770 \frac{215}{480} \\ 1771 \frac{232}{480} \\ 1772 \frac{249}{480} \\ 1773 \frac{266}{480} \end{cases}$$

And the year we were in search of, namely, A.M. $1771\frac{222}{480}$, or Conv. B.C. $2232\frac{258}{480}$, is of course the second year in the quartette.

It is gratifying to find that, in spite of the re-construction of the Clock now being made, our results, as set forth in some detail in *Ancient Romic Chronology*, remain for the most part unaffected.

Nevertheless, I find on reconsideration that the equivalent in Spheroidal or True Time for "the 15th day of the 8th month" (the date mentioned by the priest when announcing the celebration of the Feast for the Heliacal Rising of Sirius in the 7th regnal year of Senwosri III of the 12th Dynasty), *i.e.*, 15th Pharmūthi, is not 17 ATHYR, but 16 ATHYR. Hence—

$$16 \text{ ATHYR} = \text{Spheroidal Division} \quad 308\frac{208}{480}$$

$$\text{Add for 2nd Cycle.....} \quad 1461$$

A.M. $1769\frac{208}{480} = 7\text{th regnal year of Senwosri III} = \text{the last year of the quartette of years—}$

B.C.	2237	293/480		A.M.	1766	187/480
	2236	286/480	=		1767	194/480
	2235	279/480			1768	201/480
	2234	272/480			1769	208/480

I therefore re-construct the 12th Dynasty thus—

$$\text{Amenemhat I} \quad 18 \text{ years} \quad \dots \quad \text{A.M. } 1648\frac{336}{480} - 1665\frac{444}{480}.$$

$$\text{Senwosri I} \quad 45 \quad ,, \quad \dots \quad ,, \quad 1665\frac{454}{480} - 1710\frac{480}{480}.$$

(His 3rd year would have been A.M. $1667\frac{480}{480}$; and the beginning of the *Sed Heb* period marking the completion of the Temple-foundations he had laid would have been the one immediately following the *Sed Heb* for A.M. $1674\frac{1}{16}$.)

$$\text{Amenemhat II} \quad 35 \text{ years} \quad \dots \quad \text{A.M. } 1710\frac{288}{480} - 1745\frac{40}{480}.$$

$$\text{Senwosri II} \quad 19 \quad ,, \quad \dots \quad ,, \quad 1745\frac{40}{480} - 1764\frac{288}{480}.$$

$$\text{Senwosri III} \quad 38 \quad ,, \quad \dots \quad ,, \quad 1763\frac{96}{480} - 1800\frac{288}{480}.$$

(His 7th regnal year, in which the Heliacal Rising of Sirius occurred, was A.M. $1769\frac{208}{480} = \text{B.C. } 2234\frac{272}{480}$. It would also have been the 120th of the Dynasty, thus—

$$\begin{array}{rcl} 1648 & \frac{336}{480} & + \quad 119 \text{ years of } 1\frac{7}{480} \text{ each} = \\ 120 & \frac{353}{480} & \\ \text{A.M. } 1769 & \frac{208}{480} & = \text{ the 120th year).} \end{array}$$

Amenemhat III	48 years ...	A.M. 1800 $\frac{285}{180}$ —1848 $\frac{184}{184}$.
Amenemhat IV	9 „ ... „	1848 $\frac{184}{180}$ —1856 $\frac{180}{180}$.
Sebeknefrurē	4 „ ... „	1856 $\frac{180}{180}$ —1859 $\frac{184}{184}$.

Period: A.M. 1648 $\frac{115}{180}$ —1859 $\frac{184}{184}$ = B.C. 2356 $\frac{145}{180}$ —2144 $\frac{262}{180}$.

We may therefore comfortably assume that these results—approximate only and provisional though they are for the present—constitute a fairly solid and reliable foundation on which to erect the structure of further calculations, and that in ancient Romic history, as thus culled from the monuments and put upon our Cycle, we possess a main-line from which, by the aid of whatever synchronisms exist between that history and the discovered vestiges of outside ancient Civilisations—such as Rome, Greece, Krete, Mykenae, and the even older Mediterranean World, and also Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānia, Babylonia, Assyria, Media, Israel, Central Asia, India and old Kathay—branch-lines of enquiry may now be projected, and further investigational efforts of a very far-reaching and promising nature be hopefully and confidently attempted.

Our Field of Research, however, is a vast and complex one—for nothing less than all Antiquity lies invitingly before us.

Kant's Central Concept

BY

RAMDAS KHAN, M.A., PH.D.

Every thoughtful reader of the "Critique of Pure Reason" knows that one of the most perplexing points in the mastery of the Kantian philosophy is Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself." This difficulty is doubtless partly due to the fact that the book primarily deals with the problem of knowledge, and not with the problem of being, and whatever Kant says of the latter is somewhat indirect in nature, and evidently is to him secondary in importance. But the Science of Knowledge is so vitally connected with the science of being that a thorough treatment of one to a certain extent necessitates that of the other. For this reason his doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" occupies an important place in the "Critique of Pure Reason," though the problem which the "critique" proposes to solve is that of the possibility of knowledge, *i.e.*, "How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?"

Another difficulty in understanding this doctrine of Kant is that in the different parts of the book he uses different designations for this "thing-in-itself," without defining their relations to one another. In the Aesthetic he usually has the phrase, "thing-in-itself," or "things-in-themselves," but elsewhere he employs in addition "Noumenon," "Transcendental object," "Objects by themselves," etc.

Such being the case, the question presents itself to the reader : what is exactly Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" in the "Critique of Pure Reason"? This comprehensive question at once suggests to us such inquiries as these : What is the "thing-in-itself"—is it a sense-object or simply a thought-object? Can we know anything of it? Is it correct to say that Kant asserts that *what* a "thing-in-itself" is cannot be known *by us*, but only *that* it exists can be known by us? Is the phrase "thing-in-itself" synonymous with the phrase "transcendental object"? Is Kant's Noumenon identical with his "thing-in-itself." What is the relation of the concept "thing-in-itself" to the Ideas of the Reason? What is Kant's doctrine of Substance? What is the difference between Substance and the "thing-in-itself"? What does Kant mean by the phrase "Substratum of phenomena"? Is this identical with the "thing-in-itself"? Kant most emphatically disclaims the charge brought against him that his system is idealism; he denies that he is an idealist in the ordinary sense of that term. What, then, is the difference between Berkeley's idealism, which he calls "*Dogmatic*," and Kant's own idealism, which he calls "*Transcendental*" or "*Critical*"?

These are some of the questions which suggest themselves to every attentive reader of the "Critique of Pure Reason," and yet they are questions by no means easy to answer. Therefore it must be said at the outset that what we propose to do is neither to *defend* nor to *advocate* Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" as consistent throughout his system, but to *interpret* it from a purely historic point of view in the light of the philosophic thought of his day. For this end, in the first place, we shall endeavour to determine what is his doctrine of the "thing-in-itself," as it is presented in the "Critique of Pure Reason." And in the second place we propose to

seek an historical explanation of this doctrine by tracing its development in his own mind.

PART I

I. In undertaking this historical study, the first point of our inquiry is : What is Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" in the Transcendental Aesthetic ?

(1) The only possible answer to this inquiry seems to be as follows : Whatever we may say in regard to the other parts of the book, a careful study of this division of the "Critique" clearly reveals the fact that Kant proceeds upon the assumption that the "thing-in-itself" exists, and that it produces in us sensations by affecting our senses. This is clearly implied in his definition of sensation as "the effect produced by an object upon the faculty of representation so far as we are affected by it" (17)¹ and in his definition of the Sensibility as "this faculty of receiving representations, according to the manner in which we are affected by objects" (17). For a non-existent can neither affect the Sensibility nor produce any effect upon the faculty. Kant argues, however, that we cannot know the nature of that extramental reality ; this is his *Absolute Scepticism*. Things are known to us merely as phenomena ; this is his *Phenomenism*. And this Phenomenism of Kant rests upon his *Subjectivism*, that all forms of intuition are merely subjective and have no extramental validity. Kant is compelled to uphold this Subjectivism, for this is the only way, he thinks, by which the problem of knowledge—"How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible"—can be solved. (Proleg. 14.)

The following are some of his statements in regard to the unknowableness of the "thing-in-itself." "Even

¹ The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Muller.

if we could see to the very bottom of a phenomenon, it would remain for ever altogether different from the knowledge of the thing by itself" (39). "Even if we could impart the highest degree of clearness to our intuition, we should not come one step nearer to the nature of objects by themselves" (38). "What the objects are by themselves would never become known to us, even through the clearest knowledge of that which alone is given to us, the phenomenon" (38). "It remains completely unknown to us what objects may be by themselves and apart from the receptivity of our senses" (37). "Such qualities which belong to things by themselves can never be given to us through the senses" (31) (Comp. Proleg. 14).

But phenomena imply a something which is not phenomenal; for there can be no appearance without something that appears. And Kant seems to regard the "thing-in-itself" as the correlative of phenomenon when he says: "The transcendental conception of all phenomena in space, is a critical warning that nothing which is seen in space is a thing by itself, nor space a form of things supposed to belong to them by themselves, but that objects by themselves are not known to us at all, and that what we call external objects are nothing but representations of our senses, the form of which is space, and *the true correlative of which, that is the thing by itself, is not known*,¹ nor can be known by these representations, nor do we care to know anything about it in our daily experience" (26).

Kant goes further and conceives the "thing-in-itself" as the ground of phenomena when he says: "Hence, so far as their form is concerned, much may be predicated of them *a priori*, but nothing whatever of the things by themselves on which these phenomena may be grounded" (43).

¹ The Italics are mine.

To sum up, Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" in the Transcendental Aesthetic is this :—Our knowledge is merely phenomenal, as the forms of intuition—space and time—have merely subjective and no extra-mental significance ; but the phenomenal implies that which is not phenomenal, the "thing-in-itself,"—which is its true correlative and on which phenomena may be grounded ; in other words, sensation presupposes a somewhat which affects our senses and produces sensations in us, though we cannot know anything whatever of that non-phenomenal, the "thing-in-itself."

(2) The doubt sometimes entertained in regard to the central doctrine of the Aesthetic does not, in the least, modify Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself." It is said that the cardinal point which Kant aims to establish in the Aesthetic, is not absolutely clear. (*a*) It may be regarded as the doctrine that space and time are *a priori* intuitions ; or (*b*) it may be taken as the doctrine that space and time are merely subjective forms of knowing and not laws of things ; or (*c*) it may be regarded as the doctrine that all our knowledge is phenomenal and not noumenal. But whichever of these three we may accept as the central doctrine of the Aesthetic, Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" does not require any change (B. Erdmann, Kant's *Kriticismus*, p. 20).

(3) This is the substance of Kant's conception of the "thing-in-itself" in the Aesthetic. In regard to the disputed question of a discrepancy in the two editions of the "Critique of Pure Reason," we may say that—so far as this part is concerned—whichever view one may take, Kant's position in respect to the "thing-in-itself" remains unchanged.

Perhaps this is the most fitting place to say a few words in regard to the two editions of the "Critique of Pure Reason." Schopenhauer brought the charge that

Kant in the second edition abandoned his perfectly consistent idealistic position, and made his immortal "Critique" a "self-contradictory book, the sense of which could not, therefore, be thoroughly clear and comprehensible to anyone." (The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II, p. 29.) K. Fischer concurs with Schopenhauer in this charge against Kant.¹ On the contrary, Ueberweg, who made a thorough examination of the subject, believes that Kant, as he himself states in the Preface to the second edition (Vol. I, p. 385), retained essentially the same opinions, although he changed his language. The question for us is whether the charge of Schopenhauer is just?

There can be no doubt that Kant was greatly surprised when his Critical Idealism was misunderstood and identified with the dogmatic Idealism of Berkeley, and that in the second edition he made a great effort to correct this misapprehension of his critics by suppressing some of the statements that led his readers to that misinterpretation, and by changing the form in which the deduction of the categories had been expounded. But even in the third, and all the later editions, there are passages that are just as strongly idealistic as those which were removed from the first edition. For example, the well-known passage on page 250 runs as follows:—"It must always remain unknown, whether it (the transcendental object) is to be found within us only, but (oder) also without us; and whether, if sensibility were removed, it would vanish or remain" (250). Without entering into a thorough discussion of this interesting inquiry, a careful comparative study of the two editions compels me to believe that the charge of Schopenhauer is unwarranted; all that we can say of Kant's alterations in the second

¹ A Critique of Kant, Eng. trans., London 1888, pp. 95 f., Ch. IV.

edition is that he has brought into prominence the realistic aspects of his thought in order to correct any misapprehension of the first edition.

II. Passing on to the Transcendental Analytic, our attention is at once called to the fact that Kant applies another name to what was designated in the Aesthetic as the "thing-in-itself." Kant uses the word "Noumenon" in this part of the "Critique" more often than any other term, to represent that unknowable somewhat which he regards as the true correlative of what is known.

(1) The question now arises, whether the word "Noumenon" is exactly synonymous with the phrase "thing-in-itself," and if not, what is the difference between the two?

Let us listen to what Kant himself says in reference to this point:—"Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects under the unity of the categories, are called *phenomena*. But if I admit things which are objects of the understanding only, and nevertheless can be given as objects of an intuition, though not of sensuous intuition (as *coram intuitu intellectuali*), such things would be called *Noumena* (intelligibilia)" (217).

(a) It is evident from this passage that Kant uses the word "Noumenon" in contrast with the word "phenomenon," denoting by it the thought-object which is to be intuitively known by the understanding.

(b) It is important for our inquiry to note that Kant uses the term "Noumenon" in two different senses. In the first edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason" it is sometimes used in a positive sense (220) and sometimes in a negative sense (311). In the second edition, Kant explicitly recognises the distinction between the Noumenon in a positive sense, and the Noumenon in a negative sense: "If by noumenon we mean a thing so far as it is *not an object of our sensuous intuition*, and make

abstraction of our mode of intuition, it may be called a noumenon in a negative sense. If, however, we mean by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we admit thereby a peculiar mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual, which, however, is not our own, nor one of which we can understand even the possibility. 'This would be the noumenon in a positive sense' (Vol. I, 488 : Comp. Vol. II, 249). In whichever sense the term "Noumenon" may be used, there is this common characteristic,—that it can never be the object of our knowledge. The noumenon in a positive sense certainly can never be the object of our intuition, for our intuition is merely sensuous, and not intellectual. Nor can the noumenon in a negative sense be the object of our knowledge, for our categories do not apply to it. In a word, the term "noumenon," when used without any limitation, is more comprehensive than the phrase "thing-in-itself"; for it can be used for the noumenon in a positive sense, as well as for the noumenon in a negative sense. The noumenon in a negative sense corresponds to the "thing-in-itself" of the Aesthetic, and is the true correlative of phenomena like the "thing-in-itself" in the same.

This noumenon in a negative sense also corresponds to the phrase "transcendental object." For both the noumenon in a negative sense and the transcendental object are used to denote the ground or foundation of phenomena (311, 313). And when the term "noumenon" is used without any modification in the "Critique of Pure Reason," it is generally to be understood in its negative sense. It is to be noted here that Kant conceives the term "noumenon" in a positive sense in the "Critique of Practical Reason," and never in a negative sense as in the "Critique of Pure Reason."

(2) The next question is: what is the difference in signification between the phrase "thing-in-itself" and

the phrase "transcendental object," which also is very frequently found in this part of the book? The answer is: Kant uses the phrase "transcendental object" in the same signification as the phrase "thing-in-itself," and as the noumenon in a negative sense. The following passages prove this statement. "The understanding therefore limits the sensibility without enlarging thereby its own field, and by warning the latter that it can never apply to things by themselves, but to phenomena only, it forms the thought of an *object by itself*, but as *transcendental* only, which is the cause of phenomena, and therefore never itself a phenomenon" (250). "These phenomena..... are not *things in themselves*, but representations only which have their object, but an object that can no longer be seen by us, and may, therefore, be called the not-empirical, that is, the *transcendental object*, = \times " (96).

This interpretation of the phrase "transcendental object" is confirmed by the fact that Kant speaks of both the "transcendental object" and the "thing-in-itself," as the ground and cause of phenomena throughout the "Critique of Pure Reason" (pp. 43, 241, 323, 329, 340, 429, 465, 527). Again, Kant speaks of the "transcendental object" just as he does of the "thing-in-itself," as something of which we have no knowledge, although it may be the ground of phenomena. "The transcendental object is unknown equally in regard to internal and external intuition" (318, 323, 329, 429, 527).

There is one passage in the "Critique of Pure Reason" where Kant seems to distinguish the "transcendental object" from the "thing-in-itself." It is as follows:—"The object to which I refer any phenomenon is a transcendental object, that is, the entirely indefinite thought of something in general. *This cannot be called the noumenon*¹..... (220).

¹ The Italics are mine.

R. Lehmann, in his essay on "Kant's Lehre von Ding an Sich" (pp. 44-49) maintains that Kant does not always carefully observe this distinction between the "thing-in-itself" and the "transcendental object," but that it is an important distinction in order to make his doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" consistent. Lehmann brings the charge against E. V. Hartmann and other critics of Kant, of overlooking this distinction in Kant.

It is not necessary in this connection to present a formal refutation of Lehmann's interpretation, as what we have stated above to prove that Kant identifies the "thing-in-itself" with the "transcendental object," is sufficient to show that the interpretation of Lehmann is unwarranted, and that the interpretation presented by us is correct: and it has the almost universal support of the critics and expounders of Kant.

To sum up: Kant uses the designations "thing-in-itself," "Noumenon" in a negative sense, and "transcendental object" interchangeably, and denotes by them the true correlate of phenomena. It is also to be noted here that Kant often uses the phrase "things-in-general"—"Dinge überhaupt"—in the same sense as the phrase "things-in-themselves" (30, 31) (B. Erdmann, Kant's *Kriticismus*, pp. 43-44).

(3) In the chapter entitled "On the Ground of Distinction of all Subjects (Gegenstände überhaupt) into Phenomena and Noumena," Kant raises the following important as well as interesting inquiry in regard to the "thing-in-itself": "What then is the cause why people, not satisfied with the substratum of sensibility, have added to the phenomena the noumena, which the understanding only is supposed to be able to realize"? (219)

Kant's answer to this inquiry is clear and explicit: "Sensibility and its sphere, that is, the sphere of

phenomena, is so limited by the understanding itself that it should not refer to things by themselves, but only to the mode in which things appear to us, in accordance with our own subjective qualification. This was the result of the whole Transcendental Aesthetic, and it really follows quite naturally from the concept of a phenomenon in general, that something must correspond to it, which in itself is not a phenomenon, because a phenomenon cannot be anything by itself, apart from our mode of representation. Unless, therefore, we are to move in a constant circle, we must admit that the very word phenomenon indicates a relation to something, the immediate representation of which is no doubt sensuous, but which nevertheless, even without this qualification of our sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is founded) must be something by itself, that is, an object independent of our sensibility.

"Hence arises the concept of a noumenon, which, however, is not positive, nor a definite knowledge of anything, but which implies only the *thinking of something*, without taking any account of the form of sensuous intuition" (219).

From this account of the genesis of the concept "Noumenon" we are justified in inferring that Kant's "Noumenon" is not an object of the sensuous intuition, or a definite knowledge of anything; but an entirely indefinite thought of something in general. In short, it is a mere *thought-object*.

(4) In view of this, the question is at once suggested: What are we to understand when we are told that the concept "Noumenon" thus originated is a thought-object?

(a) *The concept "Noumenon" is a problematic concept.* "I call a concept *problematic*, if it is not self-contradictory, and if, as limiting other concepts, it is connected with

other kinds of knowledge, while its objective reality cannot be known in any way. Now the concept of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which can never be thought as an object of the senses, but only as a thing by itself (by the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, because we cannot maintain that sensibility is the only form of intuition." (221) In another place Kant expresses the same thought: "..... the concept of a noumenon is *problematical*, that is, the representation of a thing of which we can neither say that it is possible or that it is impossible, because we have no conception of any kind of intuition but that of our senses, or of any kind of concepts but that of our categories, neither of them being applicable to any extra-sensuous object. We cannot, therefore, extend the field of the objects of our thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, or admit, besides phenomena, objects of pure thought, that is, noumena, simply because they do not possess any positive meaning that could be pointed out" (249) (Comp., pp. 250, 302).

It is evident from these passages, that when Kant calls the concept "Noumenon" a problematic concept, he understands by it a concept whose corresponding extra-mental existence we can neither affirm nor deny, for we have no non-sensuous intuition. All that a problematic concept signifies is, that it is not self-contradictory; but the mere fact that it is not self-contradictory does not in the least prove to us that it has an extra-mental existence.

(b) The concept Noumenon is a *necessary* and not a *fortuitous* concept. For the word phenomenon necessarily implies that which is not phenomenal but noumenal. "This transcendental object cannot be separated from the sensuous data, because in that case nothing would remain by which it could be thought." (218) "With

all this the concept of a noumenon, if taken as problematical only, remains not only admissible, but, as a concept to limit the sphere of sensibility, indispensable" (223) (Comp. Proleg. 24).

(c) The concept Noumenon is a *limitative concept*. It has a necessary use in preventing sensuous intuition from extending its field beyond the sphere of the sensibility. This negative service of the concept Noumenon, Kant calls the limitative use of the concept. "The concept of a noumenon is.....merely *limitative*, and intended to keep the claims of sensibility within proper bounds, therefore of negative use only." (222)

To sum up : When the concept Noumenon is said to be a thought-object, it signifies that the concept is not only not self-contradictory, but it is a necessity of thought, something necessarily thought as the true correlative of phenomena, and has an indispensable use in limiting the sphere of the sensibility. In a word, the concept Noumenon is a *pro'lematic, necessary, limitative concept of the Understanding*.

(5) Now this conception of the "thing-in-itself" is strongly idealistic and opposed to the realistic postulate of the Aesthetic. The question is :—How does Kant reconcile these seemingly antagonistic points of view ? Without raising any question here in regard to the success of Kant in this reconciliation, his attempt may be stated somewhat as follows :—In the Aesthetic Kant proceeds upon the assumption that the "thing-in-itself" exists extra-mentally and produces sensation in us by affecting our senses, though we cannot know what its real essence is, as our knowledge is merely phenomenal. This is a necessary postulate of thought. For the phenomenal is unthinkable without a non-phenomenal cause of sensations in us. This conception of the "thing-in-itself," however, does not determine anything in regard to the

nature of this postulate of the "thing-in-itself." It may be a sense-object or it may be a thought-object. In the Analytic Kant proceeds to determine more precisely the nature of this postulate of the transcendental object.

According to the Analytic, the "thing-in-itself" is only a thought-object, which is problematical; *i.e.*, it is a concept whose corresponding extra-mental existence cannot be *known*, but is simply *thought*. This concept, however, is a necessary concept; for, as soon as we affirm the phenomenal nature of our knowledge, we imply that which is not phenomenal in that very affirmation. For we cannot *know* an appearance without *thinking* something which appears. But the extra-mental existence cannot be *known* in the Kantian sense from this necessity of thought, for the necessity of thought does not determine a necessity of extra-mental reality. It is simply an *x* to us.

In short, the concept Noumenon is the necessary correlate of the concept Phenomenon, but it is not knowable in the Kantian sense of that word. It is simply the object of thought, a necessary presupposition of our Understanding.

III. The next point of our inquiry is: What is the relation of this problematic concept of the "thing-in-itself" to the Ideas of the Reason? This inquiry brings us at once to the Transcendental Dialectic.

In order to answer the question proposed, we must inform ourselves on the following points:—

(1) What is Kant's conception of the Reason as distinguished from the Understanding?

(2) What are its Ideas?

(3) What is their relation to the Categories of the Understanding?

To the first question we find no definite answer. However strange the procedure may seem for the author

of the "Critique of Pure Reason," Kant nowhere gives a *formal definition* of the *Reason*, although he makes various attempts. For example: "Reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of knowledge *a priori*. Pure Reason, therefore, is that faculty which supplies the principles of knowing anything entirely *a priori*" (9). On pp. 262-63, he makes the function of the Reason to be that of drawing a conclusion by the use of a mediating conception. From the proposition, "All men are mortal," the inference, "Some mortals are men," is drawn by the mere Understanding; but the conclusion, "All the learned are mortal," is not contained in this fundamental judgment, but is drawn by means of an intervening judgment, and this, according to Kant, is the work of the Reason. That is, "Reason, if considered as a faculty of a certain logical form of knowledge, is the faculty of concluding, that is, of judging mediately, by bringing the condition of a possible under the condition of a given judgment" (286). Again, the Reason is defined as "the constant condition of all free actions by which man takes his place in the phenomenal world" (477). Again, it is said to be "the very essence of reason that we are able to give an account of all our concepts, opinions and assertions, either on objective or, if they are a mere illusion, on subjective grounds" (527). On p. 552 Kant conceives the Reason as the faculty that brings unity into the concepts of the Understanding by means of Ideas: "..... as the understanding brings unity into the manifold of the objects by means of concepts, reason brings unity into the manifold of concepts by means of Ideas....."

Though Kant's Conception of the Reason is thus indefinite and vacillating, it is certain that he means by it the faculty that unifies the concepts of the Understanding: "if the understanding is a faculty for

producing unity among phenomena, according to rules, reason is the faculty for producing unity among the rules of the Understanding, according to principles. Reason, therefore, never looks directly to experience, or to any object, but to the Understanding, in order to impart *a priori* through concepts to its manifold kinds of knowledge a unity that may be called the unity of reason, and is very different from the unity which can be produced by the understanding. This is a general definition of the faculty of reason....." (261-62).

(2) What, then, are the Ideas of the Reason? The answer to this question is given by Kant as follows:—"By Idea I understand the necessary concept of reason, to which the senses can supply no corresponding object. The concepts of reason, therefore, are transcendental ideas. They are concepts of pure reason, so far as it regards all empirical knowledge as determined by an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fancies, but supplied to us by the very nature of reason, and referring by necessity to the whole use of the understanding. They are, lastly, transcendent, as overstepping the limits of all experience which can never supply an object adequate to the transcendental idea" (284). "Ideas are still further removed from objective reality than the *categories* because they can meet with no phenomenon in which they could be represented in concreto. They contain a certain completeness unattainable by any possible empirical knowledge, and reason aims in them at a systematical unity only, to which the empirically possible unity is approximate, without ever fully reaching it" (489).

(3) Since such is Kant's conception of the Ideas of Reason, the answer to the third question—what is their relation to the Categories of the Understanding?—is obvious. The Ideas of the Reason do not relate

themselves immediately to the manifold of sense as the Categories do. They relate themselves directly to the Categories and seek to bring unity among them, and this unity is nothing less than unconditional unity. "All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds thence to the understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason, for working up the material of intuition and comprehending it under the highest unity of thought" (258).

"The transcendental concept of reason is, therefore, nothing but the concept of the totality of the conditions of anything given as conditioned" (280). "Hence the transcendental ideas are in reality nothing but *categories, enlarged till they reach the unconditioned*" (354). By demanding for the conditioned the absolutely unconditioned, the Reason changes the Category into a transcendental Idea. Therefore, "pure and transcendental concepts arise from the understanding only, and the reason does not in reality produce any concept, but only *frees*, it may be, the *concept of the understanding* of the inevitable limitation of a possible experience, and thus tries to enlarge it, beyond the limits of experience, yet in connection with it" (354).

There are, according to Kant, three Ideas of the Reason corresponding to the three kinds of Syllogism—the Categorical, the Hypothetical, and the Disjunctive. These Ideas are the Soul, the Universe, and God. The three metaphysical sciences which deal with them are Rational Psychology, Cosmology, and Theology.

Kant teaches "that we can have no knowledge of an object corresponding to an idea, but a problematic concept only" (294). In this regard the Ideas of the Reason resemble the problematic concept of the "thing-in-itself," of which we have no knowledge. Like the problematic

¹ The Italics are mine.

concept of the "thing-in-itself," Ideas are not mere fancies of imagination but necessary postulates. They originate in the very constitution of the Reason. "..... they are not, therefore, to be considered as superfluous and useless" (285). In the phraseology of Kant the Ideas of the Reason are not constitutive but regulative principles of our knowledge. They do not enable 'us to extend the concept of the world of sense beyond all possible experience, but they are merely principles of the greatest possible continuation and extension of our experience, allowing empirical limit to be taken as an absolute limit' (441, 552, 555).

(4) Having answered the three preliminary questions which we proposed concerning the Ideas of the Reason, we now proceed to ascertain what is the relation of these Ideas to the concept of the "thing-in-itself."

(A) The Reason, as a unifying power of the mind, demands for internal phenomena the unifying subject of consciousness, and for external phenomena the unifying ground of the world. (a) This unifying subject of consciousness is the Synthetic Unity of Apperception. (b) This unifying ground of the world is Substratum, or Substance.

(a) This subjective formal unity is clearly stated by Kant as follows:—"..... in the original synthetic unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, neither as I appear to myself, nor as I am by myself, but only *that* I am" (Vol. I, p. 453). This consciousness that *I am*, or the proposition *I think*, to which all mental states are referred is only a *formal condition* of experience (344). It is simply "the single and in itself perfectly empty, representation of the *I* of which we cannot even say that it is a concept, but merely a consciousness that accompanies all concepts. By this *I*, or *he*, or *it*, that is the thing which thinks, nothing is represented beyond a transcendental

subject of thoughts = x , which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from them, we can never have the slightest concept” (301).

Now this consciousness that *I am* is “the only text of Rational Psychology.” It is the condition of all unity and is itself unconditioned. But the impossibility of such a science of the soul is evident from the fact that the proposition *I think* is merely a formal condition and has no contents of its own (344). Wherever the attempt is made to construct such a science, the Reason falls into a logical illusion. And this logical illusion is called by Kant the Paralogism of Pure Reason,—“the formal faultiness of a conclusion, without any reference to its contents” (297).

Since such is the nature of the Idea which the Reason demands for the logical unity of consciousness, what Kant designates as the Psychological Idea evidently is not the same as the transcendental subject which the internal phenomena imply,—the concept “thing-in-itself.” The former is simply the logical subject to which all mental states are referred,—the mere consciousness that I am; but the latter is the transcendental reality, which is thought as the ground of all mental phenomena. They are different in their origin. The Idea originates in the Reason, the concept in the understanding. The first is simply the permanent formal subject in which all internal phenomena find their unity, while the second is postulated as the free cause of all internal phenomena. They are two different concepts.

(b) Next: What is the relation of the Cosmological Idea to the “thing-in-itself”? In order to answer this question we must first know what the Cosmological Idea is.

By the Cosmological Idea Kant understands the absolute unity of the series of conditions of phenomena (290);

that is, the absolute totality in the objective synthesis of phenomena. Hence the "Cosmological Idea is nothing else than the changeless substratum of all phenomena,—the sum total of all external phenomena. But substance is a category, and merely formal. Therefore, the Cosmological Idea is simply the category of substance enlarged till it reaches the Unconditioned. Hence it must be carefully distinguished from the concept of the "thing-in-itself."

It is not to be denied that there are some passages in the "Critique" to which we cannot strictly apply this threefold division,—phenomena, substance, and the "thing-in-itself" (*e.g.*, 218; 241); but there is little doubt of the fact that this is one of the important distinctions which Kant aims to establish. This is evident from his question, "..... why people, not satisfied with the substratum of sensibility, have added to the phenomena the noumena"? (219) Overlooking this important distinction between the "thing-in-itself" and substance is, to many critics of Kant, a source of serious confusion of thought. This oversight is doubtless due to the fact that Kant does not always state it very clearly as he ought. Kant's carelessness on this point, however, is not worse than on some other important points of his system.

To sum up: Kant posits two kinds of transcendental reality—the transcendental subject and the transcendental object. They cannot be known, however, in the Kantian sense of the word "knowledge." And this transcendental subject or Ego implied in every internal phenomenon must be carefully distinguished from the formal subject of consciousness; for they are entirely different conceptions, and no relation exists between them. The transcendental object assumed in the Aesthetic as the ground of phenomena, and proved in the Analytic to be a problematic

concept—a thought-object—and shown in the Dialectic to be the free cause of phenomena, this transcendental object also must not be identified with substance—the formal unity of the world. For this unity—the Cosmological Idea—the substratum of all change—the sum total of external phenomena—is totally different from the concept “thing-in-itself” in its origin, and there is no relation between them.

In view of this, the question now arises: What then is the relation of this transcendental Ego to the transcendental object?

Kant's general answer to this question is:—“The transcendental object, which forms the foundation of external phenomena, and the other, which forms the foundation of our internal intuition, is, therefore, neither matter, nor a thinking being by itself, but simply an unknown cause of phenomena that supplies to us the empirical concept of both” (305, 323, 329, 427). In other words, they are absolutely incomprehensible to us, though we must *think* them as the cause of phenomena.

In addition to this general answer, we find the following interesting passage which has a bearing on our point of inquiry. “..... although extension, impenetrability, cohesion, and motion, in fact everything that the external senses can give us, cannot be thoughts, feeling, inclination and determination, or contain anything like them, being never objects of external intuition, it might be possible, nevertheless, that something which forms the foundation of external phenomena, and which so affects our sense as to produce in it the representations of space, matter, form, etc., if considered as a noumenon (or better as a transcendental object) might be, at the same time, the subject of thinking, although by the manner in which it affects our external sense it produces in us no

intuitions of thoughts, will, etc., but only of space and its determination" (311). Kant states the same thought more simply in the second edition: ".....what is at the bottom of phenomenal matter, as a thing by itself, may not be so heterogeneous after all as we imagine....." (Vol. I, p. 507).

This is doubtless one of the passages in which Fichte found the suggestion of his Subjective Idealism. Nowhere, however, does Kant develop this line of thought further than it is found here. Even this passage Kant introduces as a conjecture. It is not just, therefore, to identify this statement with the system of Fichte.

(c) We have seen what Kant understands by the Psychological Idea, and the Cosmological Idea; and we have also examined whether they are in any way related to the concept "thing-in-itself." The next question in order is: What is the relation of the Theological Idea—the Ideal of the Reason—the concept God—to this "thing-in-itself"?

The answer to this question gives rise to the following questions:—(1) What is the Theological Idea? (2) What is its relation to the other Ideas of the Reason?

We have seen that the Ideas of the Reason do not refer immediately to objective reality; but that the reason aims in them at a synthetical unity of the categories only. Therefore, they are further removed from objective reality than are the Categories. Still further removed from objective reality than the Ideas, is what Kant calls the Ideal, by which he means "the Idea, not only in *concreto* but also in *individuo*, that is, an individual thing determinable or even determined by the Idea alone" (490). "What to us is an ideal, was in Plato's language an *idea of a divine mind*, an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal copies" (490).

Hence "while the idea gives rules, the ideal serves as the *archetype* for the permanent determination of the copy" (491). Therefore "in its ideal, reason aims at a perfect determination, according to rules *a priori*, and it conceives an object throughout determinable according to principles, though without the sufficient conditions of experience, so that the concept itself is transcendent" (492).

The argument which Kant uses here for deriving and establishing the Ideal of the Reason or God is obscure, but what he means by the Ideal is not difficult to ascertain. "The Ideal of the Pure Reason is the absolute *unity of the condition of all objects of thoughts in general*" (290). To illustrate: "virtue and human wisdom in its perfect purity are ideas, while the wise man (of the Stoics) is an ideal, that is, a man existing in thought only, but in complete agreement with the idea of wisdom" (490). "Reason, therefore, sees in the ideal the prototypon of all things which as imperfect copies (*ectypa*), derive the material of their possibility from it, approaching more or less nearly to it, yet remaining always far from reaching it" (497). It is called the original Being (*ens originarium*), as it contains in it, not only the possibility of itself, but also of all reality. It is called the highest Being (*ens summum*), as it has nothing above it. It is called the Being of all beings, since everything as conditioned is subject to it. It is "the basis of the possibility of all things as a cause, and not as a sum total" (499). "If we follow up this idea of ours and hypostasize it, we shall be able to determine the original being by means of the concept of the highest reality as one, simple, all-sufficient, eternal, etc., in one word, determine it in its unconditioned completeness through all predicaments. The concept of such a being is the Concept of God in its transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason is the object of a transcendental theology" (499).

Having thus ascertained what the Ideal of the Reason is and its relation to the other Ideas of the Reason, we now come to the question : What is its relation to the concept of the "thing-in-itself"?

The Ideal of Pure Reason or the Idea of God, like other Ideas of the Reason, has only a regulative use. It is a regulative principle and serves to give a systematic unity to the pure concepts of the understanding ; but it is not a constitutive principle through which any transcendental objects are known. Rational Theology is an impossible attempt to construct a scientific theory of God taking the Ideal of the Reason as its only text. As the Ideal is a merely formal concept and represents no objective reality corresponding to it, it is obvious that it is impossible to develop such a science from this merely formal concept of the Reason. "It may be allowable to *admit* the existence of a Being entirely sufficient to serve as the cause of all possible effects, simply in order to assist reason in her search for unity of causes. But to go so far as to say that *such a Being exists necessarily* is no longer the modest language of an admissible hypothesis, but the bold assurance of apodictic certainty ; for the knowledge of that which is absolutely necessary must itself possess absolute necessity " (526).

Such being the nature of the Ideal of the Reason, Kant's answer to our inquiry is found in the following statement:—"The transcendental object, which forms the foundation of all phenomena, and with it the ground of our sensibility, having this rather than any other supreme conditions, is and always will be *inscrutable*. The thing no doubt is given, but it is incomprehensible. An Ideal of Pure Reason, however, cannot be called *inscrutable*, because it cannot produce any credentials of its reality beyond the requirement of reason to perfect all synthetical unity by means

of it. As, therefore, it is not even given as an object that can be thought, it cannot be said to be, as such, inscrutable; but, being mere idea, it must find in the nature of reason its place and its solution, and in that sense be capable of scrutiny" (527). "A regulative principle has been changed into a constitutive principle, which substitution becomes evident at once because, as soon as I consider that highest Being, which with regard to the world was absolutely (unconditionally) necessary, as a thing by itself, that necessity cannot be conceived, and can, therefore, have existed in my reason as a formal condition of thought only, and not as a material and substantial condition of existence" (532). In a word, the Ideal of Reason and the concept Noumenon are not at all related to each other; for they are totally different in their nature, origin, and aim. The Ideal is merely a logical unity of Ideas, while the concept Noumenon is a problematic, limitative concept of the understanding.

This interpretation of the Kantian conception of the "thing-in-itself" is disputed and rejected by some students of Kant, among whom Hegel,¹ Maimon,² Caird, Cohen,³ and Bax⁴ may be mentioned. These interpreters attempt to identify this concept with the Ideas of Reason. Caird says: "..... the conception of a noumenon can rise only in an intelligence that possesses an ideal of knowledge, to which its actual knowledge does not correspond. And this ideal cannot be presented to it either by sense or by the understanding, And such an idea, according to the Kantian division of its faculties, can be only from the reason" (Caird, *The Philosophy of Kant*, London and New York, 1877, p. 563).

¹ *Logic* (trans. by Wallace, pp 77, 79).

² Maimon (*Versuch über die Transcendental Philosophie*), Berlin, 1790, p. 32.

³ Cohen: *Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung*, Berlin, 1885, pp. 501-526

⁴ Bax: *Introduction to Kant's Prolegomena*, pp. 82, 83

Now it is not necessary for us, in this connection, to refute this interpretation of Kant's conception of the "thing-in-itself," stating the reason why it cannot be accepted; for our investigation has already shown clearly that neither the Idea nor the Ideal of the Reason is synonymous with the concept of the "thing-in-itself." This concept, therefore, must not be confounded with the Idea or with the Ideal of the Reason. Accordingly, J. E. Erdmann's opinion that Kant confounded the concept of the "thing-in-itself" with the Idea of the Reason, and that Reinhold introduced the distinction between the two, is utterly groundless.¹ Even if it was conceded that Reinhold made the distinction, he does not charge Kant with the confusion.²

IV. Thus far we have been occupied with the effort to ascertain the signification of the concept of the "thing-in-itself" as it is used by Kant in the "Critique of Pure Reason." We come now to the most difficult question in interpreting the "Critique of Pure Reason": Is this conception of the "thing-in-itself" consistent with the other doctrines of the Kantian philosophy? Or, to state the question more explicitly: (1) If causality is a category, and it has merely subjective validity, how is it possible to maintain that a "thing-in-itself" is the cause of phenomena? Is not this an application of the category of causation to a non-phenomenal existence? (2) If the category of existence, like all other categories, has subjective validity only, how can Kant consistently say that we *know* that the "thing-in-itself" exists?

Let us examine whether these objections are correct and valid.

¹ J. E. Erdmann: *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Berlin, 1886, p. 407.

² Reinhold: *Versuch einer Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens*. Prag. Jena, 1789, p. 84.

(1) The first of these objections, that according to Kant the "thing-in-itself" cannot be the ground and cause of phenomena, since the category of causation is merely subjective and has no extra-mental application, is the oldest and perhaps the severest criticism on the Kantian philosophy. It was first brought against the "Critique of Pure Reason" by G. E. Schulze and is regarded by many critics of Kant as unanswerable. (Schulze: *Aenesidemus*, pp. 294-310. Volkelt: *Kant's Erkenntniss-theorie*, Leipzig, 1879, p. 95, f. Hartman: *Grundlegung des transcendentalen Realismus*, Berlin, 1875, p. 72, f.).

Of many passages where Kant explicitly states that the Noumenon is the cause of the Phenomenon, the most important one for our present purpose is found on p. 250. It reads as follows:—"The understanding limits the sensibility without enlarging thereby its own field, and by warning the latter that it can never apply to things by themselves, but to phenomena only, it forms the thought of an object by itself, but as transcendental only, which is the *cause of phenomena*, and therefore never itself a phenomenon: which cannot be thought as quantity, nor as reality, nor as substance (because these concepts require sensuous forms in which to determine an object), and of which, therefore, it must always remain unknown, whether it is within us only, but also without us;....." (250). (See the original.)

Now this sentence is regarded by many critics of Kant as presenting the most glaring contradiction of the Kantian philosophy. For example: Dr. Stirling in his suggestive *Text-Book to Kant*, says of this passage: "The transcendental object cannot be characterised by any category; and yet at that very moment it is actually characterised by the category cause!" (*Text-Book to Kant*, p. 449).

It is not, however, unreasonable, when such a grave inconsistency as this is found in one brief sentence, that we pause and ask ourselves: can a thinker like Kant have overlooked such a serious and obvious contradiction as this? It seems highly improbable that Kant should have made such a significant mistake. It is for this reason that many interpreters of Kant have attempted to explain this differently in the "Critique of Pure Reason."

(a) The first of those interpreters of Kant whom we mention as attempting this difficult task is B. Erdmann, editor of the "Kritik der Reinen Vernunft," the "Prolegomena," and the "Kritik der Urtheilskraft," perhaps the most candid and painstaking student of Kant. B. Erdmann maintains the view that where Kant affirms that the transcendental object is the cause of phenomena, he uses the term *cause* in the sense of causality through freedom, and that, therefore, Kant is not involved in contradiction when he says that the "thing-in-itself" is the cause of Phenomena. Robert Steffen concurs with B. Erdmann in this interpretation. (B. Erdmann: Kant's Kriticismus, pp. 44 ff., 67 ff., 73. Kant's Lehre von Dinge an sich von Robert Steffen, pp. 42-43.)

K. Fischer also thinks that when Kant says the "thing-in-itself" is the cause of phenomena, he means it in the sense of causality through freedom. (A Critique of Kant, Eng. Trans., p. 37.)

Let us, then, first ascertain what Kant's doctrine of causality through freedom is, and examine whether it will make consistent Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" as the cause of phenomena.

In the thesis of the third conflict of the transcendental ideas, Kant speaks of causality through freedom, and as its proof he states the well-known reason that causality according to laws of nature cannot account for a primary beginning. For "the causality.....of a cause,

through which something takes place, is itself an event, which again according to the law of nature, presupposes an anterior state, and its causality, and this again, an anterior state, and so on" (386). What, then, is Kant's conception of a "causality through freedom"? Kant defines it as that "causality through which something takes place, without its cause being further determined according to necessary laws by a preceding cause, that is, an *absolute spontaneity* of causes, by which a series of phenomena, proceeding according to natural laws, begins by itself" (388).

Kant asserts in many places that this causality through freedom can co-exist with the causality of nature: but the question is: *How* can it co-exist?

The answer to this question Kant finds in his celebrated distinction between Phenomena and Noumena. "If phenomena are things by themselves, freedom cannot be saved. Nature in that case is the complete and sufficient cause determining every event, and its condition is always contained in that series of phenomena only which, together with their effect, are necessary under the law of nature. If, on the contrary, phenomena are taken for nothing except what they are in reality, namely, not things by themselves, but representations only, which are connected with each other according to empirical laws, they must themselves have causes, which are not phenomenal. Such an intelligible cause, however, is not determined with reference to its causality by phenomena, although its effects become phenomenal, and can be determined by other phenomena. That intelligible cause, therefore, with its causality, is outside the series, though its effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions. The effect, therefore, can with reference to its intelligible cause, be considered as free, and yet at the same time, with reference to phenomena, as resulting

from them according to the necessity of nature (463). (Comp., pp. 464-466.) This thought is explained by taking man as its illustration. "Man is one among the phenomena of the world of sense, and in so far one of the natural causes the causality of which must be subject to empirical laws. As such he must, therefore, have an empirical character, like all other objects of nature" (471). "Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature through his senses only, knows himself through mere apperception also, and this in actions and internal determinations, which he cannot ascribe to the impressions of the senses. Man is thus to himself partly a phenomenon, partly, however, namely with reference to certain faculties, a purely intelligible object, because his actions cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of the senses. We call these faculties understanding and reason" (471-72).

Thus man is a phenomenon, considered from one point of view: and, considered from another point of view, is a noumenon. Therefore in him, two kinds of causality—that through freedom, and that of necessity—exist together without any direct contradiction. This is the thought which Kant re-affirms many times in the "Critique of Practical Reason," and in the "Metaphysics of Morals." (See the following pages in Kant's *Theory of Ethics*, translated by T. K. Abbott, third edition, pp. 71, 76, 91, 139, 145, 188, 189, 191, 192, 200.)

There is, however, this noteworthy difference between the "Critique of Pure Reason" and the "Critique of Practical Reason," with respect to the inquiry before us, namely: that the "Critique of Pure Reason" simply states that these two kinds of causality are not involved in any direct contradiction, while the "Critique of Practical Reason" aims to demonstrate the objective reality of causality through freedom, though practically

only. "Speculative reason does not hereby gain anything as regards its insight, but only as regards the *certainty* of its problematical notion of freedom, which here obtains *objective reality*, which though only practical, is nevertheless undoubted" (Abbott, p. 139). "Therefore, that unconditioned causality, with the faculty of it, namely, freedom, is no longer merely indefinitely and problematically *thought* (this the speculative reason could prove to be feasible), but is even *as regards the law of its causality*, definitely and assertorically *known*, and with it the fact that a being (I myself) belonging to the world of sense, belongs also to the supersensible world, this is also positively *known*, and thus the reality of the supersensible world is established, and in practical respects *definitely* given, and this definiteness, which for theoretical purposes would be *transcendent*, is for practical purposes *immanent*" (Abbott, 200).

It is important to note that Kant insists that this extension of our practical knowledge does not in the least enlarge the sphere of our theoretical knowledge. (Abbott, pp. 144, 145, 147, 232.)

Now it seems probable from these statements, that when Kant speaks of Noumena as the causes of phenomena, he intends to use the word "cause" in the sense of causality through freedom, and not of the causality of nature. There is, however, this serious objection brought against this interpretation of Kant by B. Erdmann and others, that Kant seems to apply causality through freedom to the voluntary action of man only, and not to the phenomena of nature. To say the least, this interpretation of B. Erdmann is something forced and unnatural, and seems improbable. Moreover, there is no explicit passage in the "Critique" which supports this interpretation (J. Volkelt, Kant's Erkenntniss-theorie, p. 97 ff; Drobisch, Kant's Ding an Sich, pp. 23-25).

(b) The second interpreter of Kant whom we mention as undertaking this task of making compatible Kant's doctrine of causality and that of the "thing-in-itself," is Frederick Albert Lange, author of the "History of Materialism." He says:—"This objection has, from the first replies to the 'Critique' down to the present, always been supposed a fatal blow to Kant, and even we ourselves, in the first edition of this work, assumed that the 'armour' of the system is thereby crushed in. A more careful inquiry, however, shows that this blow does not find Kant unprepared. What was announced as a correction of the system is, in fact, exactly Kant's own view; the "thing-in-itself" is a mere idea of limit. 'The fish in the pond,' we remarked, 'can swim only in the water, not in the earth; but yet it may strike its head against the ground and sides.' So, too, we might, with the notion of cause, survey the whole realm of experience, and find that beyond it lies a sphere which to our knowledge is absolutely inaccessible" (*Geschichte des Materialismus*, Leipzig, 1874, Vol. II, pp. 49-50; Eng. Trans. (Vol II, p. 216).

It requires no profound reflection to perceive that this comparison of Lange is not exact, and that his attempt to eliminate the difficulty by making the "thing-in-itself" a pure concept of limit is not successful. For, if the fish in the pond finds out that there are the ground and sides which limit the pond by striking its head against them, it *knows* thereby *that* the ground and sides exist. And the question is, what is the means by which the existence of the ground and sides is found out? The answer is obvious enough; it is by inference. But by what inference? And there is no answer to this question according to Lange's interpretation but to say, by means of the principle of causation. But if this is the case, Lange's interpretation does not remove the difficulty

at all. Lange substantially agrees with H. Cohen on this point (Kant's *Theorie der Erfahrung*, Berlin, p. 252).

(c) 'The third interpreter who undertakes this difficult task is F. Staudinger.¹ He attempts to take away the difficulty from the "Critique" by maintaining that Kant never applies the category of causation to the "thing-in-itself." He considers this charge against Kant valid and unanswerable, if Kant maintains that some determinate object or objects produce sensations. But he insists that Kant nowhere states that any concrete things produce sensations in us, and that, therefore, the charge brought against Kant is unwarranted and groundless.

It is not difficult to see that this interpretation does not remove the difficulty. For whether the cause of sensation is some definite or indefinite object, it is posited as the cause of sensation and this is nothing else than the application of the category of causation to the "thing-in-itself."

(d) The fourth interpreter of Kant who undertakes to obviate this difficulty is Professor A. Riehl, author of "Der Philosophische Kriticismus." He maintains that Kant definitely distinguished the *principle* of causality from the *concept* of causality, and limited the former to phenomena only. The principle of causality is the application of the concept of causality to succession in time, and, therefore, has only phenomenal significance. The concept, however, remains valid without reference to time, although, in that case, it is undetermined. The concept, then, appropriates itself to thinking only, which indeed is the valid thinking of things, but does not concern itself with the intuition of them. Accordingly, knowledge by this concept alone is incomplete but not incorrect.²

¹ *Noumena*, Darmstadt, 1884, p. 26.

² *Der Philosophische Kriticismus*, Vol. I, p. 432.

It is to be said of this interpretation of Riehl that the distinction between the *principle* of causation and the *concept* of causation is nowhere explicitly stated by Kant in the "Critique of Pure Reason," and this seems to be an objection to Riehl's interpretation. There are, however, passages in which Kant implicitly makes this distinction, and Riehl's distinction is a perfectly justifiable inference. In the *Preface* to the second edition Kant says:—"we had established in the Analytical part of our "Critique" the following points:—First, that space and time are only forms of sensuous intuition, therefore conditions of the existence of things, as phenomena only; secondly, that we have no concepts of the understanding, and therefore nothing whereby we can arrive at the knowledge of things, except in so far as an intuition corresponding to the concept can be given, and consequently that we cannot have knowledge of any object, as a thing by itself, but only in so far as it is an object of sensuous intuition, that is, a phenomenon. This proves no doubt that all speculative knowledge of reason is limited to objects of *experience*; but it should be carefully borne in mind that this leaves it perfectly open to us, to *think* the same objects as things by themselves, though we cannot *know* them. For otherwise we should arrive at the absurd conclusion, that there is phenomenal appearance without something that appears" (Vol. I, Supp. II, p. 377).

Kant still further explains this distinction between thinking and knowledge in the foot-note added to the above quoted passage. "In order to *know* an object, I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its reality, as attested by experience, or *a priori*, by means of reason. But I can *think*, whatever I please, provided only I do not contradict myself, that is, provided my conception is a possible thought, though I may be unable to

answer for the existence of a corresponding object in the sum total of all possibilities" (377).

What Kant says in the first edition about the "thing-in-itself" also confirms the above interpretation. "..... it really follows quite naturally from the concept of a phenomenon in general, that something must correspond to it, which in itself is not a phenomenon, because a phenomenon cannot be anything by itself, apart from our mode of representation."

"Hence arises the concept of a noumenon, which, however, is not positive, nor a definite knowledge of anything, but which implies only the *thinking* of something, without taking any account of the form of sensuous intuition" (219).

On the whole, then, this interpretation by Riehl of Kant's conception of the "thing-in-itself" is the most satisfactory one, and appears to be what Kant intends to maintain in the "Critique of Pure Reason."

The same interpretation of Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" is presented by Drobisch in his book entitled "Kant's Dinge-an-Sich und Sein Erfahrungs begriff" (Leipzig 1885, pp. 14-16).

This is also Lasswitz's interpretation of Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" as the cause of phenomena (Lasswitz: *Die Lehre Kants von der Idealität des Raumes und der Zeit*, etc., Berlin, 1883, § 28).

To sum up: When Kant says that the "thing-in-itself" is the ground and cause of phenomena, all that he intends to say is that we must *think* it as their ground and cause, though we cannot know that they are such, as the category of causation has no application beyond the field of phenomena.

When Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" is thus interpreted, the charge that it is self-contradictory is removed; and it becomes evident that the charge is

due to misapprehension on the part of his critics; and the difficulty regarded by some critics as the fundamental defect of the "Critique of Pure Reason" is not real but only seemingly so.

(2) Another criticism generally made upon the Kantian philosophy is in reference to the *existence of the "thing-in-itself."* If the category of existence is merely subjective and applicable to phenomena only, how can we know that the "thing-in-itself" exists?

This objection is regarded by some students of Kant as involving a conflict between the Aesthetic, which posits the "thing-in-itself" as the ground and cause of phenomena, and the Analytic, which explains the "thing-in-itself" as a problematic, limitative and necessary concept. The question for us then is: Is this conflict real and the objection urged valid, or is it only apparent?

There are many critics of Kant, who regard this objection to the "Critique of Pure Reason" as revealing one of the most serious and fundamental defects of the book. This criticism also was made first by Schulze in his *Aenesidemus* (pp. 263 ff: 294 ff). Fichte made the same objection to Kant's system (*Sammtliche Werke*, Berlin, 1845-46, Vol. I, pp. 479-483). More recently this objection is presented by B. Erdmann. (Kant's *Kriticismus in der ersten und in der zweiten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Leipzig, 1879, pp. 44-46.)

(a) Such being the case, many attempts have been made to relieve the Kantian philosophy of this difficulty. As early as 1797 Salomon Maimon (1754-1800) undertook this task by suppressing entirely the conception of the "thing-in-itself." This attempt of improving the Kantian philosophy was *disowned by Kant* himself though highly esteemed by Fichte. Maimon considered Kant's conception of the "thing-in-itself," an impossible and absurd conception like the mathematical formula $\sqrt{-a}$

(Ueberweg, *History of Phil.*, Vol. II, Eng. trans., p. 197. J. E. Erdmann, *Grundriss des Gesch. d. Philos.*, § 308, 3-6. K. Fischer, *Gesch. d. n. Philos.*, Vol. V, p. 135. E. Zeller, *Gesch. d. deut. Philos.*, pp. 447-472).

(b) I. S. Beck (1761-1842) made a similar attempt to improve the Kantian Philosophy by explaining away the "thing-in-itself." He makes the Kantian philosophy to be a purely idealistic system, regarding that which produces sensation by affecting us, not as the "thing-in-itself," but as the phenomena, and considering the realistic language of the "Critique" to be a didactic accommodation on the part of Kant, and nothing more (I. S. Beck : *Grundriss der Critischen Philos.*, 1796, p. 44, § 56; Ueberweg : *Hist. of Philos.*, Vol. II, p. 203; J. E. Erdmann : *Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Philos.* § 308, 7-10; E. Zeller : *Gesch. d. deut. Philos.*, pp. 477-480; K. Fischer : *Gesch. d. deut. Philos.*, Vol. I, pp. 169-172).

(c) The third writer whom we mention as attempting the task to explain this difficulty in the "Critique of Pure Reason" is F. A. Lange. He undertakes this by reducing the "thing-in-itself" to a phenomenon. We quote his words, which are as follows:—"We do not, then, really know whether a 'thing-in-itself' exists. We know only that the logical application of our laws of thought leads us to the notion of an entirely problematic something which we assume as the cause of phenomena, so soon as we have recognised that our world can only be a world of representation. If it is asked, but where, then, are things? The answer runs, in the phenomena. The more the 'thing-in-itself' refines itself away to a mere representation, the more the word phenomena gains in reality. It embraces everything that we can call 'real.' The phenomena are what the ordinary understanding calls things; the philosophers call the things phenomena, in order to denote that they are not something

existing entirely outside myself, but a product of the laws of my understanding and my sensibility.....
The true essence of things, the last cause of all phenomena, is not only unknown to us, but even the idea of it is nothing more or nothing less than the last outcome of an antithesis determined by an organisation, and of which we do not know whether beyond our experience, it has any meaning at all." (Lange, History of Materialism, Eng. Trans., Vol. II, pp. 217, 218.)

(d) The fourth writer we mention in this connection is A. Stadler, who maintains that the "thing-in-itself" is "an imaginary concept." It is nothing else than "an idle endeavour of the understanding to solve a problem which is natural but impossible." (Die Grundsätze der Reinen Erkenntniss-theorie in der Kantischen Philosophie, Leipzig, 1876, pp. 38-39, 46-47.)

Now it will be noticed that all these critics of Kant seem to overlook or underestimate the point which Kant repeats many times and seems to regard as the most essential and distinguishing feature of his doctrine. It is a no less important aspect of his doctrine than that the concept "thing-in-itself" is a necessary pre-supposition of thought. To be sure, the concept is not knowledge in the Kantian sense, but it is not "an hypothesis, an attempt of the mind to solve an impossible problem," nor is it an unnecessary element in the critical philosophy. It is a *necessary thought* which is implied in the knowledge of phenomena. It is not something we can think or not think according to our pleasure, but something which we *must think as existing*. It is "the true correlate of phenomena." We do not *know* that the "thing-in-itself" exists, but we *must think* it as existing. In other words, the category of existence cannot be applied to the "thing-in-itself," for it applies to phenomena only. Hence we cannot *know* that the "thing-in-itself"

exists. The category of existence, however, is valid, even when it is not applied to any phenomena, though in that case it produces no knowledge. In short, it is not only possible for us to *think* by the category of existence a "thing-in-itself" as existing, but we *must think* the "thing-in-itself" as existing, since it is the correlate of phenomena.

When Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" is thus rightly understood, all those attempts to make the critical philosophy consistent by suppressing the concept of the "thing-in-itself" are not only absolutely useless, but entirely unjustifiable. For Kant nowhere affirms that we *know* that the "thing-in-itself" exists, since no category is applicable to it: all he claims for the "thing-in-itself" is that we must *think* it as existing, as it is the correlate of phenomena. In a word, it is a postulate without which no knowledge is possible, though not itself knowledge. For, according to Kant, knowledge is nothing else than the categorized sensation. We can justly question whether the Kantian signification of the word knowledge is not too restricted, and can rightly criticise it; but, if Kant's definition of knowledge is accepted, we cannot charge him with the contradiction that he applies the category of existence to the "thing-in-itself" when he only posits it as a thought-object, *viz.*, as a postulate of thought, a necessary pre-supposition of all our knowledge.

V. The main points of our investigation may briefly be summarized as follows:—

1. Is Kant's "thing-in-itself" a sense-object? No.
2. Is it a thought-object? Yes.
3. Can we *know* that it exists? No.
4. Can we say that it does not exist? No.
5. Does Kant teach, as often said, that we cannot *know* what the "thing-in-itself" is, but that we can *know*

that it exists? No ; we must *think* of it as existing but cannot *know* that it exists.

6. What then is the difference between thinking and knowing? Thinking is the form according to which the mind always acts. Knowing is the categorizing of the matter of sense ; knowledge is the union of the form of thought and the matter of sense.

7. But does he not often speak of a “ thing-in-itself ” as the cause of phenomena? He does.

8. When Kant designates the “ thing-in-itself ” as the cause of phenomena, does he not concede that he *knows* that the “ thing-in-itself ” exists and is the cause of phenomena, though he denies any knowledge whatever of it? No ; he says we *must think* of it as existing and as the cause but cannot *know* that it exists and is the cause of phenomena. For *knowledge* and *thinking* are two different acts of the mind.

9. Is Kant a monist or dualist? He is a dualist in so far as he recognises the two kinds of transcendental reality as correlates of two kinds of phenomena—external and internal. But whether they are transcendently distinct or not, he says we cannot know.

10. What is the relation of the “ thing-in-itself ” to the Ideas of the Reason? There is no relation between them. They are concepts totally different in their nature and origin.

VI. Such, in brief, is the Critical Idealism of Kant ; we shall now consider how he distinguishes it from the *Dogmatic* Idealism of Berkeley and the *Problematic* Idealism of Descartes.

The following are the passages in which Kant states his own standpoint, distinguishing it not only from that of Berkeley but also from that of Descartes :—

1. The fourth paralogism in the first edition
2. The Refutation of Idealism in the second edition.
3. The Prolegomena ; Sec. 13, Remarks II and III.

4. The Appendix to the Prolegomena, an answer to the criticism of Garve in the *Gottingen Gelehrte Anzeigen*, January 19, 1782.

It is to be noted here that our aim in this connection is not to ascertain whether or not Kant interpreted Berkeley aright, but simply to discover what is the difference between his system and that of Berkeley, as Kant understood the latter.

In the first edition Kant defines Idealism to be the doctrine that "the existence of all objects of the external senses is doubtful", on the ground that such "existence cannot be perceived immediately but is only inferred" (318). "It must not be supposed, therefore, that an idealist is he who denies the existence of external objects of the senses : all he does is to deny that it is known by immediate perception, and to infer that we can never become perfectly certain of their reality by any experience whatsoever" (320). And yet Kant recognises three kinds of Idealism : (1) *Dogmatic*, or Berkeleyan Idealism, which *denies* the existence of matter, because it is irrational to admit its existence. (2) *Sceptical* or *Cartesian Idealism*, which *doubts* the existence of matter, because it is impossible to prove it. (326). (3) *Transcendental Idealism*, which does not *hesitate to admit* the existence of matter considered *as phenomenon* only but not as a "thing-in-itself" (320).

Opposed to all these forms of Idealism is *Transcendental Realism*, which considers space and time as things in themselves independent of our sensibility (320). In the second edition Kant comprehends the first two forms of Idealism (Dogmatic and Sceptical) under the name of *Material Idealism* and distinguishes his own idealism from them as *Formal* (Vol. I, 476).

The clearest statement on this point is found in the Appendix to the Prolegomena : "The dictum of all

genuine idealists from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula : " All cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only, in the ideas of the pure Understanding and Reason there is truth. The principle governing and determining my idealism throughout, is on the other hand : " All cognition of things merely from pure Understanding or pure Reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and only in experience is there truth " (124). (Comp. Sec. 13, Remark II). The reason why Kant applies to his system the term idealism is because he holds with the idealists that " space and time, together with all that they contain, are not things nor quantities in themselves, but belong merely to the appearance of the latter : up to this point he is one in confession with the above idealists " (125).

" My so-called (properly critical) Idealism is of quite a special character, in that it subverts the ordinary Idealism, and that through it all cognition *a priori*, even that of geometry, first receives objective reality, which, without my demonstrated ideality of space and time, could not be maintained by the most zealous realists. This being the state of the case, I could have wished, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, to have named this conception of mine otherwise, but to alter it altogether, was impossible. It may be permitted me, however, in future, as has been above intimated, to term it the *formal* or better still, the *Critical Idealism*, to distinguish it from the *dogmatic* Idealism of Berkeley, and from the *sceptical* Idealism of Descartes " (126).

These statements of Kant, in which he distinguishes his Critical Idealism from the Sceptical or Problematic Idealism of Descartes and from the Dogmatical Idealism of Berkeley, are so precise and clear that there is no need of comment to convince any impartial reader of

the "Critique" of their differences. They speak for themselves. Therefore, the attempt to interpret Kant as an idealist in the same sense as Berkeley was, is an impossible task. The charge of Schopenhauer, that Kant has abandoned in the second edition his consistent idealistic standpoint by reason of his old age and moral cowardice, is not only groundless, but seems monstrous to any unprejudiced reader of the first and second editions.

So then, the "Critique of Pure Reason" is neither Idealism pure and simple nor Realism pure and simple, but a combination of the two. It agrees with Realism in admitting the existence of matter, but only as a phenomenal reality. Hence it is called *Empirical Realism*. It agrees with Idealism in maintaining that space and time are merely subjective forms of intuition and are not qualities of extra-mental realities. Hence it is called *Transcendental Idealism*. In short, the Kantian philosophy is what K. Fischer calls "Ideal-Realism" — *a via media* between Idealism and Realism. It is also called *Phenomenism* (W. Windelband, *Die Geschichte der n. Philosophie*, Vol. II, p. 78. Drobisch : op. cit. p. 2).

PART II.

HISTORICAL EXPLANATION.

1. The aim of our investigation thus far has been to enquire and ascertain what Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" is. It now remains for us to inquire what was the motive that led him to that doctrine which we have characterised as "Ideal-Realism."

One of the noteworthy signs of the present time in the study of philosophy is the prominence given to the history of speculative thought. No careful student of

philosophy would deny that one of the essential conditions for the right interpretation of any philosophic system, is a thorough acquaintance with the contemporaneous thought and the environment of the author. This is eminently true of the study of such a thinker as Kant, who has marked a new epoch in the development of speculative thought. When thus studied in the light of its historical environment, the Kantian theory of cognition reveals many important and interesting features which have not been sufficiently recognised by students of the history of philosophy in their interpretation of Kant. One of these features is a strong tendency in the Kantian philosophy to mediate between two opposing systems of thought. The ultimate object of the "Critique of Pure Reason," in our judgement, was not polemic but irenic. I regard Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" as one of the results of this mediating tendency that pervades all his thinking—a mediation between Idealism and Realism.¹

Of the fact that there is such a spirit of mediation in Kant there is no doubt. (1) One of the most obvious examples of this spirit is his position with regard to the *reality of knowledge*. Criticism is nothing else than a mediation between *Dogmatism* and *Scepticism*, between Leibniz and Hume in respect to the validity of the knowledge by the Pure Reason. (2) Another example of this mediating tendency is Kant's theory about the *origin of knowledge*. It aims to combine *Empiricism* and *Rationalism*, Locke and Leibniz. (3) Likewise Kant aims to mediate in reference to the *existence of an extra-mental reality* between *Idealism* and *Realism*, between Descartes and Berkeley on the one hand and Reid and his school on the other.

¹ Comp. R. Lehmann. *Kant's Lehre von Ding an Sich*, Berlin, 1878, p. 25.

(1) Dogmatism was the current philosophy when Kant began his study of philosophy in the university of his native town—Königsberg.

(a) By Dogmatism Kant understands the “presumption, that it is possible to make any progress with pure (philosophical) knowledge, consisting of concepts, and guided by principles such as reason has long been in the habit of employing, without first inquiring in what way, and by what right, it has come to possess them. Dogmatism is, therefore, the dogmatic procedure of pure reason, *without a previous criticism of its own powers.*” (Preface to the second edition, Vol. I, 383). This kind of dogmatism had been prevalent in philosophic thought in Europe from Descartes to Kant. Descartes, Spinoza and Malebranche are all dogmatists in this sense of the word; but whenever Kant speaks of dogmatists, he means more especially the followers of Leibniz and Wolf. Kant calls Wolf the “greatest of all dogmatic philosophers.” Though he himself was a follower of the dogmatic philosophy at the outset of his philosophic career, he was never satisfied with it.

(b) It is important for us to observe that Kant carefully distinguishes the dogmatic method from dogmatism. “Our Critique is not opposed to the *dogmatic procedure*, as a science of pure knowledge (for this must always be dogmatical, that is, derive its proof from pure principles *a priori*), but to *dogmatism* only” (Vol. I, p. 383) “Our Critique is meant to form a necessary preparation in support of a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics, which must necessarily be carried out dogmatically and strictly systematically” (Vol. I. p. 384). Kant’s chief objection to dogmatism, then, is the “undisturbed gravity” with which it claims to transcend the field of experience without any previous examination of the cognitive faculty. This dogmatism,

as Kant himself tells us, he renounced, aroused by the scepticism of Hume, and gave his researches in the field of speculative philosophy quite a different direction.

(c) Scepticism, according to Kant, is "a general mistrust of the pure reason, without any previous critique of the same, merely on account of the contradictory nature of its assertions" (Kant *vs.* Eberhard, *Ueber sine Entdeckung*, etc., Ros. and Schubert's ed. I, p. 452). Such was the philosophy of Hume. "From the inability of reason to employ the principle of causation beyond the limits of experience, Hume inferred the nullity of all the pretensions of reason in her attempts to pass beyond what is empirical" (651).

(d) Kant carefully distinguishes *Scepticism* from the *Sceptical method*, as he did Dogmatism from the Dogmatic method. By the Sceptical method, Kant understands the "method of watching a conflict of assertions, in order to find out whether the object of the struggle be not a mere illusion" (366). It is the path to certainty and "is totally different from scepticism, or that artificial and scientific agnosticism which undermines the foundations of all knowledge in order, if possible, to leave nothing trustworthy and certain anywhere" (366). The sceptical method is essential for transcendental philosophy. For "transcendental reason admits of no other criterion but an attempt to combine conflicting assertions, and, therefore, previous to this, unrestrained conflict between them" (367). "Thus the sceptic is the true school master to lead the dogmatic speculator towards a sound criticism of the understanding and of reason" (659). Scepticism, however, is "by no means the last step in our inquiry." It is only the second step and "marks the stage of caution on the part of reason, when rendered wiser by experience. But a third step is necessary, that of the maturity and manhood of judgement," and this is

the true criticism of reason. "Scepticism is a resting place of reason, where it may reflect for a time on its dogmatical wanderings and gain survey of the region where it happens to be, in order to choose its way with greater certainty for the future : but it can never be its permanent dwelling place " (652).

Dogmatism and Scepticism were thus two opposing types of thought, which Kant found struggling with each other. And, in his philosophic experience, he went through these two stages of thought before he found a new philosophic method which he calls the Criticism of the Pure Reason. He rejects both Scepticism and Dogmatism on the same ground; the one affirms, while the other denies the validity of our knowledge by the pure Reason; but both do this without a previous examination of powers of the Reason. It is between these two opposing systems—Dogmatism and Scepticism—that Criticism endeavours to mediate. Kant says: "The Critique of Reason here signifies the true middle path between the Dogmatism Hume combated, and the Scepticism he would have introduced in its place" (Proleg., § 58).

(2) Another point in which this mediating spirit of Kant appears, as already stated is in the problem of the *origin* of our knowledge. There were two opposing views current in his day in regard to the origin of knowledge—Rationalism, which Kant designates by the term Noology, and Empiricism. "Aristotle," says Kant, "may be considered as the head of the empiricists, Plato as that of the noologists. Locke, who in modern times followed Aristotle, and Leibniz, who followed Plato (though at a sufficient distance from his mystical system), have not been able to bring this dispute to any conclusion " (733).

(a) Noology or Rationalism is the theory that explains the origin of all our knowledge from the spontaneous

activity of the soul. It maintains that the content, as well as, the form, of knowledge is furnished *a priori* by the mind. And it follows from this, that all our knowledge can be deduced from the analysis of the concepts and principles native to the mind. This theory was advocated and defended by Leibniz. He made the distinction between (1) intuitive, (2) demonstrative, and (3) sensible knowledge. But there is no real difference between them; the difference is that of degree only; he regarded sensible knowledge as an obscure or confused kind of knowledge. The distinction, therefore, is merely popular and not philosophical. According to Leibniz, all these kinds of knowledge are the product of the pure spontaneity of the Reason. The question: 'How can these different kinds of knowledge, entirely subjective in origin, correspond with the reality of the world?'—Leibniz answered by resorting to his celebrated doctrines of Monads and of the Pre-established Harmony. Kant says: "The celebrated Leibniz erected an intellectual system of the world, or believed at least that he knew the internal nature of things, by comparing all objects with the understanding only and with the abstract formal concepts of his mind" (235). "For sensibility was with him a confused mode of representation only, and not a separate source of representations." In one word, Leibniz "intellectualized phenomena" (236).

(b) In opposition to this doctrine of Rationalism, Empiricism attempts to trace the origin of all our knowledge in experience. It rejects all *a priori* knowledge or innate ideas, and accepts nothing as certain or as true which does not owe its origin to experience. The soul has no native contents and is a "tabula rasa." Locke included under experience, sensation and reflection; and, though he did not carry out his theory to its ultimate logical issue, laid the foundation of a modern Empiricism

in his conception of the human mind as a "tabula rasa." Kant, therefore, says: "Locke, for want of reflection, and because he met with pure concepts of the understanding in experience, derived them also from experience, and yet acted so inconsistently that he attempted to use them for knowledge which far exceeds all limits of experience" (Vol. I, 430). In one word, "Locke sensualized all concepts of the understanding, *i.e.*, represented them as nothing but empirical, though abstract, reflective concepts" (236).

(c) Now Kant's endeavour in the "Critique of Pure Reason" was to mediate between these two extremes—Rationalism and Empiricism. Hence his famous doctrine: "thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (45). "These two powers (Sensibility and Understanding) cannot exchange their functions. The understanding cannot see, the senses cannot think. By their union only can knowledge be produced" (45).

(3) The third point, in which Kant seeks to find a *via media* between two conflicting thoughts of his day, is the reconciliation between Idealism and Realism; and his doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" represents this attempt of Kant. He recognises two kinds of Realism—*Empirical* and *Transcendental*. (a) *Transcendental Realism* is defined as the doctrine that "considers space and time as somethings in themselves (independent of our sensibility)" (320). (b) He defines *Empirical Realism* as the doctrine that "something real in space always corresponds to our external intuitions" (325). Kant also recognises two kinds of Idealism—*Empirical* and *Transcendental*. (c) *Empirical Idealism* is the theory that *doubts* the existence of matter (Descartes), or *denies* the existence of it (Berkeley). (d) Opposed to this is *Transcendental Idealism* which maintains that

“all phenomena are representations only, not things by themselves, and that space and time, therefore, are only sensuous forms of our intuition, not given determinations or conditions of objects as things by themselves” (320). This is Kant’s own doctrine and is sometimes called by him *Critical or Formal Idealism*.

Now this doctrine of Transcendental Idealism agrees with the doctrine of Empirical Realism in admitting the existence of matter. “In our system,” says Kant, “we need not hesitate to admit the existence of matter on the testimony of mere self-consciousness, and to consider it as established in the same manner as the existence of myself, as a thinking being” (321). “The Transcendental Idealist is, therefore, an empirical realist” (322) or “as he is called, a dualist” (321).

It is evident from this, that Kant’s endeavour here is to mediate between the extreme types of Idealism and of Realism—*Empirical* Idealism which doubts or denies the existence of matter, and *Transcendental* Realism that asserts the existence of matter as something independent of our sensibility.

(4) It may be added here that this mediating tendency appears also in Kant’s ethics. It is found in his well-known solution of the problem of free agency. His solution is that man belongs to two worlds, the sensible and the intelligible. As a creature belonging to the former, his action is subject to the law of necessity, but as a creature belonging to the latter, his action is free (Kant’s theory of ethics, by Abbott, pp. 76, 87-88, 188-191).

Such being the case we may say with safety that the ultimate object of the “Critique of Pure Reason” is irenic and not polemic as it is sometimes supposed. Kant himself declares: “the critique of pure reason..... which bases all its decisions on the indisputable principles

of its own original institution, secures to us the peace of a legal status, in which disputes are not to be carried on except in the proper form of a *law-suit*. In the former state such disputes generally end in both parties claiming *victory*, which is followed by an uncertain peace maintained chiefly by the civil power, while in the latter state a *sentence* is pronounced which, as it goes to the very root of the dispute, must secure an eternal peace. These never-ceasing disputes of a purely dogmatical reason compel people at last to seek for rest and peace in some criticism of reason itself, and in some sort of legislation founded upon such criticism " (641).

II. We have seen that there is a marked mediating tendency in the "Critique of Pure Reason." Whether this was Kant's conscious effort or not, there is no doubt of the fact that such a spirit pervades the pages of the Kantian theory of knowledge. Accepting the fact, we now proceed to inquire into his *method of mediation*.

It is evident that Kant does not try to accomplish this task by combining whatever truths he found in all these opposing systems of thought, but rather, by employing a profound principle which was not recognised by any of them. The question then is: What is that principle which guides him in this irenic attempt? *Our answer to this question is that the distinction between Phenomena and Noumena is his leading principle throughout.* We shall now proceed to examine whether this conjecture accords with the demands of the case.

(1) It is not necessary for our present purpose to discuss fully how this distinction between Phenomena and Noumena serves Kant's purpose in mediating between Dogmatism and Scepticism; for he himself states this clearly in the *Critical Solution of the Antinomies*. Kant maintains that the human Reason is involved in

insoluble contradictions. These contradictions Kant presents in the four Antinomies of the Reason of which the Thesis represent Dogmatism, and the Antithesis, Scepticism. And he solves the Antinomies by the distinction between Phenomena and Noumena.

(2) This important distinction between Phenomena and Noumena serves Kant again in mediating between Rationalism and Empiricism. It may be stated somewhat as follows :—In all our knowledge there are two elements involved, intuitions and concepts. “Neither concepts without an intuition corresponding to them, nor intuitions without concepts can yield any real knowledge. Both are either pure or empirical” (44). “Pure intuitions and pure concepts only are possible *a priori* empirical intuitions and empirical concepts, *a posteriori*” (45). But the question is: How is it possible to intuit anything *a priori*? How can an intuition of an object precede the object itself?

Kant’s answer to this inquiry in the Aesthetic is that, if our intuition were of things as they are in themselves, no pure *a priori* intuitions would be possible, but all our intuitions would always be empirical; for properties cannot be transferred from the things to which they belong to the faculty which presents them. Our intuitions can be *a priori*, if they are nothing but the forms of sensibility and thus precede experience. This is the only way possible in which our intuitions can be *a priori* (See Proleg. § 9). And such forms of sensibility are space and time. “But these sources of knowledge *a priori* (being conditions of our sensibility only) fix their own limits, in that they can refer to objects only in so far as they are considered as phenomena, but cannot represent things as they are by themselves. This is the only field in which they are valid; beyond it they admit of no objective applications” (34).

In like manner Kant answers the question: How can certain concepts be *a priori* and precede experience? "If the objects with which our knowledge has to deal were things by themselves, we could have no concepts *a priori* of them" (112). For we cannot take them from the object, as in that case they would become empirical; nor can we take them from within ourselves, "as that which is within us only, cannot determine the nature of an object different from our representation.....
.....But if we have to deal with phenomena only, then it becomes not only possible but necessary, that certain concepts *a priori* should precede our empirical knowledge of objects. For being phenomena, they form an object that is within us only, because a mere modification of our sensibility can never exist outside us" (113).

In short, Rationalism is right in maintaining that there is an *a priori* element in knowledge as its necessary factor, but it is wrong when it attempts to explain the origin of all our knowledge from this element alone. Empiricism is right in its assertion that "all our knowledge begins with experience" but it is wrong when it asserts that it *arises* from experience alone. Experience is the occasion, but not the sole cause, of all our knowledge. The critical philosophy, taking a middle course between the two, teaches that all our knowledge *begins* with experience but does not arise from it. There is an *a priori* element in knowledge which is not derived from experience but precedes and "converts the raw material of our sensuous impression into the knowledge of objects." It is impossible to have such an *a priori* element in knowledge, if our knowledge is that of things in themselves, or Noumena. But if our knowledge is that of phenomena, then the *a priori* factor of knowledge becomes not only possible but necessary.

Such, then, is the use which Kant makes of his famous distinction between Phenomena and Noumena, in his attempt to reconcile Rationalism and Empiricism.

(3) Another service which this distinction between Phenomena and Noumena renders to the critical philosophy, is found in Kant's attempt to mediate between Realism and Idealism.

(a) Kant's objection to Transcendental Realism is, that space and time are not realities in themselves independent of our sensibility. They are nothing but forms of our intuition. Our knowledge is not that of things in themselves, existing independent of us, but that of phenomena only. As soon as we regard phenomena as things in themselves we are involved in insoluble difficulties. The only solution of these difficulties, is that we cannot know what things are in themselves; all our knowledge is no other than phenomenal (see pp. 426-431).

(b) Kant's objection to Empirical Idealism is as follows :—

(a) *Sceptical Idealism* is untenable; because it is a self-contradiction on the one hand to affirm 'Cogito, ergo sum,' and, on the other, to doubt the existence of the non-ego. The assertion that I, as a thinking being, exist implies the existence of that which is not I. I cannot say 'I' without distinguishing myself from the not I. When, therefore, I affirm that I as a thinking being exist, I admit the existence of the not I. The one necessarily implies the other. "..... matter, as the substance of phenomena, is really given to the external sense in the same manner as the thinking I, the substance of phenomena, is given to the internal sense" (328).

In the second edition, Kant modifies the argument and maintains that the consciousness of my own existence

is impossible without the existence of things outside me. All I find in me are simply my constantly changing mental states. As such states they require "something permanent, different from them, in reference to which their change and, therefore, my existence in the time in which they change, may be determined. The perception of this permanent, therefore, is possible only through a thing outside me,and the determination of my existence in time is, consequently, possible only by the existence of real things, which I perceive *outside* me." "In other words, the consciousness of my own existence is impossible without an immediate consciousness of the permanent existence of other things (Vol. I, p. 476).

(b) Kant's objection to *Dogmatic Idealism* is obvious from what we have seen when we were discussing how he distinguishes his Idealism from that of Berkeley. Dogmatic Idealism denies the existence of matter, and regards space as a mere empirical presentation, that, like the phenomenon it contains, is only known to us by means of experience or perception, together with its determinations (Proleg. Appendix, p. 125).

Now these two points—the denial of the existence of matter, and the affirmation of the *a post priori* origin of space—are the positions which are elsewhere objected to by Kant.

The Kantian philosophy attempts to mediate between these two—Transcendental Realism and Empirical Idealism—by means of Transcendental Idealism, *i.e.*, the doctrine "that all phenomena are representations only, not things by themselves, and that space and time, therefore, are only sensuous forms of our intuition, not given determinations, or conditions of objects, as things by themselves" (320). This attempt to mediate between Realism and Idealism is fully discussed by Kant in the *Fourth Paralogism*. As this is the special point of our

inquiry, we will briefly state the argument. Transcendental Idealism does not deny the existence of matter considered as a phenomenon only. It does "not hesitate to admit the existence of matter on the testimony of mere self-consciousness, and to consider it as established in the same manner as the existence of my self, as a thinking being" (321). In the second edition he goes so far as to maintain that a permanent logical subject of consciousness is impossible without a permanent reality outside of me, that is, the existence of matter. "The transcendental Idealist is, therefore, an empirical realist, and allows to matter, as a phenomenon, a reality which need not be inferred, but may be immediately perceived" (322). Therefore Kant says: ".....the fact of my having myself given my theory the name of transcendental idealism can justify no one in confounding it with the idealism of Descartes, or with the mystical and visionary idealism of Berkeley, against which and other similar cobwebs of the brain our Critique rather contains the best specific. For what is by me termed idealism, does not touch the existence of things (the doubt of the same being what properly constitutes idealism in the opposite sense), for to doubt them has never entered my head, but simply concerns the sensuous presentation of things, to which space and time chiefly belong" (Proleg. § 13). "Empirical realism is, therefore, perfectly true, that is, something real in space always corresponds to our external intuitions. Space itself, it is true, with all its phenomena, as representations, exists within me only, but the real or the material of all objects of intuition is nevertheless given in that space, independently of all fancy or imagination" (325).

In short, Idealism is right in maintaining that space and time, with all that they contain, are not things nor quantities in themselves, but belong merely to the

appearances of the latter. But it is wrong when it regards space and time as *a posteriori* in their origin and argues that the existence of matter is doubtful or nothing. Realism is right in upholding that something real in space always corresponds to our external intuitions; that something phenomenally real exists in space. But it is wrong when it regards this phenomenal reality as the "thing-in-itself" or Noumenon.

Mediating between the two, *Critical Idealism* teaches, that something real, considered as a phenomenon only, exists in space and time; that space and time are merely *a priori* forms of our intuition and not qualities of things in themselves; that, therefore, all our knowledge is phenomenal and can never be noumenal; that the "thing-in-itself" can never be known by us; it is, however, a necessary postulate of thought, as it is impossible to assert the reality of phenomena without assuming a somewhat which appears as a phenomenon. In other words, against Empirical Idealists, Kant maintains that the matter is real and is known to us. This is his Empirical Realism. Against the Transcendental Realists Kant maintains that Matter is a phenomenon and not a "thing-in-itself." The "thing-in-itself" is a necessary postulate of thought, the true correlate of the phenomena, without which the phenomenon itself becomes groundless. It is, however, only a problematic concept. This is Kant's Transcendental Idealism.

III. Now the question arises: What is this distinction between Phenomena and Noumena which, as we have seen, serves as the principle of mediation in the Kantian theory of cognition? Is it a distinction merely in thought or in reality? Is it a logical distinction or a real distinction? The right answer to this question is not unessential to the correct interpretation of Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself," for he is often misapprehended

and accused of inconsistency on this point. Such a criticism, however, loses its force when his distinction between Phenomena and Noumena is rightly stated. What then is the distinction? It is evident that the distinction is not that of reality but merely that of thought. For, according to Kant, the Noumenon in a negative sense, is nothing but a problematic, limitative concept, and we cannot *know*, in the Kantian sense of the term, whether it exists extra-mentally or not. It is a necessary correlate of the phenomenon but this necessity of thought does not in the least prove the necessity of existence. "A real division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a sensible and intelligible world, is, therefore, quite inadmissible, although concepts may very well be divided into sensuous and intelligible. No objects can be assigned to noumena, nor can they be represented as objectively valid" (222). The distinction then is not that of extra-mental existence but that of thought only.

It is an error not uncommon among some students of Kant, to interpret him as if the distinction were that of existence, and to criticise Kant's doctrine of Phenomena and Noumena as a childish attempt to know a substance without its qualities. It is said against Kant that we cannot draw a hard and fast line between Phenomena and Noumena, and maintain that we know the former but not the latter. They are but two aspects of one and the same reality. We know Noumena by knowing Phenomena.

Now this criticism is true and valid, if Kant holds that we *know* that the "thing-in-itself" exists though we cannot know what the "thing-in-itself" is. This is not, however, the doctrine of Kant. He does not admit that we *know* that the "thing-in-itself" exists. All he maintains is that we must think the "thing-in-itself" as existent, since it is the correlate of the phenomenon. In

short, the concept "thing-in-itself" is a necessary presupposition of our thought but whether behind every phenomenon there is a somewhat which manifests itself as such phenomenon, we can not *know*; for our intuition is sensuous and not intellectual. Thus if Kant's position is rightly understood, the objection to his distinction between Phenomena and Noumena,—that it is a childish attempt to separate entity from its attributes—is removed.

IV. We have seen (1) that there is a strong tendency towards mediation in the Kantian theory of cognition; (2) that this mediation is attempted by the distinction between Phenomena and Noumena: (3) that this distinction of Kant is merely a thought-distinction. We now proceed to examine Kant's writings which belong to the pre-critical period of his speculation in order to ascertain whether there are any indications in his own mental development that the thought to apply this distinction to all the problems of philosophy was regarded by him as the key to their solution.

We have stated once before in another connection that Kant began his philosophical career with the Dogmatism of Leibniz and Wolf, but after several years' reflection under the strong influence of Locke and Hume, changed his standpoint to that of the English empirical school. Although it is not easy to determine the exact dates within which these transitions took place, it is not impossible that the second period in his mental growth began sometime near 1760 and terminated about 1769.

In the essay on the "Dreams of a Ghost Seer illustrated by the Dream of Metaphysics," published in 1766, and regarded by some students of Kant as the first book of his critical period, we find the distinction between Phenomena and Noumena recognised, and the doctrine enunciated that our knowledge deals with Phenomena and not with Noumena. Hence, Kant defines Metaphysics as "the

science of the limits of human reason." Doubtless this distinction was taken by Kant from Locke's "Essay concerning Human Understanding," where it is clearly recognised in various forms. The Phenomenism of Kant becomes more distinct in his "Inaugural Dissertation on the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World." Many salient features of the critical philosophy, as it is stated in the "Critique of Pure Reason," are found in this "Dissertation." His doctrine of space and time as subjective *a priori* forms of intuition is substantially the same as in the "Critique". The distinction between Sense and Understanding is as clearly expounded as in the "Critique". There are, however, some important points of difference between the "Critique" and the "Dissertation". For example: (1) The "Dissertation" maintains that the "thing-in-itself" is known by the Understanding, while this is denied in the "Critique"; (2) the "Dissertation" makes God the unifying ground of experience but the "Critique" finds this unity in the unity of consciousness; (3) although Kant makes the application of the distinction between Phenomena and Noumena to the problems of the Aesthetic, yet it is not carried out into the problems of the Analytic. Therefore the thought to extend this application into the Analytic must have been suggested to him some time between 1770 and 1781.

Kant was not satisfied with the treatment which he gave to the Understanding as the faculty of knowing the "thing-in-itself". This appears from a letter which he addressed to Lambert concerning this "Dissertation". Among other items, we find him saying: "The first and fourth sections, (*i.e.*, De notione mundi generatim, and De principiis formae mundi intelligibilis), may be passed over as unimportant, but in the second, third and fifth, (*i.e.*, De sensibilibus atque intelligibilium discrimine

generatim, De principiis formae mundi sensibilis, and De methodo circa sensitiva et intellectualia) in metaphysics, although on account of my want of skill, I have not elaborated them to my satisfaction, there seems to me a matter which is worthy of a more careful and extended discussion." (Königsberg, Sep. 2, 1770).

Two years later Kant writes to his friend Dr. Marcus Herz: "I have said that the sensuous representations represent things as they appear, while the intellectual representations represent things as they *are*. But how then can these things be given to us, if not by the manner in which they affect us, and, if such intellectual representations are based on our own inner activity, whence comes their agreement with objects which are not their products, and how can the axioms of pure reason about things be of any use without any experience of them?"

In this remarkable letter Kant also speaks of his plan of a work which was to bear the title; "The Limits of Sense and Reason". The book was to consist of two parts,—theoretical and practical. The first part was to contain (1) Phenomenology in general, and (2) the nature and method of Metaphysics, discussing (*a*) the general principles of feeling, of taste (*b*) the first principle of morality. This work of Kant, however, never appeared.

Kant also mentions in this letter his intention to publish the "Critique of Pure Reason," which includes the nature both of theoretical and practical knowledge, so far as it is only intellectual; and he hopes to work out and publish the first part of it, which discusses the sources of Metaphysics, its methods and limits, within about three months (I. Kant's Briefe, p. 28).

All these facts point to the conclusion that the application of the distinction between Phenomena and Noumena to all the problems of philosophy had clearly dawned upon his own mind sometime between 1770-1772. This

application once clearly perceived, Kant must have felt that the problems, for the solution of which he had laboured so long and patiently, found in this the key to their ultimate solution; for, from this time on, Kant speaks more confidently of his theory of cognition which was soon to appear. The "Critique of Pure Reason" did not, however, see the light till 1781.

This conjecture is also confirmed by Kant's statement that the "Critique of Pure Reason" is the fruit of twelve years' reflection. There is a strong reason to believe that the thought to apply this distinction between Phenomena and Noumena to the problems of the theory of cognition was suggested to him sometime after 1766 and before 1770,—say 1768. Though this distinction appears in the essay on the "Dreams of a Ghost Seer," etc., Kant there does not consciously attempt to employ it for the solution of any philosophic problem. The essay could have been written by any disciple of Locke and Hume. In the above cited letter to Lambert, Kant seems to regard the application of this distinction to the problems of the Aesthetic as the most original discovery of his reflection. Now, if we recognise the first impulse to the critical philosophy in this suggestion to apply the distinction to philosophic problems, and place it in the year 1768 or 1769, Kant's own statement in one of his letters that the "Critique of Pure Reason" was the fruit of twelve years' reflection coincides with our hypothesis and confirms it.

V. After this somewhat prolonged exposition of Kant's doctrine of the "thing-in-itself," it is hardly necessary that we should add any criticism; for the exposition itself has more or less clearly revealed to us the defects in the doctrine. But we cannot help asking, before we close our enquiry, whether this "Ideal Realism" of Kant is in general satisfactory. Does it mainly reconcile

the two antagonistic systems of thought—Idealism and Realism ?

To this most pertinent question we are compelled to give a negative answer. The distinction between Phenomena and Noumena, by means of which this mediation seems to be attempted, is groundless and untenable.

It requires no profound thought to perceive that the line drawn between Phenomena as the field of knowledge and Noumena as the sphere of thought only, is not so clear and distinct as Kant maintains. If we accept this distinction, then the realm of knowledge becomes too limited. According to Kant, knowledge is the product of the union of two elements—the matter of sense and the form of thought. “The understanding cannot see, the senses cannot think. By their union only can knowledge be produced.” In other words, knowledge is nothing else than sensations brought under the relating activity of the mind.

Now it is obvious that, if this definition of knowledge is accepted, the “Critique of Pure Reason” itself is excluded from the realm of knowledge. Why? Because the “Critique” professes to be an investigation of the conditions of knowledge; *i.e.*, the objects which it investigates are those conditions which precede knowledge, and make it possible. It follows that the objects with which the “Critique” deals are not knowledge in the Kantian sense, but the conditions of knowledge. If so, the “Critique” is not itself knowledge and the distinction which it makes between Phenomena and Noumena is not real.

If, on the other hand, we admit that the “Critique of Pure Reason” is knowledge, then our knowledge is not limited to phenomena only; for we have then a knowledge of the subjective conditions which make the knowledge of the phenomena possible. But this knowledge of the subjective conditions of phenomena is *transcendental*

knowledge and is to be distinguished from *empirical* knowledge. If this is granted, then our knowledge is not confined within the bounds which the "Critique" has set; it transcends the sphere of Phenomena. It follows that the distinction between Phenomena and Noumena, the knowable and the thinkable, is no longer strictly observed, but practically abandoned. And, if this distinction is untenable and given up, then we are justified in inferring that Kant's mediating attempt between Idealism and Realism is unsuccessful (K. Fischer: A Critique of Kant, p. 134).

Prof. Bowne aptly says: "Kant's philosophy could not stay where it stopped, but either the realistic or the idealistic factor must be given up. Kant himself certainly thought it possible to retain both, but he combined them so unfortunately that while one cannot become a Kantian without being a realist, one cannot remain a Kantian and retain realism" (Bowne's Metaphysics, New York, 1882, p. 483).

The course of the post-Kantian speculation proves the truth of this statement. The idealistic aspect of the Kantian philosophy was developed by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; the realistic aspect of it was developed by Herbart and his school.

Hence, I shall conclude this investigation with the sagacious remark of Jacobi: "without the supposition of the "thing-in-itself" I cannot enter into the Kantian system, but with that supposition I cannot remain there" (Jacobi, werke, Vol. II, p. 304).

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The Zodiac and Year-Beginnings

BY

H. BRUCE HANNAH

I

In his fascinating little work *The Orion*, in the course of a discussion on the terminological change from “Devayana” and “Pitriyana” to “Uttarayana” and “Dakshinayana,” after quoting from the *Shatūpatha Brahmana* (II. 1. 3. 1-3) to the following effect :—

“Vasanta, Grishma and Varsha are the seasons of the Devas, Sharad, Hemanta and Shishira those of the Pitris, the increasing fortnight is of the Devas, the decreasing one of the Pitris: the day is of the Devas, the night of the Pitris: again the first part of the day is of the Devas, the latter of the Pitris When he (the Sun) turns to the north, he is amongst the Devas and protects them; when he turns to the south he is amongst the Pitris and protects them,”

and after referring to the fact that the seasons in Central Asia, where the Āryas dwelt before they entered India, differ from the seasons in India—*e. g.*, the *Barsāt* (*Varsha*), or Rains, commence about the time of the Summer Solstice, whereas in Central Asia they commence about the time of the Autumnal Equinox—the late Mr. Bāl Gangadhar Tilak states that we must therefore hold that “Devayana,” in those earlier Central Asian days, extended over the six months of the year which comprised the three seasons *Vasanta* (Spring), *Grishma* (Summer), and *Varsha* (Rains), *i. e.*, from the Vernal to the Autumnal

Equinox; and he proceeds to say that this shows that the "oldest order of the seasons" (which he thus apparently associates with Central Asia) did not place the commencement of Varsha at the Summer Solstice, but at the Autumnal Equinox. Then Mr. Tilak goes on thus—

"The Winter Solstice, according to this order, falls in the middle of Hemanta. In the modern astronomical works, the Winter Solstice is, however, placed at the end and not in the middle of Hemanta, while the Vernal Equinox is said to fall in the middle of Vasanta. When the Vedic Aryas became settled in India, such a change in the old order of seasons was necessary to make to them correspond with the real aspect of nature. But it is difficult to determine exactly when this change was made."

Here, of course, Mr. Tilak does not say precisely what he means. It was not the order of the seasons that was changed. It was the seasonal difference in Central Asia and in India, experienced by the migrating Āryas, which necessitated in India some corresponding *re-arrangement of the Calendar*.

"The old order of seasons given in the passage above quoted, however, clearly states that Vasanta in old days commenced with the Vernal Equinox. We can now understand why Vasanta has been spoken of as the first season, and why the Nakshatras have been divided into two groups called the Deva Nakshatras and the Yama Nakshatras."

Further on we are told that—

"In the absence of anything to the contrary we might therefore take it as established that in the early Vedic days the year began when the sun was in the Vernal Equinox; and as the sun then passed from the south to the north of the equator, it was also the commencement of his northern passage. In other words, the Uttarayana (if such a word was then used), Vasanta, the year, and the *Satras* all commenced together at the Vernal Equinox. The Autumnal Equinox which came after the Rains was the central day of the year; and the latter half of the year was named the Pitriyana, or what we would now call the Dakshinayana. It is difficult to definitely ascertain the time when

the commencement of the year was changed from the Vernal Equinox to the Winter Solstice. But the change must have been introduced long before the Vernal Equinox was in the Krittikas, and when this change was made *Uttarayana* must have gradually come to denote the first half of the new year, *i.e.*, the period from the Winter to the Summer Solstice. After a certain period the beginning of the year was changed to the Winter Solstice, and it was some time after this change was made that the words *Uttarayana* and *Dakshinayana* came to be used to denote the Solstitial divisions of the year. But *Devayana* and *Pitriyana* could not be at once divested of the ideas which had already become associated with them. Thus while new feasts and sacrifices came to be regulated according to *Uttarayana* and *Dakshinayana*, *Devayana* and *Pitriyana* with all the associated ideas continued to exist by the side of the new system, until they became either gradually assimilated with the new system or the priests reconciled the new and the old systems by allowing option to individuals to follow whichever they deemed best" (pp. 24-27).

What we are specially interested in just now, is not Mr. Tilak's argument on the subject of "*Devayana*" and "*Uttarayana*"—except in so far as that may assist us in the prosecution of our present investigations—but what he says regarding the Calendar Year; as beginning in early Vedic times, and perchance originally, when the Sun, at Terrestrial Vasanta, or Spring, was in the Celestial Vernal Equinox; and as having been *changed* later on in India, at some not definitely ascertainable time—which, however, long preceded the date, say B. C. 1891, when the Vernal Equinox lay in the beginning of the Krittikas—to the Winter Solstice.

There seems to be no doubt at all that the Vedic Indians did, from an early point in their career, commence the year calendrically at the Winter Solstice, calling that half of the year which extends from the Winter Solstice to the Summer Solstice *Uttarayana*, and the other half, from the Summer Solstice to the Winter Solstice, *Dakshinayana*. But they also seem clearly

to have retained the memory of an age when the Nakshatras were regarded quite otherwise, *i. e.*, were divided into two great equal groups, one of which began at the Vernal Equinox, and was called *Devayana*, being the Deva Nakshatras, extending to Vishuvān, or the central day of the year at the Autumnal Equinox, while the other began from Vishuvān, extending to the Vernal Equinox, and was called *Pitriyana*, or the group of the Yama Nakshatras.

But does this really support Mr. Tilak's suggestion that there was once a time, long before the Krittika period, when the Vedic Indians, or their ancestors in Central Asia, or elsewhere, regarded the year as beginning calendrically when the sun was in the Celestial Vernal Equinox—hence at Terrestrial Vasanta, in the Spring?

It is by no means only in the sacred books of India that we find traces of a belief in such an original, or at least old-time, calendrical beginning of the year. It is very generally held now, and indeed has been a tenet of most civilised nations ever since at least the date of the Council of Nice (A.D. 325), which according to William Oxley, apart from its aspects as a historical actuality, was, in its true inwardness, really "a controversy relating to the Sun-God under the form of *Ariēs* (the Ram or Lamb)," and resolves itself "into a descriptive personified account of a conjunction of planets about the time of the nativity of Christ, and the definite fixing of the *first point of Ariēs*, as a basic point in time in history; and which point is used in astronomical science to this day" (*Egypt: The Land of Wonders*, pp. 92, 286).

Also, the writers of *The Perfect Way*, speaking of the Zōdiacal sign *Ariēs*, state that "this latter sign has survived in Christian symbolism because *Ariēs* is always the first Zōdiacal hieroglyph, and thus the permanent

emblem of the one eternal year or great sun-cycle" (*Appendix III*). Here we may remark that many profound and interesting observations are to be found in this wonderful book on the subject of the Zōdiac, which, according to the writers, is simply the first and most stupendous of Bibles, apparently pictorially representing the career of the physical sun in the heavens, and so recording the wonders of the Macrocosm, but esoterically also revealing the eternal verities in the spiritual experience of the individual soul. It represents the universal drama of these living and eternal verities, as it is ceaselessly being enacted in the soul of every child of God. It is the inner psychic history of all humanity—in short, "the Words of God traced on the planisphere by the finger of God, and first expressed in intelligible hieroglyphs by the men of the 'Age of Saturn,' who knew the truth, and held the Key of the Mysteries" (Lect. II, § 40). And so the Zōdiac is associable with, nay, is a mirror of the Microcosm.

In Lect. VI, § 41, in further allusion to the signs or hieroglyphs just mentioned, we are told that, "so far from being ascribed to Man because written in the Zōdiac, they were written in the Zōdiac because recognised as occurring in humanity." Hence, of the Zōdiacal planisphere thus regarded as a picture-bible, we learn finally that "the images embodied in it have controlled the expression of all written Revelation."

Of course, such a statement as that regarding the origin of the Zōdiac in the 'Age of Saturn'—made apparently on the authority of the writers of *The Perfect Way* themselves—will meet with various degrees of acceptance, according to the mentality of the reader. Some, no doubt, will even put it smilingly aside. This, at least, however, may be said. Many millenniums must have elapsed before even the most highly developed

representatives of evolving humanity could have attained to such a degree of interior illumination as is implied in the conceptions hinted at in the above description of the Zōdiacal planisphere as a mirror of the struggling human soul. Pondering, therefore, over this obvious fact, what sort of idea does it not necessarily give us of the immense antiquity of Man—even spiritually developing Man—not so much *since*, as *before*, the epoch when the Zōdiac with its wonderful hieroglyphs was first invented?

It is commonly held that the ancient Greeks derived their knowledge of the Zōdiac from their contemporaries, the Egyptians. To a great extent this is true: though we must not forget that the “Egyptians” were not the same ethnos as the still more ancient Romiū. They were the very mixed inhabitants of the Delta, in the ages that succeeded the tremendous epoch when the older Romiū were destroyed as a nation, uprooted from their ancient homes along the Nile, and deported wholesale to distant countries. These Egyptians of the Delta were, moreover, largely Hellenized. At the same time, this Hellenization of the Delta began before the tragic destruction of the Romiū; and was itself preceded by cultural influences emanating from the Mykenæan and other (shall we say Hanivūan?) predecessors of the Greeks in the lands eventually known as Greece.

In this connection, however, it is necessary to make certain further observations. Greece, as now historically known to us, was only a wondrously beautiful redintegration of the shattered and scattered ethnic, political, economic, and cultural elements of a much vaster, and at least equally if not more beautiful and cultured world along the northern bounds of the Mediterranean Sea, that had been utterly and dramatically smashed up about B.C. 1197 $\frac{218}{480}$ —1151 by Meren-Ptah of the 19th

Romic Dynasty and Rāmēsēs III of the 20th Dynasty. I am not very sure that these great and momentous facts—the vastness, beauty, and lofty culture of the Old Mediterranean Civilisation that preceded the epiphany of Hellas, and indeed out of whose *débris*, or well-churned waters of affliction, Greece in due time arose, like Aphroditē emerging from the Ocean-Foam—have yet been sufficiently grasped and realised, even in circles that consider themselves well-informed. It is therefore with particular pleasure that I welcome the present opportunity of inviting special attention to them, and of extracting from them such assistance as they afford to the enquiry that we now have in hand.

This pre-Hellenic Civilisation that had flourished in the Old Mediterranean World was an incalculably ancient phenomenon of the remoter Past. As sketchily referred to in my recent Lectures on my forthcoming book *Culture and Kultur Race-Origins*, it began, so far as we can rationally suppose, in that unimaginably dim and distant era when what I have called the Great Central Zone, stretching from Atlas and the Pyrenees in the West to say the Zāgros and North Arabia in the East, and lying between say Latitudes 30 degrees and 45 degrees North, was inhabited during many succeeding centuries exclusively by that Dark-White group of humanity which I have ventured to distinguish by the name of the *Melano-Leukochroi*. So remote were these days that we can hardly go wrong if, admittedly on the wings of Fancy, we connect them with the Age associated in so-called Greek Mythology with the hoary old name of Ouranos.

Then followed the Civilisation of the people I have called the *Rhodo-Leukochroi*, or “Rosy Blonds”—doubtless not of such great duration: nevertheless for us incalculably long—which may possibly have commenced in what is known as the Saturnian Age, but which, for

the most part, is connected with the Age associated in Mythology with the majestic name of *Zeus*.

If, now, we try to define the dominant characteristics which distinguished these two great types of Civilisation respectively, and which more or less clearly differentiated the one from the other, there can be little doubt that, in the course of the general and continuous evolution of humanity at large, the development of the Melano-Leukochroi during the Ouranian Era proceeded normally on what we may call *emotional* lines, with sporadic efforts in the more highly cultured circles of society to function in that division of the mental plane which is more particularly associable with the *intellect*: while, during the succeeding Saturnian and Zeus Eras, the development of the superior Rhodo-Leukochroi proceeded normally on *intellectual* lines, with an abnormal groping out, amongst some of the more advanced souls, after that loftier and subtler division of the same mental plane which is more particularly associable with the *intuition*.

Envisaging these two great Eras from the standpoint of Religion—*i.e.*, the sphere wherein Man strives to cultivate those still finer faculties which enable him to function in the realm of *subsistent* reality, *i.e.*, of the eternal verities, and so to transmute every thing of an objective nature into subjective conditions, in order that it may become pabulum of the sort that he can assimilate spiritually, *i.e.*, substantially, vitally, and dynamically—we find, in connection with the conception of God, as the Supreme Unity in whom all Differences at once subsist, consist, and disappear; and whose ineffably mysterious struggle to regain, as it were, his own Divine Self-Consciousness amid the conditions and limitations of Time, Space, and Causality wherewith he eternally, and, as an act of sublime self-sacrifice, voluntarily buries and conceals it for the purposes of what is commonly called Creation (the

production of the World of mere *Existence*, as distinct from *Subsistence*), is mirrored, or shadowed forth, not only in the whole stupendous and everlasting process of cosmic Involution and Evolution, but in the more personal and intimate drama of the individual human soul, as depicted in the Zōdiac, when interpreted from the Microcosmic point of view above referred to, and indeed in all Religious Cults as, in their original and perfect forms, gropings, more or less, after that ideal; we find, I say, that in Ouranian times—the times when Man's emotional nature sought general expression in a tendency to regard the Forces of Nature (chiefly of Creation and Reproduction, but eventually also of Preservation and Sustenance) as objects of worship—throughout the Great Central Zone, but especially throughout the Mediterranean World, the dominant Divine Name was what we may conveniently and provisionally call *El*, in all its formal variants, ultimately expressed under guises such as the familiar *Al*, *Ilū*, *Rā*, *Lā*, and so forth: while, in the succeeding Ages of Saturn and Zeus (connected, as I suggest, with the political and territorial name of Rhodochroia), the dominant Divine Name, throughout the same vast area, was what we may provisionally call *Iō*, in all its formal variants, masculine and feminine—Zeus-Pater, Jupiter Diōnē, Juno, and the like—though, like older scripts showing through a palimpsest, the more ancient Divine Names, in some form or other, still continued, as they continue to this day, to remain in evidence, in their own special areas of development and characterisation.

Needless to say, as formally and functionally expressed in the material and other objective manifestations of the cultures flourishing throughout the above-mentioned Great Central Zone during both the remoter Ouranian Era and the Era of Saturn and Zeus, and in their many more or less

complex related ceremonies and practices—some gorgeous and impressive, many beautiful and refined, but others undoubtedly gross, cruel, and revolting—these two great Religious Cults were the natural and necessary products of the countless influences, more or less subtle and indirect, of the dominant characteristics, whether emotional, intellectual, intuition, or spiritual, which, in different areas and in different periods, were specially distinctive of each, as above noticed.

Here it may be parenthetically mentioned, that the wonderful and renowned Civilisation of the Romiū in Khem was a phenomenon entirely unique and *sui generis*. With respect to the rest of the Old Mediterranean World, in the days both of the ancient Rhodo-Leukochroi, or “Rosy Blonds,” and the still more ancient Melano-Leukochroi, or “Dark-Whites,” Khem, the country, was geographically isolated. In its origins, her peculiar form of Civilisation was rooted in the mighty old Civilisation that, as above stated, flourished for unnumbered centuries throughout the Great Central Zone in the unimaginably distant days of the Melano-Leukochroi. Similarly, her peculiar Religion was rooted in the hoary old Cult that flourished over the same area throughout the same old Ouranian Era. Hence, as springing up on the banks of the Nile, this old Romic Civilisation and Religion were special and localised expressions, side-developments or by-products, of that remote and nebulous Era. Nay, politically, religiously, economically, and in every conceivable respect, Khem out-lived the venerable source from which she had derived her existence. She was a spectator—tensely interested, we may be sure—of the closing phases of that marvellous old *régime*,—the passing away of the beclouded but golden glories of the Melano-Leukochroi. All through the immediately succeeding centuries (but how many they were, who now can tell ?), enthroned upon the Nile,

she watched from afar the refulgent career of its still more brilliant and progressive successor—the Era of Saturn and Zeus—the glittering and strenuous Age of the illustrious “Rosy-Blonds”—as it rose steadily into being, attained its zenith of splendour, beauty, and power, and finally vanished under a veritable cataclysm of dramatic political, social, and even physical upheavals, subsidences, and disintegrations. But, before that tragic and momentous *dénouement* took place, she herself, as the result of multitudinous influences, ceaselessly pouring in upon her for countless centuries from her new environment in the outside world, had become radically metamorphosed, both ethnically and culturally. Nay, not only did she live to see the commencement, culmination, decline, and fall of that so-called Minōan Civilisation whose maritime empire, centring in Krete, fell heir to the power and glories, even to many of the traditions, of imperial old Rhodochroia, but, after utterly destroying the succeeding Aegean World, as it is styled, and witnessing the birth and subsequent career of Hellas—not to speak of what she knew of Rome and the Eastern World, both Cultured and Kultured—she was actually still flourishing in *otium cum dignitate* up till as late as the 6th century B.C !

In Romic, as in many other ancient languages, and even modern languages with an ancient, or rather undeveloped, basis, *l* and *r* were always interchangeable. Hence, the original etymonic form of the well-known Divine Name Rā was probably Lā, or at least admissibly also Lā. I have alluded above to the Drama of the Human Soul, the Life-History of the Divine Man, as esoterically recorded in the hieroglyphs of the Zōdiacal planisphere. In this connection the careers of certain individuals have from time to time been particularly prominent in the past, and have given rise to what are generally designated *Solar Myths*—i.e., a unique class of legends concerning

specific experiences, almost invariably of the same common nature, invariably undergone in the same common sequence, and all clustering round the names of the individuals just mentioned. Say the writers of *The Perfect Way*—

“The soul is as a spiritual sun, corresponding in all things with the solar orb. Wherefore all they who, by virtue of their constituting for men a full manifestation of the powers of the soul, have been to them as a redeeming sun—have been designated sun-gods, and invested with careers corresponding to the apparent annual course of the sun. Between the phenomena of this course and the actual history of the perfected soul is an exact correspondence, requiring for its recognition but due knowledge of both. And it is because the soul’s history is one, and this a history corresponding with the sun’s, that all those who have earned of their fellows the supreme title of Saviour of man, have been invested with it, and represented as having exhibited the same phenomena in their own lives. Thus the history ascribed alike to Osiris, Zoroaster, Krishna, Mithras, Pythagoras, Būddha, and Jesus, has not, as sciolists vainly imagine, been plagiarised in one case from another, or borrowed from some common source in itself unreal; but it has been lived, spiritually, by the men themselves indicated by those names. And, being the history of the soul of the Man Regenerate, it corresponds to that of the sun—the vitalising centre of the physical system—and has accordingly been described in terms derived from the solar phenomena as indicated in the zōdiacal planisphere. Thus the soul’s history is written in the stars; and the heavens are her chronicles, and tell the glory at once of her and of God ” (Lect. II, § 46).

For instance, of all or nearly all the individuals above-named, and, in addition, many Pagan deities, such as Apollo or Dionysus among the Greeks, Hercules among the Romans, Adonis and Attis in Syria and Phrygia, Baal and Astarte among the Babylonians, and so forth, it was more or less said and believed that—

- “ (1) they were born on or very near our Christmas Day.
- (2) They were born of a Virgin-Mother.
- (3) And in a Cave or Underground Chamber.

- (4) They led a life of toil for mankind.
- (5) And were called by the names of Light-bringer, Healer Mediator, Saviour, Deliverer.
- (6) They were however vanquished by the Powers of Darkness.
- (7) And descended into Hell or the Underworld.
- (8) They rose again from the dead, and became the pioneers of mankind to the Heavenly world.
- (9) They founded Communions of Saints, and Churches into which disciples were received by Baptism.
- (10) And they were commemorated by Eucharistic meals."

(*Pagan and Christian Creeds*, by Edward Carpenter, p. 21.)

The same fact is thus elsewhere recorded—

"Thus, to take the leading items of Christian belief—the whole story of the Incarnation, the expectation of the Messiah, the announcement by the angel, the conception by the Virgin, the birth at midnight in a cave, the name of the immaculate mother, the appearance to shepherds of the celestial host, the visit of the Magi, the flight from the persecuting Herod, the slaughter of the innocents, the finding of the divine boy in the temple, the baptism, the fasting and trial in the wilderness, the conversion of the water into wine, and other like marvels, the triumphal entry into the holy city, the passion, the crucifixion, the resurrection, and the ascension, and much of the teaching ascribed to the Saviour—all these are variously attributed to Osiris, Mithras, Iacchos, Zoroaster, Krishna, Buddha, and others, at dates long antecedent to the Christian era. And monuments and sculptures still exist, showing that the entire story of the Divine Man of the Gospels was, long before Moses, taught to communicants and celebrated in sacraments in numberless colleges of sacred mysteries" (*The Perfect Way*, Lect. I, pp. 26, 27).

In ordinary course, before an idea can pass from its preliminary inchoate and nebulous stage of original conception to that of actual birth in definite form, a considerable interval of gestation has to elapse; and this general rule must surely have come into operation with special force in the case of such a conception as that of the Divine Man as depicted in the hieroglyphs of the Zōdiacal planisphere. As, slowly but surely, throughout the ages, humanity

ascended the spiral of development in evolution, until at last the divinity, hidden from all eternity within their lower nature, began to unfold and reveal itself in all its beauty and power to what must ever heretofore have appeared, as it appears, alas, to this day, an unappreciative and even hostile environment, what countless generations—all striving, according to their lights, to search after, if haply they might find, the spiritual treasure which, had they only known it, lay concealed within their own hearts—what countless generations, I say, must have succeeded each other upon the Earth! Millions and millions of soul-wracked individuals, at some stage or other during say the remote and mighty old Ouranian Era, must have passed their lives groping vainly at first, but gradually with more and more hope of reward, after the countless fugitive fancies and mental will-o'-the-wisps that were destined, however slowly and imperceptibly, eventually to polarise into the gloriously definite though mystic conception enshrined in the Zōdiac, as above indicated. Who, then, can estimate the length of the period that must assuredly have elapsed before the first individual appeared whose psychic interior was sufficiently illuminated to enable him to realise the conception of the Divine Man in all, or anything like, its fullness, and whose natural faculties were sufficiently developed to enable him to take those first steps which must have been necessary before the invention of the Zōdiac, as a record of the Drama of the human Soul, could ever have become a *fait accompli*?

I have said that the dominant characteristic of the Civilisation that flourished during the Ouranian Era, when the Melano-Leukochroic race were in exclusive possession of the territories comprised in the Great Central Zone, was its proclivity to function on the *emotional* plane. This is not necessarily a symptom of low development

in evolution, provided it is accompanied by a capacity to function also on the higher, *e.g.*, the *intellectual* and *intuitional*, planes, or if the functioning is performed in a sphere or spheres other than the sphere of the lower nature. But there is every reason to suppose that, in the remote old Ouranian Era, at least during certain sub-periods of it, in certain local areas of the Great Central Zone, or amongst particular ethnic groups, development in evolution had not attained a very high level. Indeed, there can be little doubt that, to a very great extent, it was an Age of unrestrained Nature-worships. In these, says Mr. Edward Carpenter—

“there may be discerned three fairly independent streams of religious or quasi-religious enthusiasm: (1) that connected with the phenomena of the heavens, the movements of the Sun, planets and stars, and the awe and wonderment they excited; (2) that connected with the seasons and the very important matter of the growth of vegetation and food on the Earth; and (3) that connected with the mysteries of Sex and reproduction. It is obvious that these three streams would mingle and interfuse with each other a good deal; but as far as they were separable the first would tend to create Solar heroes and Sun-myths; the second Vegetation-gods and personifications of Nature and the earth-life; while the third would throw its glamour over the other two and contribute to the projection of deities or demons worshipped with all sorts of sexual and phallic rites. All three systems would of course have their special rites and times and ceremonies; but, as I say, the rites and ceremonies of one system would rarely be found pure and unmixed with those belonging to the two others” (*Pagan and Christian Creeds*, pp. 19, 20).

We are now in a position to see how, even during this preliminary stage of Nature-worship, in the course of the mighty old Ouranian Era—probably during its later phases and after an incalculably long age of Moon-Worship—throughout the Great Central Zone there arose and flourished a vast and probably varied Cult of Sun-Worship, which, once sprung into being, entered upon a

course of continuous and elaborate development, to such an extent and in such a manner that even El, or whatever its real etymonic form was—the name given to the Supreme Deity by the Melano-Leukochroi of Ouranian days throughout the Great Central Zone—and the innumerable special and local variants and outgrowths from it which from time to time acquired a vogue more or less lasting and renowned, became invested more or less, and in some cases even completely, with the attributes of Sun-gods. To this source, for example, we shall probably have to repair, to discover the beginnings of Cults such as that eventually known as Trōjan *Āpeilōn*—a form of Apollo, really going back for its origins to the Age of Nature-worship in its Sexual aspect, and as such deriving, perhaps through *Āb-Ālāh-On* (*Ān*, *Āun*, or *Āven*), or something similar, from Father On, or rather Father El, as originally identical with On, the old Ouranian god of Reproduction; that of Baal, or Bel—originally nothing but *Āb* (i.e., Father) *Īlū*, or El; that of Grecian Apollo—originally *Āb-Hēlios*, or *Āb-Elīos*; and so forth. Overflowing into earliest Khem, the same archaic Sun-Cult of Ouranian El appears on the isolated banks of old Nile, amongst the primitive Romiū, as *Lā*, which, in that then Melano-Leukochroic land, I take to have been the etymonic, or at least an admissibly alternative, form of that familiar form *Rā* which is more commonly associated (at least as usually rendered) with the history of later Tomeri. Nay, to this same old Ouranian fountain-head El, *Lā*, or *Rā*, as invested with the attributes of a Sun-god, I think we must even resort for a solution of the problem of the origin of the Cult of Mitra, or Mithras. In association with other Divine Names, one of which is actually *Vāruṇa* (either, like Ouranos itself, or the etymon of both, Solar, or Lunar, or perhaps Luno-Solar, in its associations), we find it solidly established, *circa* the 15th

century B.C., in Mitanni, the “Country” of the “Mits,” or ancestors of the later *Madāi*, *Matai*, *Medi*, or *Medes*: for, if we analyse the word *Mitra*, we find that, in its two component parts, *Mit* and *Rā*, it reveals itself as nothing more or less than the Sun-God *El*, *Lā*, or *Rā*, as worshipped up to the 15th century B.C. by the Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian ethnos then known to the Romiū as the Mitannians or Mits, *i.e.*, as the subjects of the highly cultured and considerably powerful State whose territories lay within the great bend of the Euphratēs, on its eastern side.

Now, if there is one conclusion more than another which impresses itself upon our minds with the force of conviction, during and after a study of these wonderful old Sun-Cults, and perhaps more especially this intensely interesting Cult of Mithraism, it is this; that we must resolutely steel ourselves to a drastic and immediate revision of our ingrained conventional ideas on the subject of the origins of Christianity, the relative merits of the Cult that now passes under that name, and what, with a superior smile, Christendom still rather contemptuously, or at any rate patronisingly, calls Paganism—which it affects to contrast with itself, much after the manner in which Mūslims contrast the so-called “Times of Ignorance” with the days of Islām—and the well-nigh incalculable spiritual debt which Christianity, whether properly conceived, *i.e.*, as originally promulgated in all its pristine simplicity and purity, or as the extraordinarily materialistic and self-centred system of faith and practice into which it has actually degenerated, owes to the really ineffably profound and beautiful teachings of Pagan Pantheism—especially as enshrined in the still greatly unappreciated, and possibly little understood, mysteries of Mithraism.

But what, it may be asked, has all this to do with the specific subject into which we are now enquiring—the

Zōdiac and Year-Beginnings ? Indeed, it is all very much to the point ; and at last we are coming to that point. We see now that—just as *genus Homo* did not originate exclusively in any one isolated local area, country, or even continent, but, like the grass, in apparently general spontaneity and independence, ubiquitously all over the Earth—so as regards the remotely ancient and once all-dominant Cult of Sun-worship, its origins, if not in fact world-wide, are certainly to be sought for, not in Khem alone, and not in any other local area, country, or even continent alone, but at least throughout the whole vast stretch of the Great Central Zone above-referred to, and of which the territories inhabited by the ancient Romiū formed only a part. Moreover, on the northern side of the “Great Green Sea,” or Mediterranean, the territories of the race or races whose once wonderful political constitution and whose undoubtedly great and almost peerlessly beautiful Civilisation were completely smashed up and scattered in the 12th century B.C. by Meren-Ptah and Rāmēsēs III—later Hellas, like a lovely dream, like Aphroditē emerging from the Ocean-Foam, or like the Phoenix rising into life again from its own dead ashes, having merely been an emanation from, and a re-gathering, re-construction, and re-organisation of, the *débris* resulting from that stupendous and portentous *débacle*—these “European” territories, which in part eventually became known again under the name of Greece, must have comprised at least a portion of the mighty area throughout which, as above explained, the hoary old Cult of Sun-worship once flourished as the dominant faith and philosophy, and wherein also, as we have seen, we must search for its earliest beginnings. Hence it follows as a reasonable conclusion that there also we must expect to find an original, and not merely a derivative, knowledge of the Zōdiac and all that it

was supposed to signify from an esoteric as well as an exoteric point of view.

Therefore, to say shortly that the Greeks acquired their knowledge of the Zōdiac from the Egyptians or the Romiū, is to give a wholly inaccurate and unfair presentation of the full and true facts of the case. Quite possibly, nay, quite probably, if not from their own traditions, at any rate from the multitudinous and complex traditions which they had inherited from their Rhodo-Leukochroic and other predecessors, the early Greeks were independently and intimately acquainted with the famous planisphere and all that it is supposed to represent. A recognition of this, however, by no means implies that, from an astro-theological point of view, early Greek Culture was in no way indebted to the Egyptians and Romiū. It certainly *was* indebted to them, and not alone from the standpoint just referred to. But, between the two regions—Hanivū-descended Hellas and Khem—and the two Civilisations—that of the ancient Rhodo-Leukochroi and the later Greeks, and that of the ancient Romiū and the later Egyptians—accounts had doubtless for untold centuries been mutual: and to-day it is probably impossible to say in whose favour, on this side or on that, the final balance, or even the floating balance for the time being in the past, really lay.

And now we can take another step forward. We have seen that, while the Vedic Indians, in their sacred books, had records which pointed to a time when, amongst their Āryan or perchance pre-Āryan ancestors outside of India, the calendrical opening of the year was possibly associated with *Vasanta*, or Spring, when the sun was apparently lying in the Celestial Vernal Equinox, yet, as a matter of demonstrable fact, when actually dwelling in India (perchance more definitely in the

regions once known as *Brahmā-rsi-dēsa*), the Vedic "Aryas" themselves in practice recognised the year, the *Satras*, and *Uttarayana* (dubiously also the more ancient but still vaguely remembered *Devayana*), as all in common beginning, not in *Vasanta*, but some time in *Hemanta*, when the sun appeared to be lying in the Celestial Winter Solstice—hence some time in the course of that moiety of the sun's annual path which their descendants or cultural heirs are now more wont to speak of as *Dakshinayana*. Further: if reference be made to my recent Lectures on *Culture and Kultur Race-Origins*, alluded to *supra*, a brief statement of the facts and arguments will be found on which I base my theory that, during some indefinite period about the time of the final *pralāya* of ancient Mediterranean "Rhodochroia," a vast wave or succession of waves of Rosy-Blond migration issued surgingly out of that once mighty old seat of glittering and beautiful power and culture, and rolled away into the Known and the Unknown in several different directions—there eventually to settle down more or less permanently, or at least long enough to bring to birth an entirely new world—ethnically, politically, culturally, and in every conceivable respect. One of these waves, or perhaps more than one, and possibly the biggest, went Eastward. Theretofore, as I pointed out, that East had known only four main types or species of humanity—in northern latitudes the Yellows, or Xantho-Tūranians; in central latitudes, but for the most part confined to what we would now call Western Asia, Eastern representatives of the Dark-Whites, or Melano-Leukochroi; in southern latitudes the Blacks, or pure-Melanos; and sporadically everywhere, but especially throughout the principal mountain-ranges, yet another and unique ethnos—originally a cross or amalgamation between the Yellows and the Dark-Whites—who, under

various names, such as the Kāssi, the Kephs, the Tokhs, and the Wolf-Folk, have consistently, throughout recorded time, blazed a blood-stained way for themselves in such manner that, in every age and well-nigh in every country, their name has been regarded as a synonym for all that is false, cruel, mean, and in every way evil. The first three types of humanity may or may not have been civilised : but at least they were not barbarous—unless we except the very lowest representatives of the Blacks, who (*e.g.*, as in India under the name of *Niṣādas*) undoubtedly roamed the wilds of southern latitudes in the well-authenticated guise of unmitigated and repulsive savages. On the other hand the Kāssi were frequently civilised, sometime highly so ; but even so—civilised or uncivilised—throughout the ages they have never, in any country, been innately anything but patently or latently barbarous.

The point to be noticed is that in those days—*i.e.*, up to the epoch of the migrations just referred to—the East had known nothing whatever of Blond Humanity. With the advent, however, into that Blondless East, of the Rosy-Blond Rhodo-Leukochroi, all this was changed. Entirely new race-stocks were brought to birth. An entirely new world—ethnically, politically, economically, socially, culturally, and in every imaginable way—polarised gradually, or, as it now seems to us moderns, sprang suddenly, into existence.

Tracing the slow but steady and impressive progress eastwards of these pink-and-white, energetic, resourceful, and culture-laden adventurers, I showed how, in consequence of a vast amalgamation in upper Western Asia that was effected at a comparatively early stage of the migratory movement, between the migrating host on the one part and the local Tūrānians, or Yellows, of the other part, in the persons of the race whom I

designate the Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānians (or shortly, the Rhodo-Tūrānians), the first great new sub-stock that appeared in the then metamorphosing Orient makes its *début* on the stage of history, in the regions stretching roughly between the Euphratēs (perhaps even the Halys) on the west, and the southern end of the Caspian Sea on the east. The semi-Rosy-Blond, semi-Tūrānian inhabitants of the country east of Euphratēs, that was known to the Romiū of the 18th dynasty, in say the 15th century B.C., under the name of Mitanni, were the final and concentrated expression of this great and interesting ethnos, as developed into maturity within their own original territorial cunabula, or area of racial characterisation. Theirs was really the country upon which Abraham and the other elder Hebrew patriarchs are said to have looked back lovingly as their true domicile of origin, or home-land. It was the realm over which those other two Bible celebrities, Tidal King of Nations in the 20th century B.C., and Cūshān Rishathaim in the 15th century B.C., are recorded to have ruled. It is there that—in the names of its deities, Vāruṇa, Mitra, Indra, and the Nāsatyau, —we find our first evidence in support of the proposition that the stream of transmitted culture, in the guise of divine names such as these, moved from the Mediterranean West eastward, and not, as the old school of Sanskritists and others would have us believe, from the Orient (especially the ancient Indian Orient) westward into the countries bordering upon the Old Mediterranean World, or comprised within it. It was a body of brilliant military adventurers, issuing out of early Rhodo-Tūrānia, who—apparently on the formal invitation of the autochthons (really “Semites” belonging to the race of the so-called “Black-Heads,” or “Dark-Faces,” *i.e.*, the stock of the aboriginal Eastern Melano-Leukochroi) then dwelling in that inter-riverine part of the Tigro-Euphratēs Valleys

which was known to the more southern Sūmerians as Agadē, and later, in Babylonian, as Akkad, or the "Highlands"—made what seems to have been a perfectly peaceable entry into the country, took effective possession of it, introduced into it such of their own originally Rhodochroia-derived institutions, laws, ideals, and customs as they thought the "Black-Heads" were capable of assimilating, gave it an efficient system of administration, took all such military steps as were necessary to protect it from its possible enemies—of whom the principal were probably the Kāssite hill-peoples of Elām to the east—intermarried freely with its inhabitants, and in short so completely transformed and transmuted it and its denizens, politically, economically, ethnically, socially and culturally, that somewhere about the epoch B.C. 2050 (*i.e.*, after a lapse of approximately 600 years from the time of their original advent), our eyes are dazzled by the rising phenomenon of Babylon—seat of a practically brand-new, unique, and astonishingly brilliant and, for a time, all-dominant ethnos, civilisation and empire.

Meanwhile, away to the north, centring at first round a city called Asshur, but ultimately finding more permanent settlement in and around Nineveh, certain other ethnic elements—hitherto, and perhaps still, conventionally regarded as having belonged to the same "Semitic" stock as Orthodoxy persists in imagining the intruding Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian administrators and reformers of pre-Babylonian Agadē, and the eventual artificially-compounded Babylonians themselves, to have belonged to—had been drawing together and growing up into an organised community which eventually polarised into the State celebrated in history under the name of Assyria. In my belief—which I hope some day to see generally accepted—the ethnic basis of this new member of the international family was not dominantly "Semitic";

certainly not "Semitic" in the extraordinary sense in which conventional teaching presents the Amorites of northern Syria as having been "Semitic"; and, except to a limited extent, not even of what I call Eastern Melano-Leukochroic stock—but principally, or at least very largely, of Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian blood. Nay, not impossibly it may turn out that Assyrian ethnic origins are traceable, at least partially, to Mitannian sources.

During the deceitfully radiant days of Amenhotep III (Nimmūrīya), *Grand Monarque* of 18th-dynasty Tomeri (B.C. 1372-1341), Mitanni was still a flourishing and influential Power, enjoying friendly intercourse with imperial old Khem. But, following hard on the collapse of the latter's Syrian empire in the reign of Amenhotep IV, *alias* Ākh-en-Āten, or Napkhūriya (B.C. 1341-1325—when, as a factor in the general situation, Assyria, though not exactly in her infancy, was nevertheless only in her early youth), disaster overtook it (apparently from the Hittites and Assyrians), and, as a political entity, at least under its old name, and in the territories associated therewith, it vanished completely from the stage of history as hitherto conventionally depicted. What, then, became of the Mitannians, as an ethnos? It is idle to try to find them, as has been suggested, in the comparatively petty little community of the Mannai (Minni), dwelling between and just south of Vān and Urumīyeh in say B.C. 734. They were a special creation of Tiglath-Pileser (Pūlū). Rather must we conclude that, some time probably in the 13th-12th centuries B.C., the Mitannians retired eastward into the territories lying on the other side of the Zāgros range, and there initiated, or at least very largely contributed to, the rise and evolution of the Medic name, so prominent and even celebrated in the pages of conventional ancient history.

Now, though the Mitannians proper were *quasi* Rosy-Blonds of the Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian variety, they were not the whole of that important sub-stock. They were only its most highly developed representatives, its finest flower, its last and best and definitely localised expression, during the centuries which immediately preceded their final dissolution and evanishment in the 13th-12th centuries B.C. Beyond their specific and perhaps exclusive pale, throughout the region above referred to as stretching between the Euphratēs, or perhaps the Halys, in the west and the southern end of the Caspian in the east, existed a population more scattered, probably less numerous, and certainly less culturally advanced, but belonging to the very same ethnic stock. Possibly in them we actually find the original *Mandā*. In the earliest beginnings of Assyria (*circa* B.C. 1840-1700), the gravitating ethnic elements which eventually matured as that nation, constituted an outlying dependency of Babylon, being ruled by *patēsis*, or priest-viceroy, appointed by her; but some 600 years afterwards, we find them developed into an individuated, co-ordinated, independent, and even aggressive political entity. In the days of their immaturity, the ethnic ingredients aforesaid had probably been drawn from the circumambient, non-Mitannian (Can we call them the original *Ma'dian*?) representatives of the Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian race just alluded to. No doubt, however, they were also partially of Eastern Melano-Leukochroic, or as we may say, "Semitic," extraction. At a much later date (13th-12th centuries B.C.), in the turmoil attendant on the fate that befell Mitanni, it is quite possible, nay, even probable, that their numerical strength and their *quasi* Rosy-Blond composition were considerably augmented by bodies of Mitannian fugitives, abandoning for ever the desolated territories of their fatally stricken homeland. Also I am persuaded—though, with our present

inadequate data, it is difficult to substantiate the suggestion for those who insist on strict technical "proof"—that, in the eventual Assyrian body-ethnic, there was a considerable strain of barbarous Kāssite blood.

Now, the Rosy-Blonds who married into the widespread community of the autochthonous Xanthochroi, or Yellows, of Tūrān'ia in upper Western Asia, and so gave birth to this great new Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian substock of which I have been speaking, were only a comparatively small proportion of the mighty wave of migrant Rhodo-Leukochroi with whom they had issued out of the Old Mediterranean World and found their way into the Orient. After, by their unions with the local Tūrānians of that part of the world, they had severed themselves from the main mass of their migrating kindred, that main mass, as I pointed out in my Lectures on *Culture and Kultur Race-Origins*, proceeded upon their way eastward, and in due course they settled down finally in the more easterly "highlands" of Central Asia, and there acquired the name of the *Airyānians*—their country becoming known as *Airyarō-Vaēja*, or the "Airyānian Home-land." Thus, as explained in my Lectures, they were an absolutely distinct and different race, not only from the historical Medes (who were not, like them, of the *pure* Rosy-Blond stock), but also from the Persians (who, as an individuated ethnos, had no Rhodo-Leukochroic blood in their veins at all, and even little or no Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian blood, but were in fact for the most part of *barbarous Kephenian, i.e., Kāssi'e, descent*): and, of course, wherever they went, these fair-complexioned migrants took along with them those priceless treasures which had been their natural heritage in the now distant West, *i.e.*, in their own wonderful home-land in the Old Mediterranean World (Rhodo-chroia), and which they had carried thence in the

momentous day of their Exodus:—its mythologies, traditions, sciences, arts, dialects, astro-theology, exoteric and esoteric faiths, divine and other names, folk-songs, laws, institutions, customs, and culture generally; though, as we have seen, the seeds of some of these possessions had already been sown by the way, *e.g.*, in the soil of Mitanni, the Tigro-Euphratēs Valleys, and upper Western Asia generally. And if the main mass of the Airyānians thus took these flowers of cultural progress with them into the virgin East, much also of a somewhat similar nature blew across in the same direction during the days of the passage of the progenitors of the Northern Medes, or *Sar-Madāi*, from 13th-12th century Mitanni and its neighbourhood into the lovely wilderness-territories that awaited them and their further historical destinies on the eastern side of the Zāgros.

The eventual separation that took place between the Airyānians (afterwards distinctively so styled, in the better known form “Irānians”) and the Āryas (also afterwards distinctively so styled, though certain *non-Āryan* ethnai called the *Pāṇchālas* ultimately appropriated the name); the settlement of these Āryas for a time in the region now called Sēistān; and their migration in alarm, *circa* B.C. 1151, to, and final re-settlement in, the riverain of ancient *Sapta-Sindhavaḥ*—followed almost immediately by the non-Āryan *Pāṇcha-Jaṇāḥ*, *Pāṇcha-Manūṣya-Jātani*, *Pāṇcha-Kṛṣṇi*, or “Five Races,” *i.e.*, the Pūrūs, Yādūs, Tūr-Vāsas, Anūs, and Drūhyūs; I merely mention for the present. The time has not yet come to discuss that subject with the fullness which it demands.

Rather let us revert to that very much earlier period—the epoch of the advent of the Western Rosy-Blonds into the partly Xanthochroic and partly Eastern Melano-Leukochroic Orient—when the foundations were

laid of that new ethnic sub-stock who, as we have seen, were really the common progenitors mainly of the historical Medes, and, to at least a considerable extent, of the historical Assyrians—not to speak of the contribution they also made to the ethnic composition of the historical Babylonians proper.

There is reason to believe that all this occurred some time during, if not before, the Tauric Era (*Cir. Conv. B.C.* 4311 $\frac{1}{3}$ —2155 $\frac{2}{3}$). The facts and arguments in this connection have already in part appeared, and will still from time to time appear, in the general course of our discussion, and therefore need not be specifically set forth here.

Now, at last, we are beginning to come to grips with what, in this paper, we originally set out to investigate—the Zōdiac and Year-Beginnings—some aspects of which have already been considered in my earlier papers on *Ancient Romic Chronology*, *The Throne of Ptāh*, *Romic Calendrical Beginnings*, and *Mēnēs and the Sōthic Cycle*.

If it really be the fact that, not only racially, but in respect also of their several cultural heritages, the ancient Medes almost wholly, the ancient Assyrians to a great extent, and the Babylonians proper at least to some extent, were the joint heirs, or heirs in common, of one common precursor—the once widespread, civilised, and influential Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian sub-stock above-referred to; and if the ethnic and cultural origins of that common precursor are themselves traceable back, at least in great measure, to the dazzling and well-nigh supernal splendours of old Mediterranean Rhodochroia; then if, amongst the surviving vestiges of these now vanished States and Civilisations—Media, Assyria, Babylon—there be aught to enlighten us as to the angle of vision at which each regarded the subject say of astro-theology in general, and perchance that of the Zōdiac and Year-Beginnings

in particular ; may we not reasonably expect, or at any rate hope, that in the data actually furnished by each, as discovered by the industry and genius of our archaeologists, past and present, there may be some obvious or inferable resemblance to, or *liaison* of some sort with, the data actually furnished by the others, and that these resemblances and *liaisons* may prove to be of such a nature as will enable us to arrive at some conclusion or conclusions whereby an appreciable advance will have been achieved along the hitherto dim and delusion-haunted high-road and by-paths of our knowledge of Antiquity? Happily, in the obscurer archives of Mediology, and Assyriology, we do, as a matter of fact, come across such a “find.”

Shortly stated, it is this : that certain Divine Emblems, representative of the gods Asshur and Ahūrā-Mazdā respectively, and in vogue in late Assyrian and what we may call comparatively early Media times, were strikingly similar, and, like the symbology of the Royal Standard of the same late Assyrian period, have obvious Zōdiacal, and in particular Tauric, associations. Thus, in these respects, both—the Emblems and the Standard—refer back for their origins to anything between B.C. 4311 $\frac{1}{3}$ and B.C. 2155 $\frac{2}{3}$ —in other words, to what I call Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian times and conceptions.

But the adequate discussion of this important subject demands a paper to itself.

The Zodiac and Year-Beginnings.

BY

H. BRUCE HANNAH.

II.

I now propose to deal more fully with the archæological "find" (or rather "finds") to which I alluded at the end of my last paper. The credit for having first intelligently interpreted them is really due to the Hon. Emmeline M. Plunket, authoress of *Ancient Calendars and Constellations*, 1903; but, in this paper, it will be convenient to present what I have to say on the subject in my own language, and from the point of view which, with reference to origins in general, I have taken up in all my lectures and writings. I make this acknowledgment the more gladly because, in the most striking way—to me as unexpected as welcome—the facts collected by Miss Plunket, and the hypotheses based thereon which she from time to time advances, in very great measure corroborate all that I have heretofore been urging.

My first reference is to the Royal Standard of Sargon II, Sār of Assyria, *circa* B.C. 720-711, or conventionally B.C. 722-705. As depicted, we see the pole surmounted by a design, consisting of a circle superposed upon a jar, which again is superposed upon two heads, or rather two in one, which are representative partly of a bull and partly of a lion. At the top of the circle is the figure of Asshur in the character of an archer. At the bottom of

the circle, placed in the mouth of the jar, are two lions' heads, one looking right, and the other left, while, out of the mouth of each, issues what seems to be a stream of water. On these two streams, stand two bulls, one facing right, the other left. From near their rumps, about the centre of the circle, and proceeding upwards, past the figure of Asshur, on each side of it, are two sets of wavy lines—possibly water, but markedly different from the water issuing from the lions' heads. They *may* refer to the Milky Way. Underneath the lions' heads, the water-jar, and the duplicated half-heads, is in each case a triple circle, which may or may not possess some esoteric significance. At the head of the pole, just beneath the design, on opposite sides, are two plain rings.

Obviously, this is all astronomic symbology, and Zōdiacal at that. In Asshur, the archer, we see Sagittarius. In the bulls, Taurus. In the jar and streams of water, Aquarius. In the lions, Leo. And yet it is not *all* quite clear. If Taurus be right, ought we not to be given its direct opposite, Scorpio, and not Sagittarius? Or, if Sagittarius be right, should we not be given Gemini, and not Taurus? The question, therefore, arises: Where, at the time supposed to be referred to in the symbology, was the Celestial Vernal Equinox? In Taurus? Or in omitted Gemini? The introduction of Leo and Aquarius settles this point. In association with them, the period indicated must have been the Tauric Era. Then why bring in Sagittarius, and not Scorpio? Miss Plunket explains this difficulty. It arises from the fact that the Constellations, being really shapeless, are not sharply defined or definable, and accordingly do not exactly coincide with the Zōdiacal Signs which are similarly named. Owing to this irregularity, the extreme western degrees of Sagittarius really tally, it seems, with the extreme eastern degrees of Taurus—instead of equating neatly, as in

theory we might expect them to do, with the extreme western degrees of Gemini. This appears to be quite reasonable, and may therefore be accepted as a satisfactory solution of the problem. I take it, then, that in the symbology of the Standard under notice, the reference is to the Tauric Era—*circa* Conv. B.C. 4311 $\frac{1}{3}$ -2155 $\frac{2}{3}$. But Sargon's day was very far removed from then. Something, therefore, is surely wrong here—either in the reference to the Tauric Era, or in our conventional notions regarding the age in which Sargon II flourished! But no: there is nothing wrong in either of these directions. I shall come back to this point later on.

There is another Assyrian Standard, less elaborately reproduced, and somewhat different in its details from the Standard just commented upon—but from which, nevertheless, similar conclusions may be drawn. Once more the design consists of a circle, with an archer-figure within it, which doubtless represents Asshur as before. He stands on the back of a *galloping* bull; and beneath this animal we again see what are apparently crude representations of the water-jar, the double griffin-heads, and the triple circlet. Possibly the galloping attitude of the bull signifies the swift passage, or approaching close, of the period recorded—perhaps pre-Assyrian. Also, attached to the head of the pole, just where the rings are in the Sargonic Standard, hang what appear to be tails—probably bulls' tails. This Standard is to be found reproduced in *Monuments of Nineveh*, Plate XXII, by Layard. One peculiarity in it invites attention. Instead of the two sets of wavy lines found in the first-mentioned Standard, passing on either side of the archer, there is a simple straight bar or band, traversing the circle on a level with, but behind, the loins of the archer. Again I suggest that this may be intended for the Milky Way.

Next let us notice some of the resemblances that so strikingly subsist between the symbolical art of the Assyrians and that which is usually spoken of as Medo-Persian. Each had a Divine Emblem—commonly, I believe, spoken of as the *Feroher*—depicting a wingéd, tailed and somewhat dove-like disc (solar in the case of Asshur), wherein is set the upper portion of the national deity—in the Assyrian Emblem, Asshur; in the Medo-Persian, Ahūrā-Mazdā. In the latter, moreover, a large circle takes the place of the solar disc. It has streamers falling from it, right and left; but in his hand Ahūrā holds a circlet—intended as an allusion to the asterism of the Southern Crown (*Corona Australis*), which, I understand, was represented by Claudius Ptolemaeus (*circa* A. D. 139-161) as belonging to the Constellation Sagittarius. It does, in fact, lie to the west of the latter, just below the archer's outstretched arm. Of the Assyrian Emblem there are varieties. In one, the disc, as already noted, is an obvious representation of the sun; while, in his hand, just like Ahūrā, Asshur holds the circlet—*Corona Australis*. In a second, what Asshur stands in is a plain ring; while this time he is portrayed as an archer, thus referring to Sagittarius. In others, no divine figure at all appears within the circle or disc—the idea, no doubt, being there more abstract than concrete.

Here, although there are no bulls, lions, or water-pots, the reference is obviously again to the Tauric Era: indeed, actually to its opening stage—a conclusion forced on us by considerations connected with the persistent inclusion, in many of these Emblems, of Asshur, or Ahūrā, in the character of an archer; for the slightest allusion to Sagittarius necessarily points to the eastern or earlier degrees of Taurus. The period indicated, therefore, is clearly somewhere about B.C. 4311 $\frac{1}{3}$.

In Persepolis—the still somewhat mysterious capital of the Akhaimenidai—there is a wilderness of ruins, amidst which are to be found many specimens of supposedly Persian art. Many of these are symbolical, and astronomical, and even—like the Standards and Emblems—carry our minds back to Tauric times. In this connection may be specially mentioned the well-known *Combat du roi et du griffon*, in which is depicted a colossal figure, perchance of Mithras, perchance of the Akhaimenian monarch, thrusting his sword into the vitals of a rampant and equally enormous monster, obviously representative of the four points of the Zōdiac already alluded to—Leo, Taurus, Scorpio (instead of Sagittarius), and the Eagle (really the star Altair in Constellation Aquila) instead of Aquarius; also the huge man-headed winged bulls, guarding the Persepolitan palace gates; also the magnificent rock-sculpturing at Persepolis, wherein Darius I is shown seated on his throne, upheld by the various nations who, either *de facto* or in virtue of Akhaimenian claims, were subjects of the Persian Crown, and which, at the top, displays the usual Divine Emblem, or *Feroher*, and, lower down, shows pillars moulded in divers esoteric fashions, including a group of 5 mysterious circlets; also the animal forms surmounting columns and entablatures at Sūsa (Shūshān)—the heads and fore-parts, sometimes of horses (specially Persian), sometimes of bulls, and sometimes of griffins, much like those above noticed; also the famous Lion-frieze at Sūsa; and so forth. Finally, there is a Royal Seal, found at Sūsa by M. Dieulafoy: but—although it displays the *Feroher*—its symbology is so obviously Egyptian, that archaeologists have concluded that it could only have been adopted from Egypt after the conquest of that country by Kambūjiyeh in B.C. 525. However, on these more distinctively Persian antiquities, I do not lay much stress, as, having, to a great extent,

been of Kephēnian, *i.e.*, barbarous Kāssite, descent, the Persians were not original thinkers, but only imitators and spoilers of the profound conceptions of contemporary or preceding culture-nations. They are not really Persian art, but surviving specimens of old Medic and Assyrian art, modified by a culturally inferior race, to suit their own tastes and fancies; and it is merely as such that I mention them.

Now, Sārgon II's regnal period was, at the very earliest, B.C. 722. Assyria herself, in her origins, does not go back much beyond say B.C. 1800. Between that date and say some time in the 19th century B.C., she cannot be described as having attained the status of an individuated body-politic. In the 20th century B.C.—about which time the Tauric Era had definitely ceased—she probably was not in existence in any traceable form.

With regard to the Medes—*i.e.*, the Northern Medes, as known to conventional history—though restless, ambitious, and aggressive in the days of Nineveh's Fall under the sledge-hammer blows of the Sākhi in B.C. 628, they did not really attain to power till the epoch of the Fall of Babylon in B.C. 538. In the days of the Arārdhan Revolt against Sārgon II (B.C. 710–705), the Medes, though numerous, were not an orderly, well-cemented, and organised community. On the contrary, despite their descent on one side of their pedigree, they were centuries behind their Assyrian, Sākh-Gelōthic, and Khāldisian neighbours in civilisation—and this as regards the arts and sciences not only of peace but also of war, and their affairs were in an exceedingly rudimentary and chaotic state. Even as late as the reign of Esarhaddon of Assyria (B.C. 679–667), they did not form a compact and united nation, as is proved by the absence among them of national government. They were, in fact, in the clan-stage of society—but in the clan-stage only.

Nevertheless, their cultural and political inferiority was not of an essential kind. They were the children of misfortune—of a tragic and a cruel fate—having fallen from a previous estate which may even be described as exceedingly lofty. In short, their immediate progenitors had been none other than the Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian inhabitants of that Euphratean State, long celebrated under the name of Mitanni, which was so completely wiped out of existence somewhere about the 13-12th centuries B.C.

But the Mitannians were not the sole representatives of their race. Throughout the regions stretching from perhaps the Halys in the west to the southern end of the Caspian Sea in the east, there dwelt another great population belonging to the same wonderful stock—though not so highly civilised, a folk perhaps more or less nomadic, and perhaps also less numerous, but scattered and uncoordinated. As already suggested, these may have been the original *Mandā*—perhaps the Umman-Mandā referred to in Babylonian texts. To them the very much later and much less multitudinous *Zāb-Mands*, or *Sāb-Mands*, or “Nomads of the Zāb”—whose ethnic affinities are still undetermined—may or may not have been akin. In any case, I am not now referring to these *Zāb-Mands*.

Now, both of these great and ancient ethnoi—the highly civilised and settled Mitannians, and the outlying scattered and more undeveloped “*Mandā*”—were simply different branches of one splendid and once dominant race, of Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian descent; having been the mighty product of a momentous amalgamation in upper Western Asia between its Tūrānian (*i.e.*, Xanthochroic) autochthons on the one part, and some of the Rhodo-Leukochroic, or Rosy Blond, migrants then (some indefinite time before the opening of the Tauric Era) arriving in the Orient from their original western home-land in the old Mediterranean World. Where, exactly, in

that part of the world, this wondrous super-race of Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānians established the Seat of their power and culture, who now can say ? Most probably it was in the territories which eventually developed into Mitanni—biblically referred to as Paddan-Arām, or Haran, with its city of Nahor (capital of Naharina?)—the beloved home-land of Abraham and the elder Hebrew patriarchs—in short, their real, traditional Holy Land, whence indeed originated all those vaguely glorious and intensely sacred memories which eventually, from say the 13th century B.C., concentrated round the obscurely renowned name of “Israel’s” alleged ancestors—the royal, semi-deified, but very indefinitely recollected Hyksōs.

Wherever it was—say provisionally in Mitanni—*there*, in reality, was the great *Distributing-Centre*, outside Europe and Africa, whence issued into the Orient all those mighty but hitherto cloud-covered streams, whether of *Racial Development* or of *Cultural Progress*, which afterwards so magically transformed the East, and which the learned world has written and talked about so very much and so very inconclusively. Thence issued those “fair-complexioned” super-men who, some six centuries before the rise of Babylon, took old Agadē in hand, and metamorphosed it completely,—ethnically, religiously, politically, and culturally. Thence issued all those divine and other names and words—*Vāruna*, *Mitra*, *Nāsatyau*, *Āb-El*, *Āghū-Rā*, or *Ākhū-Rā*, *Āpa-Vār-Yān*, or *Āpa-Vāl-Yān*, *Sindhū-Rā*, *Dyaush-Pitā*, *Yōni*, *Rlā* (afterwards *Artā* and *Āshā*), and a host of others—which almost all really came thither from Rhodochroia in the West, having been brought thence when the Rosy-Blond migrants abandoned the old Mediterranean World; many of which had already developed, or were in course of development, in that old Mediterranean World, but on lines of their own, straight from that World’s own archaic (probably Melanochroic)

etymons, into forms either morphologically somewhat similar (as *Ouranos*, *Jupit* r, *Diōnē*, *Āpeilōn*, and so forth), or else expressive of the same idea—as *Dios-kouroi*, etc. ; and which were all more or less destined to find their way, with the Airyānians and others, into the still farther East, there perhaps to be transmuted into yet further modifications—and all destined to be found by Max Müller and his disciples, and to be represented by them as having had their domicile of origin, if not exactly in “Aryan” India, at least amongst the family of “Aryan”-speaking peoples dwelling all together “somewhere in Asia,” and as having thence spread *westward into Europe* !

Lastly, from that same great territorial Distributing-Centre re-issued the main mass of the migrant Rosy-Blonds of the pure blood, who proceeded on their majestic way across the East, and settled more or less finally in the regions afterwards known as Bokhārā and Sogdiana, under the eventually acquired name of the *Airyānians*—whence the name of their new home-land, *Airyavō-Vaējo*. With them, of course, went all their heritage of traditions, ideals, laws, customs, philosophy, faiths (exoteric and esoteric), sciences, arts, dialects, vocabulary, and culture generally. But there, in *Airyavō-Vaējo*—from what cause we are still as ignorant as we are of the precise date—they ultimately separated into two bodies ; of which one stayed on in the old homes under the old name of *Airyānians* (eventually rendered “Iranians”), and became associated with the Civilisation and the Language which are now commonly called *Avestan* ; while the other transferred itself to the neighbourhood of the territories surrounding Lake Zarah (modern Sēistān), and dwelt there till about B. C. 1151, when they migrated in an easterly direction, entering *Sapta-Sindhavaḥ* under the celebrated name of the *Āryas*.

In view of all the foregoing facts and considerations, it is abundantly clear that the symbology of the two Standards above-described was in no way indicative of, and indeed had nothing whatever to do with, either Sārgon II and his times, or any other particular king of Assyria and his times. Nor had the Divine Emblems above referred to any connection either with Assyrian or Medic history in general, or with any particular period of those two histories. They take us back, in fact, to the Tauric Era, B. C. 4311 $\frac{1}{3}$ —2155 $\frac{2}{3}$, and very probably the opening stage of that Era—in other words, to nothing more or less than the far distant days, if not of the original Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian super-race, at least of the two branches by which it was eventually represented—the territorially concentrated and highly civilised Mitannians, in an early stage of their national career, and the territorially diffused and not so highly civilised population of the same stock dwelling in the regions round about—the hypothetically so-called *Mandā*.

In brief, the symbology associated with these Standards and Emblems had survived, and were in actual vogue, not only till so late a date as the time of Sārgon II of Assyria, but even till the much later times of the Akhaimenidai, remembered as a *tradition* in Persepolis and Sūsa—merely because of the fact that the Assyrians and the Medes possessed in that symbology some evidence of a *common cultural descent*—also, as we have seen, a *common ethnic descent*. And if not the *memory* of this common origin, at least this objective though obscure *evidence* in favour of it, had persisted all through the centuries in their respective national archives, despite the extraordinary vicissitudes of fortune to which these archives had from time to time been subjected.

Further support is given to these views by considerations connected with the probable affinity subsisting between the Divine Names *Asshur* or *Assur*, and *Ahūrā-Mazdā*, and with the added probability of their one-time merger in a preceding higher unity—the name *Āghū-Rā*, or *Ākhū-Rā*, having reference both to the Moon and to the Sun, as has also been said by some even of *Vārūna*. If it be true that, not only the Assyrian and Medic Ethnics, but also Assyrian and Medic Culture, had a common source in Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian (or say even Mitannian and Mandic) Ethnic Stock and Culture, does not the probability follow that *Asshur* and *Ahūrā* came originally from one common astro-theological conception, and one common etymon in which that conception was once (say some time in the Tauric Era) incorporated and enshrined? Whether the name was ever in vogue amongst the Airyānians of Airyāvō-Vaēja in the form *Asūrā*, I know not. But under that form—though with a different significance—it was certainly familiar to the Āryas of Vedic India; perchance more by virtue of the genius of their dialect than of aught else. As, in consequence of the change of the calendrical opening of the year from the Vernal Equinox to the Winter Solstice, the original *Devayana* got displaced, and original *Pitriyana* was in fact advanced 90 degrees at its expense, so, to that extent, and mystically in that sense, the *Asūrās* (who then became associated with *Dakshinayana*) ousted the *Devas*, who, as did the Āryas before their foes, retired before them. Thus these names acquired exactly reversed significations—according to the point of view, whether Airyānian, *i.e.*, Avestan, or Āryan, *i.e.*, Vedic, from which they were regarded.

All this—as the inevitable, or at least the natural, or explainable, result of changes arising out of the vicissitudes of fortune—may be perfectly true, and yet leave the

above suggested probability of a one-time merger of the two names, *Asshur* or *Assūrā*, and *Ahūrā*, in some precedent higher unity, entirely unaffected. The later Persian form of the name *Asshur* was *Athūrā*. In very much more recent times, *i.e.*, comparatively recent, the Central Asian name *Tokhārā*, or *Toghārā*, *i.e.*, “Descendants of the Tokhs,” became, on its entry into India, Sanskritised into the form *Tūshārā*. If this be admissible as evidence that the *kh*, or *gh*, and the *sh* of these old eastern languages were convertible at will, either way—like the interchangeability of *l* and *r* in old Melano-Leukochroian and other undeveloped languages—then there is little or no difficulty in supposing that *Asshur*, or *Asshūrā*, *Assur*, or *Assūrā*, was once in vogue somewhere in upper Western Asia in the guise of *Ākhū-Rā* or *Āghū-Rā*—of which, indeed, at least in Eastern Melano-Leukochroian, *Āhū-Rā* would only have been another variant. Moreover, lastly, the Avestan form *Ahūrā*—which must have come down through the old Airyānians—obviously stands mid-way between the ancient Assyrian form *Asshur*, or *Assur*, and the later Āryo-Vedic, or Sanskritised, form *Asūrā*. And certainly *Ahūrā*’s supposed affinities with *Ākhū-Rā*, *Āghū-Rā*, or *Āhū-Rā*, seem just as natural and inevitable as its known affinities with Vedic *Asūrā*.

The Zodiac and Year-Beginnings

BY

H. BRUCE HANNAH

III

We have seen that, somewhere about B.C. 2750 and B.C. 2650 (the precise dates do not very much matter), two great historical personages from Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānia—wherever that exactly was, whether in the territories that eventually became Mitanni, or in the wider domains of the surrounding “Mandā”—Shārrū-Gī and Shār-Gani-Shārri (I use these names merely representatively, and by way of illustration), entered Kish and Agadē, in what is now called Upper Mesopotamia, and entirely reorganised and metamorphosed them—ethnically, politically and culturally.

Here it may be noted that, in a still earlier age, Agadē used to be called Uri, or Kiūri, and Sūmer used to be called Keṅgi.

Also, in previous papers I have adduced facts and reasons in support of the statement that, not only were the later Medes (through the Mitannians) wholly, or mainly, and also the Assyrians, to a very great extent, ethnically descended from the great Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian race of which Shārrū-Gī and Shār-Gani-Shārri were representatives, but the cultural heritage, both of the Assyrians and the later Medes (Northern-Medes of

conventionally historical Media), is traceable back to the culture of which that wondrous race were the exponents, say some time during the Tauric Era—B.C. 4311 $\frac{1}{3}$ –2155 $\frac{2}{3}$.

On the advent of these two selected celebrities in Agadē, that district—inhabited at the time by the Eastern Melano-Leukochroi, or “Semites” proper, called by the “fair”-complexioned newcomers the “dark-faced,” or “black-headed” race—was the seat of an even then already very ancient civilisation, specially, of course, concentrated in a capital-city of the same name—Agadē, subsequently rendered Akkad. Agadē signified “Highlands”; which was also the meaning of Elām and its variant Airyān.

But, south of the district of Agadē, lay another district, known as Shūngir, Shūmir, or Sūmer (the biblical Shinar), in those days inhabited by a mixed population of Eastern Melano-Leukochroi and Sūmerians—of whom the latter were probably the more multitudinous, and were doubtless the original possessors of the country, so far as any race can really be considered autochthonous anywhere. Naturally, the local civilisation was as mixed as the peoples themselves, though its dominant note was probably Sūmerian—*i.e.*, as far as can be gathered, Tūrānian. Here, there flourished another city, known to us under two names—Shirpūrla and Lagash—which, with its Culture, was older even than Eastern Melano-Leukochroic Agadē. The modern name of its site is Tel-lo, looking across the plain eastwards, 50 miles from the present Tigris; and it stood on the banks of the ancient canal, now called Shatt-el-Hai, which connected the Tigris with the Euphratēs.

Each of these ancient cities, Agadē and Shirpūrla, had its own ideas on the subject of the construction of the Calendar. Each system was different from the other—

that of Shirpūrla doubtless having been the older—and both systems were different from, and *perhaps* older than, the system introduced into Agadē by the Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānians, on their advent there *circa* B.C. 2650, and which we may (at least provisionally) take to have been identical with the system which the later Northern-Medes had inherited from somewhere and somebody in the past, as already posited.

In *Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology*, June, 1897, V, p. 51, the Hon. Emmeline M. Plunket states as follows—

“In Accad the calendar makers clung to the originally instituted *star-mark* for the year, and made it begin with the sun's entry into (the constellation) Aries; therefore by degrees the beginning of their year moved away from the winter solstice, and in the first century B.C. coincided very closely with the spring equinox.

“In Lagash, on the contrary, the calendar makers clung to the originally established *season* of the year, and made it begin at the winter solstice; therefore by degrees the beginning of their year moved away from the constellation Aries, and in Gudea's time (about 2900 B.C.) the new year's festival was held in honour of the goddess Bau=Gula=Aquarius” (Quoted in *Ancient Calendars and Constellations*, 1903, pp. 56, 57).

Proceeding, the same thoughtful writer observes—

“I now desire to draw attention to the Median calendar, which appears to have differed from that used, as above suggested, in Accad or in Lagash; inasmuch as the beginning of the Median year was not dependent on the sun's entry into the *constellation Aries*, as in Accad; nor was it fixed to the season of the *winter solstice* as in Lagash.

The beginning of the Median year was fixed to the *season of the spring equinox*, and remaining true to that season, followed no *star-mark*. The great importance, however, of Tauric symbolism in Median art seems to point to the fact that *when the equinoctial year was first established* the spring equinoctial point was in the

constellation Taurus. Astronomy teaches us that was the case, speaking in round numbers, from 4000 to 2000 B.C." (*Anc. Cal. and Con.*, p. 57).

Thus we see that in early Eastern Melano-Leukochroic, *i.e.*, "Semitic," Agadō, the year was regarded as based on *sidereal* considerations, *i.e.*, was taken as commencing at the moment when its accepted seasonal opening coincided with the advent at a particular point in the heavens of some selected asterism, or perhaps rather of the principal star in that asterism. Therefore, says Miss Plunket, the Agadēans made their year open calendrically with the sun's entry into the Constellation Ariēs, or, as they or their successors called it, Sara (Bar) Ziggār, *i.e.*, "The Sacrifice of Righteousness"—the associated month being Nisanrū, thus indicating the terrestrial Spring. But *why* Ariēs? In what Miss Plunket goes on to say, she gives us to understand that, in spite of their theoretically *sidereal* year, these early Agadēans actually in practice opened their year calendrically at the *Winter Solstice*, though she adds that, owing to the Precessional movement (as I understand her), by degrees that actual opening of their year moved away from the Winter Solstice, and in the first century B.C. coincided very closely with the then Spring Equinox. I therefore repeat: Why Ariēs, as first referred to? In B.C. 2650 that Constellation certainly did not equate with the Winter Solstice. It *did* equate with it in B.C. 6467, when the celestial Vernal Equinox lay at the point between Constellations Gemini and Cancer. But here we are not concerned with that remote epoch. I can only explain the seeming difficulty by reference to the fact (which Miss Plunket communicates to us later on) that, in Sūmer, the much older Shīrpūrlaites did commence their calendar year at the actual Winter Solstice. We can well understand how this was probably the case amongst them, and all ethnoi at an early

stage of their evolutionary career. Such undeveloped races would be much more likely to become familiar with the facts relating to their terrestrial seasons, long before they became acquainted with those relating to the stellar hosts. Hence, their year would naturally at first be a Tropical one—that is, a year bound to the terrestrial seasons: though why this particular preference should be accorded to the Winter Solstice does not seem very obvious. One would think that popular choice would much more naturally have fallen upon the Spring. However, the facts of history appear to be against this expectation; and so, all that remains is to try to find an explanation for the fact, above noted, that, with a year opening calendrically at the Winter Solstice, the early Agadēans nevertheless associated this with the sun's apparent entry into Constellation Ariēs. The only consideration that for me throws any light on the difficulty is the fact just stated, that in B.C. 6467 the Celestial Vernal Equinox lay between Constellations Gemini and Cancer; that the then Winter Solstice must accordingly have lain between Constellations Piscūs and Ariēs; that at that epoch the names, order, and significance (exoteric and esoteric) of the hieroglyphs of the Zōdiacal planisphere, as now and for many centuries past recognised, were definitively fixed and promulgated by universally accepted authority; that the tradition of these things lived long; and that for some such reason Constellation Ariēs may have acquired that prominence in men's minds throughout the world which it has ever since retained—and none the less so, of course, because, for $2155\frac{2}{3}$ years (*i.e.*, from Conv. B.C. $2155\frac{2}{3}$ to Zero at the opening of the Christian Era), it has itself been honoured by the actual presence within its limits of the slowly westward-shifting Celestial Vernal Equinox. Possibly, however, this last consideration had no value for the early

Agadēans of say B.C. 2650, and even perhaps before then.

Indeed, the fact, referred to by Miss Plunket *supra*, that the old Agadēans, or Akkadians, made their sidereal year open with the sun's apparent entry into Constellation Ariēs, seems to me to be rather explainable thus: that what we have heretofore discovered regarding their calendrics does not date back to much before the founding of Babylon in (assumedly) B.C. 2050—by which period the Ariēs Era had of course actually set in, since it started in Conv. B.C. $2155\frac{2}{3}$ = True B.C. $2304\frac{2}{3}$. Hence, even if before then—or at least before say the advent of the reforming Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānians—they had been wont to regard say 30 Piscēs or 1 Ariēs, or, more exactly, the point just between them, as the spheroidal *locale* of the Winter Solstice, as traditionally remembered by them, it is very probable that gradually they came to realise that in fact it was slowly losing those old associations, and acquiring those other Spring-tide associations which were eventually connected with it, and which we certainly have connected with it ever since the slowly westering Celestial Vernal Equinox reached what we conventionally style *Zero*. Indeed, we *know* that this was in fact their point of view in the 2nd century B.C., for we possess tablets showing that they then began their year with the Spring-tide month, Nisannū.

Now, the Vernal Equinox was *always* the Vernal Equinox, wherever from time to time it happened to be on the Spheroid—whether at the *Zero*-point between 30 Piscēs and 1 Ariēs, which it occupied at the conventional (though not the true) opening of the Christian Dispensation; or about 3 Ariēs in the above-mentioned 2nd century B.C.; or at 30 Ariēs (the last—or, from another point of view, the first—degree of that Constellation), where it lay at the close of the Taurus Era and the

commencement of the Ariēs Era. Hence, there is no obvious reason why the month of the Akkadian year, coinciding with this moving Equinox, should not always have been called Nisannū. Indeed, very probably it *was* so called by them throughout at least the Ariēs Era, *i.e.*, throughout the period of $2155\frac{2}{3}$ years commencing at 30 Ariēs in Conv. B.C. $2155\frac{2}{3}$, or True B.C. $2304\frac{2}{3}$, and ending with what we call the *Zero-point* that marks the conventional opening of the Christian Era.

And thus, perhaps, may reasonably be accounted for the fact commented upon by Miss Plunket, that the numerous tablets now in the custody of the British Museum, and which are stated to “cover a period of over two thousand years”—

“are all dated in such and such a month of such and such a year of some king’s reign; the months are the same (at first under their earlier Accadian names) as those we find in the almanacs translated by Epping and Strassmaier, and we meet in them, and in other historical inscriptions, with the intercalary months, the second Elul, and the second Adar. It would seem, then, that it was the same calendar, worked in the same way, that held its place through these two thousand years” (*Ancient Calendars and Constellations*, p. 5).

It will be noted, however, that—as actually in vogue in Akkad—I do not put this Calendar earlier than Conv. B.C. $2155\frac{2}{3}$, or other the approximate epoch when the Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian reformers had succeeded in indoctrinating the local “Semites” with their superior astronomical and astro-theological conceptions, and so had become the creators of historical old Babylon.

Miss Plunket—working on the older Assyriological data that have only recently been superseded—is, it is true, inclined to assign this Akkadian Calendar to an even very much earlier age.

"But further," she continues, "there are astiological works copied for the library of Assurbanipal from ancient Babylonian originals. The compilation of many of these originals is placed by scholars in the reign of Sargon of Accad, at the remote date of 3800 B.C." (*Ibid*, p. 6.)

In a foot-note Miss Plunket states—

"Sargon I of Accad was of Semitic race. He was established as ruler in the city of Accad, and there reigned over a great non-Semitic race, in ancient cuneiform inscriptions styled the *Accadai* (Accadians)."

This is a perfectly accurate statement from the orthodox expert point of view which still holds the field in conventionally learned circles: but the real facts of the case are precisely the other way about. Shār-Gani-Shārri, as Sārgon of Akkad is now called, was *not* a Semite; but the race of "Dark-faced" or "Black-headed" folk over whom he reigned *were the Semites proper, i.e.,* local representatives of the widely-spread Eastern Melano-Leukochroi. Furthermore, scholars—even Assyriologists—have been known to be wrong, and I would like to be much more certain than I at present feel, that these last-mentioned originals do go back to the time of Sargon of Akkad. Besides, as regards his date, a great deal of doubt hovers around this very *andāzily*-arrived-at figure, B.C. 3800. I much prefer the late Mr. King's approximate estimate—B.C. 2650.

To sum up, so far: in dominantly Sūmerian, *i.e.,* Tūrānian, old Shirpūrla, or Lagash, the year, in very archaic times, was held to begin calendrically at the Celestial Winter Solstice, *i.e.,* not the traditional, but the actual one, equating with some month associated with the cold or rainy season on the terrestrial spheroid, or revolving epicycle. Similarly, in very archaic times, in Eastern Melano-Leukochroic, *i.e.,* "Semitic," Agadē in the north, the year was very probably, or at least possibly, regarded

as commencing at the same actual Winter Solstice—having thus, in both cases, been taken as Tropical. This state of things continued till the advent of the fair-complexioned Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānians, under the leadership of say Shārrū-Gī (B.C. 2750) and Shār-Gani-Shārri (B.C. 2650).

From then onwards—while the old state of things may or may not have continued undisturbed in Sūmer in the south, *i.e.*, in Shirpūrla, or Lagash—an entirely new system was inaugurated in Agadē, or, as it was subsequently called, Akkad. The year became regarded from the *Sidereal*, instead of the old *Tropical*, point of view; in B.C. 2155 $\frac{2}{3}$ —just a century before King's suggested approximate date for the founding of Babylon—the ever slowly-westering Celestial Vernal Equinox entered 30 Constellation Ariēs from its old haunts in 1 Taurus. A new era had commenced: and with it new ideas had poured into men's minds.

In particular, they had before them the fact that traditionally—perhaps ever since say B.C. 6467—the point on the spheroid (between 30 Piscēs and 1 Ariēs) which *we* now call the place of the Celestial Vernal Equinox, had been associated with the Celestial Winter Solstice, and as such had marked the calendrical beginning of the year, which in those archaic times had always commenced in the cold or rainy weather. But also, staring them in the face, was the further fact—communicated to them, no doubt, by the scientists amongst the newly-arrived Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānians—that the ceaselessly westering Celestial Vernal Equinox had, 100 years before the founding of Babylon, actually entered Constellation Ariēs (Sara-Ziggar, or Bar-Ziggar); that thenceforward, for 2155 $\frac{2}{3}$ years, that Constellation would stand for the Spring-tide; and that the corresponding month for it on the terrestrial spheroid, or revolving epicycle (also, like the Constellation,

traditionally called Sara-Ziggar, or Bar-Ziggar, *i.e.*, "The Sacrifice of Righteousness," was then already, or was about to become, no longer in reality a Winter month, but more and more a Spring month.

Hence, the only sensible thing to do was to recognise facts, and thenceforward regard the old traditional opening-month of the year, Sara-Ziggar, or Bar-Ziggar, as (under its newly acquired name of Nisannū) no longer a Winter month, but a Vernal month. And this, it would appear, is exactly what happened at or about the epoch of the founding of Babylon—say B.C. 2050.

Such, then, were the Zōdiacal conceptions and Calendrical arrangements acquired by the Babylonians from their Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānian rulers and teachers about the beginning of the Ariēs Era (say B.C. 2155 $\frac{2}{3}$), and which continued to be in vogue in Babylonia, and also in neighbouring and related Assyria, for the next 2000 years or more.

Of the Medic Calendar Miss Plunket remarks that it—

"appears to have differed from that used, as above suggested, in Accad or in Lagash; inasmuch as the beginning of the Median year was not dependent on the sun's entry into the *constellation Ariēs*, as in Accad; nor was it fixed to the season of the *winter solstice* as in Lagash."

It was—

"fixed to the *season of the spring equinox*, and remaining true to that season, followed no star-mark" (*Ancient Calendars and Constellations*, p. 57).

This is only another way of stating what I have tried to explain above, in connection with the calendrical reforms introduced into Melano-Leukochroic Agadē by the more highly cultured Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānians after their advent there *circa* B.C. 2650. In other words, these

fair-complexioned reformers knew that the Celestial Vernal Equinox was always the equinox of Spring-tide, wherever it lay spheroidally for the time being; that it was ceaselessly shifting from celestial east to west—as we say, Precessionally; that, for a period of $2155\frac{2}{3}$ years starting from about a century before the time of the founding of Babylon, it would be creeping through Constellation Ariēs (there previously called Sara-Ziggar, or Bar-Ziggar); that accordingly, throughout that period, Ariēs was destined to be associated with Spring-tide; and that, in natural consequence, the old-time corresponding month on the terrestrial sphere, which was also called Sara-Ziggar, or Bar-Ziggar, and which had theretofore been regarded as opening the year calendrically at the old *traditional* Winter Solstice in what was now *Vernal* Ariēs, should for the future be regarded as still opening the year, but as a Spring-tide month—which was in fact done, its name being changed to Nisannū, or Nisān.

These having been the ideas of the Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānians, we may take them as having also been the ideas of the highly cultured and politically highly developed Mitannians, as also—in perhaps a vaguer way—of those less highly cultured and politically less highly developed “Mandā,” scattered throughout the region lying between the Halys in the west and the southern end of the Caspian Sea in the east, who were really of the same ethnic stock.

We have seen that the later historical Northern Medes, wholly or mainly, and the Assyrian people, to a great extent, were not only ethnically descended from this great sub-stock, but were also indebted to it for their largely common cultural heritage. We have therefore no difficulty at all in understanding how and why the Medic Calendar, as described by Miss Plunket, and as


above further explained, came to be of the character that it was.

Lastly, we have seen that, on one side of their descent, both ethnic and cultural, the Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānians above-mentioned traced back their origins to the great wave of Rosy-Blond migration, issuing at some indefinite epoch in the very remote past (probably after B.C. 9000 and before B.C. 6000) from Rhodochroia, and settling temporarily in upper Western Asia, which from time to time I have already referred to in previous lectures and writings. We have seen that considerations connected with the symbology of certain Assyrian Standards and Divine Emblems, as also of certain Medic Divine Emblems and other surviving objects of art, take us back to the opening stage of the Tauric Era, *i.e.*, speaking in round numbers, to B.C. 4000, and even earlier. We also know that, in the sacred records of the Vedic Indians, there are passages which seem to enshrine positive, if not very definite, memories of a past centring round the same approximate date. We are therefore led to hope that along the line of investigation carrying us back from the Āryas of Sapta-Sindhavaḥ to the Āryas of Zarah-Lake land, from them to the Airyānians of original Airyavō-Vaēja, and from them again to their migrant Rosy-Blond ancestors when settled for a time in upper Western Asia, we may perchance pick up much information which is entirely new; or, even if not entirely new, that the angle of vision from which we are now able to regard it may be such that it will enable a flood of fresh and welcome light to irradiate for us the hitherto dark and hallucination-haunted wastes of Antiquity.

In conclusion, let us not be daunted by any craven fear lest such an enquiry should result in the upsetting of long-established and very much cherished views. It is immeasurably better for us to know the exact and

unvarnished truth about ourselves, than in that connection to go on living in a little subjective world of our own which, however seemingly delightful and flattering, has absolutely no relation whatever to the real facts of existence.

PLATE I.



Coup-de-poiing. Scraper leaf-shaped palæolith and Wynne's Godavari Chip.

Prehistoric Arts and Crafts of India*

Preliminary Notes

BY

PANCHANAN MITRA, M.A.,

Lecturer Prehistoric Archaeology, Calcutta University.

INTRODUCTORY.

We cannot say whether it be too early or too late in the day to take a critical survey of the technique of the weapons and implements and objects of adornment of the pre-historic age of India. Within the last few years new finds are accumulating in the various museums of India, which are multiplying fast in distant corners of the vast empire, which are too important to be missed, as they often form connecting links of vital importance. And the Catalogues of the Prehistoric Antiquities already existing seldom attempt any differentiation or classification. Thus Coggin Brown's Catalogue of the Antiquities of the Indian Museum possessing a great value in itself as opening pre-historic studies gives us an array of only 'Bouchers' and 'Palæoliths' so far as the Old Stone Age is concerned and incorporates Banda and Marpha specimens which have been recognised by Sollas to be Azilian not to speak of the 'Pygmies' of Tardenoisian aspect with the neoliths. So Bruce Foote

* For earlier work, to which this is in a sense supplementary, see *Prehistoric Cultures and Races of India*, Calcutta University Journal of the Department of Letters Vol. I, 1920, pp. 113-200.

- C.P.A. ... Catalogue of the Prehistoric Antiquities of the Madras Museum, 1901.
- C.R.I.M. ... *Catalogue raisonné* of the Pre-historic Antiquities in the Indian Museum, Calcutta, by Coggin Brown, 1917.
- C.R.M.M. ... *Catalogue raisonné* of the Foote collection in the Madras Museum by R. Bruce Foote, 1914.
- R.A.P. ... Mr. A. Rea's Catalogue of the Prehistoric Antiquities from Adichanallur and Perumbair 1915.
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CHAPTER I

PLEISTOCENE AND RECENT GEOLOGY AND PREHISTORIC ARCHAEOLOGY.

A sudden depression of temperature putting an end to the warm life of Pliocene days marks the advent of the Pleistocene and it is well known that the Great Ice Age has become the chronometer of Palaeolithic cultures in Europe. In India the sudden extinction of the rich Siwalik fauna has become problematical as much as the indications of subsidences and upheavals in late geological times have been argued to be co-eval with sudden fluctuations in temperature that Europe has been proved to have passed through. The glaciated topography or rather the brilliant researches in Europe have correlated the Gunz, Mindel, Riss and Würmian ice epochs (leaving aside Geikie's Scanian, Norfolkian, Tyrolean, Polonian, Durentanian, Mecklenburgian Forestian and Turbarian) with palaeolithic industries¹ which are made to begin in the Mindel Ice Age or the next interglacial stage or according to some, still later at the close of Rissian times.²

“Whether India, that is, parts lying to the south of the Himalayas, passed through a Glacial Age, is an interesting though unsettled problem.”³ “There is no physical evidence, so far as is known of a *geologically recent cold epoch*, and some geologists have doubted whether the


The glacial period in India.

¹ Vide Zeitschrift für Ethnologie 1913, p. 128

² Osborn, Men of the Old Stone Age, 1918, p. 107.

³ Wadia, Geology of India, 1919, p. 243.

PLATE II.



A celt from Salem, core from the Punjab, celt from Banda, shouldered celts from Assam, a palæolithic celt form.

peninsula was affected by the glacial period ; but it does not appear hard to understand that a period of great cold in central and northern Asia, was in the south represented by a very wet period, a really pluvial epoch which was characterised by the formation of the great lateritic deposits of the east and west coasts of the peninsula," so remarked Bruce Foote.¹ There is no doubt that India witnessed in recent times great changes of levels of land, subsidences and upheavals which unfortunately have as yet been little studied with other problems of the pleistocene geology of India. It can be very well imagined that the great alterations of the face of the land-surface in extra-peninsular India witnessed in Tertiary times by the upheaval of the Himalayas or the formation of alluvial deltaic formations would set a-going oscillations which continued far late in pleistocene times. The change of climate is now ascribed to astronomical causes or rather to variations in solar phenomena or to land-movements and there is reason to believe that the Vindhya ranges and its outstretching arms have undergone great changes and possibly witnessed subsidence not on a small scale within human memory (and the interesting tradition of Agastya causing its pinnacle to lower itself in making obeisance to him may contain a germ of geological tradition handed down from primitive times to a myth-making age). However there is little denying at present that there was a severer climate at a time not far remote prevailing even in India. Thus Kropotkin says "There is reason to believe that the Pamirs were ice-bound and the great extensions of formidable glaciers in the Himalayas is fully proved in my opinion."² I think, the case as it stands, is soberly stated by Vredenberg thus : "Indications of the glacial period in the mountains of India have not

¹ N. A. p. 196.

² Report of the British Association, 1893, p. 775.

been clearly recorded, the question having scarcely received any attention. The Himalayan glaciers were far more extensive during the Glacial Period than at the present day, though they still include some of the largest glaciers of the globe. According to R. D. Oldham's investigations, there are indications of three great oscillations of the extension of the glaciers coinciding with some of the glacial and interglacials of the great ice-age in Europe."¹

In explaining the occurrence of certain Himalayan species on the mountains of Southern India and even further south and not in the intervening area, Blandford also was led to premise glacial conditions in Pleistocene India, which he said 'if accepted, will add to the evidence, now considerable, in favour of the glacial epoch having affected the whole world and not having been a partial phenomenon induced by special conditions such as local elevation.'² It is now very interesting also to turn to the Records of the Geological Survey which are valuable mines of information. So far as Europe is concerned the lucid statements of Sollas, the great geologist who also has become a no less famous prehistoric archaeologist are the best guides for us. They run thus:—"The great ebb and flow of temperature was at least four times repeated; four times have the glaciers enlarged their bounds, and four times have they been driven back in their mountain home."³ After studying the river terraces he says "The four terraces are ruled, as it were, across the last page of terrestrial history; they are datum lines, which enable us to divide the Pleistocene or Quaternary epoch

¹ Vredenburg's Summary of Indian Geology. p. 108.

² The distribution of Vertebrate animals in India, Burma and Ceylon, Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc. Vol. 194, p. 426.

³ Ancient Hunters, 2nd edition p. 23

into seven ages, the first, second, third and fourth glacial ages, with their three intervening genial ages, ¹ In Central Asia too, Messrs. Davis, Huntington and R. W. Pumpelly established independently positive proofs of at least three distinct glacial and interglacial epochs of the great Ice Age.² We know that as early as 1867 Dr. Verchere recorded the presence of erratic blocks in the Potwar at less than 2000 feet altitude ³ and Mr. Wynne's dissertations on 'Indus-borne crystalline fragments' as he tried to prove them, of boulder deposits scattered about on the ranges of Bagh and Choi at heights of 2,500 to, 3,000 feet, 'too numerous to be carried by humans, have become one of the curiosities of Indian geological literature. Mr. Lydekker ⁴ comes to the conclusion that in Kashmir 6,500 feet is about the lowest level at which undoubted evidence of former glacier-action exists and Mr. Wynne in the same volume divides the pleistocene deposits of the Punjaub into an upper, middle, and lower subdivision characterizing them as "Northern detrital drift," "Alluvium and river drift" and "Post tertiary valley or lake deposit." It is quite evident that this division tries to explain the sequence of three different groups of boulder beds in its own light of which the first represents the latest and the last is of the earliest pleistocene epoch and the intervening one a middle period. Theobald's masterly paper ⁵ established once for all that these are to be ascribed to glacial action and had it not been so early as 1880 we would have probably got as interesting a study of the Indian glacial stages from him as we have got of the six English stages from Prof. James Geikie. However his personal observations are of the highest value and he tries to establish that there was an extension of an isothermal

¹ *Ibi*, op. 29.

² Pumpelly Expedition 1904, Vol I p. xxxvi

³ Journ. Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. XXXVI p. 113.

⁴ Records of the Geological Survey Vol. XIII

Ibid Vol. XIII

line compatible with the existence of glaciers to so low a level as 2000 and 3000 feet in the Northern Punjab,' The sections of the Kunhar river given in the plate accompanying the paper are very interesting as they show two glacial stages in the early fluvial deposit period of Mr. Wynne and thus gives us practically all the phases in India. However the question is of great intricacy as even now there is a tendency to attribute some of the boulder conglomerates spread over a large part of Northern India to the fluvial action of a great Siwalik river in Tertiary times. But still everything shows that there was a glacio-pluvial period and La Touche's paper in the Relics of the great Ice-Age in the plains of Northern India¹ and Huntington's physiological researches in Turkestan clearly lead to it.

Sollas has well pointed out how the river-terrace enables to divide the Pleistocene or Quaternary epoch which is almost synchronous with 'Palæolithic' culture into several ages, giving there respective stages of the prehistoric archaeologists. We all know how rivers cut through their channel and their banks are worn off by rain or stream action which are technically known as 'erosion' and 'denudation'. Now if any body visit rivers showing such process he would be struck by seeing various step-like ridges in the banks which are known as 'terraces'. In these would be found partly the alluvial or rocky soil of which the surrounding land is composed and partly gravel-beds. Now these are the most important things for us. "The gravel beds found in terraces up the side of river-valleys were deposited at different periods by the river to which must be attributed often a greater carrying power than it now possesses. And it will be evident that the higher

The significance of
'river-terraces'

¹ Geological Magazine, 1910

terraces were formed before the lower, and consequently the higher the position of the terrace gravel the greater must be the antiquity of the implements contained in them, supposing no disturbing agencies to have been at work."¹ Besides the terraces are now shown to be indelible records of climatic conditions. For as Ellsworth Huntington says "It seems probable, as Park has suggested in regard to those of Asia, that the oldest terrace may represent the last glacial epoch, and that others represent the post-glacial stages, or minor epochs of glacial retreat. In as much as man is known to have existed prior to the last glacial epoch, the terraces preserve the record of a series of climatic changes which have played a part in shaping human destiny. If the oldest terrace dates back no more than 30,000 years more or less, to the last glacial epoch, the youngest cannot be more than 2000 or 3000 years old at most and may be much less".²

But still now river-terraces especially bearing human artifacts in India have scarcely been begun to be studied and we are constrained to notice on a sure basis only three Palæolithic periods—a lower, a middle and an upper. The lower coincides with the older alluvium (*Bhangar*) of the *Ganges*, *Narbudda*, *Tapti*, etc., where the rich Siwalik fauna are still continued to a certain extent and fossils of extinct species of *Elephas antiquus*, *Rhinoceros*, *Giraffa*, &c., are found and in the lower alluvium (*Khadar*) we can distinguish some fauna still racially distinct from modern ones, while midway stand such fauna as show a transition from older to later forms as is witnessed in the fossiliferous stalagmite caves like *Karnul*, containing some living as well as extinct species.

Bhangar, *Karnul*
and *Khadr* pleistocene
deposits.

¹ British Museum Guide to the Antiquities of the Stone Age, 1911, p. 3.


² E. Huntington, *The Climatic Factor*, Washington, 1914, p. 36.

A word of caution is necessary. It is not every
 swallow that makes a summer nor every
 river in India that would afford us old
 terraces or implement bearing gravels.

The two types of
 Indian alluvium.

In India the two types of river-beds and alluvium are sharply distinguished. The one which is the more recent is spoken of as the Newer Alluvium and still in process of formation. The other, the older Alluvium is the most important for us though they await systematic study by the prehistoric archaeologists still, for there alone genuine palaeoliths would be found if it happened to be a human settlement in those far remote days. As their geological features become very important for us, I give below an excerpt from Vredenberg's excellent Summary : " The great depth of the Ganges alluvium, as revealed by borings, indicates that in its case also subsidence must have preceded simultancously with deposition. Except in the neighbourhood of the delta, the greater portion of the alluvial plain is above the level of the highest floods of the Ganges and its tributaries, indicating that this area has been upheaved, or that the delta region has been depressed within relatively recent times. The presence of a mass of ancient alluvium, known as the Madhupur jungle north of Dacca in the midst of the delta region, further indicates that a certain amount of disturbance must have occurred. The existence of the ancient alluvial areas enclosed within rock basins along the course of some of the Peninsular rivers, such as the Nerbudda, Tapti &c. points to the same conclusion, and it is evident that a certain amount of irregular warping has affected India in Pleistocene times. In consequence of these physical changes, the ancient alluvium and the one still in process of formation can be readily distinguished from one another. They are known in the

PLATE III.



Hammerstones from Marpha and Banda and Kingstones from
Burma like American forms.

vernacular as “*bhangar*” and “*khadar*.” In geological age, they correspond with the two main divisions of the Quaternary era, the Pleistocene and Recent. The Pleistocene age of the *bhangar* or older alluvium is clearly shown by the remains of numerous extinct animals amongst which may be mentioned *Elephas antiquus*, a characteristic species of the Pleistocene of Europe, and various extinct species of horse, ox, rhinoceros, hippopotamus. Contemporaneous with these are the earliest remains of prehistoric man in the shape of stone implements.” (p. 109—110.)

Besides these amongst the Pleistocene and recent deposits may be reckoned among others the high-level river terraces of the Upper Sutlej and other Himalayan rivers, the lacustrine deposits of the Upper Jhelum Valley, the Poravander stone of the Kathiawar coast and the *zeris* of Tinnevely and Travancore coasts, the aeolian deposits of the Godavari, Kistna and Caverry, the loess deposits of Potwar-plateau, the cotton-soil or Regur of Gujrat and the Deccan and last but not least the perplexingly wide distribution of high-level laterites¹ all of which are too important for prehistoric archaeology some having already yielded palaeoliths in abundance.

Laterite is also of great importance to us as it is easily found out in India especially in the south and often yields human implements. It has now been accepted that this is formed by action of water dissolving rich ferruginous masses and forming reddish concretionary masses consisting of hydrates of iron, aluminium or manganese. This has been found often in high levels and high level laterites are now being established as of great antiquity indicating fluviatile or lacustrine deposits of the Pleistocene

¹ The peculiar case of ‘Laterites’ and raised ‘sen-beeches.’

¹ Wadia, *Geology of India*, p. 262.

age and sometimes earlier. There is also a low-level laterite which is rather recent and in some places it is still in process of formation. As implements of antique amygdaloid types have been found in high level laterite, their antiquity is unquestioned and so also lateritic accretion in places where water-action is absent now is also a fair indicative of a great length of time which must have elapsed before the physical changes of upheaval could have accomplished this. So also raised beeches have been observed all round India which are now ascribed to Pleistocene times. It would be interesting indeed to study the upper strata of these, as now the question of migrating races is no longer looked upon as a heresy and the sea-craft of some of the earliest people of late Pleistocene and later times might have left some traces to serve as an important nucleus for the studies of 'ships as evidence of the migration of culture.'

So also submerged forests which have done so much for throwing light on late prehistoric times in Britain have been discovered in the Ganges delta, Pondicherry, and the Eastern Coast of the Island of Bombay and it may be hoped some future Reid or Minro would elicit much tellurine and human secrets from them.

CHAPTER II


OLD STONE AGE

It is a matter of common knowledge that in the year 1847 Boucher de Perthes of Abbeville began to discover rude stone things which he claimed to have been shaped by man in the long bygone ages before the deluge. In those days the orthodox Biblical dogma had caught so much hold of the geologists that no one would believe that the frail human body could withstand the rigours of a diluvial age, which it was held, had swayed the world in geologically recent times. In 1855 Dr. Rogillot of Amiens also published an account of the discovery of flint implements enclosing the remains of extinct animals. It is a source of satisfaction to us that Dr. Hugh Falconer, whose name would, as one would find later, figure prominently in the controversy regarding one of India's oldest artefacts, and Prestwich, turned the scale in favour of accepting the antiquity and 'humanity' of these finds in question. Since then nobody dares to deny when chipped stones are found in river-drifts that they bring forth evidence of the existence of man at the age calculated by studying the conditions of the bed in question. And of late years the balance has seemed to sway to the other side. For in ancient days the classification roughly was River-drift period and Cave-period which was called Palaeolithic (and formerly Archaeolithic *i.e.*, of Old stone)

and the surface period distinguished by the term Neolithic (or New stone) which have passed into general currency since Avebury's use of the terms. Since 1892 when J. Allen Brown brought forward a new term for forms considered earlier than Palaeolithic, the term Eolithic (Dawn-stone), the word has been a great bone of contention among prehistoric archaeologists most of whom reject and some still hold to that term. The Twentieth Century has seen a great study of Palaeolithic forms, often to the neglect of Neolithic and Metalic ages and has brought forth these names for successive phases of old stone culture, *e.g.*, Chellean, Acheullean, Mousterian, Aurignacian, Solutrian, Magdalenian and Azilian. Some forms from Strepy, Mesvin and Maffle have now been established mostly by the efforts of Mr. Rutot of Belgium, a great champion of 'Eoliths' and are now spoken of as 'Pre-Chellean' by the French savants like Boule, etc., who are reckoned the highest authorities in this matter. Mr. Rutot's proposed term 'Reutelian' is far from being accepted and we should do well to use the term 'Pre-Chellean' not only of shapes of the horizon of these early Belgium finds but to extend it to earlier forms still where the human hand in the chipping is not doubted.

Though Eolithic types in general have not been accepted, we should know what a 'rostro-carinate,'
 1. The oldest authenticated Pre-chellean forms. the supposed earliest stone implement used by man, is, for round it the controversy raged very strong. In the words of its great champion Mr. Reid Moir "A rostro-carinate is an implement with broad posterior region, narrowed anteriorly to a quasi-vertical cutting edge. This anterior narrow edge is strongly carved and gives the implement the form of the beak of an accipitrine bird. The form of the region of the implement may also be compared to that of the prow

PLATE IV.



Copper axes from Manipur and Pachumbia like Egyptian neoliths.

of a boat (the boat being turned keel upwards)."¹ No beaked rostro-carinate types nor eoliths according to Bruce Foote have yet been found in India, though I had pointed out already that one of the Burma finds of Dr. Noetling of rectangular shape bore a remarkable resemblance to a similar Eolithic type figured in *Man*, 1908. As for the Burma finds by Dr. Noetling in 1894 though much ink has been spilt to show that they belong to Miocene and then later to Pliocene, the modern opinion seems strong to accept them as of the earliest Pleistocene times if not earlier. Not having the good fortune to study them first hand, all that could be made out from the plates is that there is not much of design there, though little doubt exists as to their being chipped, as was the opinion expressed by Professor T. Rupert Jones in *Natural Science* 1894, p. 345. The presence of nodules gives us reason to compare them with Chelles forms and absence of design to a little earlier stage.

The next authenticated implement described in detail in Coggin Brown's Catalogue p. 57 is Hackett's Bhutra Boucher found associated with bones of extinct animals. (1) The Prechellean Nerbudda Boucher It was found in a gravel bed about 6 ft. above the low-water level of the Nerbudda and that indicates the vast age that must have elapsed before the Nerbudda could find its present course allowing for the various changes of level by subsidence and elevation, denudation and deposition in the meanwhile. The ossiferous gravel in which it has been found has been assigned by competent palaeontologists to a horizon just succeeding the last of the Siwaliks and it is immaterial whether it is called the latest Pliocene or the earliest Pleistocene

¹ Journal, Royal Anthropol. Inst., Vol. XLVI. p. 198.

Dr. Hugh Falconer was disposed to consider it as Pliocene. What is the most remarkable about this is that it undoubtedly was of a time which can be called 'Pre-glacial' and yet its forms betray a finish of the Chellean type though probably Mr. Reid Moir would be disposed to detect also an accipitrine beak of the 'rostro-carinate' types. A large portion of original mass of unworked Vindhyan sandstone still remains and the specimen appears to be a little too heavy for its high finish.

The next in order though scarcely less important in antiquity and authenticity comes an Agate chip $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches long and $\frac{7}{16}$ inches wide, described in some detail in C. R. I. M. p. 61. It was found at Mungi near Python. It is also a riddle for by its Paleontological associations it has been found to be of a horizon identical with that of the Nerbudda find (this may be found out to be wrong later for while the Nerbudda Boucher was found at a level about 6 or 10 ft. above the present water-level, this was extracted from a bed about 20 ft. from the present water-surface). Anyway if Indian paleontology is right, this and the Nerbudda boucher have been ascribed to a time scarcely less than 400,000 years ago. But though of such hoary antiquity, the shape inevitably suggests the fine form of a Levallois flake of Mid-Palaeolithic times of Europe. It had evidently been used, and being found *in situ* and having been considerably written upon, there is little doubt about its genuineness at present. The question is, whether it may be of Pre-chellean times or of Mid-Palaeolithic age. Palaeontological arguments leave no doubt as to deciding its place in the earlier phase for a considerable section was for holding that both this and the Hackett Boucher belonged to the Upper "Pliocene".

I had already insisted on a systematic regular gradation of culture discernible between the Burma and the Godāvāri types while the Nerbudda type came in as an intervening step. Fortunately my recent excursion to Chakradharpur under instruction from Sir Asutosh Mookerjee and Prof. Bhandarkar has been very fruitful, for it has placed in my hands cases of two finds which, coming of the hills of the Singhbhum district, on the way to Nerbudda, betrayed far earlier shapes. One was a very heavy precursor of Chellean Boucher, which, could not but have been used except by both hands, which still forms part of Mr. Anderson's excellent private collection and the other a primitive heavy end-scraper (grattoir) which my friend Mr. Ghosh picked up from a high part of the river-terrace when I accompanied him on an axe-hunting expedition to the Sinjai-Binjai Valley. We await eagerly the publication of exact data about these, but to my eyes their forms left no doubt of the phase of culture they indicated being of the earliest Pre-chellean times. The Sinjai-Binjai Valley seems to have been inhabited by prehistoric peoples from almost the earliest times to the dawn of Neolithic age and several stages could be easily detected from the specimens with Mr. Anderson. The paper in the *Journal of Behar and Orissa Research Society in 1917* published an account of some remarkable Palaeolithic forms found associated with gravels at a height of about 18ft. from the present river bed where the fossil tooth of a wild horse of Karnul (mid-pleistocene) type was found. The palaeolith that we picked up had evidently been washed off from the highest existing gravel bed which is only about 2 or 3ft. from the top of the plateau whose total present height is about 50 ft. Below it was another gravel bed after which we came to the third bed in which

Some
handed
poings.
heavy
two
Coup-de-

was found the teeth of *Equus* of Karnul type. So stratigraphically also the great antiquity to the grattoir we picked up, can be arrived at. While the heavy boucher form betrayed traces of high level 'laterite' sticking to it, thus carrying it to the earliest pre-historic times. That such heavy forms were not uncommon in Palaeolithic India are evidenced by the presence of at least 6 such specimens (in a collection of over 2000 palaeoliths) in the Indian Museum. They came from Chanda and Sripur areas of the Godavari district¹ and various sites in the Chingleput and Arcot districts.² In the course of a recent excursion to Ghatsila, I extracted such a heavy coup-de-poing of very early shape and chipping design sticking *in situ* in a denuded earlier terrace of the river Kharsuti (in Singhbhum district) 3'4" above the present high-water-level and 8'10" above the low-water level.

We are not quite sure if the 'retouch'-test of R.R. Schmidt would hold good for other parts of Europe but they are too important to be given the go-by as we know that South African or Syrian artifacts are being studied and classified thus and it is desirable that science should have but one language. So Sollas has done well to quote from *Mannus*, 1910, p. 98 Schmidt's nice differentiations that *Chellean* retouches are coarse, broad, conchoidal, leaving strongly marked concavities which in *Acheullean* times though conchoidal are narrower, longer and fewer and persist up to Lower Mousterian times. In upper Mousterian we get 'stepped' in Auri-gnacian 'channelled' or 'fan-like' in Solutrian 'scaly' and in Magdalenian 'nibbling' retouches.³ In this light

The various subdivisions of palaeolithic artifacts in Europe.

¹ Cat. No. 43 and 32, C. R. I. M.

² Cat. No. 416, 442, 479, 602, C. R. I. M.

³ *Ancient Hunters*, 1915, Footnote, pp. 437-48.

a classification of the Palaeoliths in the Indian Museum all huddled together under one heading would not have been impossible, and would have given us an insight into the gradation and distribution of cultural activities in our land for thousands of years. Thus at the outset it is noticeable that bone-implements are very rare (they may be due to termites or other peculiarly destructive Indian conditions as suggested by Bruce-Foote) and earlier forms apparently abound, with Chelleo-Mousterian according to Bruce Foote or Chelleo-Acheullean facies according to Coggin Brown. But this roughness of forms might have been due to the Indian 'Palaeolithians' using the less tractable but easily accessible quartzite and not flint. Still I could discern Aurignacian retouches in C. R. I. M. No. 594 and 597¹ or Solutrian forms in C. R. I. M. No. 528, 584² bearing in mind that these come from the districts of Chingleput and Arcot which have also yielded the earliest forms in abundance. The 'inferior chert flakes' already described at length in the J. B. O. R. S. 1917 present marked Mousterian characteristic and the finely worked specimens in Mr. Anderson's collection including some very nice arrow-heads and burins come from the

The several later stages of culture discernible in Mr. Anderson's collections.

just lower gravel bed. Nobody who has just had a look over the fine collection of arrowheads of pointed and leaf-shaped flakes would be disposed to doubt of their existence and subscribe to the sweeping generalisation of Bruce Foote that these were unknown to the Stone Age in India. It is rather interesting to turn to Evan's work³ where we find an arrow-head from India, acutely pointed 2½ inches long and tanged and barbed described, and also to

¹ C. R. M. M., p. 40.

² C. R. M. M., pp. 37 and 40

³ First edition, p. 361.

notice that the specimens which raised doubts even in Bruce Foote's mind were those collected from Chota Nagpur by Mr. Wood Mason.

Besides the arrow-heads, beaked burins, keeled scrapers, strangulated spokeshaves, 'gravette' points, chatelperron points, elongated laurel-leaf points and the wonderful variety of the stone artifacts of middle palaeolithic shape in Mr. Anderson's collection all pointed to a great development of Late Aurignacian and Early Solutrian cultures in the locality. But what we missed was bone implements which had either disappeared owing to the destructive nature of the soil in which they were buried or by the quick action of the termites when exposed. What was still more striking that the locality was still strong with its populace, one of the most primitive (Pre-Dravidian) inhabitants of India whose huts well shaped were painted in rectangular patterns with inlaid figures or sometimes isolated figures of animals like the elephants which, inevitably (what with the gaudy colour what with the crude shape) suggest Bushman-like activities. So here we are face to face with palaeoliths and colouring materials suggestive of palaeolithic art and also an aboriginal tribe still carrying on rude artistic designs in a manner leading us to think of them as survivals though with many modifications and complications by later cultural and possibly ethnic contacts.

Holmes has in his 'thorough' manner pointed out that the following methods of classification are possible :—(1) by geographical areas, natural and political, (2) by culture characterisation areas, (3) by peoples, as tribes, stocks and nations, (4) by successive geological periods as Tertiary, glacial, post-glacial, (5) by classes of artifacts as implements, utensils, weapons, (6) by the materials employed, as mineral, animal, vegetable, as bone, stone,

Classification and
Distribution of Indian
Palaeoliths.

metal, wood, bone, shell, (7) by arts and industries as hunting, war, agriculture, quarrying, mining, building, (8) by successive steps in culture-development as savage, barbarous, civilized, (9) by function groups as practical, ornamental, sacerdotal, diversional.¹ And it should be remembered to arrive at historical truths if not for a complete study technological classifications should proceed along all these lines. However, Bruce Foote's studies have presented us with 14 different Palaeolithic forms, i.e. 4 kinds of axe, 2 forms of spears, digging tools, circular implements, choppers, knives, scrapers, cases, hammer-stones and strike-alights.² So far as the distribution is concerned he remarks "the localization of all the races has also been influenced in some measure by the distribution of the rocks yielding materials suitable for their respective implements. Thus there are far more numerous traces of the Palaeolithic race (*sic*) around the great quartzite yielding groups of the hills forming the Cuddapah series of Indian geologists and the great quartzite shingle conglomerates of the Upper Gondwana system in the Chingleput, North Arcot and Nellore districts than in other regions. In diminishing quantities traces of Palaeolithic man are found to the northward of the Kistna valley as also to the south of the Palar valley."³ But we have already cited instances of early Palaeoliths from Chhota Nagpur and Dr. Noetling's Burma finds as well as Wayland's Ceylon finds which has been ascribed to Palaeolithic Indians walking on terra firma to the island connected with the mainland in Pleistocene times shows that the whole of the Indian continent had been traversed by early Palaeolithic culture in Pleistocene times though it is noteworthy that the route possibly lay through

¹ Handbook of Aboriginal American Antiquities, 1919, Part I, p. 148.

² N. A., p. 9

³ N. A. p. 36.


the older rocks and by the older river-beds which in contrast with the other parts of India had been very little subject to orographical changes on a huge scale. So also that this cultural and racial movement continued till late Palaeolithic times can be maintained by showing that the Azilo-tardenoisian Pygmies (Sollas speaks of those from Banda and the Vindhyan area as Azilian) are obtainable from Central India to Ceylon not to speak of other parts of the world. To whatever psychological or ethnological causes the widespread distribution of the 'pygmies' may be ascribed, the occurrence of quartzite industries in flint-using countries such as Somaliland and Assuan (Egypt),¹ Morocco and France,² as well as Rhineland,³ require more investigation when considering the question of first human migrations.

¹ Zeitschrift f. Ethnologie 1909, pp. 737-741.

² L'Anthropologie, 1908, pp. 166, 425. 1914, pp. 43 and 47

³ Zeitschrift f. Ethnologie, 1910, pp. 586. 591.

PLATE V.



Painted potteries from Beluchistan in Anan and Elam linear designs

CHAPTER III.

THE NEOLITHIC TYPES OF INDIA.

The most common of neolithic forms are polished celts.

Celts. This name has been given to hatchets, adzes and chisels of stone. It has got no reference to Keltic people but is merely the English form of the Lat. *Celtis* or *Celtes*—a chisel. It has been suggested that they may originally have been some connection between the Lat. *Cellis* and the Welsh *Celt*, a flint; but this is merely accidental. The Welsh proverb says that there are three hard things in the world—maen-celt (a flint stone), steel and miser's heart. The general form of stone celts is well known, being usually that of more or less flat blades approaching an oval in section with the sides more or less straight and one end broader and also sharper than the other. They have been divided into three classes by Evans, *viz.*, (1) Those merely chipped out in a more or less careful manner and not ground or polished; (2) Those which after being fashioned by chipping have been ground or polished at the edge only; (3) Those which are more or less ground or polished not only at the edge but over the whole surface. There is a curious wide-spread belief all over the world amongst savage (uneducated) people that the celts were thunder weapons. In the west of England people still hold that the thunder axes they find, once fell from thy sky. In *J. A. S. B.* 1909 there is an article by Coggin Brown showing how these celts are sold in Yunnan (Western China) for medicinal purposes. In most parts of Europe, Asia, Africa

and America these celts are looked upon with a great deal of awe and regarded as lightning weapons.

These were used hafted in various manners. The earliest handles seemed to have been made of horn into which the narrower end was inserted. Then more commonly wood was used in the early neolithic site of Robenhausen. We find blades often inclined towards the handle. Often we find an intermediate socket of stag horn used with the celt when inserted into the handle. Sometimes also similar tools were used in the hand without the intervention of any haft. The forms of polished celt are many. Sometimes as in the earliest forms they show facet at the edge but more often they are thin and highly finished with flat sides and oblique edge. They are generally triangular in section but rectangular and oval sections are also not unknown. Some forms are sharp at both ends. They were used chiefly for cutting down timber and for scooping canoes out of the trunks of forest trees ; for dressing posts, for huts, for grubbing up roots and killing animals for foods, for preparing fire-wood, for scraping the flesh from bone when eating and for various other purposes in the domestic arts. But they were also employed as weapons of offence and defence and sometimes for minning in chalk in pursuit of stones and probably also for religious purposes. (These two paragraphs like some others have been conveniently taken from Evans, *Ancient Stone Implements of Great Britain and Ireland*).

The stone selected for the celts in India is in the case of the polished ones, diorite, of varying degrees of fineness in some cases nearly approaching porphyry. A perfectly distinct type roughly chipped is of a hard black basalt. As a rule while those of the one class are thick and show an ovate section, the basalt celts are comparatively flat. The basalt weathers differently

from the diorite. In rare instances celts of polished sandstone have occurred.

Rough hewn celts of basalt may be divided into three types : (a) heart shaped or cordate, rather an uncommon type, the edge alone highly polished and so much rounded as to be almost semi-circular. In many cases inequalities of the chipping have been partly removed, but in no case has the implement itself been entirely polished. (b) Lanceolate, long and comparatively narrow and coming to a point at the end, resembling the arrow-heads termed leaf shaped in European collection. The side edges have the appearance of being serrated owing to flakes having been taken off, on alternate sides. (c) Very flat and almost triangular in shape.¹

“Grooved hammers and axes are perhaps the rarest of numerous neolithic stone implements recorded from eastern Asia. Only one specimen of

Hammer-stones.

this type appears to have been described from India. It was found by J. A. Cockburn together with a number of other stones under a sacred tree 37 miles south west of Allahabad at Alwara. In form it somewhat resembles a modern hammer, being flat at the ends and slightly carved on the upper surface. A groove 50 inches in width and 5 inches in depth has been carefully carried round the centre. The base has been hollowed out in equal care in a gouge like form to the depth of about $\frac{1}{3}$ of an inch. The whole arrangement suggest that the hammer was attached by ligature to a wooden or withy handle, the ligature being kept in its place by the upper groove, while the lower groove held the hammer in position on the rounded haft.² Mr. Cockburn has pointed out certain minute marks especially on the lower

¹ J. A. S. B. pp. 228-29.


² J. Coggin Brown, Grooved Stone Hammers from Assam &c., J. A. S. B., 1914 p. 107.

groove, which suggest the possibility of metal implement having been used in the fashioning of the hammer and it may be that this implement belongs to the transition stage from stone to metal. These implements may be counted among the best known relics of the aborigines and specially in the rural districts of the older states of America they are very frequent. Red Indian stone tomahawks are familiar objects. In general they can be defined as wedges encircled by a groove usually nearer the butt than the edge. The grooves served for the reception of a withe of proper length which was bent round the stone-head till both ends met when they were firmly bound together by ligatures of hide or some other materials.

Another kind of hammer stone from India was also collected from Allahabad. It is a cubical mass of basalt measuring 2·50 inches each way. On each of its six sides is a hole or depression about one inch in diameter and ·25 in depth. The implements fit conveniently into the hand the depression affording a hold for the fingers and suggesting its use as a many-sided hammer, the faces of which were changed from time to time when the pit became inconveniently deep for use.

Another kind is seen in a flat red quartzite pebble, measuring 4·25 inches by 3 inches by 1·75 inches. The two ends are slightly flattened and the upper and lower sides exhibit a double groove or notch for the purpose of securing it to a wooden handle. On the upper and lower surface double cup marks or depressions which are not easily accounted for but may have been meant for hammering appear.

Another kind of curious implement is a wrought piece of basalt 3·50 inches by 3 inches. It bears the appearance of having been split into two either either by accident or design. A deep but narrow groove



Painted potteries from Beluchistan in Tripolje (A) and Egyptian style,

runs through the centre. Mr. Cockburn considers it a type of implement resembling the single Bolas or modern slung shot, and supposes the groove to have been intended for the reception of a thong. Mr. Cockburn found a card figure at Kalinjar bearing in his hand an implement which he considers resembles that now described. At the back of the stone is a small but curious depression hardly large enough to have been produced by hammering.

Another type very well known in Europe is a mace-end or ring-stone. It is sometimes made of quartzite and has got a central hole. On either surface towards the centre it narrows in the manner characteristic of the working of the implement of this description found both in India and in Europe. Many examples of this type are to be found figured by Evans and others in their works on 'Stone Implements'. Perfect specimens in some numbers have been found by Mr. Cockburn and Rivett Carnac, beside a large number of fragments. The perfect specimens are generally found under trees, deposited there together with celts, but numerous fragments have been picked up at the base of hills on the Kaimur plateau or in ravines together with fragments of celts and flint chips and other indications which usually mark the sites of ancient encampments. Large round pebbles with the drilling of the central hole in a more or less imperfect state have also been found in considerable numbers indicating that the process was troublesome and lengthy. Some exhibit a deep cup mark or depression on either side, others on one side only. They closely resemble the hammer stones found in Europe and America and figured in the various works on the subject. In many of these cases it seems doubtful whether it was intended to perforate the stone, which fitted conveniently enough into the hand as a hammer.

Four sided blocks of diorite ground to a rough point at the end bear all the appearance of having been used as picks or hoes and are well adapted for grubbing out roots or digging out holes. According to Rivett Carnac this implement may have been used in a rude state of culture. The fact of the point being unsymmetrical and the right side exhibiting a greater amount of the wear than the left favours this idea.

Long, tapering well rounded pieces of diorite measuring $9\frac{1}{2}$ inches in length are sometimes met with. It bears from top to base the marks of the chipping by which it has been worked into its present state. The implement has all the appearance of having been used as a pestle for pounding grain or other substances. It may possibly have been used as a stone club like those of the Merai of New Zealanders but is rather short for such a purpose.

CHAPTER V.

PREHISTORIC ART.

Bruce Foote while pointing out by the presence of chert burin at Jubbulpore the possibility of prehistoric paintings in India had bluntly stated that none had as yet been reported.

Reports of Cave-paintings in India.

Though this is true very largely, as any cave scientifically explored seems to have been the Billa Surgam Caves which contained no trace of any etching or primitive figures; we find reported in *Indian Antiquary*, 1901¹ a remarkable paper on the Rock Carvings in the Edakal Cave, Wynaad, in the *Journal of the Royal Society* a no less interesting paper on the Cave Drawings in the Kaimur Range, North-West Provinces by John Cockburn and in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* for 1889, a big paper by the same author on an archaic rock painting from Mirzapore. Besides these, etchings have been reported from Bellary which have been noticed by Bruce Foote and caves have been reported in Kalat, and another paper, from Mr. Carlleyle seems to have reported notable discoveries of paintings from Berghelkhend, Bundelkhend and other places. From Ceylon and Tibet have also come informations of rock carvings. Similarly Cave paintings have also been reported in Hosangabad but the last and the most important of all in fulness of details is the paper of Mr. Anderson, in the *Journal of the Behar and Orissa*

¹ Pp. 402-421.

Research Society for September, 1918. The paper has attracted world-wide attention and describes a rock-painting near Singanpur in the Raigarh district. Under instruction from Sir Asutosh Mookerjee and Professor Bhandarkar and on behalf of the Post-Graduate Council and Teaching of the Calcutta University I visited the place

The Singanpur paintings and our visit there.

in November last in the company of Mr. Ghosh, Curator of Patna Museum. We had before this met Mr. Anderson and learnt from him how when he discovered these paintings long ago he had invited the Indian Museum authorities to study them and Mr. Percy Brown of the Art section and Mr. Coggin Brown of the Geological Survey had also been taken by him to the spot and the latter had reported to the Asiatic Society of some paintings in the Raigarh which had already been noticed in *L'Anthropologie* in 1915, p. 304, thus:—"The Asiatic Society of Bengal in a sitting of the 7th April last has heard a communication of Mr. Brown in the walls of a cavern situated near Raigarh in the Central Provinces of British India. This cavern represents nothing but the ruins of a site once much used. The anterior portion has gone to give way to an ancient epoch and the debris in obstructing the openings has preserved the designs. They represent the scene of chase and resemble occasionally in an extraordinary manner the paintings of Cogul in Spain. From the point of view of technique there we have the approaches to the cross-lined 'pottery of prehistoric Egypt.' The paintings are of great interest and cannot be estimated by less than thousands of years—they are much older than all that have been hitherto discovered. Some agate flakes have been found in conditions which enable us to arrive at interesting geological conclusions." The Singanpur hill is well known to the villagers on account of the caves it contains. They told

us that there were three 'Mandirs' (temples or sacred places?) where the hermits used to reside and from one cave often appeared a white rider on horseback which disappeared mysteriously in the grotto. As is common with such places the tradition connected it with fairies and mysterious creatures. The caves are all well-suited to human habitations there being a pool of water inside. It seemed to lie on the highroad of people passing from the North of India to the South. It is however not in the caves but on a part of rock surface now thoroughly exposed to the sun by some apparent projections having fallen away, that numerous figures in red pigment occur. Unfortunately the majority have been washed off and there is no possibility of rescuing them. It is evident that all these scenes depicted were connected with some sort of magic or totemistic rites. Just getting up the surface on the left hand remains of a scene very interesting prehistorically for we have got the clear outlines of a *Kangaroo* and just beneath apparently the faded outlines of a still bigger one. This fact is very important as these marsupials, now restricted only to Australia, must have been known to the painters who have given quite a life-like reproduction in palaeolithic times. The other figures have been given in some detail in Mr. Anderson's paper who has however failed to catch the import of the Kangaroo scenes. The only perfectly preserved scene which is still to be seen is the bull or sambar-hunting scene where the people conventionally or probably dressed in masks, which according to Mr. Capitan was an widespread custom in quaternary times.¹ Another piece missed by Mr. Anderson is a spirited though a little conventionalised human figure with arms akimbo near the hunting scene. The right ankle is bent in such a way as to suggest a dancing posture. In one place appeared the

¹ Vide *L'Anthropologie*, 1914, pp. 106-113.

traces of a mammoth-like figure which is now too fragmentary to allow of any sure assumption. Almost all the paintings were in red pigment except the semi-circular figure of a sun (?) with divergent ray-like lines near the mouth of the grotto. All the paintings are highly interesting and have been figured by Mr. Anderson in his article in the J. B. O. R. S.

From the Kapgallu hills in the Bellary district have been reported more than 20 groups of figures of birds and beasts of various degrees of article execution. Some of them are described by Bruce Foote in *N. A.* pp. 88 & 89. In one group there are obscure human figures with a well drawn figure of a bustard. In another are figures of two elephants of a very lean type standing tail to tail to each other. A third group contains a bird with a big tail and a thin body with a high-humped bull near by. The most interesting of them all is a hunting scene depicting two men with upraised right arms as if for hurling javelins, having something like shields on their left arms proceeding towards a bull. There is also delineated in another part a six-rayed star. All the figures are interesting and occurring in a Neolithic site being more of conventional shapes and mystic outlines, they cannot be referred to the best art period of Palaeolithic times to which the Singanpur paintings most probably belong but to later artistically decadent neolithic times.

Probably to the same decadent culture horizon belongs the series of carvings occurring in the Edakal cave, Wynaad and situated about 56 miles from Calicut, about the same distance from Octamund and four miles S. W. from Sultan's battery. Mr. Fawcett, a Superintendent of Police has introduced the subject with some detail and several plates to readers of the Indian Antiquary in October, 1901. One

The Bellary "graffiti."

The Edakal rock carvings.

part of the cave contained inscriptions of ancient and mediæval historical times which were deciphered by Dr. Hulizsch. But of much earlier date are the carvings which had been partly covered up by a mould which was completely cleared up only after an excavation of 7 ft. which had accumulated under the roof rock during a long stretch of years. "After the rock carvings had been completed and indeed after the place had been abandoned." "The carvings clearly represent human beings and animals and objects for human use and symbols, but they so run into each other and are placed so closely together that it takes a protracted and close study to make anything of them. The most interesting features of the sculptures are the frequent human figures with a peculiar head-dress. There are several rather indistinct figures of animals. The usual Indian symbols are of frequent occurrence, *e.g.*, the *svastika* and specimens of the familiar circula 'sun-symbols.' There is evidence also of magic squares."¹ It appears that all the figures are but rude outlines conventionally drawn and probably associated with some magic or totemistic rites. Many appear to be men dancing in masks or masked head-dresses. The elongation of the figures are noticeable here as in the Singanpur figures. That they belonged to Neolithic times is proved by the find of a fragment of a well-shaped and polished celt from the place.

To the same culture horizon, at least so far as the style was concerned belonged a group of rockcarvings discovered by me in a village callad

Rock-carvings in Maubhāndār accessible from Ghatsila,
Ghatsila. a town in the Singbhum district. Tradition goes that the five Pāndava brothers spent their year of secluded life there and the marks of their habitat had been left in the incised human figures on the black

¹ Ind. Ant., 1901, p. 413.

stone (See Plate). What was remarkable in the style was that the figures agreed extraordinarily in style with the dockcarrings of Australians as figured by Matthews in J. R. A. I., Vol XXV., p. 16.


As I could pick up fortunately a neolithic axe of campignian *facies* ticking in the matrix on a level with the carvings I am inclined to ascribe a neolithic date to these. **This group as well as the Kangaroo scene of Singanpore might go in support of an Indo-Australian culture-contact from late Palaeolithic up to Neolithic times, which the Philological studies of W. Schmidt have just begun to hint at.** (*Vide Die Gliederung der Australischen Sprachen, Wien 1919, p. 22*).

Of unique interest are Cockburn's researche¹ which would have been invaluable if recorded fully with coloured plates but whose fragmentary descriptions are but preserved to us in two interesting papers in J.A.S.B., 1883 and J.R.A.S., 1899. It is evident that thanks to the liberality of Rivett Carnac, Mr. Cockburn long pursued his work in this direction and came across paintings in Ghormangar cave, Chunadry cave, Louri cave, Likhunia rock shelter and other places, fraught with great prehistoric interest, in the Kaimur ranges. From what can be gathered from the descriptions in the papers we can come to the conclusion that they belong to late Palaeolithic times and not mediaeval historical times as the writer was led to grope into. These are bound

John Cockburn's discoveries of cave paintings in the Kaimur ranges of late Palaeolithic times.

¹ Mr. Dikshit, Offg. Supdt. of Archaeology, kindly showed me several photos from various places of Mirzapore District, of rock-paintings in red haematite configuring hunting scenes. He was led to explore the sites following the clues given by Cockburn and though he came across quite different scenes, e.g., huntings of elephants and not rhinoceros, it seems the Vindhya when thoroughly explored would prove to be a classic ground of primitive if not prehistoric art like the Pyrenees.

PLATE VII.



A Kangaroo painting in Singapore like Australian rock-paintings.

to shed much light on the late Magdalenian and later Azilian and Capsian cultures in India for the Vindhyan hills and Banda (which is near these caves) are recognised as Azilian stations by European savants.¹ It should be noted that Mr. Anderson showed to me a nice collection of white keeled scrapers collected from the Reva which less finely finished belonged probably to Azilian times when they were revived than to early Aurignacian times. The three very rude and unsatisfactory outlines in J. R. A. S. facing page 89 are of the highest value to us as they represent hunting scenes with weapons which are unmistakable. The first shows the hunting of a stag with prominent horns which played so great a part in providing the Azilian hunter with his characteristic harpoons with a spear tipped with what may be considered the late Palaeolithic modification of a Chatel-perron point. The second represents a man besides a leopard and curiously what the man holds in his hands has been suggested by Vincent Smith who communicated this paper to be a torch (!) though it and the weapon in the hand of the third figure are unmistakable varieties of late Palaeolithic harpoons. The sketches in the paper are too rude to build any hypothesis upon but the three weapons are unmistakable and the writer of the paper has testified to the lifelike portraiture of these groups, which occur in the caves, now as inaccessible as forming "veritable museums of prehistoric antiquities in the way of flint knives, cores, arrow-heads, celts, fragments of fossil and charred bone, etc., from which could be made a fine collection, sets from which might be sent to every museum in the world."² The paper in J. A. S. B. contains descriptions of cave paintings of great prehistoric interest

¹ *Vide* Sollas, *Ancient Hunters*, second edition, p. 529.

² J. R. A. S., 1899, p. 93.

and as they have been recorded nowhere else I quote at some length the several notices. First comes the details of a Rhinoceros hunt in the Ghormangar cave of which fortunately a plate is given. "A group of six men have attacked the rhinoceros. One of these the animal has tossed in the air and the position of the man sprawling in the air is comically like the drawings of people tossed.¹ A man wearing an unusually large head-plume² who is in the rear has tried to draw the animal off by plunging his spear into its hind-quarters. In front of the enraged animal are two men, the lower of whom in an attitude highly indicative of action has what appears to be simple spear of hardened wood with two supplementary barbs levelled at the animal's breast." Cockburn while emphasising that these were of the Stone Age could not shake off the idea that paintings in India must be very late. "*These spears I consider to have been made of wood and stone only,*" he writes in italics. It is not strange that it would be so as he was writing early in 1883 when Sautuola's discovery of Altamira cave paintings only five years before had probably not been heard of in India and the question of Palaeolithic art had to wait another 20 years to be fully understood and its possibility recognised even in Europe. He records another rhinoceros painting which he first thought to be a boar hunt-scene painted near the village of Roup in Pergannah Burhur about three inches long. "There is a group of three men attacking a boar whose tusk is planted on the tip of his nose like the horn of a rhinoceros. Two of the men who are in advance wear short skirts (but the form of their lance heads is on too small a scale to be defined) attack him from the rear is the

¹ Note—Cf. the similar fate of the man in the Singunpur hunting scene.

² Note—probably it is a mask.

obliterated figure of a man on a large scale and the form of lance head he is using plainly indicates the chip spear." Similarly he records another rhinoceros hunting scene from Harin Harna Cave near Bidjeygarh. Another hunting scene of a man 'spearing a sambar with a weapon, which is represented in the Likunia rock-shelter.' "The last evidence we can have in support of the idea that the drawings above alluded to represent stone weapons is the fact that stone implements occur in abundance mingled with the identical material with which the drawings were executed." The descriptions are all the more exasperating for though the author notes that the Rhinoceroses do not now range in the locality or any place near the painting sites, the sketches given in the plates do not afford us any clue as to whether they represent the atalodine variety esp. the *Rhinoceros deccanensis* or *R. Karnuliensis* which though now extinct had a wide distribution in Pleistocene and Prehistoric India. (*Vide Lydekker, Catalogue of the Pleistocene and Prehistoric Vertebrata of the Indian Museum.*)

Before taking leave of this chapter, it is well to take note of the latest views as to the motives which led these men of so very early times to take to the palaeolithic art. Was it for the satisfaction of some aesthetic tastes as in later times? Modern opinion seems to hold that these elaborate carvings and paintings executed in places under exceptionally difficult circumstances such as in a kneeling posture or with the aid of light must have been connected with some form of crude faith. Recently Mr. Wennert of Spain has brought forth a brochure which is quoted with approval in *L'Anthropologie*, 1916, pp. 117-120, by Breuil, the greatest living authority on Palaeolithic art that probably ancestors were represented either realistically or conventionally for some cult of ancestor-worship. The conditions of palaeolithic

discoveries in several caves of Europe oblige one to admit the existence of animistic and magic beliefs even at that early period. "So in the Upper Palaeolithic times we have but magic represented by art thus:—the human hands mutilated of fingers (rites), the animals pierced by dart (magic of hunting), the females in gestation (magic of reproduction), the masked dances (magic of chase), the generative organs (magic of reproduction), the animals struck with darts (magic of arms), etc. To the same ideas belong the employment of ochre, the cups cut in the skulls and the corpses in crouched positions. Considering the principles of primitive thought and taking note of the racial movements at that early epoch one ought to admit that there existed at that period certainly a great variety of religious manifestations founded on the veneration of ancestors (manes) of animals and totemic ideas." Mr. Capitan has also shown that the quaternary designs especially in France naturally lead one to assume that masks or ceremonial accoutrements were worn in those times.¹ As for the sociological and psychological needs that produced the stylised and schematic figures, Durkheim states: "It is in the Australian societies that we must seek the origin of these representations. Although the Australian may show himself sufficiently capable of imitating the forms of things in a rudimentary way, sacred representations generally seem to show no ambitions in this line: they consist essentially in geometrical designs drawn upon the churinga, the nurtunja, rocks, the ground, or the human body. They are either straight or carved lines, painted in different ways and the whole having only a conventional meaning. The connection between the figure and the thing represented is so remote and indirect that it cannot

¹ *Vide* L'Anthropologie, 1914, pp. 106, 113.

be seen, except when it is pointed out. Only the members of the clan can say what meaning is attached to such and such combinations of lines. Men and women are generally represented by semicircles and animals by whole circles or spirals, the tracks of men or animals by lines of points."¹

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¹ Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, tr Swain, pp. 126-127

CHAPTER VI.

PREHISTORIC POTTERY AND TERRA COTTAS.

The Ceramic art in India “The first appearance of vessels and other objects made of earthenware occurs in the neolithic age, no trace of them, having, in India as yet been found in any connection with the remains of the earliest representatives of mankind known, the palaeolithic folk,” so wrote Bruce Foote (N. A., p. 29). But ‘palaeolithic pottery’ is a veritable contradiction in terms, the arts of weaving or pottery-making being held up to now to have originated only in the Neolithic age though Flinders Petrie would have ‘Magdalenian pottery’ from Egypt and ‘Solutrian pottery’ from Elam. From the Neolithic age onwards up to the Iron age, as we should think, ceramics as an art flourished but then it stopped and the modern patterns are after a lapse of so many thousands of years, often identical in form and design with degenerate prehistoric types. It is true indeed that some exotic motives in pottery decoration had a temporary survival and showed some curious forms in late mediaeval and Mogul times but pottery, though much in request as article of daily use by the mass of Indians has seemed to receive little attention from the artist within measurable historical times. Is it because it originated and developed amongst the ‘Pre-Aryans’ and became hard set in type-forms when the Aryans spread over India that this has been so? The contrast between

the great use of pottery and the low estimate of potters in the caste-scale seems well nigh to suggest this and Bruce Foote has well remarked thus:—"There had been a true evolution in the potter's art which then attained a stage of very real beauty. This was probably before the great Aryan invasion under which the potter's craft came to be despised and neglected, as it is now-a-days to a very great extent, as evidenced by the great plainness and often absolute ugliness of the present day pottery." (N. A., p. 31.)


Culture, has more than once been labelled as the product of its environment and it is worth while to enquire why the triumphs of art which found expression so often in ceramics in other parts of the prehistoric world are missed in India. It has been already pointed out that steatite vessels are now found in many places and those from Calcutta, had they not been modern, would have been interesting. Then again porcelain is unknown from ancient India. That steatite vessels are largely used in ancient times can very well be seen from the relic-vases of early Buddhistic times (*e.g.*, the Peppé vase) often being made of this material. Besides this, it was often used for decoration of temples. From La Touche's excellent Bibliography we read as follows:—"Talcose schist or potstone is widely distributed in India among the crystalline rocks of India and is quarried at many places to be fashioned into bowls, plates and other utensils" (p. 156). "The coarser kinds of clay, so largely used by the native potters for making unglazed cooking utensils, water-jars, and the like, are to be found in the immediate neighbourhood or nearly every village throughout India and Burma" (p. 283). The finer varieties of clay, suitable for the manufacture of Chinaware or art pottery have been reported from various places in India

Pottery materials
in India.

notably Assam, Bhagalpur, Manbhum, Jubbalpur, Madras and Mysore.

It is remarkable how there are no less than 35 terms in the Dravidian languages to indicate various types of pottery, and from Madras side has come a host of various forms associated with various sites of prehistoric times. The potteries chronologically may be arranged as belonging to Neolithic, Chalcolithic, Early and Late Iron Age times. They may also be distinguished as (1) big sarcophagous type, (2) small offering cups and (3) intermediate forms, all associated with burial rites. Other articles for daily use are also found in prehistoric sites and as no prehistoric 'city' or dwelling place has as yet been unearthed the wealth of the earliest Indian pottery-types is still hidden from us. So instead of talking of various phases of culture we are perforce compelled to restrict ourselves to the mechanical geographical divisions of the find-places. But with the slippery index of style we can at times compare the potfabrics of India with those of foreign lands and arrive at some rough idea as to the probable age and succession of some occasional types. Thus we have been able to distinguish sarcophagous pottery in India bearing resemblances to very ancient Egyptian and Babylonian ceramic ware. There has come from Baluchistan types which are almost identical with the Kabyle pottery of ancient Africa. And lastly from a close study of the primitive potteries and terracottas in the Indian Museum as well as some pieces from Central Asia one cannot but notice the remarkable 'Mediterranean' affinities of several types. While the marks and scripts from the ceramic wares have but lent additional confirmation to these assumptions. New sidelights are likely to be opened on the earliest phases or prehistoric life in India by discoveries of these similarities.

Main pottery-types
in India.



Hunting scenes from Mirzapur with stone-tipped Spear,
Azilian and Copper harpoons.

The earliest Neolithic potteries of India with incised patterns.

“The facies of the typical neolithic pottery will, I believe, turn out to be dull-coloured and rough-surfaced with but little decoration”—such is the opinion of Bruce Foote who had been a lifelong student of the prehistoric ceramics of the Deccan. (N. A., p. 34.) Coggin Brown, I think has a little overshot the mark when he states that “Many finds of prehistoric pottery are tentatively considered to be Neolithic. These are distributed through the district of Anantpur, Cuddapah, Kurnool, Tinnevely, Salem, Bellary and across Mysore, Hyderabad, Baroda, Kathiawar, Baluchistan and other regions. In South India, pottery is often met with on the sites of Neolithic settlements and implement factories but the collocation of pottery and Neolithic implements is by no means an absolute criterion for determining the age of the latter, especially as it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish the Neolithic from the later Iron Age ceramic ware.” (C. R. I. M., p. 8.) The three most important sites for Neolithic pottery appear for the present to have been Tinnevely, Salem and the Bellary. The Tinnevely fragment is of red colour and may have contained incised patterns. The Salem district abounds with Early Iron Age ceramics but some fragments of early red pottery seem to have been found. The Bellary is famous prehistorically for its cinder-mounds and as a neolithic manufacturing site and has yielded an abundance of good ceramics. Several forms appear to have been *impressed with finger-tips, five* (C.R.M.M. 444-24) or *four* (C.R.M.M. 444-7) or *three* (C.R.M.M. 386-2) or *two* (C.R.M.M. 1429-38) in number. A noteworthy form is vessels *pierced with a certain number of holes* in two pieces of grey pottery from the same place *four* or *ten* in number as in C.R.M.M. 336-6 and C.R.M.M. 386-11. Closely associated with these are forms analogous to the

fabric-marked pottery of which one has been reported in Travancore state and to which class may be assigned a large number of those described as *impressed with fillets* of the simplest type which appear to have been so common in Neolithic India.

An equally common form is the *grooved pattern*, two (C.R.M.M. 1353-1), three (C.R.M.M. 1213-17) or sometimes even *fourteen* (C.R.M.M. 347-1) lines incised which is often varied by *impressed* (C.R.M.M. 347-1) or *raised ring designs* (C.R.M.M. 1456-10).

The sarcophagous urns of India have attracted attention long since on account of their

The sarcophagous urns of chalcolithic times.

affinities with those of other countries.

“There is a very remarkable resemblance between the oblong terracotta sarcophagi standing on short legs, found at Pallavaram in the Madras district, and probably of Neolithic age and certain terracotta coffins discovered near Bagdad, and also between the latter and more highly developed and ornamented Etruscan terracotta coffin-tombs. This similarity of internment in earthenware coffins, identical in shape, size and material, has given rise to interesting speculations connecting archaic Indian civilization with that of

(a) the big urns like that of neolithic Egypt and Babylon.

Babylonia and Assyria” (C.R.I.M., p. 7). Some very big types have been

unearthed from Perumbair by Mr. Rea. “They are generally *oblong* cists of thick coarse red pottery, rounded at each end and on the cross section of the bottom, and supported by two or three rows of short roughly shaped cylindrical legs. These legs are hollow and sometimes have a hole perforated in the inner side for drainage of moisture. They are generally covered by an elongated dome-shaped lid” (R.A.P., No. 169). These are at times also of *ovoid* form (R.A.P., No. 169). Pyriform vessels varying in height from 2'-2" to 3" and circumference

from 5'-3" to 7'-4" tapering to narrow flat bottom indented at times with impression have been unearthed from Adichanallur in the Tinnevely district (R.A.P., Nos. 611 to 616). Four fine specimens are now in the Indian Museum and what struck me was **their identity in form as well as in the style of the impressed signs with similar urns in Neolithic Egypt** as figured in Morgan '*Recherches sur les Origines de l'Egypte (Ethnographie prehistorique*, p. 168). A remarkable form, rescued by Mr. Bruce-Foote is a four-footed vessel from Tungabhadra in Hyderabad state differing from other forms in having the long diameter of the oval body placed in a horizontal position instead of a vertical one and strongly resembling a grotesque elephant with a very small head' (N.A.P. 128). Along with it comes for consideration the

(b) the legged vessels of Trojan facies.

peculiar *legged vessels* (vide N.A., p. 68)

so numerous in India whose strong resemblance to some prehistoric pottery unearthed from Hisarlik Troy had been noticed as early as 1875 in a paper in the Indian Antiquary by M. J. Walhouse. We have already seen how in the oblong cists the legs sometimes number 12 or more and smaller vessels with three or four legs of peculiar conical shape and Trojan facies evidently used as funerary urns have been obtained from various prehistoric sites. A

(c) the hut-urns of Etruscan forms.

similar case is of the hut-urns for funeral purposes, a fragment of which was discovered by Bruce-Foote from Maski

in Hyderabad state and of which he reports later representatives from Harsani in the Baroda state and Mandir in the Surat district. They resembled a cottage with vaulted roof and are almost identical in shape with some of the earliest Etruscan hut-urns (N.A., p. 35).

It is a matter of regret that good specimens of painted ceramic ware have not been found in good numbers but from some of the fragments in the Foote Collection it is quite evident that this aspect of the potter's or painter's art was not at all neglected in pre-historic times. First of all should be stated that the red polish on many vessels was often secured by painting rather than by good burning. A common design seems to have been several *horizontal or vertical bands* of pale purple or brown colour on the sides of vessels (C. R. M. M. 444-2, 444-3). Purplish brown *gratings* are also sometimes found painted on dark grounding in a fragment from Bellary (C. R. M. M. 386-7). *Diagonal cross-bars* often five in number are found painted in pale red over finger-bowl type of vessels (C. R. M. M. 1437-15 to 17). One of the most interesting specimens considered by Bruce Foote to be unique is a beautiful milk-bowl unearthed by him from Patpad a village in Banganapalle in Kurnool which looked fine with a prominent spout lip and was painted with faint purplish stripes near the spout lip. There are remarkable ornaments, cruciform in shape on the side of a large 'chatty' (C. R. M. M. 252-62) found in Lakshanpur Iron Age site which Bruce Foote regards as modified Swastika. Srinivasapur in Mysore state has also yielded much richly decorated pottery as with fillets of diagonal grating over fillets of dot bars (C. R. M. M. 202-38). Another great pottery site in South India is Tadpatri in Anantapur district from which has come wares of beautiful shape decorated with fillets or painted with gratings, or traced with other elaborate pattern (C. R. M. M. 2055-14 to 19).

In a corner of the prehistoric gallery of the Indian Museum are lying some fragments of pottery found in the

Other ornamented
and painted designs
of the Early Iron Age.

neighbourhood of Beluchistan about 50 years ago and described in some detail in Anderson's Catalogue and Handbook, Vol. II. What attracted my attention was the gorgeous combination of colours, the beautiful geometrical lozenge or rectangular patterns recalling strongly the 'Kabyle pottery' dating from very early times in Africa as reported in *Journal Royal Anthropological Institute* in 1902. All the potteries are of a much higher type of execution than other primitive patterns. The spouts are delicately formed and the shapes are very graceful. There is a bright glaze and glossy varnish of high finish. A small flask in yellow can scarcely be distinguished from early Egyptian specimens. The fragment No. 11.6.22.17 bears polychrome painting of green white and ochre patterns while the piece numbered 2.2.10.77, has got a nice spout and six black thick lines running round the vessel while between the third and the fourth lines are triangular patterns, the whole appearing very beautiful. The piece 19.3.70.77 is white in colour and shaped like a coiled rope. Anderson could not comprehend the prehistoric importance found as they were associated with fragments of bones, and reported under circumstances which leave no doubt of their early date. Coming from places on the high roads to India they enter largely into questions of prehistoric migrations of cultures and peoples from and to India especially as besides the other affinities mentioned, some marked Minoan features may be detached in some primitive Bhita pottery as well as certain pieces recently found from Central Asia.

Probably, if not the earliest, the most interesting series of prehistoric figurines occur in the Brecks Collection in Madras from the Nilgiris. The riders, the elephants, the leopards and other animal figures such as that of

Kabyle' decorations on some Beluchistan pottery.

Prehistoric terracottas and figurines.

the cock are highly interesting as belonging undoubtedly to some pre-Aryan cult whereas the ethnic types of the human figurine unquestionably call for interesting speculation on the mysterious connections between prehistoric India, Central Asia, Babylonia and Egypt. Some of them are figured in Bruce Foote's Catalogue of 1901 and reveal the hunter and warrior type of the race whose products they were and often showed a good grasp of art. Bruce Foote himself discovered two female figurines from Scotforth estate in the Salem district whose interest is unique on account of the style of head-dress they show having their hair dressed in short ringlets all round the head and wearing high combs on the top, recalling the Minoan fashion delineated in Hagia Triada in Crete. Of great interest are some primitive Bhita specimens, which lying in the Indian Museum afforded me special scope for study, by the courtesy of the Archæological department. The oldest specimens cannot be compared with anything known in later India but rather with specimens from prehistoric Egypt and Greece and are undoubtedly of great antiquity being found far below Maurya foundations. They belong to the *late chalcolithic culture of India* as the presence of neolith, whose very make suggests their use for ceremonial purposes, clearly indicates. Such undoubtedly is the case with the *bulging pot-bellied vessel* with flat bottom (diameter 5 mm.) and narrow neck (diameter 1 mm.) and only three depressions representing the arms and legs which is probably a vestige in India of the steatopygous race that was so widely distributed over prehistoric Africa and Europe. Of like interest are the other ethnic types which are as unmistakeably primitive as meant to differentiate clearly the different kinds of

(a) Nilgiri speci-
mens.

(b) Scotforth Estate
figurines.

(c) Primitive Bhita
types.

people of those times. One of the commonest and most frequent of types is that of crude, small, bulging subbrachycephalous face with a crest at the top, bored invariably, probably for suspension and wearing as talismans. It is marked by a characteristically circular face and ears so pierced that the distended lobes extend up to the shoulder. The arms extend systematically from both sides as if forming a circle with the navel. There are no fingers, the palm being primitively formed by an oval indentation near the extremity. On the forehead between the two eyebrows there is often a tatoo with circular dots and a central dot. There are no ornaments and the make is strongly primitive in as much as there is a definite conventional representation, complete in its own manner but not merely betraying artistic incompetency. N.S. 92, N.S. 535, N.S. 93, N.S. 513, etc., are figures of these types in the Indian Museum. Another not uncommon type is that of dwarfs with a raised coiffure at the top one hand at the hip and the other raised aloft or folded as if for benediction (*vide* figures numbered N.S. 574, N.S. 588, N.S. 600, N.S. 599, in the Indian Museum). In strong contrast to these dwarfs are the giant faces tall in stature and stout in build as in numbers N. S. 307 and N. S. 961. Another type quite interesting and undoubtedly of great antiquity and represented by at least 4 specimens, which are all *black incised* figurines with points pricked or raised all over. Of these three are of owl-shaped form and one (N.S. 861) is remarkable as having a proto-Phrygian helmet on the head and a peaked beard and distended arm and apparently attired in military cuirass. The presence of 'pintaderas' in the Bhita specimens and of some signs of probable Minoan affinities also turn our eyes to the cultural contact which may have existed in those days between prehistoric India and the Mediterranean area.

As no excavations in India have brought forth like Hissarlik in Troy different city-stages it is extremely doubtful whether a definite pottery-sequence can be built up. But the “ownership marks” recently studied by Mr. Yazdani, the signs, sometimes continuous enough to be called scripts have opened a chance of speculating on probable synchronisms. The Tinnevely pottery bear marks in style and figure resemble so strongly Neolithic Egyptian marks, that barring the question which region influenced the other, may reasonably lead us to infer the sway of a common culture which would be correct within an allowance at the most of 200 years. This would give us *circa* 3000 B.C. Similarly *some* of the Bhita specimens would give us *circa* 1200 B. C. This may be called to set the limit of the chalcolithic culture of India and midway would come the Etruscan hut-urns or Kabyle Beluchistan pottery. As to the data on which these assumptions are made, they relate to provinces of ethnology and human palaeontology and combined evidence than an isolated study and I have dealt with the subject in some detail in a paper on India’s Prehistoric Foreign Contact with Egyptian and Mediterranean Cultures, in Sir Asutosh Jubilee Commemorative volume. Meanwhile everyday is bringing in fresh materials strangely confirmative of some of my theories such as the studies of pottery and structure of the Asuras of Chhota Nagpur by Babu Saratchandra Roy. However slippery the question of date may be there is no doubt that the Iron Age or Chaleolithic culture began very early and reigned very long even I am tempted to say, up to pre-Buddhistic times over major portions of India and its ceramic ware, a splendid multiplicity of form rough or polished, painted or decorated, large or small, funereal or domestic, whose

Chronology would probably be settled by a study of the marks and signs on potteries.

subsequent history in later historical times, is but a sudden arrest of development and continuous conventionalisation and deterioration. Of special importance however is the fact that painted geometrical patterns of Elam and much more of Anau 'chess-board' type have come out of pre-historic Deccan and this Central Asiatic affinity, if any, has probably a chance of explaining the earliest Egyptian and still more perhaps the Trojan Aegean and Etruscan similarities met with here. The difficulties about holding forth a later cultural contact with these places are that in India we miss completely phyllomorph or anthropomorph designs which developed characteristically in the west just after the primitive phase.

CHAPTER VII.

PREHISTORIC METALLURGY.

The 'wealth of Ind' and its 'barbarous pearl and gold' had always been before the eyes of the civilised world and the modern views are that prehistoric peoples were not blind to the beauties of the yellow metal. Savants led by Eliot Smith are trying to map out the trend of prehistoric migrations by the location of mines and attractive materials. The articles that came in for our consideration are Copper, Iron, Gold and Gem Stones. In all these cases we find not only that they are widely distributed throughout India but they had been worked almost from time immemorial. The difficulties for prehistoric study are increased for it is very difficult in India to associate the working of a particular metal with a particular set of people or fix its beginnings at a particular point of time. This much is known that the beginnings of metal for general use as distinguished from articles of ornamentation came into vogue gradually after the people had known the art of perfecting stone implements, taken to a settled life, learnt the art of weaving garments, began to use pottery and gradually inventing the use of the wheel for making it quicker in the end of the Neolithic age. But though it is true that copper (and much less bronze) and iron were totally unknown in the Neolithic age and were used for some time side by side with polished stones, the same can scarcely be said of the precious metals and shining beads for which as for coloured stones,

The early knowledge
of metals in India.

a fascination was never wanting from almost the earliest dawn of humanity probably in India.

For "Gold is very widely distributed throughout India, more so perhaps than any other Gold and gem stones. useful mineral with the exception of iron ore. There is, in fact, hardly a province in which the washing of alluvial gold from the sands of the rivers is or has not been practised by the native inhabitants." (La Touche, *Art. Gold*). Gold is obtained also directly from quartz veins or schists of Southern India. It is well-known that the Deccan Palaeolithic peoples used quartzite and were very fond of milk-white quartz. "Many old workings have been met with along the out-crops of the veins in the Chota Nagpur with large number of grooved stones which had been used for crushing and grinding the quartz" (*Ibid*). Gold has been obtained at great depths from various prehistoric sites of Tinnevely in South India. "India, at all times, has been regarded as a land of gold, yet the gold-bearing districts are almost exclusively confined to comparatively small areas in the South, so that the question naturally suggests itself, whether the gold was chiefly obtained by mining or by external intercourse. Gold certainly occurs in small quantities in the sands and gravels of many rivers and streams but the chief remains of ancient workings are found in the Wynaad district of Malavar and Nilgiri and in Mysore and Haiderabad. In the former, the country is covered with detritus left by ancient miners, who here were not content to treat only the alluvial deposits but sank shafts in the quartz veins" (Gowland, *Metals in Antiquity, Journ. R. Anthropol. Inst.*, Vol. XVII, p. 260). Its yellow colour was the cause why it was found in sporadic use in such early times. A like case is of several finely coloured gem-stones which were in demand for beads which were used for ornamental

as well as ritual purposes. Agates and Carnelians were great favourites and it may be said that diamond exercised like attraction as it occurs in districts of Anantpur, Bellary, Cuddaph, Kurnool, Kistna and Godavari which we know were great centres of human habitations even in early Palaeolithic times.

Copper is also of wide occurrence throughout India though not in native sheets but as ores.

Copper.

What is of great interest to us is that copper ores have often been found associated with iron in India, so here the invention of the extraction *of copper probably had gone hand in hand with that of iron* at least in Northern India. Ancient mine workings have been found in many places which are still the seats of peoples who are accepted as the descendants of Pre-Aryans of India. Thus in Singbhum heaps of slags still bear witness to the fact that copper deposits had long been known and exploited by the primitive tribes living there. Mr. S. C. Roy has discovered copper slags from Pre-Dravidian 'Asura' sites. 'Their treatment (which may be considered to be substantially unchanged through ages) consists in four processes : (1) the ore is thoroughly pounded and washed ; (2) it is smelted with charcoal in a primitive furnace, so as to form a regulus, the slag being removed by cooling the surface of the molten mass with a wisp of wet straw ; (3) the regulus is pounded and mixed with cowdung, made into balls, and roasted with free access of air, (4) the roasted powder is resmelted in the original furnace' (La Touche, Bibliography, II, p. 115). Old copper workings have been reported from the Shan States, Indore, Nellore, Nepal and Kangra, Singbhum, Sikkim and Kumaon. Vincent Smith in a paper in the *Indian Antiquary*, October 1905, has dwelt in detail on the large number of copper implements and weapons found and established conclusively the existence of a Copper Age at

least in Northern India which Bruce Foote had previously been led to doubt.

In the same paper Vincent Smith had as emphatically held also that India (in spite of there
 Bronze. being reports of Bronzes at various place) *had no Bronze Age*. All the bronzes that occur here were used as adornments or mere exotics. "That the iron age in peninsular India was not preceded by a Bronze age, as in Crete, Greece and so many other Western countries, was very probably due to the land-loving character of the Neolithic people, for had they possessed any sea-faring inclinations, they would certainly have sailed across the Bay of Bengal, reached the Tenasserim coast and there become acquainted with the tinstone of that region. As copper is found plentifully in India, the art of making an alloy must soon have followed. As it fell out however, the discovery of the alloy was not made in India till after the art of Iron-smelting had been acquired and Iron weapons and tools had come largely into use (N. A., pp. 24-25)"—such is the opinion of Bruce Foote. Mr. Read in his Presidential address to the Royal Anthropological Institute in 1900 also harped on the probable precedence of Iron to Bronze specially referring to Mr. Gowland's paper on Early Metallurgy of Copper, Tin and Iron in Europe thus:—"One point of great interest that in his judgment is still undecided, is whether iron or bronze was first used by man though it is probable that many archæologists have made up their minds on the subject; but he dispels altogether the idea that there is any greater difficulty, by the most primitive process, in producing an implement of iron than in making one of copper or bronze and endorses Dr. Percy's opinion that metallurgically the Age of Iron should precede the Bronze Age." Six bronze weapons of which three are

harpoons, one a celt, one a spearhead and the last a sword have been noticed by Vincent Smith and no less than 123 Bronze objects are recorded by Mr. Rea and I found not quite a small number in the Patna Museum. Where did they come from ?

If the predominance of any article is to give the name to any country, India should have
 Iron. been called 'the land of Iron' so widely distributed is the ore here and so many workings have been reported from various places. The question of the antiquity of iron in India has always been studied from the wrong side in as much as evidence was always sought from the literatures of 'the Bronze and Copper-using Aryans' whereas 'Pre-Aryan' India gives quite a different tale. Go to any part of *primitive India*, iron industry, the high quality of steel produced and the low state of civilisation of people producing them (*e.g.*, the Khasis, the Kols) would present a great riddle. It does not matter whether in the Vedas, the shining metal often mentioned *Ayas* would be 'steel' or 'copper' though as in the case of Homeric literature the case for Bronze or Copper seems to be more weighty than that of Iron. But there is also no denying that when some time had elapsed after the settlement of the Vedic peoples in this country they came in contact with the aborigines who prepared steel 'wootz' and this word might have soon artificially modified the meaning of Aryan 'Ayas.' This alone can explain why Iron according to Vincent Smith is not mentioned in the Rigveda but is evidently known by the time of Atharva Veda and Satapatha Brahmana on the one hand as well as the very important fact adduced by Bruce Foote that traces of Iron smelting have been noticed in many neolithic settlements in the Deccan, *e.g.*, the Bellary. Bruce Foote has also rightly observed that iron industry

is one of great antiquity in India, far greater indeed than in Europe, *e.g.*, at Hallstatt and La Tene. Primitive furnaces have been reported from various parts of India.

“The furnace is built of clay by the Its ancient smelting processes. smelter and his family, and is of no great capacity, the maximum yield reported for a single furnace being about 30 tons per annum; while the blast is usually supplied by a pair of leather bellows. Only the softer varieties of one such as can be easily reduced to powder, and if necessary concentrated by winnowing, are made use of. These are gathered from the surface or dug out from shallow pits and trenches; or when available are collected in the form of iron sand from the beds of streams. The ore is reduced in direct contact with charcoal, and without the addition of a flux to a pasty mass or ‘bloom’ from which a slag is expressed by repeated hammering and re-heating; since the temperature at command is seldom high of the charge.” (*La Touche, Bibliography*, Vol. II, p. 233.) Another special feature was the manufacture of *wootz* or crucible steel by the carbonisation of wrought iron as practised in the Trichinopoly district and other places of Southern India from time immemorial. The iron is placed in crucibles made of ferruginous clay and charred rice husk, with wood of the Avaram tree (*Cassia auriculata*) and leaves of *Calotropis gigantea* or *Convolvulus laurifolius*, and sealed with clay. The crucibles are arranged in the furnace in batches of 25, forming a flat arch, and are subjected to a continuous blast for about 2 hours. The steel is produced in the form of small conical ingots, each weighing from 8 to 11 ounces.”


Dr. Panchanan Neogi, Professor of Chemistry, Rajshahi College, shows in his admirable monograph on “Iron in Ancient India” (1914) that the crucible process of making cast-steel is an Indian discovery. He says “It is evident

that the traditional Indian method of making steel was the crucible process of making cast-steel in a fused condition by cementation, which process should really be regarded as an Indian discovery. The chemical action that takes place is that during the application of heat to the closed crucible the dry wood and green leaves would yield charcoal as well as an abundant supply of hydrocarbons. This joint action of carbon and hydrocarbons greatly facilitates the formation of steel as the European method of cementation by means of *charcoals alone* used to take six or seven *days*, and even fourteen to twenty *days*, while the Indian process takes only four to six *hours*."

It is curious how 'wootz' is often spoken of in very ancient Greek literature as well as Egyptian dynastic literature as one of the metals imported from the East and has been generally interpreted as Electrum, but much more likely refers to Indian steel where we get the very name. Von Luschan in dealing with "Eisentechnik in Africa" (Zeitschr. f. Ethn. 1909) had described the Egyptian "Schalengebläse" the handled blowing instruments which were worked by standing on leather and maintained that these were the most primitive and the Egyptians had derived the knowledge of these from Negroid neighbours and from Egypt this had spread all over the old world. Now amongst the Kols of India *exactly identical processes* prevailed till a late day. Thus we read in the District Gazetteer on Santal Parganas (1910, p. 201) "In the ground on each side of the furnace a planted stake 8 or 9 feet in length had been driven. These were now bent over towards the bellows, and to the stake on the left-hand side was fastened a string which was attached to the goat-skin of the left-hand bellows, so that the stake, trying to spring back into place, pulled up the skin on the bellows. The stake on the right-hand side

The antiquity of the
Early Iron Age in
India.

PLATE IX



A hunting scene from Mirzapur with stone-tipped harpoons.

was similarly attached to the right-hand bellows. The skins each had a perforation. Then a man standing on the bellows, with one foot on each, depressed the right-hand stake, and at the same time closed the perforation in the skin of the right-hand bellows with his foot, and by means of his weight drove the air from the bellows into the furnace. He then leant over to the left and repeating the operations on the left-hand bellows sent a blast from the left-hand pipe into the furnace and thus alternately he threw his weight from right to left in a series of operations resembling a man in the tread-mill, and gave a fairly steady blast into the furnace." It seems as if we were reading a description of Egyptian treadle-blasts depicted in Fig. 7 of Luschan's article, so strikingly similar are the methods adopted by these Pre-Dravidians to that of the Egyptians. I had already given hints of some facts and data which go to show that the civilisations of early Sumer and Egypt might be due to some Neolithic Indo-Erythraeans whose home was likeliest to be round the shores of the Erythraean sea whom ethnically we may call with Ruggieri *H. Sapiens Indo-africanus* and with Elliot Smith as the *Brown Race*. The opinions of several Egyptologists are well known to be the same, though India specifically was not mentioned by them. Now it is a curious fact that iron though not in common use in Egypt till in the middle dynastic period, occurs as sporadic specimens undoubtedly in the earliest dynastic times. **If the mysterious ethnic and cultural connection between India and Egypt based on the similarity of some hyper-dolichocephalic skulls, identity of the shape of some funeral urns as well as Neolithic pottery-marks and affinity of agglutinative tongues is conceded, it must be also said that in predynastic times even**

the knowledge of iron was probably common to both countries. And as the one is possessed by India at large, we think steel, especially wootz was imported from India in Egypt as objects of high value in those early times about 3 to 4 thousand years before Christ. It seems that a great equatorial Pre-Dravidian race of India, of East African affinities, whom I called the Indo-Erythræans, probably evolved in the Deccan the process of smelting iron and that is why we find iron beads in Egypt in Pre-dynastic times occurring sporadically long before the times when they became more frequent when possibly trade-relations were re-established with the Deccan after a long lapse following the ethnic separation of the peoples on the African and Indian littorals. It would not indeed be impossible to think of the piece of iron of the Great Pyramid at Gizeh in the IVth dynasty as results of trade relations with India as was the case with the piece of Indian teak found in Mugir in a strata of about 4000 B.C. That the knowledge of iron did not spread from Asia Minor eastwards is proved by the Iron age in China (about 2357 B.C.) being much anterior to that, say in Hissarlik (about 2000 B.C.)

CHAPTER VIII

SURVIVALS IN TECHNIQUE

One of the most reliable authorities on Indian art and technology, Dr. Coomarswamy, was never oblivious of the earlier strain in Indian art and a few excerpts from his work are only needed to show the true aspect of things. Thus he opens his work on the *Arts and Crafts of India and Ceylon* with these remarkable words "The oldest inhabitants of India are known to us by their stone and copper implements and pottery; they survive in the wild hill and forest tribes of many parts of India, and form quantitatively the most important factor in the origin of all those who are known now as Indians. Of the mainly non-Aryan Indians, the most important modern representatives are the Dravidians, especially the Tamils and Sinhalese, who already possessed a highly developed civilisation when the first Aryan teachers reached them, some centuries B.C. The origin of these Dravidians is not certainly known. Thus we have got at the outset three strands of culture in India—the primitive, the Dravidian, and the 'Aryan.'" As there can be no people completely devoid of culture, these must have been a primitive element, some of which must have passed into Dravidian to merge still later into the 'Aryan' fold. When long years of systematic research would have unfolded the true tale of Indian culture, there would probably be found stages of progress and decline synchronous with peaceful or unquiet times brought


Much of Indian civilization—Pre-Aryan.

about by the disturbance of a foreign ethnic element which took some time to be received into the traditional current to open up new roads of future revival.

It is not very many years ago that the world has realised that in the dim past of palæolithic times reckoned in hundreds of thousands of years, humanity was capable of showing products of art, which according to some eminent authorities as Cartailhac and Breuil were scarcely inferior to the best productions of Greek or Roman times. The Cave paintings of India have been often admired, their antiquity in some cases have been proved to extend to 2000 to 2500 years. Cave shelters of a prehistoric type with early drawings are not unknown in India. Some of the cults though later admitted into the folds of Hinduism, such as that of Saivism seem to originate in the remote past of prehistoric times. Is it possible that a primitive tradition of cave-paintings had been handed down to very late times from the remote prehistoric ages? The negroid features of some of the people portrayed in Ajanta or for the matter of that, curved in Sanchi stupa give us cause to ponder about the ethnic element concerned being 'Pre-Aryan' or even 'Pre-Dravidian' or not. In the temple of Mallikarjuna dedicated to the antique cult of Siva we find the unmistakable figures of 'giraffes' which palæontologists and prehistoric archaeologists know to have been abundant in India in early 'human' times and whose total disappearance from this land many thousand years ago has not yet been fully explained. But here as elsewhere more data are needed and there is indication that prehistoric research in India alone has probably a fair chance of explaining the sudden rise and great excellence of the earliest Buddhist art. The foreigner, be it the Hellenes or the

Cave paintings and
delineations of extinct
animals.

PLATE X.



A Neolithic (?) rock-carving near Ghatshila like that of Australia

Persian or the Assyrian may have acted as the stirrer, as it always does in like case, but what was the thing stirred? More research alone can answer.

Long ago Fergusson had drawn attention to the remarkable similarity of form and apparent origin of the earliest Buddhist 'stupas' in motive and design from the countless 'Rude Stone monuments' to be found in the Deccan. Dr. Coomarswamy has also pointed out how the prototypes of the earliest models of Indian Historic Architectures perhaps survive in the dairy-temple of the Todas, who, it must be remembered, are decidedly 'Pre-Aryan' if not 'Pre-Dravidian.' A study of some of the ruins of structure in Anuradhapura in Ceylon and some of the southernmost point of the Deccan have revealed an interesting fact that they were built probably after the earliest 'Ziggurat' type which were of four tower-stages and not seven or more as in the later times as has been found from the drawing on the fragment of a blue stone-vase found from Adab (Jastrow Jr., *The Civilisation of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 53). Jhering in his *Evolution of the Aryan* (Eng. Transl., 1897, p. 181) aptly remarks how 'other Indian structures built after that (Babylonian) pattern must have preceded those preserved to us.' Thus our attention is turned to the search of such pre-Buddhistic monuments as the Cyclopean walls of Raigir which may at some later date come up to reveal some lost motives which were identical with those inspiring the prehistoric monuments of Pre-dynastic Egypt, pre-Semitic Babylon and pre-Hellenic Greece!

Potteries sometimes also present to us the same riddle.

The case of the early pottery and other decorations.

As soon as we step the bounds of historic times we are led at once to some forms which inevitably suggest the designs of the prehistoric periods of the early seats

of culture in the Euphrates or the Nile or in Crete. The following paragraph from Dr. Coomarswamy's *Arts and Crafts* (p. 39) is very significant. "The most ancient part of Indian art belongs to the common endowment of "Early Asiatic" culture which once extended from the Mediterranean to China and as far south as Ceylon, where some of the most archaic motifs survive in the decoration of pottery. **To this Mykenean facies belong all the simpler arts of wood-work, weaving, metal-work, pottery, etc., together with a group of designs including many of a remarkably Mediterranean aspect, others more likely originating in Western Asia.** The wide extension and consistency of this culture throughout Asia in the second millennium B.C. throws important light on ancient trade intercourse, at a time when the Eastern Mediterranean formed the western boundary of the civilised world." Whatever be the place of origin of this very early motive, once for all is here recognised the prehistoric element in the decoration which underlies much of later work, as the author says later on (*Ibid*, p. 186) "The unglazed earthenware all over India is of the remotest antiquity, in form and technique unaltered since prehistoric times. The forms are of exceptional simplicity and dignity, while the decorative ornament, especially in Ceylon, is of great interest as preserving many archaic (Mykenean or Early Asiatic) motifs." The Minoan affinities of the Bhita pottery and the Kabylian aspects of some pieces from Baluchistan deposited in the Indian Museum have also been noticed by me while the legged vessels have been more than once pointed out to resemble strongly some Trojan potteries (*vide* Walhouse's paper

in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. IV). Bruce Foote's objection (*vide* his Note, etc., p. 68) does not count as three-legged vessels and loop-handles also are known now in several specimens from the Indian Museum.

Any one who has gone carefully through Decandolle's 'Origin of Cultivated plants' must have

The textile fabrics.

noticed the greater antiquity of linen over cotton and how the ancient peoples of Egypt used linen stuff, how the perennial variety (*Linum Angustifolium*) found wild from Canary Island to Palestine was cultivated in Switzerland and northern Italy by peoples more ancient than the conquerors of the Aryan race and how the annual variety (*Linum usitatissimum*) cultivated for at last 4 or 5 thousand years in Mesopotamia and Egypt and found wild in the districts between the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea and the Black sea was introduced into Northern Europe by the Turanian race. Cotton has also been often taken on philological grounds to be an Indian invention of remote antiquity. Baines in his Ethnography (p. 62) points out how the weaver castes (in India) occupy a low position, considering the character and utility of their function. This is doubtless due to the fact that the latter originated amongst the "Pre-Aryan races." Now the weaver castes generally are known "Patve" as in Gujrat or Pator as in Orissa or Pattunurkaran as in the Tamil country, words which suggest the manufacture of 'Patta' a coloured stuff which in all probability was linen. It is worth enquiring whether a linen industry was flourishing in India from prehistoric times which later merged into the cotton and muslin industry which won for India a world-wide reputation as the great industry centres are found to be rather the easternmost and southernmost parts than the midlands so much influenced by the "Aryan" sway. However conjectural the above

may be, it is worthy of note that it is from the pre-Buddhistic and primitive potteries of Bhita that there has come numerous 'pintaderas' as well as 'the oldest and most beautiful of the terra-cotta medallion' as Dr. Coomarswamy calls it (*Arts and Crafts*, p. 187) which with its motley character might have been used as earthenware hand-blocks for printing of costly garments.

Medieval Sculpture in Eastern India*

BY

RAMĀPRASĀD CHANDA, B.A.

By Eastern India I mean the land of the Prācyas or Easterners of the ancients lying to the east of the meridian of Allahabad which marked the eastern boundary of the Madhyadeśa or middle country as defined by Manu ; and by medieval we understand that epoch in the history of Northern India which begins with the rise of the Gupta empire in the fourth century A.D., and came to a close with the Muhammadan conquest at the end of the twelfth.

Before the Gupta period two great schools of sculpture flourished in the west, the Mathura school of the Kushan period, and the Græco-Buddhist school of Gandhāra. Contemporaneously with these well-known schools of the west, there flourished in Eastern India a vigorous indigenous school of sculpture called by Sir John Marshall the early National School. This early school of sculpture of Eastern India spread its offshoots to Sāñci in Central India and to Amarāvati in the south. As it preceded and prepared the ground for the rise of the Medieval school of the Gupta period, an acquaintance with the sculptures of this early national school is necessary for the proper understanding of the Medieval. With few exceptions all the known specimens

* A lecture (illustrated by lantern slides) delivered at the Indian Museum, Calcutta, on September 28, 1920.

of ancient sculptures of Eastern India are found in connection with Buddhist monuments—the ancient railing round the Bodhi tree at Bodh Gayā, and the Buddhist stūpas at Bharhut, Sāñcī and Amarāvati, and therefore the school of sculpture is also known as the ancient Buddhist school. The most notable feature of this old Buddhist art of Eastern India is the *absence* of the representation of Buddha himself. His throne is always vacant, or, at the most, there is a symbol indicating the invisible presence of the Buddha. Writes Dr. Foucher, “These selected examples suffice to demonstrate that the ancient Indian sculptors abstained from representing either the Bodhisatva or Buddha in the course of his last earthly existence [at least under his human form]. Such is the abnormal, but indisputable fact of which every history of Buddhist art will have at the outset to render account.”¹ This abnormal but indisputable fact demands an explanation not only at the very outset of the history of Indian art, but it is the corner stone of the whole fabric of Indian art, ancient and medieval, and upon the satisfactory explanation of this fact depends the understanding of the whole course of the history of sculpture in Northern India.

Dr. Foucher’s explanation of this abnormal fact deserves serious consideration. He writes, “If they did not do it, it was because it was not the custom to do it.” “Buddhism did not develop,” he adds, “like Christianity, in a world long infected by the worship of images and prompt to contaminate it in its turn.” The eminent French *savant* does not give evidence for thinking so. But the Pali Nikāyas and the Āngas and Upāṅgas of the Śvetāmbara Jainas enshrine traditional evidences in support of this thesis. These works purport to report the sayings and

¹ *The Beginnings of Buddhist Art*, Paris, 1917, p. 5.

doings of Gautama Buddha and Mahāvīra and are recognised by the faithful as first-hand and strictly genuine. Modern criticism finds this position untenable. But modern criticism cannot deny that the Nikāyas and the Piṭakas contain good deal that is pre-monumental, that is, good deal older than the railings of the stūpas of Sāñcī and Bharhut. On the railings of Sāñcī and Bharhut, are named donors who are called *pacane-kayika*, "who knows the five *nikāyas*," and *peṭakin*, "who knows the Piṭakas."¹ This of course does not imply that in the pre-monumental epoch the five *Nikāyas* existed in the same form as we have them, but it warrants us in holding that in those days there already existed five collections of the dialogues of the Buddha that are now represented by the *Nikāyas*. Take for instance the Dighanikāya, No. 14, *Mahāpadāna Suttanta*. It contains the lives of six previous Buddhas—six predecessors of Gautama Buddha,—Vipassi, Sikhi, Vessabhu, Kakusandha, Konāgamana, and Kassapa, and is therefore considered a late compilation. But these six Buddhas are also named on the railing of the Bharhut stūpa and some episodes of their life stories are figured in the reliefs. This shows that the kernel of the Mahāpadāna Suttanta, the canonical version of the lives of the six previous Buddhas, are older—considerably older, than the railing of Bharhut. We may therefore conclude that the Pali Buddhist suttas contain good deal that dates from the pre-monumental days. The Pali suttas in turn confirm good deal that is contained in the Śvetāmvara Jaina canon, and the ancient Jaina sculptures of Mathurā dating from the first century A. D. guarantee the antiquity and authenticity of many of the Jaina traditions. So we may very well expect in the Pali Buddhist suttas

¹ Luders List, Nos. 290, 856, 867.

and the Jaina Āngas and Upāṅgas genuine traditions relating to the religious life in Eastern India at the time when Buddhism arose.

It is possible to distinguish three different strata in the very complex religious life of Eastern India in the sixth to fourth centuries B. C.

(1) At the top the religion of the monks belonging to diverse orders.

(2) Just below it, the official Brahmanism or Vedic ritualism.

(3) Folk-religion.

We shall examine these three strata to see whether there was idolatry in Eastern India in those days.

(1) Even non-Brahmanic monasticism is much older than Mahāvira the Jina and Gautama the Buddha. It is generally believed that there were Jaina monks before Mahāvira belonging to the order founded by Pārśvanātha. Very probably there were also Bauddha monks even before the rise of the Sakya-puttiya Samanas or the order founded by Gautama the Buddha of the Śākya family. We have already seen that the life stories of the six previous Buddhas have been narrated and depicted in the Mahāpadāna Suttanta and the railing of Bharhut respectively. The orders of monks founded by these Buddhas are referred to in the Vinayapiṭaka, Suttavibhaṅga (Pārājika I, 3). There Gautama Buddha is made to say :—

bhagvato ca Sāriputta Vipassissa bhagavato Sikhissa bhagavato
ca Vessabhussa brahmacariyam na ciraṭṭhitikam ahoṣi, bhaga-
vato ca Sāriputta Kakusandhassa bhagavato ca Konāgamanassa
bhagavato ca Kassapaṣṣa brahmacariyam ciraṭṭhitikam ahoṣiti.

“O Sāriputta, the order of monks founded by the Blessed Vipassi, the Blessed Sikhi and Vessabhu have not survived, but the orders founded by the Blessed Kakusandha, the Blessed Konāgamana, and the Blessed Kassapa are everlasting.”

This passage shows that when it was composed there were orders of monks believed to have been founded by the Buddhas Kakusandha, Konāgamana, and Kassapa. Ancient Buddhist traditions tell us that these three Buddhas lived before Gautama Buddha. So we may conclude that there were orders of Buddhist monks before the Buddha Gautama. Besides the Jaina and the Bauddha orders, there were five other great orders of monks led respectively by Purāṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla (of the cowpen), Ajita Kesakambali (of the garment of hair), Pakuḍha Kaccāyana, and Sañjaya Belatthaputta whose doctrines are referred to in the Samāññaphala Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya. Add to these the orders headed by Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka the disciple of Rāma to whom Gautama after his renunciation attached himself in turn before he resorted to the forest at Uruvelā near Gayā. We are here concerned to examine the religious doctrines held by these monastic orders from the standpoint of sculpture, that is to say, of idolatry; whether the religious doctrines held by these orders afforded any scope for idolatry. As the religions of ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Greece show, idolatry is a handmaid of polytheism with personal deities. The ancient Indian monks believed in the existence of different classes of superhuman beings such as the Brahmās, Indras, Devas, Nāgas, Yakṣas, but they were not polytheists, for they held that like men these superhuman beings also were subject to the law of transmigration, and not undying denizens of a paradise of eternal bliss. The philosophical position of all these sectaries may roughly be described as agnosticism which is not favourable to image worship. I have not hitherto spoken of the orthodox Brāhmaṇic monks who followed the Upaniṣads. They were either monotheists or pantheists. As we shall see later on, Indian monotheism is not quite agreeable to ordinary

image worship. It was less so in those ancient days before the path of bhakti (*bhakti-mārga*) with a personal God gained ascendancy over the path of knowledge (*jñāna-mārga*). And all the monks of ancient India, whether Brahmans or Śramanas, were followers of the different branches of the path of knowledge.

(2) If from the wandering mendicants we turn our eyes to the householders we find that the official religion of the upper classes, the Brahmans and the Kṣatriyas, is Vedic ritualism. Our authorities do not tell us much about other grades of society. Is Vedic ritualism favourable to image-making? In a Vedic sacrifice food and drink are offered to devas through sacrificial fires, and images have no place in the sacrificial hall. Is Vedic ritualism polytheism? We are not here concerned with the R̥g-vedic religion which pertains to a remoter time and a remote clime. But in the later Vedic literature, in the Black Yajurveda and the Brāhmaṇas, we find the *devas* thrown into the background, and *yajña* (sacrifice) and the *tapas* (penances) pushed above all else. It is said that the *devas* became *devas* and attained to *svarga* or heaven by performing sacrifices, and even Prajāpati, the Supreme Being, acquired the power of creation by performing *tapas*. Then who is the dispenser of the reward of the *yajña* and *tapas*? The answer to this question is furnished by the Pūrva Mimāṃsā system attributed to Jaimini which teaches us that the *devas* are not the giver of the reward of sacrifice, but the sacrifice itself rewards the performer. In most cases a sacrificer has to wait for his reward till his death. So during the interval between the performance of the sacrifice and the death of the sacrificer the reward remains in abeyance in the form of something mysterious called *apūrva*. It is said that in a lost chapter of the Pūrva-Mimāṃsā system called the Saṃkarṣaṇa-kāṇḍa the very existence of the

devas was denied. Any way, the later Vedic sacrificial religion is frankly agnostic.

But it may be asked, are not images and temples referred to in the Vedic literature and did not the Vedic folk make images? According to Macdonell, "one or two passages of the R̥gveda seem to allude to some kind of symbol or possibly a rude image."¹ In the *Agnicayana* or the ceremony of building the fire-altar described in the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Yajurveda it is necessary to place a lotus leaf in the centre of the altar site, a golden plate on the lotus leaf, and thereon *hiranya puruṣa* or gold man, an image of man made of gold. This image is identified with Prajāpati, with Agni, and with the sacrificer. The image was a crude one. According to one view referred to in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa VII, 4, 1, 45, no arms were to be made and two wooden spoons placed on two sides of the figure were to serve the purpose of arms. But the author of the Brāhmaṇa enjoins that nevertheless the figure should be made with arms. The golden man was solemnly worshipped and the bricks were laid on and around it and the altar was built. The *Agnicayana* ceremony must have originally stood apart from the sacrificial system, for it has no place in the ordinary scheme of sacrifice. It is quite different from the regular Agnyādhāna or Agnyādheya, the ceremony of establishing sacrificial fires which every young householder is required to perform. No image is mentioned in connection with the building of the fire altars of the Agnyādhāna, nor in connection with the special altars, Mahāvedi and Uttaravedi, of the Soma sacrifice. Temples and symbols or images of *devas* are referred to in some of the Gṛhya-sūtras. But as the ceremonies connected with these symbols or images do not form essential parts of the *grihya* rites in connection with which they are

¹ *Festschrift Ernst Windisch*, Leipzig, 1914, p. 158, note 1.

mentioned, for they are not prescribed in the corresponding sections of the sūtras of all the schools, these passages cannot be considered as old as the main portions of the *Grihya-sūtras*, and may or may not be pre-monumental.

(3) Now to return to Eastern India, from the Vedic religion as practised in the sixth to fourth centuries B.C. to the folk religion, the transition, or rather the fall, is a very sudden one. In the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, among the seven conditions of the welfare of the Vajjians of Vaiśālī, occurs the following :—

“So long as they honour and esteem and revere and support the Vajjian caityas in town or country, and allow not proper offerings and rites, as formerly given and performed, to fall into desuetude—so long as the rightful protection, defence, and support shall be fully provided for the Arahants among them, so that Arahants from a distance may enter the realm, and the Arahants therein may live at ease—so long may the Vajjians be expected not to decline, but to prosper.” (Rhys Davids.)

We may recognise the Vajjians as typical of the clans of Eastern India of those days. In the above extract only two phases of their religious life are noticed, worship of the caityas and maintenance of the monks. The five other conditions of welfare mentioned in the text relate to matters temporal. Of the two aspects of the religious life of the Vajjis we are here concerned with the *caitya* worship. What were these caityas? The following caityas of Vaiśālī are named in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta—Udena, Gotamaka, caitya of the Seven Mangoes (*Sattambaka*), caitya of Many Sons (*Bahuputta*), Sāranda, and Cāpāla. In the Paṭika Suttanta of the Digha Nikāya (Vol. III, P. T. S., pp. 9-10) the situation of four of these caityas is defined. The Udena caitya was situated to the east of Vaiśālī, Gotamaka caitya to the south, Sattambaka caitya or the shrine of the Seven Mangoes to the west, and the Bahuputta caitya or the

shrine of Many Sons to the north. The Buddhist and Jaina texts contain the names of other caityas that were situated near other cities of Eastern India such as Śrāvastī, Benares, Mithilā, Vaiśālī, Rājagṛiha, Campā, Kayaṅgala, etc. According to Buddhaghōṣa these caityas were Yakṣa caityas, and as some of the caityas are named after well known Yakṣas like Maṇibhadhra and Pūrṇabhadra, we may believe the tradition handed down by Buddhaghōṣa and also by the author of the Gujarati gloss on the Jaina texts that these ancient caityas of Eastern India were dedicated to Yakṣas.

The term caitya is usually translated as "shrine." What sort of shrines were the caityas mentioned in the ancient Bauddha and Jaina texts? According to the later medieval commentators of the Jaina texts these caityas were temples with idols of deities. But this view is opposed to the texts and the opinion of earlier commentators. In the Sanskrit passage of the Divyāvadāna (p. 201) corresponding to the passage of the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta that gives this list of the caityas of Vaiśālī the *Gotamaka cetiya* of the Pali text is called *Gautama-nyagrodha* in Sanskrit. It shows that the shrine of Gotama at Vaiśālī was not a temple but a nyagrodha (*figus indica*) which was the abode of probably a Yakṣa named Gautama. In both versions one caitya is called *Sattambuka* (Pali), *Saptāmraka* (Sanskrit), and this shrine was evidently a grove consisting of seven mango trees. In the Sanskrit version one caitya is called Śālavana, 'a śāla grove.' In the Saṃyutta Nikāya (P. T. S., Part II, p. 220) is named a *Bahuputta cetiya*, shrine of many sons, between Rājagṛiha and Nālanda. In the commentary on the Theragāthā, Psalms of the Brethren, translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids, we are told (p. 361), "And the supreme Buddha, seated in the fragrant chamber of the great Vihāra in the

Bamboo-wood, knew what the earthquake signified, and gathering eighty chief Theras together, he walked three leagues on the road, and seated himself at the foot of the Bahuputtaka Banyan, between Rajagriha and Nālanda.”

The Jaina description of a caitya of those days is given in full in the *Aupapātika Sūtra* and has been translated into English by Barnett in his English version of the *Antāgaḍa-Ḍasāo*. It runs thus:—

“Outside this city of Campā, to the north-east thereof, was a sanctuary named Punnabhadde. It was of ancient origin, told by men of former days, old, renowned, rich and well known. It had umbrellas, bauners, and bells, it had flags and flags upon flags to adorn it and was provided with brushes. It had daïses built in it, and was reverentially adorned with a coating of dry cowdung and bore figures of the five-fingered hand painted in gośīrṣa sandal, fresh red sandal, Dardara sandal. There was in it great store of ritual pitchers. On its doorways were ritual jars and well fashioned arches. Broad rounded long-drooping masses of chaplets lay in it below and above; and it was filled with appertaining bunches of fresh sweet-smelling blossoms of the five colours scattered therein. It smelt pleasantly with the shimmering reek from incense of Kālāguru, fine Kundurukka, and tarukka, and was odorous with sweet smelling fine scents, a very incense-wafer. It was haunted by actors, dancers, rope-walkers, wrestlers, boxers, jesters, jumpers, reciters, ballad-singers, story-tellers, pole-dancers, picture-showmen, pipers, lute-players, snake-charmers, and minstrels. Its fame was widely spread among many populations of town and country. It was meet for the prayers and supplications of many prayerful folk; meet for worship, celebration, veneration, offering, largesse, and respect; meet to be waited upon with courtesy as a blessed and auspicious sanctuary of the gods, divine, truth-telling, truth-counselling. Miracles were manifested therein, and it received shares in thousands of sacrifices. Many people came to worship the sanctuary Punnabhadde.

“This sanctuary Punnabhadde was encompassed round about by a great wood.....

* * * * *

"In this wood was a broad mid-space. Therein, it is related, was a great and fine Aśoka-tree. It had its roots pure with Kuśa and Vikuśa grass.".....

* * * * *

"Underneath this fine Aśoka tree, somewhat close to its trunk, was, it is related, a large dais of earthen blocks. It was of goodly proportions as to breadth, length, and height, and it was black, with the hue of an anjana, a cloud, a sword, a lotus, the silken robe of the Ploughshare-bearer, an ākāśa-keśa, a soot collector, cart-grease, a section of a horn, a riṣṭaka gem, jack-fruit, an asaṇaga, a saṇa-stalk, a mass of blue lotus petals, or the flower of flax, with the colour of a heap of emeralds, sapphires, kaḍitra-skins, or pupils of the eye. It was smooth and massive, eight-cornered like the face of a mirror, very delightful, and variously figured with wolves, bulls, horses, men, dolphins, birds, snakes, elves, ruru-deer, sarabha-deer, yak-oxen, elephants, forest-creepers, and padmaka creepers. It felt as though it were of deer skin, of rūta, of būra, of butter, or of tūla. It was shaped like a throne, and was comforting . . . comely."

It will be seen that, as in the panels of the balustrades of Bharhut and Sāñcī, so in the caitya, the objects of worship are the Aśoka and daises and thrones decorated with figures of animals and men, and not images. Of course the primitive worship of mounds and trees as the abode of spirits belongs to a much lower level of culture than polytheism and image worship. But the worship of mounds and trees countenanced by the promulgator of the Noble Eight-fold Path must have been something nobler than primitive worship of trees and mounds. In those days, as at present, all parts of India were inhabited by men of different castes and tribes belonging to different ethnic stocks and having different types of culture. So it is quite possible that image worship was practised by some of the castes and tribes, but it was not, as our evidences show, regularly practised by those classes of the people who were progressive and whose sympathy and support could have led to the development of the art

of image-making or sculpture. The making of images referred to in the texts of the pre-monumental period like Pāṇini's sūtras was evidently confined to the primitive effortless stratum of society and not patronised by the progressive sections who with their pantheistic or agnostic tendencies could not fully reconcile themselves to idolatry and polytheism. These latter sections worshipped and maintained the caityas because it was their custom to do so from time immemorial, and, when they got hold of some higher objects of worship like Buddha, they made the presiding spirits of the caityas like the Yakṣas, Nāgas, and Devas, as the Buddhist texts and monuments show us, to fall in line with their old worshippers and adopt the worship of Buddha. At two sites we have remains of Vaiṣṇava monuments dating from the second century B.C. At Besnagar have been found the remnants of two inscribed Garuḍadhvajās or pillars, symbols of Viṣṇu, and the capital of a Makaradhvajā, the symbol of Pradyumna, a Vaiṣṇava deity. In course of the excavations of the site carried on by Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar no trace was found of any temple or image of Viṣṇu. At Ghasundi in the Udaypur state in Rajputana has been discovered a stone slab bearing an inscription which records the erection of a *pūjā-śīlā-prākāro* usually translated as "stone enclosure of worship." But perhaps a closer rendering is, "an enclosure round the stone which is the object of worship." Here the object of worship representing Saṃkarṣana and Vāsudeva was probably a stone bearing symbols, and not images. It is very doubtful whether even the Vaiṣṇavas of Central and Western India in those days made images of the chief objects of their worship.

History of the ancient civilised nations teaches us that artistic taste and the capacity for speculation and scientific thinking that leads to the progress of religious

ideas do not go hand in hand. The ancient Egyptians, as their sculpture and painting show, had high order of artistic capacity. But throughout their history their religion remained static and primitive and the one reformer that arose among them was frustrated by the lack of sympathy on the part of the people. In Greece, again, with a people gifted with the highest artistic genius, the progress of art retarded, instead of promoting, the progress of religion. Professor Gilbert Murray writes :—

“ Now the Greek gods seem at first sight quite particularly solid and anthropomorphic Even if we go back to the fifth century B.C. we shall find the ruling conceptions far nobler indeed, but still anthropomorphic. We find firmly established the Olympian patriarchal family, Zeus the Father of Gods and men, his wife Hera, his son Apollo, his daughter Athena, his brother Poseidon and Hades and the rest. We probably think of each figure more or less as like a statue, a habit of mind obviously wrong and indeed absurd, as if one thought of ‘ Labour ’ and ‘ Grief ’ as statues because Rodin or St. Gaudens has so represented them. And yet it was a habit into which the late Greeks themselves sometimes fell; their arts of sculpture and painting as applied to religion had been so dangerously successful: they sharpened and made vivid an anthropomorphism which in its origin had been mostly the result of normal human laziness. The process of making winds and rivers into anthropomorphic gods, is, for the most part, not the result of using the imagination with special vigour. It is the result of not doing so.

* * * *

“ We must get back behind these gods of the artist’s workshop and the romance-maker’s imagination, and see if the religious thinkers of the great period use, or imply, the same highly human conceptions. We shall find Parmenides telling us that God is One, and coincides with the universe, which is a sphere and immovable; Xenophanes, that God is all-seeing, all-hearing, and all mind; and as for his supposed human shape, why, if bulls and lions were to speak about God they would doubtless tell us that he was a bull or a lion. We must notice the instinctive language of the poets, using

the word *theos* in many subtle senses for which our word 'God' is too stiff, too personal, and too anthropomorphic."¹

Again :—

"It is curious how near to monotheism, and to monotheism of a very profound and impersonal type, the religion of Greece came in the sixth and fifth centuries. Many of the philosophers, Xenophanes, Parmenides and others asserted it clearly or assumed it without hesitation. Aeschylus, Euripides, Plato, in their deeper moments point the same road ... Certainly Greek monotheism, had it really carried the day, would have been a far more philosophic thing than the tribal and personal monotheism of the Hebrews. But unfortunately too many hard-caked superstitions, too many tender and sensitive associations, were linked with particular figures in the pantheon or particular rites which had brought the worshippers religious peace."²

Here the author clearly indicates that art, instead of promoting, proved a hindrance to religious progress, and stood as a barrier between the teaching of the philosophers and the poets on the one hand, and the general public on the other. Another authority, Dr. Farnell, writes relating to the effects of Greek idolatry on Greek religion, "It intensified the perception of the real personal god as a material fact. It increased polytheism by multiplying the separate figures of worship, often, perhaps, without intention."³ If the teachings of Yājñavalkya Vājasaneyā and Gautama the Buddha met with better fortune in India than did those of Ikhnaton in Egypt and of Xenophanes and Parmenides in Greece, it was because the teachings of Yājñavalkya and Buddha suited better the racial temperament of the people of India than did the teachings of Ikhnaton, Xenophanes, and Parmenides that of their respective peoples. Religion and art are at base things of the mind.

¹ Gilbert Murray, *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, New York, 1912, pp. 24-26.

² *Ibid.*, p. 90.

³ Farnell, *Greece and Babylon*, London, 1911, pp. 12-13.

As types of mind differ according to the difference of physical types of man, so the types of religious and artistic ideas differ according to the difference of the types of the mind. Polytheism, idolatry and artistic taste were not quite in consonance with the mental constitution of the progressive sections of the population of ancient India. So art of sculpture did not flourish in ancient India as did other elements of progress.

Undertaking to discourse on medieval sculpture, if I have so long been wandering far away from that period, it is because Indian sculpture is usually studied from the morphological and aesthetic standpoint and its ethnological and psychological aspects have not received the attention it deserves. Now to return to the monuments with bas-reliefs, the earliest of them, the balustrades and gateways of Sāñcī and Bharhut, date from the second and the first centuries B. C. when the inhabitants of Eastern India had come in contact with the image worshipping and artistic Greeks of Bactria. Very near Sāñcī is the Garuḍa pillar erected in the first half of the second century B.C. by a Greek from Taxila who had adopted Vaiṣṇavism. This contact of east and west must have given a strong impulse to the indigenous sculpture of Eastern India. Image worship is not yet adopted. The main object of worship, Buddha, is not figured. But the objects of worship of the folk religion, the Devatās, Yakṣas, and Nāgas are figured as worshippers of Buddha. This is the first step of image worship—giving human form to superhuman beings. But no effort is made to indicate the superhuman character of these superhuman beings. Not only their form, but also the expression of their face, is quite naturalistic, human.

The stūpa of Amarāvati, as I have shown elsewhere, was under construction and repair, for at least four centuries, from the second century B. C. to the second

century A. D. In the earlier sculptures of Amarāvati, as in those of Bharhut and Sāñci, the Buddha is conspicuous by his absence.

In later sculptures of Amarāvati Buddha appears. But there is nothing superhuman or supernatural about the expression. It is quite naturalistic.

The period of Indian history with which we have hitherto been dealing, the period extending from the time of Gautama Buddha when Bimbisāra and afterwards Ajātaśatru reigned in Magadha to the second century A.D., is a period of contact and intermingling of races and cultures. In the Vedic period a barrier stood between Vedic India including Kośala, Kāśi and Videha in the east on the one hand, and Magadha and Aṅga, which are named with contempt in the Vedic literature, on the other.¹ But when Buddha was living and preaching, this barrier was non-existent, and Magadha was trying to gain ascendancy over her neighbours in matters spiritual and temporal. Early in the fourth century B.C., Nanda, King of Magadha, is said to have overthrown the ancient Kṣatriya dynasties of Northern India, and towards the close of the same century Chandragupta Maurya extended his conquest as far as Gāndhāra in the North-West. Aśoka added Kalinga to this empire and extended its sphere of influence far beyond its confines in the south and the north-west. Aśoka in his minor rock edicts thus bears witness to the intermingling of cultures that was going on in his empire; "Those gods who up to this time had been unassociated (with men) in Jambudvīpa have now been made associated (with them)." Soon after the demise of Aśoka began the invasion of the Bactrian Greeks and other hordes from the north-west that probably continued right up to the end of the first century A. D. Those were days when no insurmountable social

¹ R. Chanda, *The Indo-Aryan Races*, Rajshahi, 1916, pp. 37-40.

barrier divided the Hindus and the foreigners.¹ Therefore, when, with the establishment of the Gupta empire in the fourth century A. D., the veil is lifted, we find a new order of things as compared to the India of the fifth century B. C. Vedic ritualism and the old world Buddhism of the laity have been ousted from the position of the official religions and their places have been taken up by the religions of the Bhakti-mārga or the path of devotion to the Supreme Being conceived as a personality, such as Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, Śāktism, and Mahāyāna Buddhism. These religions are monotheistic. But their monotheism is peculiarly Indian and unlike anything found outside India. It is monotheism pervaded by pantheistic ideas. In this monotheism the personal God or *saguṇa Brahman* is conceived as something mysteriously identical with the impersonal or *nirguṇa Brahman*; the dualistic conception of the divinity is syncretised with the non-dualistic. Logically speaking, this is nothing but a confusion of ideas. But the followers of the path of bhakti always show supreme indifference to logic. At their inception their doctrines were not elaborated by trained thinkers like Yājñavalkya or Buddha who might care for logical consistency. Upaniṣadism originated probably in the land of the Kurus and the Pañcālas and developed in the land of the Kāśis and the Videhas. Buddhism originated and developed in Magadha and the neighbouring countries. Vaiṣṇavism originated in Western India in the country between Mathura and Dvārakā, and Śaivism somewhere outside the home of Upaniṣadism and Buddhism. There are evidences in the ancient Sanskrit literature to show that originally these religions lay outside the pale of Brahmanic orthodoxy.

¹ R. Chanda, *Archæology and Vaishnava Tradition*, Memoirs, A. S. I., No. 5, pp. 157-159.

² *The Indo-Aryan Races*, pp. 100-101, 105-108, 249-252.

The orthodox Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism of the Gupta period did not develop under the guidance of cultured religious reformers, but was the result of the intermingling of cultures; so it is a mistake to look for logical consistency in their doctrines. Now to return to our point; like the Vedic *karma-mārga* or ritualism and the *jñāna-mārga* of the Śramaṇas and the Brahmans, the monotheism of the *bhakti mārga* is not also quite favourable to image worship, for the Bhagavat of the bhakta is not a fully personal, but a semi-personal, Being. And yet, as a consequence of the rapid development of the art of sculpture, image worship had obtained too strong a grip of the Indian imagination to be avoided.

Archæological evidences enable us to discover the manner in which, approximately fix the time when, and determine the place from where, image worship found its way to Eastern India. In the Lucknow Provincial Museum there is a Buddhist image originally found at Chaubārā Mound at Mathurā, bearing an inscription dated in the year 33 in the reign of Huvishka which records the setting up of a Bodhisatva image at Madhurabaṇaka by the nun (*bhikṣuṇī*) Dhanavatī, the female pupil (*antēvāsini*) of the monk (*bhikṣu*) Bala, who knows the Tripitaka (*trēpiṭaka*). The place of installation, Madhurabaṇaka, connects the image with Mathurā which was also known as Madhurā. In the Indian Museum, Calcutta, there is a Buddhist image, originally found at Sāheṭh-Māheṭh, the site of ancient Srāvastī, bearing an inscription dated in the year 19 in the reign of Kanishka, which records the gift of an image of a Bodhisatva, an umbrella, and a staff, by the monk Bala, who knows the Tripitaka (*trēpiṭaka*). At Sarnath also have been unearthed an umbrella post, and a Bōdhisatva image bearing inscriptions that agree in substance. These inscriptions are dated in the year 8 in the reign of Kanishka and record the "erection

of a Bodhisatva and an umbrella with a post (*chatra-yashṭi*) at Bārāṇasī at the walk (*chaṁkama*) of Bhagavat, (the gift) of the monk (*bhikṣu*) Bala, who knows the Tripiṭaka (*trēpiṭaka*).” There can be no doubt that friar Bala, the Trepīṭaka named in the Sarnath, Śrāvastī and Mathurā image inscriptions is one and the same person. All these three images are made of Mathurā sandstone and are the handiwork of the sculptors of the Mathurā school. The earliest Buddhist image found at Sāñcī is also made of Mathurā sandstone and is a product of the Mathurā school of sculpture. It bears an inscription dated in the year 28 of the Kushan King Sahi Vasishka who reigned between Kanishka and Huvishka and records the erection of an image of the Bhagavat who is described as “*jambuchhāyāsailagrihasya*.” This epithet has been left untranslated by Bühler, Lüders and Vogel (Lüder’s list No. 161; A. S. R., 1910-11, p. 42). But there can be no doubt that this epithet refers to the miracle that the future Buddha, as Prince Siddhārtha, performed near Kapilavastu under a Jambu-tree at the time of the “Ploughing Festival,” and may be translated thus: “(An image) of Bhagavat (Bodhisatva) sitting on the hill under the shade of the Jambu (rose-apple) tree.” The head of this image is missing. But the elaborate necklaces and the amulet chord that the trunk wears indicate princely rank. If these inscribed images prove anything, they tend to prove that the worship of the image of Buddha as Bodhisatva was introduced into Eastern India by pilgrims from Mathurā. The figures of Buddha found on some of the marble slabs of Amarāvati were probably engraved later than the reign of Kanishka and Huvishka in imitation of the images from Mathurā that found their way to the Buddhist centres of Eastern India.

So the ground was already prepared for the regular introduction of image worship and a higher development

of the art of sculpture than was possible before, when the ascendancy that the spirit of bhakti or love of the divine obtained in the religious life of India in the Gupta period brought the Indian nearer image worship than was the case before. How did the Indians of the Gupta period make their object of bhakti? In one of his lectures delivered before the Calcutta University in December last (1919) Dr. Foucher declared that the Gupta sculpture in its outward form was but a modification or Indianisation of the Græco-Buddhist sculpture of Gāndhāra. In an important article on "The development of early Hindu Iconography" published in *Festschrift Ernst Windisch* (Leipzig, 1914) Prof. Macdonell expresses the opinion that the multiplication of arms and head introduced in Hindu iconography is probably based on suggestions contained in ancient sacred literature and that the general idea of the gods having special Vāhanas is inherited from the *Rigveda*. I am not here concerned with the outward features of the images of the Gupta and post-Gupta or later medieval periods, but with the spirit that pervades these images. It was in the Gupta period that the sectaries of Eastern India first seriously attempted to make images of the main objects of their worship. I have already stated that the monotheism of the Bhakti-mārga that obtained ascendancy in the Gupta period is a synthesis of the personal with the impersonal Brahman, rather of the finite with the Infinite. This remark is also applicable to the Buddhism of the period. From the standpoint of sculpture it may be said that for the Buddhist the Buddha occupies the place that Viṣṇu does for the Vaiṣṇava and Śiva for the Śaiva. In Buddhism the Mādhyamika doctrine of vacuity (*śūnyatā*) serves the purpose of the pantheistic background of orthodox monotheism. So in regard to the inward spirit of the images there is no difference whatever between the

Vaiṣṇavas, Śaīvas or Bauddhas of the Gupta period. Now the question is, how did the Indian sculptors of the Gupta period give expression to the synthesis of the personal with the Impersonal, of the finite with Infinite in stone? Sir John Marshall, one of the most critical and discerning students of Indian art, writes, "The types of the Buddha which this age produced and in which it succeeded in combining beauty of definition with a spirit of calm and peaceful contemplation are among the greatest contributions which India has made to the world's art."¹ Not only in this age, but also in the later medieval age, and not only the types of Buddha, but also the types of Bodhisatva, Viṣṇu, Śīva, Durgā and Sūrya are pervaded by the same spirit. The term "calm, and peaceful contemplation," or "impassioned contemplation," appears to me to be rather a tame description of this spirit at its best. Contemplation is our *dhyāna*, and there are different grades of *dhyāna*. The right word for this spirit is highest *sādhana* or severest spiritual exercise, the finite being's supreme effort to grasp the Infinite and the Unknown.

This is how a synthesis of the monotheism with pantheism or Buddhist nihilism was brought about. The doctrine that appears to be a mere paradox in its literary garb ceases to be so when dressed in stone. As Dr. Coomarswamy rightly observes, "The study of the art, side by side with that of *śruti* and *smṛiti*, is absolutely necessary for a full understanding of Hinduism."² Now to conclude, what is the message that these images have for their votaries? It is not, "O ye mortals, worship this"; but

neti yadidaṃ = upāsate

"It (*i.e.*, the object of worship) is not that (*i.e.*, the image) which you worship."

¹ *A Guide to Sāñchī*, p. 20.

² *The Arts and Crafts of India and Ceylon*, London, 1913, p. 69.

The images of the Devas, Yakṣas, and Nāgas, carved on the railings and gateways of Bharhut and Sāñcī, also teach the same lesson by their outward pose. But the best medieval images of Eastern India, whether of the Gupta or of the Sena period, teach this lesson by their inward spirit. Speaking of the influence of Greek idolatry Dr. Farnell observes, "To it they (the Greeks) owed works of the type that may be called the human-divine, which surpass any other art-achievement of man."¹ Unfortunately most of the extant statues of the classical period of Greece are not originals but Græco-Roman copies marked with the taint of decadence. But the remnants of the Classical Greek sculpture lead us to think that the Greek sculptors endeavoured to represent the divine by accentuating and idealising the ordinary human impulses. In Greek art the divine element of the "human-divine" is only the human element emphasised. The medieval sculptors of Eastern India, on the other hand, by successfully representing in their icons the finite being's intensest struggle for grasping the Infinite, has produced a type that is nearer to "human-divine" than anything yet moulded by the hand of man.

¹ *Greece and Babylon*, p. 12.

An Introduction to the Evolution of the Schools of Buddhism

BY

NALINAKSHA DATTA, M.A., B.L.

Modern researches have done much to collect and weave into a connected account the scattered evidences bearing on the development and decay of Buddhism in India since the time of its great founder, but there are yet dark spaces in the account which require to be illumined. One of this dark spaces, I may point out, is the period of about four centuries between the session of the Second Buddhist Council in 383 B. C. and the reign of Kanishka in the last quarter of the first century of the Christian era and later. It was in the latter portion of the century preceding this period that we find symptoms of differences of religious opinions which expressed themselves in the schism leading to the convening of the Second Council. The followers of Buddha who, hitherto, regarded themselves at least professedly, as holding the same beliefs and tenets, found themselves divided into two sects, the *Theravādins* and *Mahāsanghikas*, the former clinging to a conservative interpretation of Buddha's doctrines and the latter to a liberal one. This marked the beginning of the process of segmentation which ultimately gave rise to a multitude of sects which were followed by the birth of the two great beliefs known as *Hīnayāna* and *Mahāyāna*. It will be my object to detail this process of development, to show how the

discussion in the *saṅghāramas* elicited and accumulated differences of opinion which led the *bhikkhus* to give a wider currency to their individual opinions by wandering and preaching, and to establish their own monasteries which become centres for the propagation of their particular tenets.

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The origin of the various schools, not long after Buddha's death, was rather a healthy sign of *Tathāgata's* religion. After Buddha's death there was none at the time able to take his place as a religious teacher. His charming doctrine attracted thousands of men seeking eagerly a solution of the various problems relating to life in this world and the next. There were among these the highly learned followers who were descended from Brāhmaṇa families and imbued with an intimate knowledge of Brāhmanic philosophy, learned members of various religious orders like the Jāṭilas, Jainas, Ājivikas. They were of a very speculative turn of mind and could not remain satisfied with the then current interpretations of the teachings of Buddha as the common folk were, as a rule. These seekers after truth demanded a more thorough elucidation of the significant words of the Teacher, the leading Buddhist teachers of the time being unable to furnish explanation. Naturally these Buddhist preachers took to hair-splitting argumentations but could not arrive at definite conclusions. The fundamental propositions about which they all agreed were¹:—

1. All is momentary (*sarvam kṣaṇikam*)
2. All is empty (*sarvam śūnyam*)
3. All is without self (*sarvam anātman*)
4. All is suffering (*sarvam dukkham*)
5. All is such as it is (*sarvam tathātvam*).

¹ D. T. Suzuki's "*Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*," p. 140 (Item 4 is not mentioned in this book).

But round this nucleus of agreement were ranged several divergences of opinion as to both tenets (*dhamma*) and rules of discipline (*vinaya*) which were responsible for divisions in the fraternity. The development of the six systems of Hindu philosophy from the *Upanishads* as their common basis furnishes a parallel to the growth of schools of Buddhism out of a single original cult. "The founders of the Hindu schools," says Professor Max Müller¹ "always pretend to find in the *Upanishads* some warranty for their tenets, however antagonistic in their bearing. The same applies to the numerous sects that have existed and still exist in India." This remark applies *mutatis mutandis* to the various Buddhist sects. Each sect laid claim to the orthodoxy and special strength of its views and beliefs² by culling out and emphasizing those sayings of Buddha that lent support to its particular doctrines, while the sayings that were not so tractable or positively antagonistic were either impeached or passed over in silence.

Genesis of Indian
sects.

The formation of about thirty Buddhist schools within a restricted area covering the Prācyā deśa only, *i.e.*, the countries situated on the east of the river Sadānīrā³ (mod. Gandaki) and within the short time of a century and a half preceding the reign of Aśoka was due mainly to the following factors:—

Factors peculiar to
Buddhism for the
origin of schools.

(1) Want of provision for the supreme headship of the Buddhist church after the founder's death. Buddha thought that the prescription of heavy punishments for

¹ *History of Sanskrit Literature*, pp. 162, 163.

² For illustrations, see *Points of the Controversy* by Mrs. Rhys Davids and Mr. Shwe Zan Aung, pp. 27, ff.

³ For the extent of Buddhism during the centuries preceding the reign of Aśoka, see Dr. Oldenburg's *Buddha*, pp. 39, ff.

schisms in the church would check them effectively and that his *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* would be self-sufficing in keeping intact the religion established by him obviating thereby the appointment of religious heads. In this supposition the Teacher no doubt delimited the need for the supreme headship as the future history of the Buddhist church has proved, and magnified the unaided strength of *Dhamma* and *Vinaya*. According to the *Sāmagāma Sutta*,¹ Buddha hears of dissensions in the Jaina community as soon as the leader Nigaṇṭho Nāta-putto was dead. He was afraid of like dissensions in his church after his death but consoled himself that there was no difference of opinion among his followers in regard to the *Dhamma*² preached by him and to ensure further safety of his church (in this behalf), he delivered a religious discourse on the cause of schism and the means to avoid them.³ He placed too much reliance on his *Dhamma* and the attachment of his followers to his *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* which he supposed would be of the implicit type for ever.⁴ He instructed his disciples that after his death his teachings would be their Teacher. This is recorded in the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta*⁵ and

¹ *Majjh. Nik.*, II, 105.

² The dhamma is thus detailed by Buddha :—

- (i) Four satipaṭṭhānas ;
- (ii) Four sammāppadhānas ;
- (iii) Four iddhipādas ;
- (iv) Five indriyas ;
- (v) Five balas
- (vi) Seven bojjhaṅgas
- (vii) Eight-fold path.

Dīgh. Nik., XVI, 3, 50 ; *Majjh. Nik.*, II, 77, 103, 104 ; *Lalita-vistara* (Bibl. Ind.) a book of the Sarvāstivādins, pp. 34-37 ; *Saṅgiti-Paryāya*, one of the seven Abhidharma books of the Sarvāstivādins in *J.P.T.S.*, 1904-5, pp. 71, 75.

³ See *Kinti Sutta*, *Majjh. Nik.*, II, 103.

⁴ See *Pāsādikā Suttanta*, (*Dīgh. Nik.*, XXIX), p. 121.

⁵ *Dīgh. Nik.*, XVI, 6, 1 : “ Yo mayā Dhammo ca Vinayo desito paññatto so va mama ācāyena saṅghā.”

forms also the subject of a dialogue between Ānanda and Vassakāra brāhmaṇa, the minister of Magadha.¹ Vassakāra asks Ānanda, "Has any bhikkhu been specified (by Buddha) as would after Buddha's death become the refuge (*i.e.*, leader) of men under whom everybody would seek shelter." Ānanda answers in the negative. He asks again, "Has any bhikkhu been selected by the saṅgha as would become their leader, etc." To this also Ānanda answers in the negative. Vassakāra was curious to learn the cause of the prevailing concord of the church in spite of there being no leader (*lit.* refuge). Ānanda replies "we are not without a refuge (*appaṭisarana*), *Dhamma* is our refuge. There is a treatise *Pātimokkha* which has been formulated by the omniscient Teacher and which all the monks living in the same parish (*gāmakhetta*) have to recite in a monastery where they assemble on the *Uposatha* days.² Should there occur any difference or doubt in the recitation, the bhikkhus present should explain them in accordance with the *Dhamma* (hence they have their refuge as *Dhamma*)." In answer to another question put by Vassakāra, Ānanda explains that though there was no supreme head of the Buddhist fraternity, there was in each parish a qualified head who was respected by the people under his charge and whose guidance would be strong enough to keep the great many parishes connected together in religious concord. This conversation makes it clear that each parish was under the control of the seniormost and best qualified monk that the parish could furnish.³ The bhikkhus residing under his

¹ *Majjh. Nik.*, *Gopaka-Moggallāna Sutta*; Oldenburg's *Buddha* (Eng. transl.), p. 108.

² See *Ind. Ant.*, Vol. XXI.

³ In the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta* (*Dīgh. Nik.*, II, p. 77) it is enjoined upon the bhikkhus that they should offer due respect to the *Saṅghapitara* or *Saṅghaparināyaka* (the head of the parish) who are bhikkhus of long-standing and experience for the well-being of this saṅgha.

superintendence met together on the *Uposatha* days and held religious discussions among themselves in order to elicit the true meaning of Buddha's words. In the course of their discussions, they interpreted the terse expressions of the Teacher in different ways and introduced additional materials in the interpretations, passing them in the name of Buddha to give them stamp of authenticity. This happened in most of the parishes scattered over the whole of Prācyā-deśa. There was none at that time in the whole of the Buddhist community who could dissolve the numberless divergences thus originated into one uniform whole and convert the threatening centrifugal forces then at work into centripetal, conducive to the well-being of the whole saṅgha.

(2) Grouping of disciples around a noted *thera*. Buddha awarded prominence to some of his disciples by extolling them for their attainment of proficiency in certain branches of the Buddhist *dhamma*.¹ Of them, the following needs mention for our purpose,

- (i) Sāriputta, the foremost of the highly wise (mahapaññā).
- (ii) Mahā Moggallāna, the foremost of the possessors of miraculous powers (iddhimantānam).
- (iii) Anuruddha, the foremost of the possessors of divine eyes (dibba cakkhukānam).
- (iv) Mahākassapa, the foremost of the followers of *dhūta* precepts (dhūtavādānam).
- (v) Puṇṇa Mantāniputta, the foremost of the preachers of *dhamma* (dhammakathikānam).

Childers in his *Pāli Dictionary* (s. v. saṅgha) says that a *Saṅghatthera* is usually selected as the President of an assembly. He cites, for instance, Kassapa, the then *Saṅghatthera* was the President of the first council. He also points out that a *Saṅghatthera* is not always the one who is the longest ordained, for Sabbakāmin who was the longest *upasampanna* bhikkhu was not the President of the Second Council.

See also *Ang. Nik.*, VI, 21 ; V, p. 353.

¹ *Ang. Nik.*, I, XIV, 1.

- (vi) Mahakaccāna, the foremost of the expositors (saṅkhittena bhāsitaṃ vitthārena attham vibhajjanantānam).
- (vii) Rāhula, the foremost of the students (sikhākāmānam).
- (viii) Revata Khadiravaniya, the foremost of the forest recluses (āraññikānam).
- (ix) Ānanda, the foremost of the vastly learned (bahussutānam); and
- (x) Upāli, the foremost of the masters of Vinaya (vinayadharānam).

Buddha used to observe the mental proclivities of the person to whom he imparted a religious lesson and selected a discourse that appealed to him most. He followed the same course, while prescribing to his disciples their duties for the attainment of arhathood. He also indirectly pointed out to his disciples the preceptor most suited to each in view of his peculiar mental leanings. This practice led to the grouping of students around a teacher or his direct disciples; hence the remark made by Buddha that “*dhātuso sattā samsandenti samentī*”¹ on the principle that like draws like. In the *Majjhima Nikāya*,² we read of ten chief *theras*, viz., Sāriputta, Moggallāna, Mahākaccāyana, Mahākotṭhito, etc., having ten to forty disciples under their tuition. Buddha on a certain occasion pointed out that the group of *bhikkhus* formed round each of these *theras* was possessed of the same special qualifications that characterised the *thera* himself. Thus the *bhikkhus* accompanying Sāriputta were *mahāpaññāvantā*, those accompanying Mahāmoggallāna were *mahiddhikā*, those accompanying Mahākassapa were *dhūtavādā*, those accompanying Devadatta were

¹ Sam. Nik., II, p. 157.

² Majjh. Nik., III, 118.

sinfully inclined (pāpicchā) and so on.¹ Yuan Chang noticed about a thousand years later that on auspicious days the Abhidhammikas worshipped Sāriputra, the Vinayists Upāli, the Sramaneras Rāhula, the Sutraists Purpa Maitrāyaniputra, the Samādhists Mahāmoggallāna, the bhikkhunis Ānanda, the Mahāyānists Mañjuśrī and other Bodhisattvas.² In the first four classes of bhikkhus, the aforesaid affinity between them and their leaders is obvious. In the next three classes, the affinity existed all the same though it may not be apparent on the face of it. For the Samādhists followed Mahāmoggallāna because he was the master of *iddhi par excellence* which could be obtained only through *samādhi*, and the bhikkhunis followed Ānanda because to him the order of nuns, owed its origin. The Mahāyānists do not come within our purview at present. The principal points of resemblance between the followers and their preceptors were the ties that bound them together but these were the points which constituted the features by which the chief qualities of the preceptors were distinguished. These distinctions among them did not lie in any differences of doctrines which they professed but in the degrees of proficiency attained by each, in particular directions of Buddhistic *sādhana*. But the divisions though not proceeding from radical differences in doctrine grew stereotyped in course of time, and fusion between them later on became an impossibility due to the separatist frame of mind that their existence as separate orders naturally developed. Thus the division which had commenced without any doctrinal differences gradually gave rise to the latter and grew into full-fledged schools. History shows that this process of development actually came to pass. For instance, the

¹ Sam. Nik., II, pp. 155, 156.

² Watters' Yuan Chang, Vol. I, p. 302.

school of the Sarvāstivādins who were connected with the original division of *abhidhammikas* with Sāriputra at their head affiliated themselves to Sāriputra's disciple Rāhula at whose time however the doctrinal differences had not yet appeared, similarly, the Sthaviravādins affiliated themselves to Upāli, Mahāsaṅghikas to Mahākassapa and the Sammitiyas to Mahākaccāyana.

(3) Division of monks into bodies, each of which was meant to preserve a particular portion of the Buddhist scriptures. Throughout the Pāli literature, we often come across terms like these :¹—

- (i) *Suttantikās* or masters of *Suttanta* (belonging to the Sutra-piṭaka);
- (ii) *Vinayadharas* or repositories of the rules of discipline ;
- (iii) *Mātikādharas* or those versed in *mātikā* (i.e., *abhidhamma*);
- (iv) *Dhammakathikas* or the preachers of the Buddhist doctrine ;
- (v) *Dīgha-bhānakā*, *Majjhima-bhānakā*, etc.² (i.e., reciters of the Nikāyas).

The object of this is obvious. In those days, when writing was hardly used for recording books the sayings and preachings of Buddha, the means that was utilized for preserving and handing them down to posterity was reciting them regularly and committing them to memory. This was akin to the method that had been in vogue in India from the earliest Vedic period, the needs of which mainly gave rise to the numerous Vedic schools. A similar cause produced a similar result among the Buddhists and we find that the memorizing of different portions of the Piṭaka was entrusted to different sets of people

¹ See *Digh. Nik.*, *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta*, iv.

Ang. Nik., II, 117.

² *Sum. Vil.*, p. 15.

who developed into different bodies hardened and separated from one another in course of time and bearing names descriptive of their functions.

It should not be inferred from this that side by side with these bodies, there were not religious students who specialised in a number of branches of the Buddhist scriptures and received epithets like *āgatāgama*, *bahussuta*, *tipelakin*, *pañcanekāyika*. But the existence of such scholars with such wider scopes of knowledge does not preclude that of bodies of scholars having as their special duties an accurate memorising of special branches of the sacred lore. This is confirmed, and that its origin dates back as early as the First Council is evidenced by the fact that in that council Ānanda was requested to recite the Sūtras, while Upāli the Vinaya. This would not have been the case if Ānanda or Upāli were not generally famed for proficiency in the particular branches of the Piṭaka. Elements of such specialisation have found to have existed still earlier in Buddha's life-time as can be noticed in a quarrel that took place between a *dhammakathika* and a *vinayadhara*.¹ Commonness of duties gave rise to unity among the *dhammakathikas* on one side and the *Vinayadharas* on the other in such a marked way that each group made the cause of one individual member its common-cause and participated in the dispute. This is sufficiently indicative of the crystallization that had commenced in each group round its common function and the awakening of a consciousness of common interests that bound together its individual members. Indications of stages previous to this crystallization into bodies are found in the Vinaya in connection with the arrangements made by Dabba Mallaputta² for the residence of the bhikkhus. Dabba Mallaputta made such an arrangement that the

¹ See *infra*, p. 263.

² *Vinaya*, II, pp. 75, 76.

bhikkhus adopting the same mode of life (*sabhāgā*) resided in the same place in order that the *Suttantikas* could recite *suttantas* among themselves, the *Vinayadharas* discuss the rules of discipline with one another, the *Dhammakathikas* talk mutually about questions of doctrine and so on. Instances are not rare of a feeling of rivalry among these bodies, each member of which wished and was pleased to see the body to which he belonged take precedence over other bodies in having seat or food in assemblies or in thanksgiving after a meal.¹ These separate bodies which existed for a particular function necessary for the whole Buddhist community, *e.g.*, the preservation of a particular portion of the *Piṭaka* by regular recitations imbibed in course of time, doctrines, which could be looked upon as peculiar to the body holding them, and in this way, the body developed into a separate religious school of Buddhism. Such instances are found in the *Theravādas* who had developed into such a school from the *Vinayadharas*, and the *Sautrāntikas* from the *Suttantikas*. It must not be thought that all the divisions mentioned above in this connection developed into religious schools, but what I mean to point out is the fact that such divisions supplied from among them bodies which in time grew into full-fledged schools.

(4) Elasticity of the rules of discipline. The rules of conduct were in the course of being defined but were not codified at the time. The *Sākyaputtiya samanās* like the other contemporary religious orders possessed a set of rules known as *Pātimokkha* for their guidance and the disciples had to recite those rules every fortnight in the presence of the congregation, the bhikkhus residing in forests (*ārañṇakas*) not being excepted.² The *Pātimokkha*,

¹ *Vinaya*, II, CV. IV. 6, 2; MV. 15, 4

² *Majjh Nik.*, II, pp. 8. 9. "Te (*ārañṇaka sāvaka*) *anvaddhamāsam saṅghamajjhe osaranti pātimokkhuḍḍesāya.*"

as we have it now, obtained its present shape after various additions and alterations according to the exigencies of times and circumstances. For instance, Buddha made some exceptions in favour of the bhikkhus who were placed at a disadvantage by reason of the locality in which they resided. In the border countries (*paccantima janapada*) such as Avanti, the converts were few and intractable, hence, Buddha at the request of Kātyāyana and Puṇṇa Mantāniputta made some exceptions in their favour in regard to the rules for the formation of an assembly for the ordaining of monks and the wearing of leather-made shoes, etc., prohibited to the bhikkhus dwelling in the middle country.¹ Buddha's primary object was the emancipation of all beings and as a means to that end, he laid the greatest stress on the control of mental functions² permitting greater latitudes in the discipline of body and speech according to the circumstances of each individual than were allowed by the contemporaneous sects of Jains, Ajīvikas, etc. In the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta*,³ one of his instructions was that the saṅgha might, if necessary, abolish the minor rules, making thereby the *Vinaya* (or rules of conduct) subject to changes as times and circumstances required. Besides elasticity, there were other causes for changes in the *Vinaya* rules, one of which was hinted at by the Chinese traveller Fa Hian in the course of his remarks bearing on the Mahāsaṃghika schism: "Certain bhikkhus (of Vaisali) broke the rules of Vinaya in ten particulars saying the Buddha had said it so."⁴ Another cause of such division is mentioned by a Sanskrit treatise as lying

¹ See *Vinaya*, I, pp. 197, 198. *Divyāvadāna*, p. 21.

² *Majjh. Nik.*, Vol. I, p. 56.

³ *Digha. Nik.*, II, p. 154. "Ākaṅkhamāno Ānanda saṅgha mama accayena bhuddānukhuddāni sikkhūpadāni samuhantu." Cf. *Milindapañha*, p. 143.

⁴ *Beal's Records of the Western Countries*, Vol. I, p. liv.

in the fact that the seceders sought "different interpretations for the commandments of the departed master."¹

(5) Dialectical differences. According to Profs. Beal and Minayeff² the practice of preserving the sacred lore in one's own vernacular contributed to the formation of schools. At present, evidences are not strong enough to put this conclusion on a solid basis and we are now not in a position to point to any particular school as the result of the operation of this factor alone.

(6) Austerities and ritualism. It is well known from Buddha's life that his attainment of Buddhahood led him to adopt 'middle path' which eschewed austerities as a means of attaining religious goal. We are also aware that just after his renunciation he became a disciple of two *gurus* under whose guidance he led a life of severe austerity for a few years which only opened his eyes to the fact that such austerities could never fulfil his mission. For this reason austerities could not be expected to figure in the doctrines preached and recommended by him to his disciples. But in spite of this position we find in some of the earliest portions of the Pīṭaka such as the *Majjhima* and the *Anguttara Nikāyas* that Buddha is praising ascetics³ who were given to the practice of *dhuta*-precepts⁴ involving austerities. This is an inconsistency which can be explained in two ways, first by holding that the passages were interpolated in later times by Buddhists who were in favour of such practices, and secondly, by the supposition that Buddha changed his attitude later on in view of the strong tendency of people who took to or believed in the efficiency of the austerities

¹ Rockhill's *Life of the Buddha*, p. 177.

² Minayeff's *Intro. to Pali Grammar*.

Beal's *Abstract of Four Lectures on the Buddhist Literature in China*, p. 49

³ *Ang. Nik.*, III. p. 341 ff.

⁴ See Kern's *Manual of Buddhism*, pp. 75, 76.

and who could not be satisfied with religion barren of such practices. In either case, we have to admit that austerities crept into Buddhism in early times and the adoption of these by Buddhists led to the formation of schools.

Likewise ritualism which Buddha, from the commencement of his career as such, eschewed as a thing with which the religion preached by him should have no connection, could not be kept in abeyance for a long time. The passages found in the early portions of the Pīṭaka advocating certain rites may, like the references to austerities, be explained in the way indicated above. Whatever might be the explanation, it is certain that by degrees rites and ceremonies entered into Buddhism giving it an appearance which could in no way be distinguished from the elaborate rituals of Brahmanic worships barring, of course, differences in the rituals themselves. The introduction of this feature could not certainly have been welcome to the founder of the religion but it was a feature that was demanded by the large mass of the laity as well as by a great body of their religious teachers. The schools or groups of Buddhists that adopted the rituals naturally fell apart from those that did not do so and ritualism was taken as a feature distinguishing certain schools from the rest.

The above factors have been generalised from the history of the Buddhist church during the two and half centuries after Buddha's death, and have been mentioned as the chief ones that led to dissensions, and development of schools. It is clear from Buddha's sayings that he had apprehension for future dissensions among his followers. He often laid stress upon the importance of *samaggā parisā*,¹ i.e., the unity of the

Buddha's apprehension for future dissensions among monks, and the remedies.

¹ *Digh. Nik., Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta*, p. 76.

Ang. Nik., IV, p. 21 ; II, p. 70.

Buddhist monks as the means of keeping it strong and uninjured in the face of oppositions made by its opponents in various ways. To remedy the evil of breaches in their own camp, he charged his favourite disciples Ānanda, Sāriputra¹ and Moggallāna with the duty of settling disputes whenever they took place among the monks in order that it might be nipped in the bud. In his opinion it was only the wicked and selfish bhikkhus who achieved their selfish ends by introducing new principles of Dhamma and Vinaya which proved sources of heated contentions.² He was however not very particular in regard to the existence of differences in *abhidhamma*³ (i.e., atireka dhamma or minor points of doctrine), *ajjhāyīva* (minor rules of livelihood), and *adhipātimokkha* (minor rules of discipline), which he regarded as inevitable in all religions. When it was necessary to check the currency of dissentient views with regard to doctrine, a neutral bhikkhu was sent to a sane and reasonable member belonging to the party which held the views in order to convert him to the orthodox opinions and if the attempt failed no other steps need be taken.⁴ As regards the other two classes of differences just mentioned, there were punishments⁵ to check them but as they have no bearing on the present subject they may be passed over. To stimulate the bhikkhus to stand united, he held out before them the prospect of a happy and glorious life like that of Brahma that will fall to a monk's lot to lead in after-life as the result of any act of his that served to re-unite bodies of monks separated from one another, while he declared the monk sowing dissension among his brethren as doomed to perdition for a *kalpa*.⁶

¹ *Ang. Nik.*, II, p. 239.

² *Ang. Nik.*, Vol. V, pp. 73, 75.

³ Q.v. Atthasālini, p. 2.

⁴ *Majjh. Nik.*, II, p. 238.

⁵ *Adhikaranasamathas*, in *Cullavagga*, IV, 14.

⁶ *Ang. Nik.*, II, p. 293; V, 73, 75, 78.

Every quarrel or difference of opinion among the bhikkhus was not characterised by Buddha as *saṅghabheda*. A breach in the saṅgha accompanied by the conditions

The conditions as laid down in the Vinayapiṭaka, leading to a saṅgha-bheda; and how it is distinguish from saṅgharāji.

laid down in the *Vinaya piṭaka* was designated *Saṅgha-bheda*. It is thus described in the *piṭaka*, "For not only is a formal putting forward and voting on the false doctrine essential to schism as distinct from mere disagreement, but the offending bhikkhu must also be quite aware that the doctrine so put forth is wrong, or at least doubtful, and also that the schism resulting from his action will be or will probably be, disastrous to the *Dhamma*. In other words, the schism must be brought about by deliberately putting forward a doctrine known to be false, or at least doubtful, or with the express intention or hope of thereby injuring the *Dhamma* (that is, of the truth).¹ This definition obviously represents the opinion of the conservative school of the Theravādins who naturally looked down upon those who differed from them on religious points and ascribed an evil motive to the entertainment of the differing views. It is very reasonable that the dissenters may have an honest belief on their own view clear of the evil motive of injuring the *Dhamma*. It will, therefore, be apparent from a neutral standpoint that evil intention is not essential of *saṅghabheda*. The real essentials are:—

(1) Belief in a dissentient religious view regarding either one or more points of faith or discipline.

(2) The entertainment of the view by eight or more than eight fully ordained monks.²

¹ *Vinaya Texts* (S.B.E.), pt. III.

² *Vinaya. Cullavagga*, VII, 5, 1; *Milindāpañha*, p. 108.

"No layman can create a schism, nor a sister of the order, nor one under preparatory instruction, nor a novice of either sex. It must be a bhikkhu under no disability, who is in full communion and a co-resident" (S.B.E., Vol. xxxv, p. 163).

(3) The division taken among the aforesaid eight or more monks must show a majority on the side of the dissenters.

Saṅgharāji is a disunion confined to eight monks. This restriction as to number forming the essential of *Saṅgharāji* shows that it might at any moment develop into a *Saṅghabheda* by drawing an additional monk into the difference. Of course, *bona-fide* belief and the full ordainment of monks are necessary requisites.

During Buddha's life-time dissensions of minor character took place in the Buddhist saṅgha only two of which attracted his attention and which were called by him *saṅghabheda* and condemned to be as heinous as patricide or matricide.¹ The first dissension occurred at one of the monasteries of Kausambi²

Germes of dissensions
in the fraternity during
Buddha's life-time ;
(1) Division at Kausambi.

where a bhikkhu through ignorance of the law committed a breach of discipline, the monks attached a magnified gravity to the offence and punished him by *Ukkhepana* (excommunication). The accused, on the other hand, attributed the offence to his ignorance of the law which did not deserve the severe penalty inflicted on him. The justice of the cause gained for him several adherents who worked to have his penalty set aside. This caused a division not only among the monks but also among the lay devotees and ultimately led to Buddha's mediation before the differences could be settled. This dissension, it is true, did not last long owing to the presence of the Teacher who removed the doubts of both the parties by his lucid explanations but yet it argues the existence of germes of dissension which bore fruits of far-reaching importance in later times.

¹ Vinaya, Mahāvagga, x, 8, 1 ; Nathavatthu, xiii, 1.

² Vinaya pitaka, Mahāvagga, X, p. 337 ff.

Majjhima Nikaya, Vol. I, Kosambi-Sutta ; *Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā*, Vol. I.

The next dissension originated with Buddha's cousin, Devadatta, who in his advocacy for more austere discipline requested the Teacher to introduce the following five rules¹ in the monasteries :—

- (The brethren) shall
- (1) live all their life in the forest ;
 - (2) subsist solely on doles collected out-doors ;
 - (3) dress themselves in rags picked out of dust-heaps ;
 - (4) dwell always under tree and never under a roof, and
 - (5) never eat fish or flesh.

The Teacher declared that he could not make the rules obligatory upon all the monks on the ground that it would conduce more to their welfare to make the observance of these rules optional. Devadatta took this opportunity to create a division in the *saṅgha* (congregation) and departed to Gayāsisa with five hundred followers.

We have reason to believe that this secession of Devadatta from the original brotherhood gave birth to sects which existed up to the end of the fourth century A.D. and a remnant of whose practices was found by Hiuen Tsiang to be in use in three saṅghārāmas in Karna-suvarna.² The two foregoing instances of division in saṅgha during Buddha's life-time illustrate that the Buddhist church could not keep itself intact inspite of his personality and sublime teachings.

Within the period of Buddha's ministry which covered less than half a century and the limited localities to which Buddhism was confined at the time, the various forces were already at work for the formation of schools.


¹ *Vinaya Pitaka, Cullavagga*, VII, I, Jātakas, Vol. i, p. 34. Oldenburg's *Buddha* (Hoey's transl.) pp. 160, 161.

² *Beal's Records of the Western Countries*, Vol. II.

It can therefore be well-imagined that in the absence of the great Teacher, the monastic order, which though well-organized with the precautions against schisms, had to give way to the growth of as many as thirty or more schools within two centuries after Buddha's death. The appended chart¹ shows the number of schools and how the united

¹ This chart is based mainly upon the traditions as preserved in the Pāli works. The dates affixed to most of the schools are approximate and have been taken from Mrs. Rhys David's *Points of the Controversy*, Introduction. I have used Prof. Geiger's valuable Appendix B to his *Translation of the Mahāvamsa* where all the references to the varying lists of schools have been collected and arranged.

church of Buddha gradually separated from one another :—



Schools that originated after the Christian era :—

- Andhakas (250 A.D.) {
1. Rājagiriya, said to be a branch of the Mahāsāṅghikas.
 2. Siddhatthika.
 3. Pubbaseliya or Pūrvāsaila (closely related to the Caityika).
 4. Aparseliya or Aparasaila.
(Acc. to Wassiljew, it is a branch of the Mahāsāṅghikas).
 5. Vājirīya, Dhammaruci and Sāgaliya (Ceylonese sects).
 6. Vetulyaka.
 7. Uttarāpathaka.

VĀLMĪKI

As he reveals himself in his poem¹

BY

B. M. BARUA.

I. PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH.

There are different ways of judging and appreciating a poem and one which has immensely influenced the civilisation of a great people, and the intrinsic worth of which is beyond dispute. These different ways can be conveniently reduced to a few and distinguished as falling under the following three methods:—

1. Scholastic or Critical.
2. Psychological or Psychogenetic.²
3. Historical.

Let us examine what these methods signify and ascertain how they, when judiciously combined, can help us to realise that a poem is nothing but a permanent record of the inner life of the poet, a reflection of the age and society in which he lived and a forecast of the history of the succeeding ages.

1. *Scholastic or critical approach.*—Under this we have to include two methods, ancient and modern. The ancient method is the method of the commentators which

¹ The paper was read last year as a popular lecture at a meeting of the literary section of the Y. M. C. A.

² The second term was suggested by Prof. B. M. Seal.

combines within itself an analytic treatment of poetry with philological dissection of words and traditional exegesis. The commentators judge from outside whether or no the Rāmāyaṇa is a great poem, whether or no it possesses all the characteristics of an epic poem. They examine the central idea and point out how it animates and justifies the whole narrative, which also they put to the test so as to determine its suitability for the grandeur of an epic (mahākāvya). They come to a conclusion from a judgment of the propriety (aucitya) of such indispensable elements of a great poem as grandeur of the subject, sweetness of the verses, the music of the rhythm, the melody and majesty of tone, the loathing of the false and the base, combination of all the sentiments heightening the effect, striking situations with dramatic setting and, above all, the sublimity of the moral. The main task which the commentators set themselves is to explain the text and to reconcile, from a traditional and theological stand-point, all the discrepancies that may suggest themselves. The modern method, on the other hand, is partly critical and partly historical. It agrees with the ancient method in so far as it judges a poem from outside. While the ancient method tends as a rule to reconcile discrepancies and defects, the critical method of the modern school seeks honestly to judge things as they are, detecting interpolations and determining the original form of the Epic. Weighing the internal and external evidences it attempts to fix the probable date of composition with the further object of determining its importance as a literary composition and historical record.

2. *Psychological approach*.—There is, beside the scholastic or critical, another method which is psychological. Instead of judging a poem from outside, it leads us to place ourselves somehow or other at the point of view of the poet himself, to see things as he would see

them. The scenes, incidents, and characters, which are considered real when judged from outside, are all regarded as mere creations of the poet's imagination, when looked at from the stand-point of the poet himself. These, in other words, are considered, as mere devices whereby the poet reveals a history of his inner life and experiences, and portrays the state of society and civilisation under which he lived, moved and had his being. This method which we call psychological, is psychogenetic in so far as it seeks to trace the development of the poet's mind.

3. *Historical approach.*—The psychological or the psychogenetic method, when judiciously applied, can help us to have a communion with the poet or his inner life, but it is not sufficient in itself to enable us to solve all the problems that are apt to arise in connection with the poet, his age, country and environment. The deeper problems of history still confront the critic—at what stage of Indian civilisation, the Rāmāyaṇa with all its grandeur became possible as an epic and what effect it had on the culture of the succeeding ages.

In this paper I propose to approach the subject from a psychological stand-point. If, instead of judging a poem from outside and judging it piecemeal, we are interested in judging it as a whole, the best and only method will be not to place ourselves outside it but to place ourselves in it, to coincide by intellectual sympathy, as Bergson puts it, with what is unique in it, and above all, to have a communion with the poet whose life, education, character and experience are in the background of his work. There is nothing more profitable, I think, than this kind of study.

To proceed with our task, a word is necessary, at the outset, about the original form of the Epic which is the only record which the inspired seer Vālmīki has left of himself. The modern critics are of opinion that the

Epic in its original form consisted of five books, II—VI, the first and the seventh being later additions. “What was obviously a part of the commencement of the original poem, has been separated from its continuation at the opening of Book II, and now forms the beginning of the 5th Canto of Book I. Some cantos have also been interpolated in the genuine Books.” This is the fruitful result of Professor Jacobi’s investigations as summed up by Professor Macdonell in his *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 304. Professor Griffith remarks in the Appendix to his beautiful translation, p. 8:—“The Rāmāyan ends, epically complete, with the triumphant return of Rāma and his rescued queen to Ayodhyā, and his consecration and coronation in the capital of his forefathers. *Even if the story were not complete*, the conclusion of the last Canto of the Sixth Book is evidently the work of a later hand than Vālmiki’s, which speaks of Rāma’s glorious and happy reign, and promises blessings to those who read and hear the Rāmāyan, would be sufficient to show that, when these verses were added, the poem was considered to be finished. The Uttarakāṇḍa or Last Book is merely an appendix or a supplement, and relates only events antecedent and subsequent to those described in the original poem.” Prof. Cowell observes to the same end, “Both the great Hindu epics.....end in disappointment and sorrow. In the Mahābhārata the five victorious brothers abandon the hard-won throne to die one by one in a forlorn pilgrimage to the Himālaya; and in the same way Rāma only regains his wife, after all his toils, to lose her. It is the same in the later Homeric cycle—the heroes of the Iliad perish by ill-fated deaths.....But in India and Greece alike this is an after-thought of a self-conscious time, which has been subsequently added to cast a gloom on the strong cheerfulness of the heroic age.”¹

¹ Academy, Vol. III, No. 43,

It will not be out of place to state the arguments whereby these scholars justify their conclusions.

- (1) That there are two tables of contents in the First Book, Cantos I and III, which do not tally with each other, and the first of which takes no notice of the First and Last Books.
- (2) That the interpolations are so loosely connected with the main body of the Epic as to make the junctures easily detectable.
- (3) That at least the Uttarakāṇḍa must be left out, as the Epic narrative had probably like its legendary prototype a happy ending.

I cannot endorse these views without certain reservations. It seems to me that the end of the original form of the Epic was tragic and that Sītā's disappearance into the bosom of the earth was very likely the culmination. Hence the Uttarakāṇḍa is a prodigious accretion round a nucleus which originally formed an integral part of the Rāmāyaṇa. If we think that Vālmīki strictly reproduced in his narrative the outline of a Rāma-story, as is said to have been narrated to him by Nārada in the first canto of Book I, we are sure to labour under a great misconception. In that case, we would identify the Rāmāyaṇa which is an epic with the older bardic tales on which it was based.¹

After all the concessions that can possibly be made to the above arguments, I do not see how two entire Books could be put aside as interpolations simply on the ground that there are two tables of contents which differ in certain details from each other, and the first of which does not mention the topics treated of in the first and the last Book. To do so would be, I am afraid, to identify the narrative of Vālmīki's Epic with an older form of a

¹ The point is discussed in detail under Historical approach.

Rāma-story, put into the mouth of Nārada. This cannot surely be done except by way of *suggestio falsi*. To leave out the Uttarakāṇḍa on the ground that the Epic should have a happy ending like the Rāma-story of Nārada would be as if to say that Vālmīki's was a simple and faithful reproduction of the outline of a story which he found ready-made in the country. The Rāmāyaṇa must *ex hypothesi* be judged as an Epic with its own moral and purpose, distinguishing it from its legendary basis, which had a different purpose altogether. If it can be rightly supposed that the starting point of an *epopea* is a striking moral which lends its colour to and determines the character of the narrative, composed of legends which are discordant in themselves but concordant as interwoven into a whole, the end suggested by the moral of the Rāmāyaṇa must have been tragic. The older Rāma-story, as found in the introductory canto of the Epic and in the Buddhist Jātaka, has a happy ending as all the folk-tales and the ballads which are still popular usually have. Scanning these two older Rāma-stories along with others to be found in the Mahābhārata, we see that they can all be grouped in either of the following two classes :—

- (1) Those that seek to represent Rāma as an avatāra—a national hero—a finished example of moral excellence. To this class belong the Rāma-Upākhyāna of the Mahābhārata, Book I, the Dasaratha Jātaka as it occurs in the extant Commentary and the Rāma-story of Nārada, incorporated in the Rāmāyaṇa itself.
- (2) Those of which the purpose is to inculcate, by the example of Rāma, the necessity and wisdom of keeping up one's spirit and strength of purpose even in the midst of sorrow and trials. Such are the Rāma-stories of the Mahābhārata, Bk. III, Cantos 277-291, and of

the Dasaratha Jātaka as it occurs in the Canonical Jātaka Book.¹

In neither of these two classes could be placed the Rāma-Episode of the Rāmāyaṇa, for it stands by itself and conveys throughout one central idea, or a moral, as we may say, which suggests a tragic end to the fable conveying it. It is stated in the introductory canto (Canto III, Bk. I) that the Śloka which Vālmīki uttered at a moment of sudden shock of grief, contained the moral, and that he proceeded thereafter to develop an epic out of the current Rāma-story in the light of the teaching of the Śloka. The oft-quoted Śloka reads:—

Mā niṣāda pratiṣṭhām tvamagamah śāśvatiḥ samāḥ
Yat krauñcamithunād ekam avadhīḥ kāmamohitam

—which Griffith neatly renders :

“ No fame be thine, for endless time,
Because, base outcast, of thy crime.
Whose cruel hand was fain to slay
One of this gentle pair at play.”

This prophetic utterance of Vālmīki one might take as a later invention, since it occurs in an introductory canto which is regarded as an interpolation. But the fact remains, as we shall see anon, that this is the only tune which the Indian Epic keeps harping on, the one spirit which permeates the whole narrative. Indeed, the Epic narrative is not the bardic Rāma-story only, but admirably done up with this one end in view by a harmonious combination of Nārada's Rāma-story and other episodes, all drawn from the great Indian stock of legends and exquisitely interwoven. That the Epic narrative and the bardic Rāma-story are not the same is

¹ Dasaratha Jātaka, No 461. The moral verses, quoted from the Canonical Jātaka Book, are either identical with or similar to those in the Rāmāyaṇa, Bk. II Canto 105.

clearly stated in the introductory cantos (Bk. I, Cantos II & III). Here, at any rate, lies the answer why there should be two tables of contents instead of one; one table for Nārada's story (in Canto I, Bk. I) and another for Vālmiki's narrative in Canto III of the same Book.

In this second table there is mention of certain topics which are handled along with others in the Bāla and the Uttarakāṇḍa, and so far as the Uttarakāṇḍa is concerned, it contains only one topic of the table, *viz.*, the banishment of Sītā, and its other details are not indicated in the table. In this table the item "banishment of Sītā" comes just after the item "discharge of the legions." Now, the discharge of the legions marks the close of the 5th Book, which just precedes the Uttarakāṇḍa. The Uttarakāṇḍa, it is strange to say, does not take up the thread of the narrative, *i.e.*, the banishment of Sītā, until after its first 43 cantos, which are digressions devoted to extraneous matters abounding in popular and mystical notions about the cycles of time, the origin of the Rākṣasas and so forth. I think here is sufficient reason to believe that there was some basic fact which was wrought into a prodigious structure of fancy and mysticism.¹

To wind up, I take the Uttarakāṇḍa, as a whole to be an interpolation, except certain cantos or portions which relate to Sītā's banishment and its sequel. Similarly the introductory cantos, a few mythological legends ascribed to Viśvāmitra and the passages where there is an attempt to prove that Vālmiki was a contemporary of Rāma may be left out of consideration. The question of interpolations can partly be settled by a careful comparison of the existing recensions of the Rāmāyaṇa. The interpolations, wherever they occur, are to be regarded as the work of some unknown Indian Pisistratus. The rhapsodists who mingled their own songs with the Epic

¹ The points are discussed in detail in connexion with Historical approach.

must also be allowed a share in the growth of the original poem to its present dimensions. These later additions have their own value and historical importance.¹ But the final question of interpolation cannot be settled without a close study of Vālmiki himself. Hence the question arises—who was Vālmiki and what was he ?

Prof. Wilson, in his *Specimens of the Hindu Theatre*, Vol. I, p. 313, has gathered the following information regarding Vālmiki: “Vālmiki was the son of Varuṇa, the regent of the waters, one of whose names is Prachetas. According to the *Adhyatma Rāmāyaṇa* the sage, although a Brahman by birth, associated with foresters and robbers, attacking on one occasion the seven Rishis. They expostulated with him successfully, and taught him the *mantra* of *Rāma* reversed, or *Marā Marā*, in the inaudible repetition of which he remained immovable for thousands of years, so that when the sages returned to the same spot, they found him still there converted into a Valmīk or ant-hill, by the nests of the termites, whence his name of Vālmiki.”

The current popular tradition about Vālmiki is very much the same except that it attributes his conversion to the instrumentality of Nārada instead of to that of seven Rishis. Thus popular tradition and the *Yogavāsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa* representing Vālmiki as a sage turned from a robber seek only to sing the glory and the chastening influence of the name Rāma. They recognise by his quondam name *Ratnākara*, i.e., “Treasure-Mine,” that spiritual faculties lie dormant even in the hardened soul of a criminal and high-way robber, and that the soul can be awakened to conscience by the proper exhortation of a *sadguru*. They also inculcate that complete transformation of the soul is possible only by the redeeming power of faith, that the *alabaster* of sin can only drop off by the sweet name of the Lord—Rāma, Rāma. The fanciful derivation of

¹ The points are discussed in detail in connexion with Historical approach.

the name Vālmīki from *valmīk* or ant-hill is intended only to emphasize the rigid austerity of the sage.

An earlier and less exaggerated account of his life can be gleaned from the Bāla and Uttarakāṇḍas, the Books which we have, with certain reservations, put down as interpolations. In the introductory cantos of Bk. I and in the cantos of Uttarakāṇḍa where the story of Rāma-Sītā is continued, we perceive throughout a deliberate attempt to prove that Vālmīki was a contemporary of Rāma in that his epic is stated to have been brought to a close a few years after Rāma's return from exile, and this is the one fact which sharply distinguishes the earlier account from the modern Indian tradition, especially current in Bengal, that the Rāmāyaṇa was composed 60 thousand years before Rāma, *Rām nā hote Rāmāyan, i.e., "Rāmāyaṇa when Rāma was not,"* a proverbial satire on chimerical speculations. Although the accounts in the Bāla and Uttarakāṇḍas complete each other and partly coincide, a distinction is to be made with regard to the motive in each. The Bāla Kāṇḍa seems more concerned with the genesis of the Epic, and the Uttarakāṇḍa more concerned with its recital throughout the world. I proceed to summarise from these two Kāṇḍas all the main facts that can be gathered about Vālmīki. First, as to the Bālakāṇḍa :—

Vālmīki is introduced as a gifted saint who lived with Bhāradvāja and other pupils in the solitude of a beautiful hermitage, situated not far from Ayodhyā, in the sequestered valley of the Tamasā and the Ganges. He received from Nārada the outline of a Rāma-story representing Rāma as an ideal man, adorned with all the qualities of head and heart. After having finished his bath in the Tamasā, he chanced to see in the adjoining forest a pair of *Krauñcas* at play with each other. Suddenly a cruel fowler shot an arrow that pierced the male bird. The *Krauñcī* was

disconsolate and bitterly mourned the tragic separation from her mate. This painful sight moved the heart of Vālmiki, and the impious act of the fowler kindled wrath in him and with a mingled feeling of intense sympathy and disgust he burst forth quite unconsciously into a poetic utterance, a pronouncement of curse on the fowler. Returning to his cottage he brooded over the pathetic incident and mused on the śloka that had expressed his shock of grief. In this psychological moment the poetic vision dawned upon his mind. The inspiration came from Brahmā himself, urging him to convey the truth and pointing out the Rama-story as the proper vehicle. Accordingly he set to weave the instructive narrative of the Rāmāyaṇa out of the Rāma-story with which he combined many other legends, told by the holy sages of old. When he finished his work, he became anxious to see it recited all over the world. In such a moment the twins Kuśa and Lava, who were living under his protection, happened to come to him. In this princely pair of graceful voice, he found the first rhapsodists to whom he entrusted the task to recite his heroic song.

“..... . .in tranquil shades where sages throng
Where the good resort, in lowly home and royal court.”

Kuśilava carried out the task to the satisfaction of the master by whom they had been trained. This unheard of heroic song appealed to all and was received with favour wherever it was chanted, even in the royal court of Rāma himself.

Next, as to the Uttarakāṇḍa, Vālmiki received with a fatherly affection the forsaken Sitā in his hermitage, where she had been helplessly banished. There she gave birth to the princely twins Kuśa and Lava, who by a singular fortune, were brought up under his saintly care. They were trained to recite the Rāmāyaṇa,

and when Rāma performed the Horse-sacrifice, Vālmiki, accompanied by the twin rhapsodists, visited Ayodhyā, where the princely singers drew the tears of the court by singing of the strange fate to which their mother the innocent Sītā had been a victim.

This is all the information we have of Vālmiki from the two Kāṇḍas of the Rāmāyaṇa, and all that we have known may be summed up in a line—that Vālmiki was a Brāhman, an ascetic, a saint, a seer and, above all, a poet. These are the main facts of Vālmiki's biography, which have no meaning whatever except when studied in connection with the history of his inner life—his mind and thought, revealed in his epoch-making work.

If we judge of his personal history from his poem and from his poem alone, we may be involved in uncertainty in every detail, but there is one statement which can surely be vouchsafed as certain, *viz.*, that he was a man with all his good qualities and limitations.

The popular belief that Rāma was an avatāra seems to have been gaining ground in the time of Vālmiki, and it was through the agency of the rhapsodists that this belief was fast assuming a theocratic character. In spite of the unavoidable influence of the existing ballads deifying Rāma, Vālmiki was one of the many sages of popular tradition whose standpoint was pre-eminently human. He was anxious to represent Rāma more as an ideal man than as a god incarnate; at any rate he emphasized mainly the human side of Rāma's personality. Wherever he had to portray Rāma's character, he was careful to safeguard his own position by *comparing* him and *not identifying* him with all that is known as the most potent among natural forces, or with the highest in nature. As a matter of fact, he always employed in such cases the particle "*iva*" which means *like unto*. Let us take a few instances. In Canto 1, Bk. II, Rāma

and his three brothers are all said to have sprung from King Daśaratha and to have clung round their affectionate father like four arms. This conception underwent a change at the hands of the rhapsodists who pictured the sons of Daśaratha as the four portions of the substance of Viṣṇu, the four-armed god, separately incarnated. In the same Canto, Rāma is said to have become among men as good as the self-sprung God (*Svayambhūriḥ bhūtānāṃ babhūva guṇavattaraḥ*). Again Rāma is spoken of as being, in wisdom, like Brīhaspati, and in strength, like Śacīpati, who shone in virtue as the sun shines gloriously with his rays, and shone, indeed, with all the virtues, like unto the Lord of the Universe, and him the world might claim as its lord (*Lokanāthōpamaṃ nātham akāmayata medinī*). In the same way and in the same Canto, Bharata and Śatrughna are likened to the great Indra and Varuṇa (*Mahendra-Varuṇōpamau*). It may be noticed that the Benares recension of the Rāmāyaṇa is wanting in that śloka of the Bombay Edition where the eternal Viṣṇu is represented as promising to descend into the world of men, in response to the prayer of the distressed gods who had appealed to him for the destruction of Rāvaṇa. In fact, we meet with a clearer statement from Vālmīki in the Sixth Book, 117th Canto, Bombay Edition, proving that he considered Rāma to be a man, for in reply to Brahmā who came to remind him of his divine origin and former position as the Lord of the Universe, Rāma is made to say :—

Ātmānaṃ mānuṣaṃ manye Rāmaṃ Dāśarathātmajaṃ |

So'haṃ Yaśca Yataścāhaṃ bhagavānstad bravitu me ||

i.e., “I consider myself to be a man, Rāma the son of Daśaratha. Who really I am, and from whom I have been, O Lord, tell me (only) that.”

Thus the task of Vālmīki seems to have been to bring out what moral perfection man may reach or what ethical

and social ideals man may pursue, by purely human strength (*parākrama*). Himself a man, Vālmiki naturally viewed things as man, and what is more, as a moral man. To be a moral man and not a man only, what are the principles to follow and what are the duties and obligations to fulfil? Vālmiki's reply is, one must be a whole man, who should be judged in his relations with his own past tradition, present education, family connection, social environment and public duties and religion. He must not be under the control of time and fate. In order to distinguish him from animals and from men in the lower stage of civilisation, he should conform to a standard of conduct, *i.e.*, he should be *ātmarān*, self-reliant, having powers to control himself. This standard of Dharma which he has to conform to must be such as not to conflict with the general dictates of conscience, the established usage of a civic society and the higher principles of religion. He must have to act in accordance with this principle, whatever walks of life he may be in, and stand by and die for that principle. All this Vālmiki seeks to illustrate by his description of the slaughter of the demons who had menaced the religious life of the hermits. The episode of Śūrpanakhā in the Aranyakāṇḍa serves also to bear out this view-point of Vālmiki. Śūrpanakhā, the winnow-nailed sister of Rāvaṇa, impelled by her animal instincts and with all the wiles and witchcraft of a savage, had dared to encroach on the rights of Sītā, by virtue of which she could expect that her lord would always be devoted to her, and to impose her barbaric ideal on the Aryan civilisation. Śūrpanakhā sought the favour of Rāma in the presence of his wife, and when asked to court the love of Lakṣmaṇa, his younger brother, she ran to him, who again referred him back to Rāma and again she came back to Rāma in utter disregard of all the decorum of female modesty. In spite of her being told

that he could not oblige her as he was already married, she persisted by the boast of her wild beauty to prevail upon Rāma. When all her gentle persuasion failed, she had recourse to threats. Nevertheless, she was rejected ; and when she fell upon Sitā with her demoniac fury and *anārya*-like grudge, Rāma was made to utter the following command :—

“ Ne’er should we jest with creatures rude,
Of savage race and wrathful mood.
Think Lakshman, think how nearly slain
My dear Videhan breathes again.
Let not the hideous wretch escape
Without a mark to mar her shape.
Strike, lord of men, the monstrous fiend,
Deformed, and foul, and evil-miened.”

Though Vālmiki raised the scale of civilisation by setting up a high standard of morality and duty, and sharply contrasted the civilized man from the brute and the savage who are in a state of nature, he did not fail to impress the necessity of living in conformity with the simplicity of nature, and this simplicity is the one expression which characterises the life of the poet and can furnish a key to the appreciation of his great poem : simplicity of conduct, simplicity of manners, simplicity of thought, mingled with the simplicity of words, diction, metre and all the rest. That which adds grace to the character of a person, man or woman, placed in high position is this one element, *viz.*, natural simplicity, *i.e.*, simplicity with which we are all born. In the characters of Rāma and Sitā he has placed side by side the two aspects of life, contrasted as stern and simple, the one full of heavy responsibilities of public duty, the other sweet with the tender cares of a wife, which has a chastening influence on the husband and on which depends the domestic happiness of man. And so in his own life,

we see the rigid austerity of a hermit, contrasted and harmonized with the simplicity of nature, as is evident from his vivid description of the hermit-life in the *Aranyakāṇḍa*. The contrast and harmony of the rigidity of religious life and the simplicity of nature is apparently a contradiction in terms. But how the austere mode of discipline could exist side by side with the tender emotions and the simple beauty of nature can well be illustrated by what Rāma said at the sight of Agastya's āśrama :—

“ How soft the leaves of every tree,
 How tame each bird and beast we see !
 Soon the fair home shall we behold
 Of that great hermit tranquil-souled.
 The deed the good Agastya wrought
 High fame throughout the world has brought :
 I see, I see his calm retreat
 That balms the pain of weary feet.
 Where white clouds rise from flames beneath,
 Where bark-coats lie with many a wreath,
 Where sylvan things, made gentle, throng,
 And every bird is loud in song.”

This is what appeals naturally to the man who comes from the hot hubbub of town life to the quiet vicinage of a religious home in the forest. Again, when Rāma and Sītā had reached the Pañcavaṭī, attracted by its charm, Sītā, the simple child of nature, true to her instinct, broke forth into the following utterance :—

“ See, see this smooth and lovely glade
 Which flowery trees encircling shade :
 Do thou, beloved Lakshman rear
 A pleasant cot to lodge us here.
 I see beyond that feathery brake
 The gleanings of a lily lake,
 Where flowers in sun-like glory throw
 Fresh odours from the wave below.

Agastya's words now find we true,
He told the charms which here we view.

.....
The spot is pure and pleasant : here
Are multitudes of birds and deer.
O Lakshman, with our father's friend
What happy hours we here shall spend !"

We feel as if Vālmīki himself had spoken through gentle Sītā the very words which he himself would have uttered at the sight of the charming Indian forest. Verily, it is he, in whom there is such a simplicity, who can discern the purity of human soul when in tune with the whole of nature. In Canto II of Bk. I Vālmīki is represented as expressing to his pupil Bhāradvāja :—

" See pupil dear, this lovely sight,
The smooth-floored shallow, pure and bright,
With not a speck or shade to mar,
And clear as good men's bosoms are."

These words put into the mouth of Vālmīki, occurring as they do in an introductory canto may not have been actually uttered by him. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the rhapsodists understood Vālmīki out and out and fittingly ascribed them to him ; for, verily his was the good man's heart, clear as the transparent water of the Tamasā, truly gifted was he with that boon of nature—simplicity, whereby he could have a clear perception of the divine.

The Rāmāyaṇa does not contain much information regarding the early years of Vālmīki, but it may be surmised from his patriotic and minute account of Kosala with her capital Ayodhyā, her benevolent ruler, her wise ministers, happy people and abundant riches, that he was an inhabitant of the country which he was never tired of painting in extravagant colours :—

" On Sarju's bank, of ample size,
The happy realm of Kosal lies,

With fertile length of fair champaign
 And flocks and herds and wealth of grain.
 There, famous in her old renown,
 Ayodhyā stands, the royal town.
 In bygone ages built and planned
 By sainted Manu's princely hand.

.....
 King Daśaratha, lofty souled,
 That city guarded and controlled

.....
 As royal India, throned on high
 Rules his fair city in the sky.
 She seems a painted city, fair,
 With chess-board line and even square."

(Bk. I, Canto V.)

At least Kosala seems to have been the country where he had spent the greater portion of his life. He certainly knew of a few other countries, *e.g.*, Videha in the north; Aṅga, Magadha and Kāśī in the east; Sindhu, Sauvīra and Saurāṣṭhra in the west and the distant kingdom of Aśvapati Kekaya in the north-west, and such other countries which were linked with Kosala by matrimonial alliances and bonds of friendship. He was probably educated at Taxila, the ancient seat of Brāhmanical learning, where he had the good fortune of mastering the Vedas, together with all the auxiliary sciences and arts. At any rate, he appears to have been familiar with two routes whereby a person could travel from Ayodhyā to Rājagṛīha, the capital of Girivraja, perhaps the older name of Takṣaśilā. Speaking of these two routes, Prof. Lassen in his *Indische alterthumskunde*, Vol. II, p. 524, points out that the one taken by the envoys despatched from Ayodhyā was shorter than the route by which Prince Bharata returned from the kingdom of his maternal uncle Aśvapati Kekaya in the Punjab. Although the existing recensions of the Rāmāyaṇa differ to some

extent as to the enumeration of the principal stopping places of the roads, such an elaborate description of them as we obtain from Vālmīki's poem cannot be expected from a person who was not intimately acquainted with them. Perhaps he was engaged for a number of years as a councillor in the court of Ayodhyā, faithfully discharging the important function of a Judge and Jurist. At all events, there is no other inference to be drawn from the intimate knowledge which the Rāmāyaṇa shows he possessed of the onerous duties of ministers and other functionaries of the state. The further proof to be adduced in support of our surmise is that he represented among the ministers of King Daśaratha those sages and saints, Vasiṣṭha, Vāmadeva, Jayanta, Vijaya, Dhṛiṣṭi, Siddhārtha, Arthasādhaka, Dharmapāla, Aśoka, Jābāla and Sumantra, whose views should be authoritative in the Indian treatises on morality, law and polity.

The Rāmāyaṇa abounds in descriptions of the duties of kings, which cannot but remind one of the teaching of Bṛihaspati, the views of whose school still survive in a Sūtra, called after his name, and are referred to in Kauṭilya's Science of Polity as well as in the Mahābhārata. I am referring here to those passages where Vālmīki enjoined that a king should, defying time and fate, be *ātmavān*, and discharge all his duties with the one object, safeguarding the material and spiritual advantages of his people. Even if it be not allowed that he held the post of a minister or a judge it cannot be denied that at least he was a citizen conversant with the art of government and juristic thought. This is corroborated by the central idea running through the Rāmāyaṇa, which is nothing but a juristic conception of right, widened in scope and utilized for a spiritual purpose. The śloka "Mā Niśāda, etc.," which was the starting point of the Epic teaches, if I rightly understand it, that we have no

business to encroach on the rights of others, even of the meanest things, to enjoy happiness in their own sphere and in their legitimate ways, and that any one who violates this rule is to be looked down upon as a base outcast and punishable by law. King Daśaratha shot an arrow at the Andhamuni's son who came to draw water for quenching the thirst of his blind parents, mistaking the sound of the pitcher for the trumpet of a thirsty elephant. Although it was not a conscious crime of the king, he was cursed by the sorrowing parents that he must share the same fate.¹ The underlying arguments with which Vālmiki justifies the fateful curse is that Daśaratha interfered with the right of the blind family to live happily and suffered in consequence. Likewise was Śūrpanakhā punished as she endeavoured to encroach on the conjugal right of Sitā in tempting Rāma to marry her. In the same way Rāvaṇa with his family and people went to destruction, because he had madly violated the divine right by which the princely pair in exile had sought to live in the Daṇḍaka forest. That Vālmiki's standpoint is Brahmanical and juristic is borne out by the fact that he, in spite of his teaching the daśakuśala-karma, *ahimsā* and the rest, justified slaughter under unavoidable circumstances, *e.g.*, in the case of Agastya (Bk. III, Canto 8), who devoured the demon Vātāpi and killed his brother, although it was quite inconsistent with the hermit-life that viewed every creature with sympathy. Here Vālmiki differed from the Jainas and the Buddhists who under no pretext gave sanction to an act of slaughter. Thus Vālmiki explained *himsā* as wrath without provocation (*vinā vīram raudratā*, Bk. III, Canto 9, śloka 4). The expressions put into the mouth

¹ Rāmāyaṇa, Bk. II, Canto 63. The story is the same as that of Sāma in the Sāma Jātaka, No. 540, except that the names of king, countries and rivers are different. Compare the verses in this Jātaka with those in the Rāmāyaṇa.

of Sītā in this Canto may serve to bring out Vālmīki's position as to the import of *ahimsā*. Hearing that Rāma had pledged himself to slay the *rākṣasas* who continually disturbed the peaceful life of the hermits and were a constant source of terror to them, Sītā tried to dissuade her lord in these words:—

“Mayst thou, thus armed with shaft and bow
So dire a longing never know,
As, when no hatred prompts the fray
 These giants of the wood to slay :
For he who kills without offence
Shall win but little glory thence.
 The bow the warrior joys to bend
 Is lent him for a nobler end,

 The noblest gain from virtue springs
 And virtue joy unending brings.
 All earthly blessings virtue sends ;
 On virtue all the world depends.”

In the Rāmāyaṇa we feel throughout a deep religious sense of duty, right and justice, of which the tone is intensely moral, and devoid of all subtleties of Ānvikṣaki or speculative philosophy. A good common sense runs through his poetry. He has nowhere taken notice of the views of speculative philosophy except in the singular instance (Bk. II, Canto 109) where Jābāla pretending to be a *nāstika*,¹ tries to persuade Rāma to return to his father's capital with arguments drawn from a philosophy well known as Cārvāka or Demoniac. And in vehemently criticising and reproaching Jābāla, Rāma only voiced the feeling of the poet who had no patience with the views of speculative philosophy which are far remote from common sentiments of mankind and which discredit by sophistry and false logic all established social and religious institutions, based upon common sense.

¹ A similar story of Socrates is noticed by Mr. Taylor in his “Epicurus.”

Another distinctive feature which marks Vālmīki out as a Brāhman Jurist, liberal in principle, is that he places everywhere the society above the individual. At the same time, without disturbing the social order, he was ready to afford every scope for the free growth of the individual mind and character. Let us take two instances. First, in the story of Rīṣyaśṛiṅga (Bk. I, Cantos 9, 10) Vālmīki is not sorry that the princess Śāntā tempted the hermit's son Rīṣyaśṛiṅga or that the latter being the son of a Brāhman sage agreed to marry a Kṣatriya lady to participate in all that concerned her lord, even in the *homa* sacrifice. He did not hesitate to urge the sage Vibhāṇḍaka to greet his daughter-in-law, although of the warrior caste. But he compelled Rīṣyaśṛiṅga to undergo a rite of penance because he had left the hermitage in his father's absence and married without his father's permission. Similarly in the case of Sītā, Vālmīki had no objection that she when rescued from Lāṅkā, should go through the ordeal of fire, as a proof to society of her unsullied honour. Rāma was satisfied and returned in course of time with his lady to Ayodhyā, where they spent a few happy years. And when again she was banished at a most critical period of woman's life, in order that the people might be pleased, Sītā took counsel not to commit suicide thinking that patience was the greatest virtue of a woman and that it would have been rash on her part to kill herself with the future descendants who would continue the line of Raghu. But the poet was aware that there was a limit even to patience, and when Sītā, being recalled by the general assembly of the people, was again asked to undergo the same fire-ordeal, the poet took up, as it were, the cause of Sītā:—this time she must not submit, innocent and pure that she was, to the tyranny of the rule of the majority; and if the society did not appreciate goodness and was bent upon

crushing a guileless creature, the poet argued that she must bid good bye to this wicked world rather than submit to its base tyranny; that she must in such a case prove to the world by bravely facing death that soul ever triumphs over the body. She died, the Mother Earth opened up to receive in her bosom the dear child, the gods from heaven rained down flowers, and it was not till then that the foolish multitude appraised her for all she was worth, as in the parallel and more historical instances of the prophet of Nazareth and the wise Socrates of Athens.

When Vālmīki turned an ascetic, and under what circumstances it is difficult to say. It was probably following the usage of his time that he retired from the world at the third period to spend his closing years in the practice of penance and meditation. There is reason to believe that he built his hermitage in the vicinity of Kosala where, not far from the confluence of the Jumna and the Ganges, he conceived, developed and finished his epoch-making Rāmāyaṇa. He lived in a time when the different Brāhmanical settlements had been scattered over the country between the Ganges and the Godāvarī, and one need not be surprised that he had left the memoirs of his personal experiences in the vivid account of the wanderings of Rāma from the hill of Citrakūṭa in the north to Janasthāna, modern Nasik to the south 'about seventy-five miles to the north-west of Bombay.' He was perhaps not acquainted with that great trade-route extending from Kosala to Patitṭhāna, modern Paithan, near the Godāvarī,—the Dakkhināpatha of which an interesting account, with its main stopping places, is to be found in the prologue to a Buddhist canonical Book of Poems, the Pārāyaṇavagga. He had no first-hand knowledge of the countries that lay to the south of the Godāvarī. He has broadly distinguished them as Kiṣkindhyā and Lankā, inhabited by two different races, the Monkeys

and the Demons, differing in culture, character and religion. As in the parallel instance of the Buddhist Valāhassa Jātaka, the women of Laṅkā, are denounced in the Rāmāyaṇa as wanting in morality and female modesty. But as regards Kiṣkindhyā, Vālmiki recognises that her apish inhabitants had a strong political organisation, social order and Aryan faith. On the whole, his description of Kiṣkindhyā and Laṅkā is to be regarded in the light of the following remarks of Prof. Griffith :—

“The people against whom Rāma waged war are as the poem indicates in many places, different in origin, in civilisation, and in worship. from the Sanskrit Indians; but the poet of the Rāmāyaṇa, in this respect like Homer who assigns to Troy customs, creeds and worship, similar to those of Greece, places in Ceylon..... names, habits and worship similar to those of Sanskrit India.”

Thus the Rāmāyaṇa has sufficient indication that Vālmiki was a Brāhman jurist and ascetic, whose life was spent within the city walls and the far off hermitage, the two centres of ellipse round which his whole life turned. His poem, though wanting in the details of the daily life of the Hindu people at large, preserves a true picture of Hindu life at its best. How long he lived none can tell, but he did not live in vain and surely lived long enough to enjoy that rightly won fame, predicted by Brahmā in these words :—

“As long as in these firm set land
The stream shall flow, the mountains stand,
So long throughout the world, be sure,
The great Rāmāyan shall endure.
While the Rāmāyan's ancient strain
Shall glorious in the earth remain,
To higher spheres shalt thou arise
And dwell with me above the skies.”

The Indigenous Banker of India

BY

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU, M.A., F.R.E.S. (Lond.)

The terms 'banks' and 'bankers' are quite modern but the profession is an old and time-honoured one. The word 'banck' was a German term signifying a joint-stock fund. The Italians succeeded in converting the name 'banck' into 'banco' meaning a heap of money or an accumulation of stock. The common derivation of the word 'bank' from the counter upon which the Italian money-changer was wont to lay out his stock, has been ridiculed by H. D. MacLeod on the ground that the Italian Money-changers as such were never called 'Bancheiri' in the Middle Ages. Whatever might be the origin of the word 'bank' we see that the etymology of the word 'bank' suggests an origin which would trace the history of banking in Europe from the Middle Ages.

The Meaning of Banking.—Originally banking has had its origin in the efforts of individuals to supply certain primitive wants of an advancing community, namely, lending and receiving deposits. The process of satisfying these wants was by means of a few perfectly simple operations. But with the evolution of time, these individual wants sank into insignificance and the unforeseen, much disputed and ulterior effects of a Banking system have been recognised and these have been cited as some of the reasons for introducing a banking system in every modern community. The primary and original functions

of Banking, namely, lending and receiving deposits are still the important functions but a great variety of services have been performed by banks and with the advent of specialisation due to the progress of society we find a diversity of banking operations. It has fallen to their lot to finance the country's industries, to liquidate international indebtedness, to manipulate the currency system and lastly to mobilise credit. H. D. MacLeod says the meaning of the word 'to bank' is to "issue credit." C. A. Conant describes the banker as a trustee of the money of his depositors and still more important than this is the fact that he is the trustee of the mechanism of credit for the entire community. Mr. G. D. Chisholm in an article on Scientific Banking in the June number of Journal of Institute of Bankers, 1918, says that the Banker is "the trustee of the resources of others, that he is the trustee of the Nation's security and that he is the trustee of the Nation's material future." From a simple dealer and broker in money the Banker has become "the arbiter of a nation's industrial organisation and even of the fate of nations" as C. A. Conant has put it.

The development of Banking in Europe.—As C. A. Conant has proved the forerunners of "modern Bankers were the individual money-changer, the Jewish money-lender and the Lombard banker." As industry expanded by leaps and bounds and as centralised government emerged out of the welter of political chaos and as national life became organised the necessity for public banks arose. The Bank of Amsterdam rose to remedy the defects in the currency circulation of Holland. The Bank of England would not have come so soon into existence but for the necessity to finance the Dutch Wars of William III.

The origin of Banking in India.—Evidence is forthcoming in abundance that the business of banking was

thoroughly understood by our ancestors and fairly practised by them. Dr. Pramathanath Banerjee in his work "Public Administration of Ancient India" quotes from Gautama, Brihaspati, and Baudhayana verses which regulate the rate of interest on money loans. The Institutes of Manu give us rules as regarding the regulation of interest and the policy of loans. Kautilya also had some advice on these points in his Arthashastra. Prof. Rhys Davids in his book "Buddhist India" writes that "letters of credit were of common use at that time." Sir W. W. Hunter in the Imperial Gazetteer of India, has given us valuable information as to the way in which a private Banker sets up his business. The late Mr. B. M. Malabari the well-known South-Indian journalist and social reformer has given us some glimpses into the working of our indigenous system of banking in his "Guzerat and the Guzeratis." Sir Richard Temple, one of the finance ministers of the Indian Government, writing in the second number of the Journal of the Institute of Bankers, testifies to the fact that banking business was carried on by our ancients. He has estimated that the number of bankers is "one hundred and eighteen thousand adult males of which some are money-changers. There are half-a-million villages and there are about two bankers to every village." But no connected historical account of our indigenous banking system has ever been written due to the paucity of materials. Secondly, no statistical information has ever been collected by our previous writers; thirdly, the lack of political tranquility for a number of years must undoubtedly have told very severely on the banking houses; lastly, the Bankers plied also another occupation notably that of a merchant. The Banker *quâ* Banker did not exist in the past. He is something more than a mere banker. Strictly speaking, there are no indigenous 'bankers' in India. Men who are

called ' Bankers ' are either money-lenders, lending either upon landed security or other property or agricultural produce or else are ordinary merchants. The Hoondies are not used for ordinary purposes of banking but for conducting the great inland trade in agricultural produce and also in industrial products. Many of these Bankers held high political authority at the Moghul Courts and the advent of the British Rule has no doubt destroyed their political importance and prestige. The political influence of Jaget Seth and Umachand during Plassey days is well-known to readers of Indian history. The Seths of Madura also exerted much influence in the past history of the Southern part of Madras Presidency. The Nagerseths of Bengal financed the local Nawabs. The Peshwas were financed by these bankers. One Banislal Abhechand financed the Government of Bengal during the Great Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. The indigenous Banker continued his avocation undisturbed during the times of East India Company's rule and although deprived of his political importance he was playing no mean role in financing the internal trade of India. It might be quite true that the pristine honesty and scrupulous regard for truth which were some of the salient features of the ancient indigenous banker might have been dimmed by the more materialistic tendencies that have been introduced of late into the calm and placid atmospheres of our social life. Either this fact or the " passing of the English Law of Bankruptcy has demoralised the Native Bankers of the Presidency Towns " (Sir Richard Temple).

Nature of the Business.—The private Bankers are known by various names in various parts of India. Their business is purely a family concern and hereditary in the family. It is more or less an ancestral occupation in the family. So banking business is conducted by a class. The father of the family is a banker. He transmits the

knowledge and good-will of his business to his son and so on. So the class has not been strengthened by the recruitment of fresh blood into the class. No new ideas take hold of the business-man. His conservatism is of course a strong asset and saves him from many a bad debt. He is a mere private capitalist. Many of these people own princely sums and a close scrutiny of the list of subscribers to the Indian War Loan will reveal the munificent sums that have been invested by these individual bankers. They are averse to the principle of Joint-stock banking. They shun the light of publicity and refuse to publish figures revealing their business. They are generally very courteous and indulge in gossiping to a certain extent. They entertain you on a variety of topics but they set a seal on their lips as soon as the drift of conversation turns to their private matters. But the one great distinction is that this private bank is always in the hands of one family. A man who originally starts the private Bank may be a good banker, financier and business-man but it does not always follow that his son, who in all likelihood and certainty will inherit this business, will be capable of running it. But the joint-stock Banks do not go from father to son but are always under efficient management.

The Function of the Indigenous Banker.—He is a dealer and broker in capital. His main business is to lend money. It is not purely a case of personal security that he wants but the indigenous banker is the most inquisitive of all mankind and the customer has to give him his free confidence. Since the loans are generally for performing social functions or other unproductive purposes he takes good care to take sufficient collateral securities to balance the amount of his loan. He deducts the interest beforehand and pays the outstanding balances to the customer. He takes care to

collect the debt by monthly instalments. His rate of interest is often so high and he is so exacting in his levies that he has been nick-named the "Indian Shylock." But there has been a marked fall in the rate of interest due to competition from the Co-operative Credit Societies and the increase of stability and security due to British Rule. The high rate of the rural Bankers is due to the worthless security of the ryots on the one hand and the difficulty of collecting it has also to be reckoned by him. Again the financing of agriculture which is largely dependent on monsoon and which is only a seasonal occupation, means half-time occupation for money. Money is not employed all round the year and so it has to earn a high rate of interest when it is employed. There is no attempt made to vindicate the usefulness of the village Mahajan or Rural banker in India. Sir T. Morison has proved that his existence does not harm the cultivator but it is in one sense a clear benefit to the Indian Ryot. He supplies the capital in doles and protects the Ryot from the rapacious hands of the landlord. Thanks to the Co-operative Credit Societies, the predominance of the Rural banker is fast decaying and he is being gradually undermined. Mr. H. Wolff remarks that "Co-operation brought money to many a thirsting spot for it, replaced hopeless insolvency by solvency, liberated many from the userer's yoke and awoke many a Mahajan or Sowcar to find the fact that his occupation is gone." As the co-operative societies gathered strength and began to work successfully the Mahajan himself has been drawn into the vortex of the society. He supplies the capital as he finds better security and no risk when he lends money to the co-operative society. It has been recommended by high authorities that the co-operation of the Mahajan is to be enlisted because he is the only educated man knowing something about banking and if his services are enrolled

in the cause of the co-operative society, it will not only result in the elimination of a dangerous competitor and rival but will bring the aid of expert knowledge to a just cause.

Comparison with the money-lending policy of the Western Banks.—The Commercial Banks of Europe do not grant loans for long periods and lock them up in an unrealizable asset. 'They always prefer 'liquid assets.' In as much as deposits are liable to be called upon at any time, it is a suicidal policy on the part of the Banker to invest them on loans for long periods. "All the assets of the Bank should be within quick and easy control of the Bank." But the indigenous Banker of India does not conform his business to these principles. He lends to people on every kind of security preferably, land, real estate and jewellery. In as much as the working capital is his own, he is not afraid of any run.

Again the European Banker weighs each debt by itself, *i.e.*, he grants a loan on sufficient collateral security placed in his hands but the indigenous Indian banker balances good against bad debts. He distributes his risks among his various clients. When a higher and more tempting rate of interest is offered he willingly hazards the risk but of course he has the common sense to take some kind of security. So the necessity to write off bad debts is less urgent in the case of the European banker and the native banker though he does not lose his capital, gets it locked up in real estate or other property, so for some time at least, there is a temporary diminution of capital with which the business is run. The indigenous baker does not understand that "the banker should be a liveried stable-keeper who must keep his horse always ready for hire."

Again there is much truth in the sarcastic remark that the Indian Banker's motive in granting loans is not

a laudable one. He trades on the misfortunes of others, *i.e.*, his clients. The client is pampered with fresh loans and loans upon loans till he is head and ears in debt. The only way to extricate himself from the money-lender's clutches is to bid farewell to the mortgaged property.

Another notable feature already alluded to is the close personal knowledge of the clients he insists upon having. He must satisfy himself as to the ways and means of the income of his client and he will insist on possessing some knowledge of the way in which the client spends his income. This prudent way of managing his business is a praiseworthy feature.

The European Banker will not allow his reserves of gold to remain permanently higher than he considers necessary for the purpose of his business. To do so, would amount to neglecting to take a profit in his business which could be safely secured and that is a course which the banker does not adopt. When his reserves are in excess of his requirements, the Banker lowers the rate of discount, issues credit to a greater extent and sees his reserves gradually reduced to the amount below which he considers it unsafe to allow them to fall, *i.e.*, 'the apprehension limit' as Bagehot would put it. Owing to the ebb and flow of business there may be at times a superfluity of gold at the banks or the reserves may fall below the apprehension limit but the guiding principle is that the supply of the gold should be fully utilised. The indigenous Banker of India on the other hand lays much importance on the rate of interest and he would prefer to have the stock with him rather than lower the value of the wares which he places in the market.

Money-changing.—The next important function of the indigenous banker of India is money-changing, *i.e.*, the

exchanging of one kind of coin for another. The name 'Poddar' was given to the Banker who specialised in this business. In the former times there were a variety of coins issued from a number of mints which numbered more than a hundred. These mints belonged to the different Native States and each state had a distinct coin of its own. It was calculated that 100 different coins of gold 300 of silver and 50 of copper did circulate at one time in India. The money-changers used the multifarious currency to their own advantage. The money-changers were the contractors in the Native States for the mint. Up till the year 1793 there was an endless trouble and disturbance due to the multiform Native coinage. With the unification of coinage in the year 1835 by the East India Company's advocating the Silver Rupee as the standard coin, this lucrative source of profits has disappeared.

Deposits.—The European Banker is more a borrower than a lender, *i.e.*, he attracts much money in the shape of deposits part of which he utilises in granting loans on overdrafts. Even while discounting bills of Exchange, the modern Banker gives the right to draw money on him and this takes the shape of a book credit with him. The customer can draw a cheque to the full amount or may increase his current account balance with the Banker in order to draw upon it at a later date. Thus in the civilised communities where banking is fully known and practised, deposits arise in three ways, *i.e.*, (1) by actual deposit of cash paid across the counter, (2) a loan may become a deposit, (3) the process of discounting bills of Exchange. Thus by these three ways the Banker succeeds in making the community lend him so much money and it is with this borrowed Capital he does his business.

The private Banker, *i.e.*, the indigenous banker of India attracts very little money in the shape of deposits.

This is partly due to the fact that the 'banking habit' has not taken hold of the people as yet. He makes no attempt to *attract* deposits but he *keeps* the money that poor people generally entrust to him for safe custody. He pays the current rate of interest which the Savings Banks or the Banks of his place may pay and there is the moral obligation on the part of this depositor that he should not make a call at any inconvenient time. Again there are some indigenous Bankers who in the beginning of their career take much care to attract deposits but as soon as they have built up a safe and lucrative business, they no longer care to burden themselves with the onerous duty of attracting deposits, and be in a position always to pay them at call. Those people consider the deposits more a source of hindrance than a help to them, so much so it has been asserted that some of the indigenous bankers have willed down to their successors never to take up this irksome business of attracting deposits. Again many of the indigenous bankers prefer to receive deposits from friends and not from business men, *i.e.*, they do not like to attract "Commercial deposits." Full well do they know that money from business people is liable to sudden, frequent and untimely calls. So the indigenous Banker does not make it a systematic policy on his part to *advertise* for deposits and *attract* the deposits by paying a stipulated rate of interest agreed to, at the beginning. Yet it would be quite wrong to assert as many have done, that he does not make use of others' deposits. To a great extent, he depends for money on the contents of his own purse and if he is in need of money he goes to a fellow Banker who lends him at 2 to 6 per cent rate of interest. It is only in the last resort that they go to the Joint-Stock Banks for money. Again the indigenous Banking firm consists of two or three partners and besides the original capital subscribed to, at the

beginning by the partners, they may deposit their surplus cash at the firm. Thus it is an abuse of facts to lay down that the indigenous banker does not depend on outside factors to deposit their cash. It is always their wish to be self-dependent and rely on their own purses rather than subject themselves to sudden liability by attracting deposits systematically as do the joint-stock banks. Not only is the reluctance of the indigenous bankers to receive deposits, mainly responsible to the absence of the 'banking habit' on the part of the Indian people, but also the want of security in the past was operating against the growth and development of the banking habit on the part of the people. The absence of the Savings Banks or other institutions to store up savings, the occurrence of famines, and the innate poverty of the people must have had also retarded the growth of capital in India. The rise of banking institutions and the tolerable security arising out of Pax Britannica has given a stimulus to the growth of deposits.

Table showing the deposits and their growth.

(Statistical Table relating to Banks in India.)

Year.	Presidency Banks.	Exchange Banks.	Joint-Stock Banks.	Total.
	Rs	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1887	11,0,000,000	4,0,000,000	1,0,000,000	16,0,000,000
1897	12,0,000,000	9,0,000,000	6,0,000,000	27,0,000,000
1907	31,0,000,000	19,0,000,000	14,0,000,000	64,0,000,000
1917	75,0,000,000	53,0,000,000	32,0,000,000	160,0,000,000

Another curious phenomenon is the fact that the Indian people as a rule never draw cheques of any kind on the deposits they give to the Indigenous Bankers.

‘It is a most extraordinary instance of the mutual distrust between man and man,’ says Sir Richard Temple. But the habit of drawing cheques is slowly coming to favour. The depositors of the Indian Joint-Stock Banks now usually draw cheques for all large payments say hundred Rupees. The cheques are not so very popular because the agriculturists and the less enlightened people do not know how to draw it up and get it cashed duly. The fact that they are written in a foreign language stands in the way of their popularity.

The “*Hoondi*” business. It is a well known fact that all the banking transactions in India are exclusively in the hands of the trading classes especially in the interior of the country. They exchange funds by the well known device of a ‘Hoondi.’ The word ‘Hoondi’ is a Persian word given to it by the Muhammadans. The ‘Hoondi’ is a bill of Exchange running for 41 days at Benares, Bombay, Lucknow, 61 days at Farackabad, 121 days at Lahore and Multan. The noticeable fact is that they are drawn for an odd number of days. The ‘Hoondi’ resembles a bill of Exchange and is drawn payable on the 11th, 21st, 41st, 51st day of issue or so on as the case may be. Some of them are ‘sight bills’ and are known as ‘Darsani Bills’ but a great majority of the ‘Hoondies’ are drawn for long dates. The first of the three copies of the bill of Exchange is known as ‘Khoka,’ the second of the three copies of the bill of Exchange is known as ‘Penth,’ the third of the three copies of the bill of Exchange is known as “Parpenth.” The rate of discount is known as ‘Hundiya’ and varies with the state of trade and the credit of the party. There are certain brokers, especially the Mooltani Bankers of Bombay whose main line of business is to deal in ‘Hoondies’ and they obtain handsome profits amounting to several thousands of Rupees per year. The ‘Hoondi’ changes hands like a bill of

Exchange. The dishonouring of a 'Hoondi' is very rare. The 'Hoondi' bears an impressed stamp and is drawn up in the vernacular. Formerly when the railway communications were not perfectly developed, the Bankers used to earn much money from this source. But now some other means of conveyance of money are resorted to and in Allahabad and other places the 'Hoondis' are on the decrease. The Indian Government plays an important part in supplying currency to finance internal trade. The Government possesses numerous treasuries, sub-treasuries and currency agencies in places where the branches of the Presidency Banks do not exist. The Government keeps the cash balances in these tills and when Rupees are wanted to finance the Jute harvests in Bengal, the Cotton and Ground-nut harvests of South India the Rupees are sent up-country. The peasants no doubt hoard some Rupees but the remaining come back again to railway bills or Government treasuries at head-quarters of the Districts. The Government maintains local currency chests and free transfers are made from Treasury balances to local currency chest while at the head-quarters a corresponding transfer is made from the Currency chest to Treasury balances of the Government. Thus a merchant at Mymensingh can obtain money there from the currency chest by paying an equal amount in Calcutta into the currency Reserve. So the Currency Reserves play no small part in the distribution of circulating medium between the different parts of the country and obviates the necessity to remit coin. Yet it is the indigenous bankers' money that finances largely the moving of the crops from the interior to the port towns and the loans of these bankers are repaid from funds obtained from the Banks later on. The total amount of 'Hoondis' drawn depends on the amount of internal trade. Mr. Shirras, a member of the Prices Enquiry Committee and

now the present Director of Statistics, says, that the number of 'Hoondis' are on the increase but the 'Hoondi' in the interior specially at Benares, Allahabad and Cawnpore, is becoming rarer and rarer and this has been attributed to the fact that there are available at present many cheaper and secure means of transferring money actually thus dispensing with the use of a 'Hoondi.'

Again the Indian merchants usually gave drafts upon any places in the world, upon Constantinople, upon the Levant, upon London, upon New York and San Francisco. These letters of credit "Jawabi Hoondi" and bills of Exchange are drawn after letters of advice are given for their being honoured by the foreign correspondents.

Discounting Trade Bills.—The shroff or the indigenous Banker Acts also as the middlemen between the Presidency Banks and the Exchange Banks on the one side and the vast trading community on the other. He buys the trader's bills at a high rate of discount for ready money and when he has not enough money to carry on his transactions he simply rediscounts these bills at the big banks. The Presidency Banks indulge in this sort of business because the shroff or private bankers' endorsement makes the trader's bill doubly secure and as the shroff himself takes good care as to the nature of these bills there is no danger arising to the Presidency Banks. Thus he is performing the function of a bill-broker in the London Money Market. It has been written that keen competition exists in Bombay for this kind of business and the profit arising out of the differences between the Presidency Bank rate and the shroff's rate is gradually becoming smaller and smaller. But as in the London Money Market we do not meet with a uniform rate for the discounting of these trader's bills by shroffs in the local

markets. In Bombay there are two sets of indigenous bankers, the Multani bankers who do the discounting business alone, the Marwari bankers who combine banking business with other kinds of business. The 'Multani' bankers do pure banking business and discount the traders' 'Hoondies' drawn generally for 61 days or 91 days at rates ranging from 6 to 9%. These bills are re-discounted at the Bank of Bombay and the difference between the rates constitutes the profit for them. The endorsement of the Native Banker is important and as such the trader has to pay this price. There is an Association of the Multani Bankers which regulates the discount rate in accordance with the Bank rate. There are about two-hundred members and a small Committee of five members and the president of the Association is the senior-most of these Bankers and the Association holds meetings on every Sunday and discusses common matters pertaining to all of them.

Other functions than Banking.—It has been written already that the Banker *quâ* Banker does not exist in India. The indigenous banker of India very generally combines business with trade or holds land or does commission business and very often in order to get rich quick he speculates heavily in all kinds of produce. He does mortgaging business which often involves him in litigation. The indigenous banker or the shroff speculates in Government paper especially during the off season but rarely holds it or lends money on it. "Some of the most desperate gamblers in the market of speculation are to be found among the Native Bankers of Western India" (Sir Richard Temple).

At Cawnpore, the Native Bankers trade in money, cotton, grain, flour, and other articles. Some of them manage the flour mills and the sugar works.

At Delhi, some of the bankers finance the goldsmiths and other skilled workers. "The banker of the East tries to adhere to the practices of the guild that are comparatively neglected by the great money-lenders of Europe and counts jewels among his means of trade, and not as objects to be kept in his safe. He makes systematic advances to the goldsmiths and sells the goods himself. He tries to efface the maker of the goods he sells and poses as the actual producer." Thus he plays both the rôles of a jeweller and banker at one and the same time.

In Bombay, the Marwari Bankers deal with cotton seeds and shares and do much speculation in the value of these things. Instances of this sort of double dealings can be multiplied. Thus the general practice is that the indigenous banker rarely does pure banking business alone.

One of the instances which prove the trading instincts of the Marwari class is beautifully illustrated in the country of Mysore. In Mysore, the Marwari is likened to a 'Jew' and a 'Jap' and the comparison holds good in many points. Like the Jew, the Marwari is a great stickler for interest. He lends money generally for short periods and calculates interests at an exorbitant rate and pays the stipulated sum after deducting the interest beforehand. As soon as the prescribed period is over, he rarely extends days of grace and goes to the law court for prompt decree and settlements. He never grows sick of litigation and in many mofusil places the local contractors and merchants are first enticed by tempting offers and subsequent persecutions ruin them. He never lets go the opportunity which affords him the chance to settle securely and here he affords a striking resemblance to the 'Jap.' The 'Jap' is now trying to establish himself in the Cotton industry in Upper and the

Southern India. The 'Jap' has purchased the Lahore Cotton Mills, one of Lala Harikishen Lal's concerns and he is trying to establish himself in the Tinnevely Cotton area. Even the Marwari women seem to share these trade instincts along with their males as a sort of peculiar heritage. They do not share in that passionate liking for jewellery as the other Indian women possess.

The present position of the Indigenous Banker.
—Thanks to the British Rule, a well administered government has given perfect security and with it the flow of foreign capital has taken place into India. Banks have been started on the model of European Joint-Stock Banks and the Joint-Stock principle has been extended to banking business. These banks have contributed to a great extent to minimise the importance and diminish the rôle played by the indigenous banker. The net-work of co-operative societies that have been springing up like so many armed soldiers out of Mineroa's teeth has ousted the indigenous banker from his favoured post but still the village Mahajan or the Rural Banker holds his own though in a much less restricted sphere. The Co-operative Banks lend money only for production purposes and the impecunious man who has to borrow for social functions has been left to his mercy. Again the rate of interest has been drastically cut short. The former 25% rate of interest has now been reduced to 12 or 15% and this is telling very seriously on the rural bankers. The urban bankers have been unable to obtain even the little deposits that they used to attract before due to the opening of the branch banks. Their reluctance to finance manufacturing concerns which are rapidly springing up must also go against them. The individual proprietary basis on which private banking has hitherto

been conducted must give place to joint-stock basis. Again the indigenous banker has done very little to manufacture credit money. Their bills of Exchange and "Hoondies" are merely a species of mercantile exchange. They have never manufactured credit by the issue of notes. They have never financed manufactures on a large scale. If the essence of banking business consists chiefly to issue credit and to deal in credit operations, the indigenous bankers of India have done very little with regards credit development beyond issuing letters of credit from one place to another. Deposit-holding and the increase of notes are alike credit operations and the indigenous banker has left both these sources of credit untapped. Finally one has to observe the direct and indirect services that a bank does to the general community. Some of the most direct services the bank performs, are the provision of banking facilities for those who require them and the extension of these banking facilities by a network of branches and the bank also acts as the financial secretary to the customers. The indirect services are the providing of a sound and stable credit, by enabling the financial machinery of the country to run smoothly and by directing the country's capital into the most profitable channels. The indigenous banker of India when weighed according to this standard will be found wanting. It can be asserted without doubt that with the exception of 'Hoondi' business no other transaction of his produces a direct and cheap benefit to the community. Of course he is the only thrifty man in the community and the value of his example might be taken as the one other service he is giving to the public.

Again our indigenous banker is not a "scientific banker." A scientific banker should forbid speculation, refuse to support overtrading or over-investment. The indigenous banker violates all these functions. Not only

is he not a 'scientific banker' as understood in the modern sense of the term, but he does not perform some of the elementary duties of Banker. As Dunbar has said "to be a bank now at the present day an establishment must carry on the purchase of rights to demand money in the future on securities and it must use in some form or other its own engagements for the payment of money upon demand." The supreme rôle of the Western Banker in aiding production and stimulating the capabilities of the 'captains of industries' by their timely monetary help is not a distinguishing feature in the case of the indigenous banker of India. The Western Banker does not create capital out of nothing but the control of capital is concentrated at the Bank and the bankers by means of judicious loans and cautious advances in one form or other enables the persons in whom he has confidence to obtain the temporary use of capital. The Banker is under the strongest inducement to see that capital passes into the hand of those persons who are able to use it to the best advantage. The person who can use capital to the greatest advantage will naturally be anxious to obtain it and will be in a position to pay for the facilities afforded him and if the Banker makes an advance to a person who cannot use capital profitably he runs the risk of loss. The indigenous banker does not shrink from financing industries on the strength of industrial security provided he is satisfied as to the fact that the business is carried on, on sound lines. But on the whole, there is no facilitating of the profitable employment of capital on his part.

As Bagehot remarks that "the Rothchilds are great capitalists but not bankers" one must repeat the dictum that these indigenous bankers are great capitalists but not bankers.

“A nation gets the banking system it deserves” and it is a matter of sincere regret that India of the past rent by internecine warfare and political turmoil could give no free scope to the rapid growth and development of banking business.

Kingship and Administration of Justice in the Jātakas

BY

AMARESWAR THAKUR, M.A.

The Jātakas—the stories of the past or the birth stories as they are popularly called give us an insight into the customs, manners, economic condition and administration of justice as prevailed in ancient India at the time in which they were written. They are fables no doubt but we cannot overlook the fact that fables have a special value of their own inasmuch as they reflect society in all its aspects and embody in themselves all kinds of popular beliefs and ideas in an unmodified form. There are indeed great difficulties in accepting the evidences supplied by them as undoubted truths and what we should do is to judge these in the light of others obtained from more authentic sources. These evidences are to be sifted and analysed between themselves and strengthened and corroborated by more reliable historical data. A paper licked into shape from a huge mass of fables might not stand sufficient scientific scrutiny but might open up a vista of the life lived by the ancients in India.

Mayne observes—“Before society existed every man carried life in his hands. He was liable at any moment to be attacked in his person or his property and could only resist by over-powering his opponent. He generally did so by killing him. It was the simplest and

most effectual method. The maxim, a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye, a life for life though apparently rude, marks a distinct step towards criminal justice. The next step, *viz.*, the execution of these rules should be taken out of the hands of individuals and entrusted to state officials was a very long one and often was not taken for a long time." The Vedas, the epics, the Purāṇs and numerous books on Hindu polity all point to the stage when society had been well-formed, kingship had been instituted, public opinion had begun to act in an organised direction and individuals had left fighting between themselves and had their disputes decided by the state and its officials. In the first place, in the Jātakas, as in other historically important treatises of ancient India, we have a king. He is regarded as the fountain of justice. The modern system holds the king responsible for the happiness and misery of his subjects. We get similar references in many Jātaka stories. In the Kurudhamma-Jātaka we find mention of a dire famine in the kingdom of Kalinga on account of drought. The people were very much disturbed, they held the king responsible, approached him and said that it was for him to find means to redress the evils. In the Nalinikā-Jātaka also people under the stress of a famine gathered themselves together in the courtyard of the palace and reproached the king saying "Your Majesty, for three years no rain has fallen from heaven and the whole kingdom is burnt up and the people are suffering greatly; cause rain to fall — Dubbikkha-pīlitaṃ manussā sannipatitvā rājāgaṇe upakkosimsu, mahārāja tiṇi saṃvaccharāṇi devassa avassantassa sakala-ratṭhaṃ uddayhati, manussā dukkhitā devaṃ vassāpehi devā" ti. The evils that befall a country if the king does not properly look to its administration are pointed out in the Gaṇḍatindu-Jātaka. Here the king and his councillors began to rule the country unrighteously.

“The subjects being oppressed by taxation fled from the state with their wives and families and wandered in the forest like wild beasts. Where once stood villages, there now was none, and people through the fear of king’s men and robbers did not dare dwell in the villages but took to forest life.” “By day they were plundered by king’s men and by night by robbers”—“divā rājapurisā vilumpanti rattiṃ corā.” The Bodhisatta who was born as a tree-sprite came to their rescue and admonished the king in eleven stanzas and the king turned over a new leaf in his administration. In the introduction to the Tesakūṇa-Jātaka it is stated that when the kings are unrighteous, his officers also become unrighteous—“Mahārāja raññā nāma dhammena rajjam kāretabbam, yasmiṃ hi samaye rājano adhammikā honti rājayuttāpi tasmiṃ samaye adhammikā hontī” ti. The bad effects of unrighteous rule are also described clearly in the Mahābodhi-Jātaka. Here it is stated that the inevitable results of unjust rule are the drying up of the sources of revenue and the thinning away of the army.

The king was at the head of administration and his principal business was to see that cases were rightly judged and thus to protect the good from the oppressions of the evil-minded. In the introduction to the Rājovāda-Jātaka it is stated that the king of Kosala after passing sentence in a very difficult case involving moral wrong saw the Master. The Master praised him very much for this act and said—“Mahārāja dhammena samena aṭṭavinicchayaṃ nāma kusalaṃ saggamaggo esa—to judge a case with impartiality and justice is the right thing ; this is the way to Heaven.” For his protecting the good and punishing the wicked and thus keeping society in order, the king got a share of the produce of the fields. In the Kurudhamma-Jātaka a man thinks in this way while in

his paddy-field :—"imambā kedārā mayā rañño bhāgo dātabbo—I shall have to pay the king's dues from this heap of paddy." It may be remarked here that in sanskrit literature and law books the king is frequently called **षडंशवृत्ति** or the enjoyer of the sixth part of the gross produce from his subjects. The persons who were in charge of collecting the king's dues are termed "balisādhaka" in the Jātakas.

The king was to administer justice with an impartial mind unprejudiced by personal likes and dislikes, whims and fancies. In the Sumangala-Jātaka, Sumangala, a park-keeper, killed a Paccekabuddha taking him for a deer. In apprehension of punishment he fled the country with his wife and children and remained incognito for a year. After a year he came and enquired of a minister if the king was appeased. The minister went to the king and spoke of Sumangala in many eulogistic terms but the king gave no reply. Sumangala understood that the king was still angry with him. He went away, came again after a year and requested the minister to put in a word in his behalf before the king. This time also he met with no better results. When he came for the third time after another year, the king spoke to him, pardoned him being convinced of his innocence and reinstated him in his former office. The minister one day asked the king why he kept silent when Sumangala was praised twice before him. The king replied :—"Tāta rañña nāma kuddhena sahasā kiñci kātum na vaṭṭati, tenāham pubbe tuṇhi hutvā tatiyavāre Sumangale mama cittassa mudubhāvaṃ ñatvā taṃ pakkosāpesin" ti rājavattaṃ kathento :—

Bhus'amhi kuddhoti avekkhiyāna
na tāva daṇḍaṃ panayeyya issaro
aṭṭhānaso appatirūpam attano
parassa dukkhāṇi bhusaṃ udfraye

Yato ca jāneyya pasādam attano
 atthaṃ niyuñjeyya parassa dukkataṃ
 tadāyam attho ti sayāṃ avekkhiya
 ath'assa daṇḍaṃ sadisaṃ nivesaye

Rājāham amhi narapamadānam issaro
 sace pi kujjhāmi ṭhapemi attanaṃ
 nisidhayanto janatam tathāvidhaṃ
 panemi daṇḍam anukampa yoniso ti

The translation of the above extracts runs thus:—
 Dear Sir, it is wrong for a king to do anything hastily in
 anger; therefore I was silent at first and in the third
 time when I knew I was appeased, I sent for Sumangala
 and so he spoke these stanzas to declare the duty of a
 king:—

“ Conscious of an angry frown,
 Ne'er let king stretch out his rod
 Things unworthy of a man
 Then would follow from his nod.

Conscious of a milder mood
 Let him judgments harsh decree
 When the case is understood
 Fix the proper penalty.

King am I, my people's lord,
 Anger shall not check my bent
 When to vice I take the sword
 Pity prompts the punishment.”

The next thing for us to enquire is whether the people
 had any hand in the administration of the country. This
 cannot be known unless we know the position of the king
 in relation to his people. If the kingship be found to be
 elective in a large number of cases, it shows that the people
 were far advanced in civilization and competent to take
 part in the administration. Many Jātaka stories tell us of

the election of a king and of the power of the people. Thus the Jātakas also indicate that kingship by election was not an unusual conception in ancient India. In the Pādañjali-Jātaka, the king Brahmadatta of Benares had a son, Pādañjali by name, an idle lazy loafer. By and by the king died. The ministers thought of making Pādañjali king. They tested him as to his capacity in the following way. They seated the youth before them and decided a case wrongly. They adjudged something to the wrong owner and asked him if the case was rightly decided. The lad simply curled his lip. The ministers thought that the prince truly understood the case and were satisfied. Next day again they arranged another trial and this time they judged aright and on their asking the prince about the decision, he again curled his lip. The ministers now became convinced of his foolishness, gave up their intention of enthroning him and made the chief adviser king. In the Gāmaṇicanda-Jātaka also after the death of a king his ministers assembled and thought over the matter of making the young prince, only 7 years old, king. They tested him, were satisfied with his qualities and he was enthroned. The story of the festal car (phussaratha) as mentioned in the Sonaka-Jātaka is also of interest in this respect. Here the king of Benares died without an heir. His councillors met together and arranged a festal car to choose a king. They started the car saying "rājārahassa santikaṃ gamissatī'ti—Thou art to go to the man that is worthy to be a king." In the Siri-Jātaka the courtiers select the king. The idea of election has its place even in stories of beasts and birds. In the Nacca-Jātaka the animals choose the lion as their king. In the Ulūka-Jātaka the birds of the Himalaya think thus—"among men there is a king and the beasts and the fish have one too, but amongst us birds there is no king; we too should choose a king. Fix on some one fit to be set

in the king's place—*manussesu rājā paññayati, tathā catuppadesu c'eva macchesu ca, amhākaṃ paṇ'antare rājā nāma n'atthi, appatissavāso nāma na vattati, amhākaṃ pi rājānaṃ laddhuṃ vattati, ekaṃ rājatthāne thapetabbayuttakaṃ jānāthā*" ti. The reference to the election of a king is found in the Culla-suta-soma-Jātaka as well. Here a king wants to abdicate his throne and recognises the right of the people to elect their king saying—"I am now nothing to you, choose a king of your own—*ahaṃ tumhākaṃ kiñci na homi, attano rājānaṃ gaṇhathā*" ti.

That society was well formed, the people had an idea of constitution and that they understood the importance of well-organised administration is clear from the many references to voting affairs. In the introduction to the *Susīma-Jātaka* there is mention of a dispute regarding the distribution of alms, the disciples of Buddha being in favour of Buddha and his company and heretics in favour of the heretics. The disciples of the heretics voted for the heretics and the disciples of Buddha for Buddha and his friends. Then it was proposed to divide upon the question and accordingly they divided. Those who were for Buddha were in majority and consequently prevailed over the minority—"Sambahulaṃ karissāmā'ti sambahulatāya katāya Buddha-pamukhassa saṅghassa dassamā'ti vadantā yeva bahū jātā tesaṇṇeva kathā patitthāsi." In the introduction to the *Kāsāva-Jātaka* it is mentioned that there was a dispute regarding the gift of a perfumed robe. Some were in favour of giving it to *Sāriputta* and some to *Devadatta*. They made a division and those who voted for *Devadatta* were in majority and thus he won the garment—"sambahulikaṃ karontesu pi Devadattassa dassamā'ti vattāro bahū ahesuṃ. Atha naṃ Devadattassa adaṃsu." In the main story of the *Ulūka-Jātaka* it is seen that a bird made proclamation three times to all to the effect that votes would be taken in the matter of the

election of a king. There a bird made a speech and as he went on other birds granted him leave to speak—*Atha eko sakuṇo sabbesaṃ ujjasaya-gaḥaṇatthaṃ tikkhattuṃ sāvesi . . . Atha eko kāko āha Atha naṃ anuññātattā sakuṇā āhaṃsu*—so evaṃ anuññāto āha, etc. We gather from some Jātakas that often a number of judges would jointly try cases and it is possible that in cases of difference of opinion they came to decision by this voting system.

The Jātaka stories show that the king was not immune from punishment at the hands of his people if he ruled badly. The maxim “a king can do no wrong” was not, it seems, a faith with the people of the time. If the king derived his authority from the people, it was binding on him to keep them pleased by just administration and righteous conduct. If he failed to do so it was natural for the people to rebel against him and try to dethrone him. Some of the Jātakas picture such a state of things. In the *Maṇicora-Jātaka*, a householder with his wife was going to a certain place. His wife was exquisitely beautiful. The king happened to see her in the way and became enamoured of her. The king could not smother his passion and thought of doing away with her husband. With that view he caused some of his men to drop his jewelled crest in the waggon of the householder, got him arrested as a thief and had him brought before himself for trial. The king ordered him to be beheaded. People became discontented, Sakka intervened and on the execution ground the head smitten off was that of the king. In the *Khaṇḍahāla-Jātaka* king Ekarāja being persuaded by his family priest and minister arranged a great sacrifice in which his son, wife and some other people were to be killed. The people rose against him, the minister was put to death, the king was made an outcast and his dwelling

was appointed outside the city. In the Mahāsutasoma-Jātaka the story goes that a king was driven from the country for his propensity to eat human flesh. 'The Jātaka stories are also not without indications that the wishes of the people had to be respected by the king. In the Vessantara-Jātaka, Vessantara, a prince, made the gift of an elephant, which was supposed to be a great benefactor of the kingdom, to certain Brahmanas. The people became furious and peremptorily demanded of the king the banishment of the prince. The king thought for a moment not to obey the peoples' voice (Nāhaṃ Sīvināṃ vacanā rājaputtāṃ pabbajeyyāṃ) but at last he had to yield to it and banish the prince from the kingdom.

The king was helped in the discharge of the difficult duty of administration by his viceroy (uparājā), captain (senāpati), councillors, judges and a family priest who, it seems, was the chief minister. 'The post of the 'uparājā' was very important and in most cases one of the princes, generally the eldest son of the king held it. So far as can be gathered from the Jātakas the seat of his office was in the kingdom itself and his business was to render help to the king in the transaction of all important affairs of the state. The post next in importance seems to be that of the 'senāpati.' The three very high posts as mentioned in the Tesakuṇa-Jātaka are those of Mahāsenāgutta, Bhāṇḍāgārika and Senāpati. The senāpati was not in charge of the army only but often took part in the administration as we shall see later on. The councillors (amaccas) are mentioned as being lower in rank of service than the Senāpati in the Culla-sutasoma-Jātaka—"Senāpati pamukhāni asīti amaccasāṇi--Eighty thousand councillors headed by the captain." It may be said, however, that the councillors were the real pilots of the state as we frequently meet with passages in the Jātakas containing references to the necessity of appointing good councillors.

Of the five powers of the realm, councillors constitute one —“*amaccabalañ ca dighāvu tatiyañ vuccate balañ*” (Tesakuṇa Jātaka). The necessity of having councillors of wisdom and character is insisted on in the same Jātaka. In the Cullahaṃsa-Jātaka the Great Being asks a king if his councillors are free from all stain—“*Kacci bhoṭa ammaccesu doso koci va vijjati.*”

In the matter of ruling a kingdom kings were often advised by scholars. In one place the Master says to a king:—“*Etad eva acchariyañ yañ pubbe rājāno asabbaññūnañ pi paṇḍitānañ vacanañ sutvā dhammena samena rajjañ kāretvā saggapadañ agamaṃsū'ti*—It is indeed to be wondered at that some former kings could rule the country with righteousness though they took counsel from scholars who were not all-wise.” Sometimes, in the Jātakas, we read of kings appointing a minister who became his counsellor in matters temporal and spiritual (*atthadhammānusāsaka*). These ministers or *amaccas* often judged cases—“*Tasmiñ evaṃ dhammena rajjañ kārente amaccāpi dhammena eva vohārañ vinicchiṃsu*—as he ruled justly his ministers on their part were also just and administered justice with uprightness.” There might have been some distinction between an ordinary minister and one that tried cases, as we frequently meet with the term “*vinicchayāmacco*” (minister judge) as distinct from an ordinary “*ammacco*.” In the Dhamma-ddhaja-Jātaka the *Senāpati* or captain is represented as a trying judge—“*Atīte Bārāṇasīyañ Yasapāṇi nāma rājā rajjañ kāresi. Kālako nāma assa senāpati ahosi... Rājā dhammena rajjañ kāreti, Senāpati paṇ'assa vinicchayañ karonto lañcañ khādati, lañcañ gaheṭva asāmika sāmike karoti*—once upon a time Yasapāṇi was king of Benares. Kālaka was his *Senāpati* or captain. The king ruled righteously but his *Senāpati* or captain while trying cases swallowed bribes and thus defrauded the rightful owners.

In many stories the family priest or 'Purohita' is mentioned as a judge and it appears his functions were sometimes those of a chief judge inasmuch as he enjoyed the power to revise the judgments passed by other judges. In the Aitareya Brahmana, Institutes of Viṣṇu, Apastamba and Gautama the appointment of a domestic priest is enjoined but his duties are mentioned as more or less of a religious character and not administrative. In the Mahābhārata, Adiparva, Chap. 170, and in the Śāntiparva we meet with passages to the effect that kings can govern the country safely for a long time with the co-operation of priests. In the Jātakas these priests do not only perform the religious duties for a king but often advise him in matters temporal and even act as judges and chief judges. In the Kimchanda-Jātaka the family priest acted as a judge—"Purohito paṇ'assa lañcakhādako kūṭaviniṇṇayiko ahoṣi—His priest took delight in taking bribes and gave false judgment." In the Khaṇḍahāla-Jātaka the prince acted as a judge. In the Mahābodhi-Jātaka four men were appointed to judge cases in the king's court and being greedy of money they dispossessed rightful owners. In some places the king himself is mentioned as acting as a judge and trying cases. From these various stories it appears that the king himself was the centre of authority which was often delegated to persons after his own choice. Thus we see that sometimes his ministers, sometimes his captain, sometimes his purohita, sometimes his son and sometimes other persons were appointed judges by him. He seems to have kept to himself the right to revise their judgments and this right also often was vested in some other high officials of the state, generally the high priest and the prince. In the Dhammaddhaja-Jātaka above referred to, the high priest who was none but the Bodhisatta revises the judgment of the captain—"Atha ekadivasaṃ viniṇṇaye parājito manusso bhāhā paggaḥya kandaṃāno

vinicchayā nikkhanto rājupatthānaṃ gacchantam Bodhisattam disvā tassa pādesu patitvā tumhādisesu nāma sāmī rañño atthañ ca dhammañ ca anusāsantesu Kālakasenāpati lañcam gahetvā asāmike sāmike karoti'ti attano parājitabhāvaṃ kathesi. Bodhisatto-kāruṇṇaṃ uppādetvā taṃ gahetvā vinicchayatthānaṃ agamāsi. Bodhisatto taṃ attam paṭivinnichinitvā sāmikaṃ eva sāmikaṃ akāsi—one day one who had lost suit was departing from the court weeping and stretching out his arms, when he fell in with the Bodhisatta as he was going to pay respects to the king. Falling at his feet, the man cried out, telling how he had been defeated in his cause; 'although such as you my lord, instruct the king in the things of this world and the next, the captain takes bribes and deceives rightful owners.' The Bodhisatta pitied him, "come my good fellow," said he, "I will give your property to you," and he proceeded to the court-house and judged the case aright." In the Khaṇḍahāla-Jātaka the story is nearly the same; here the family priest used to take bribes and misjudged cases. In such a case the prince came to the rescue of the aggrieved person and revised the judgment of the priest. It may be gathered from the Jātaka stories that the people were not kept off the scene of trial as we frequently meet with a passage "Mahājano sādhu-kāraṃ adāsi—the spectators applauded"—in connection with good judgments. The judges were not men of good character always. As we have seen, they often took bribes. In many cases, we see, on getting proofs of their dishonesty the king drove them away from the country after confiscating their properties. In some cases, however, they are depicted as getting spiritual punishment and suffering eternally in hell. The Bhāru-Jātaka tells us of a king who was not above such corruption. Here he was bribed by some heretics for passing a decree in their favour. In the Kaṇvera-Jātaka, it is

said, the governor of the city (nagaraguttika) took bribes and let a robber free. Some of the Jātakas say that those who revised the judgments of others correctly often produced an impression on the king who in the interest of good rule and sound administration induced them to be permanent judges. Thus in the Mahābodhi-Jātaka the Great Being revised the judgment of the four greedy judges and was appointed a permanent judge by the king. Though an ascetic, he with a view to doing good to the people accepted the appointment and agreed to try eight cases daily. In the Khaṇḍahāla-Jātaka also the prince was made a permanent judge by the king after he had rightly revised the judgment of the unscrupulous judges.

In villages the administration was carried on in respect of petty affairs by the headmen (gāmabhojaka) under the supervision of the king. He tried petty cases only and any big case he had to report to the king for decision. I may quote the following passage from the Gāmaṇicaṇḍa-Jātaka—"so gāmabhojako pubbe dhammena smena attam vinicchini, tena manussānam piyo ahoṣi, manāpo, sampiyāymānā c'assa manussā bahupaṇṇā-kāraṁ āharimṣu, tena adhirūpo dhanayā yasasampanno ahoṣi, idāni pana lañcavittako hutvā adhammena attam vinicchinati, tena duggato kapaṇo paṇḍurogenābhībhuṭo, etc.—"That village headman used once to deal justice impartially, so that men were pleased and delighted with him, and in their delight they gave him many a present. This is what made him handsome, rich and honoured. Now he loves to take bribes and his judgment is not fair; so he is poor, miserable and jaundiced." In the Gahapati-Jātaka we learn of a village headman of a very licentious character and of his being beaten by a householder for an improper conduct on his part. In the Kulāvaka-Jātaka the Bodhisatta was born as a Brahmana in a certain village. He formed a company of thirty good

men who all devoted themselves to the improvement of the village they lived in. The headman of the village thought—"when these men used to get drunk and commit murder and so forth, I used to make a lot of money out of them, not only on the price of their drink but also by the fines and dues they paid." He at once went to the king and brought a false charge of robbery and theft against all of them. Without enquiry into their doings, the king commanded offhand that they should be trampled to death by elephant. The king, however, was persuaded to enquire into the matter, was convinced of their innocence and punished the village headman. In the Kharassara-Jātaka, a minister was appointed headman of a border village. He privily incited robbers to carry off the taxes collected for the king. His villainy was detected and the rascal was punished by the king. In the Rathalaṭṭhi-Jātaka, the priest became the headman of a village.

The Kūṭavaniya-Jātaka contains reference to cases being tried by an umpire if both the parties agreed.

There were officers of the king to look to the peace of the country and trace and arrest culprits. They were Nagaragūttika, Rājādūta, etc. These officers were called by the general name of Rājapurisa. The word Nagaragūttika has been translated as "Governor of the city," but from a consideration of the duty he does in the Kaṇavera-Jātaka, I am inclined to take him as the chief police officer. The Rājadūtas seem to have been ordinary police officers. Of course, the word 'Dūta' means a messenger and the word 'Dutakamma' is frequently used in the sense of 'doing errands,' but that the 'Rājadūtas' were police officers seem probable from what follows. Mention is made of a custom in the Gāmanicaṇḍa-Jātaka by which the complainant without the help of any Rājapurisa could conduct the person, against whom he had

a grievance, to the royal court. I may quote a passage from that Jātaka to prove the point—"Tena hi ayam te rājadūto, ehīti āha. Tesu pi janesu yam kiñci sakkharaṇi vā kapālakhaṇaṇi vā ukkhipitvā' ayam te rājadūto ehīti vutte yo na gacchati tassa rājāṇam karonti, etc. Then he (the complainant) said—Here is the king's officer; come along! Now these people have a custom that they pick up a bit of stone or a potsherd and say—"Here is the king's officer; come along!" "If any man refuses to go he is punished. We meet with the term 'Kattā' in the Vessantara-Jātaka in connection with sending a message, but whether he was simply an agent or an officer is not known.

In the Kulāvaka-Jātaka the story is told to the effect that a case of summary trial by the king had to be revised subsequently after the matter was investigated into at the request of his minister. In the Rathalatthi-Jātaka also the same state of things occurred. Here a priest brought a charge against certain carters. The king without investigating into the matter gave judgment in favour of the priest. His minister asked him to investigate first and then to pass judgment. The king investigated into the matter and as a result of his investigation had to revise his own judgment. In many other Jātakas the kings are seen to give judgments on the strength of the allegations made by the complainant without giving any chance to the accused of clearing themselves. But some Jātaka stories relate that proper investigations were carried on in some cases before trial. In the introduction to the Maṇisūkara-Jātaka we see that a false charge was brought against Gotama, *viz.*, the charge of murdering Sundari. On the king being informed of it he asked them as to wherein their suspicion lay. He bade his servants scour the city and made enquiries through his officers. The real culprits were traced and the king

punished them for the commission of the murder. In the Tacasāra-Jātaka also the king investigated into the complaint, discovered the innocence of the persons falsely charged and then passed judgment.

A point to consider in criminal cases is to see what constituted guilt. Was the mere act sufficient to establish guilt or was intention taken into consideration in determining it? Many Jātaka stories emphasise the consideration of intention in ascertaining the nature of guilt. We have seen in the Sumangala-Jātaka that Suman-gala killed a Paccekabuddha without, of course, any evil intention. On the king asking him why he did such an act, Sumangala explained the real circumstances—and said that he did it without any intention to commit crime—"Nāham deva paccekabuddham māremi'ti māresim—Atha nam rājā tena hi ma bhayiti samāssāsetvā puna ujjānapālam eva akāsi—I did not intend to kill the Paccekabuddha; then the king said—'do not fear' and made him his garden-keeper again." In another Jātaka a certain wealthy man doubts if he is liable to be charged with theft. Another man consoles him by saying that without intention no one can be proclaimed guilty of theft—*tumbakam theyyacittam n'atthi, tena vina adinnā-danam nāma paññapetuṃ na sakkā*—you had no intention to commit theft and therefore the charge of theft cannot be laid against you." In the Gāmaṇicanḍa-Jātaka a man is brought to the king's tribunal for injuries done unwittingly. The king holds the offender not guilty and acquits him.

The modern theory of criminal justice gives much freedom to the accused. They are distinctly at an advantage as they are not to prove their innocence. They are supposed to be innocent unless they are proved to be guilty. The accused are not bound to make any statement even. The whole responsibility of proving the

guilt lies practically on those who prosecute. The Jātaka stories tell us nothing of the existence of any such theory as the presumption of innocence. We find the picture of a trial scene in the Gijjha-Jātaka. Here a merchant of Benares on his way to bathe saw some vultures in a very miserable state. Being moved, he gave them all possible comforts and practically saved their lives. The vultures out of gratitude to the merchant began to snatch away clothes, finery and ornaments from other people and drop them in the yard of that merchant. The people told the king about the vultures plundering the city. The king asked them to catch one of the vultures and they did so. The vulture was brought before the king and the king examined him in this way—
 ‘Tumhenagaram vilumpitvā vatthādini gaṇhathā’ti.—‘Āma māhārājā’ti—‘kassa dinnānī’ti—‘Bārāṇasi-setthissā’ti.—‘Kīmkāraṇā’ti—‘amhākaṁ tena jīvitam dinnānī’ti—‘You rob our city and carry off clothes and all sorts of things’—
 ‘Yes sir’—‘Whom have they been given to?’—‘A merchant of Benares.’—‘Why have you done so?’—‘He gave us once our lives.’ Then the king turned to the merchant and enquired if what the vulture said was true. The merchant replied in the affirmative and the stolen articles were returned to the respective owners. Here the king asked the accused to explain his conduct and called in a witness to verify his statement. In the Gāmaṇicaṇḍa-Jātaka, the king heard both the complainant and the accused and asked the accused to establish his innocence by narrating the actual occurrences.

The various Jātaka stories convey to us the idea that in respect of awarding punishment there was a complete lack of the sense of proportion on the part of those who were in charge of dealing justice. Even a simple case of theft was punishable with death attended with all sorts of horrible tortures. In the Gāmaṇicaṇḍa-Jātaka, above

referred to, the punishment laid down for telling a lie was the loss of the eyes and the tongue. In the Muga-pakkha-Jātaka the punishment for a simple offence was one thousand strokes with barbed whips. We read from the Bakabrahma-Jātaka that physical tortures were often resorted to in extracting confessions from the accused. The following lines occur therein :—“Yathā nāma dubbala-coro katipaye pabāre labhitvā vā kiṃ aham eva coro asuko pi coro ti sabbe sahāye ācikkhati etc.—As a timid thief after receiving a few blows says ‘I am not the only thief, so and so are also thieves.’ Another cruel practice references to which are abundant in the Jātakas was that a culprit condemned to death was put to all manner of disgrace, torture and humiliation. He was often carried in a procession through the public streets, beaten all the while and being brought to the execution ground had the different parts of his body cut off and then impaled or smitten off with a sword. In the Cullapaduma-Jātaka a robber guilty of high treason had his hands and feet, nose and ears cut off and then put to death. Thus the punishments were chiefly retributive and deterrent and not at all reformatory. The modern tendency is to make all criminals useful members of the state by correcting them but as we learn from all authoritative ancient Indian treatises on law and polity, the administrators in their zeal to do good to the innocent public overshoot the mark by treating the offenders in an inhuman manner and holding their lives too cheap. In this respect, it may be remarked, however, that ancient India was no exception to the other countries of the world. The gravity of a crime differs in different countries and in different ages. What the conscience of society takes to be a heinous crime at one time and visits with severe punishment is not thought to be so and is lightly passed off at another time. Theft was considered to be

a very despicable act and even a trivial case of it was attended with rigorous punishment not in a very remote time in England which prides itself on the possession of the most humane criminal code in the world.

Another feature of criminal justice reference to which we get in the Jātaka in more than one place seems to have been that importance and usefulness of the person whose guilt had been proved were to be taken into consideration in awarding punishment. In the Pabbatūpatthara-Jātaka, a courtier of a certain king intrigued in the harem and the king came to know all about it. He was convinced that both his queen and the courtier were guilty. He forgave them both thinking—"amacco pi me bahūpakāro, ayaṃ itthī pi piyā—the courtier is a very useful servant and the queen is also very dear to me." In the Khantivaṇṇana-Jātaka a very useful member of the court carried on intrigue with the queen. Both the parties were forgiven in consideration of their position. For the same offence, it deserves mention here, in the Ekarāja-Jātaka and Ghata-Jātaka, two ministers, who perhaps were not so useful, were banished from the country.

In many Jātakas mention is made of prisons (bandhanāgāra) but we do not know how the prisoners were kept there. Nor do we know how the period of imprisonment was apportioned in accordance with the gravity of offence. That they were often released seems clear from a phrase in the Mugapakkha-Jātaka—"assa nikkhamanakālo viya hoti—looking like a prisoner at the time of his release." The Kusa-Jātaka tells us that prisoners were released on festive occasions such as marriage in the royal family, etc. Here Okkāka, King of Kusāvati, gave orders by means of drums for all prisoners to be released when the marriage ceremony of his son was settled—"Okkāko kusāvatinī gantvā sabbabandhanānimocāpetvā

kusarājassa ānā'ti bheriñ carāpesi." The Sutano-Jātaka represents the king as having unbounded authority over the prisoners. Their life and death, as indicated by this Jātaka, were in his hands. The king in order to save his own life sent one prisoner every day to a "Yakkha" as his food. His minister encouraged him saying—"mā cintayittha, bahū bandhanāgāre manussā'ti—Do not think, there are many men in the jail." The effect was that the jail gradually became empty.

I shall conclude my paper with a word about legislation. The question is who made the laws? We do not get much light on this point from the Jātakas. We know so far that proclamation of royal edicts was made from time to time by beats of drums and like means. In the Kusa-Jātaka above referred to we hear of the proclamation of the command of the king by beating of drums. There is mention of public notices being given by beats of drums in the introduction to the Cullahamsa-Jātaka. In the Bhuridatta-Jātaka King Dhaturatṭha made a proclamation to the effect that the people would be punished if found guilty of committing an act prohibited by him. In the Tunḍila-Jātaka, however, we see that the Bodhisatta caused a book of judgments to be written and said to a king—"By observing this book you will settle suits—Vinicchaye potthakam likhāpetvā imañ potthakam olokentā attam tīreyyātha." In the Tesakuna-Jātaka, the Great Being after admonishing the councillors said—"Evañ vinicchayam pavatteyyāthā'ti vinicchayadhammaṃ suvaṇṇapatte likhapetvā araññaṃ pāvisi—'Execute justice' and he had righteous judgment inscribed on a golden plate and disappeared in the forest." From such references it appears that there were some authorities also other than the king who made laws as occasions required.

AGNI

BY

H. BRUCE HANNAH.

The mysteries enshrined in the Zōdiac are many. Is one of them the mystery of Agni? In a foot-note under the opening verse of H. H. Wilson's *Rig-Veda Saṁhitā* it is stated that many etymologies have been devised to explain the meaning of the term Agni—most, he says, being obviously fanciful, though their import expresses the notions entertained by the ancient Indians of Agni's character and functions.

In his *Science of Language* Max Müller tells us that Agni is sometimes found with Indra in the dual form Indrāgni—Indra being the god of the bright sky; Agni the god of fire. When invoked together they become correlative powers, and are conceived of as one joint deity. In one passage of the *Rig-Veda* (I. 109. 4) they are called Aṣvina, and they share several attributes of the Aṣvins, who, from one point of view, are the deified personification of the conception of correlativity running throughout all manifested Being. In this sense Indra and Agni are called brothers, and twins—also *Vṛishanā*, “Bulls,” as the givers of rain; and, just as the Aṣvins are styled *ihehagāte*, “born here and there,” *i.e.*, on opposite sides, *e.g.*, in the East and in the West, or in Heaven and in the Air, so are Indra and Agni when invoked together. Compare the similar dualistic couples Indra and Vāruṇa, the two Indras, the two Vāruṇas, also Mitra and Vāruṇa (pp. 613-615). *

Popularly, of course, Agni is understood as being the deified personification of Fire, visible and invisible—the lead, in this connection, having apparently been given by Max Müller. That great scholar's method is now well known. First he formulates his "Elements of Language," his "Principles of Etymology," or any other arbitrary department of the Science of Language. Then he selects a word, from Greek or from Latin, from German, French, or English, or from Vedic, or Sanskrit, or Avestan; and, after discoursing pleasantly upon its origins and developments, he forces or insinuates it, somehow or other, into the mould of his general theory—where, willy-nilly, it is supposed to find a place that has been prepared for it since the beginning of philological time. Thus, of *Agni*, he declares outright—

"Agni, one of their principal gods, means clearly fire; it is the same word as the Latin *ignis*. Hence we have a right to explain his other names, and all that is told of him, as originally meant for fire" (*Ibid*, p. 522).

But are we so sure that this is really so? May it not be that Max Müller's explanation is much too obvious, direct, and superficial to be sound? Has he not been adopting the easy course which lawyers have in view when they speak of the *Cy près* doctrine? Is he not simply taking what is known as "the line of least resistance?" In short, is it absolutely impossible that here even this great authority has been led hopelessly astray by the fatal beckoning of a mere *ignis fatuus*?

From H. H. Wilson's foot-note above referred to we get some interesting information—whence, indeed, it would seem possible to arrive at still more interesting conclusions, if only we ponder over some of his etymologies in a spirit which avoids the mistake of looking upon them as "obviously fanciful." *Inter alia* Wilson tells us that on Earth Agni is invoked as the first (*agra*) of

the gods. In Heaven he is the leader (*agrani*) of the host of the gods. He is the first-born of the gods.

“In these derivations, Agni is compounded, irregularly, out of *agra*, first, and *ni*, to lead. It is also derived from *angu*, body; because he offers his own substance, in the lighting of the sacrificial fire.”

In Varga II, 6, again, the name of the so-called *rishi*, *Angiras*, is mentioned—obviously as a punning play upon the name Agni. In fact, it seems here to have been used as a synonym for Agni.

Also, how Agni, who is one, eventually became many, *i.e.*, how the alleged “family” of Priest-Poets known as the *Angirases*, came into existence, is the subject of an obscure legend supposed to be related by Mārkaṇḍeya to Yūdhishthira (*Note*, p. 4).

Another story tells how *Atharvāna* (the name of another alleged “family” of Vedic Priest-Poets), also called *Angiras*, was designated as Agni’s substitute (*Note*, p. 5). In this connection compare *Āthravan*. “He who tends the Fire”—the name for the “priest” throughout the *later* Avesta, but nowhere found in the Gāthās.

Recalling all that we now know about the nature and origin of the Zōdiac, about the Vedic *Satras* and their relation to the *Samvatsara*, about the origin of Brāhmaṇism in Kūrū-land, and about the Vedas having been reduced to writing (in the form we now know them in) not earlier than Brāhmaṇa times, *i.e.*, circa B. C. 800-500—their compilation and “editing” having unquestionably been under Brāhmaṇistic control—do not these data supplied by Wilson (though he himself did not perceive their real bearings) give us an entirely different “angle of vision” from which to meditate over the problem of the etymology of a name such as *Agni*, and the real nature of the deified personification who goes by that name throughout the *Rig-Veda* as we have it? No doubt

Agni was eventually associated with Fire-worship—but there is a good deal more than this behind the name.

* In his *Orion*, the late Mr. Bāl Gangadhar Tilak has a chapter on the word *Agrahayana*, explaining that it is really descriptive of the *Nakshatra Mrigashiras* in the days (say *circa* B.C. 4000) when the Winter Solstice (*Brūma*) occurred on Phalgūni full-moon day ; whence—

“ We find that *Mrigashiras* has been designated by a name which, if properly understood, denotes that it was the first of the cycle of the *Nakshatras*, thus showing that the vernal equinox was once near it ” (p. 95).

All this, to my mind, demonstrates that *Agni* was originally the deified personification associated in remote times (say in round numbers B.C. 4000) with that Subdivision of the Zōdiac where *Mrigashiras*, or *Agrahayana* (i.e., *Rāsi Vrishabha*, the “ Bull,” Greek *Taurus*, Babylo-Assyrian *Khar-Sidi*, Romic *Mes-Rā*) is found—the Year then opening there in the Celestial *Vasanta*, or Spring. Also, *Āngiras*, *Atharvana*, etc.—supposed to be the names of individual Vedic *Rishis* and their descendants and successors in office—and also, with other similar names, representing all that really now remains as evidence in proof of the belief that the *sūkla* Āryas were ever in *Sapta-Sindhavaḥ* at all—were originally nothing but designations descriptive of the duties or functions of divers individuals who, *circa* B. C. 4000, performed the sacrificial ceremonies during the *Satras* which commenced when, with the Vernal Equinox in *Mrigashiras*, the Year, or *Samavatsara*, opened calendrically with *Agrahayana*. Hence *Agrahayana* was regarded as presiding over the Opening of the Year and of the *Satra*, and eventually became personified and even deified under the name of *Agni*—his priests being known as the *Agnirases*, or *Āngirases*, and *Atharvānas* of the *Rig-Vedic* hymns. The

rest is all explainable by reference to Brāhmanistic editing, and to those subtle changes in priestly or poetic or popular ideas and language which everywhere and always arise with the lapse of time.

Modern Scholarship affects to regard the mentality and attainments of the remote Past with a smile of benevolent superiority. Even Max Müller speaks of the "childish way" in which the minds of the early poets of the time spoken of in the *Rig-Veda* strove to pierce beyond the limits of this finite world" (*Science of Language*, p. 619). It is not, however, to Antiquity that *I* would feel inclined to repair, were I in search of a "childish way" of looking at things.

Indo-Aryan Ethnic Origins

BY

H. BRUCE HANNAH.

I.

Before the Rosy-Blond Āryas proper (*śūkla, svityam*), entered India from the Central Asian side, coming directly from Zarah-Lake land (modern Sēistān) and settling in Sapta-Sindhavaḥ (modern Panjāb), India—not then known under that name—was inhabited, more or less ubiquitously, by a rudimentary, savage, and repulsive black-complexioned ethnos who are generally called the *Niṣādas*, or “Aborigines.” These, moreover, were not the ethnos so frequently alluded to in early Vedic literature under the name of *Dasyūs*. All along the Himālayan Tarāi and Duārs, however, this Niṣādan type was very distinctly modified by a considerable influx of yellow-complexioned, slant-eyed, broad-and flat-featured, brachycephalic humanity from the Tūrānian North—representatives, of course, of those Xanthochroi who, for incalculable ages, had been the main-stock in, and the autochthons of, that northernmost of the three principal zones into which, in an earlier paper, we arbitrarily divided the eastern hemisphere. These Yellow Folk seem to have been in greatest strength

in the regions now known as Nipāl and Assām. Possibly they were to be found elsewhere—*e.g.*, in what are now styled Bengal and Orissa—though, arguing from the physiognomy of present day Bengalis and Uriyas, and from their respective legends and traditions, this hypothesis has not met with complete acceptance. Nevertheless, I think it is based, to some extent, on sound views: for even granting a subsequent “Āryan” influx which contributed to the modern physiognomy of these ethnai, it need not upset the other hypothesis as applied to preceding conditions: while, as regards traditions and legends, the Bengalis have ever displayed an intense longing to be considered of Āryan descent—largely, no doubt, attributable to the fact that, at least from the time of King Adhisūra (*circa* 11th century A.D.), they have enjoyed considerable appropriations of so-called “Āryan” (really Madhyā-dēśan) culture—and naturally their traditions and legends, if they have not in fact grown out of these longings and appropriations, have at least been highly coloured by them. Nor must we omit to note that, in the 7th-8th centuries A.D., Tibet was a powerful State. Free communication went on between her and Northern India: and, some time during A.D. 630-698, Srong-Tsan Gampo annexed Nipāl, and actually occupied Tirhūt; but in A.D. 703 both Nipāl and India threw off the Tibetan yoke. Also, in this connection, the rise and survival of Kūch Bihār has surely some significance. In short, all this must have had at least *some* effect upon the ethnic constitution of Northern India, so far as it had in fact been subjected to Mongolian, and in particular Tibetan, dominance or even influence.

From these main northern settlements of the yellow races, minor modifications of the general Niśādan type subsequently resulted, though, of course, they became

fainter and fainter the further south they extended. In any case, they were, for the most part, very remotely ancient.

Then, in addition to this great yellow invasion, there was, in these remote pre-Āryan times, yet another. That was the advent from what we now call Central Asia of a mighty wave of the then extreme eastern representatives of the wide-spread Tokhs, Wolf-Folk, Kāssi, or Kūṣa Race. As already explained, these were originally the outcome of a huge amalgamation, long previously effected, between the autochthonous Xanthochroic main-stock in archaic Tūrānia, and the equally aboriginal Melano-Leukochroic, or Dark-White, inhabitants of the Eastern regions of the Great Central Zone, mentioned *supra*. At some unknown time long before B.C. 1151 (which latter date I shall recur to presently) they poured into "India" by those same north-western passes through which the *śukla* Āryas, followed by the non-Āryan *Pāñcha-Janāh*, or "Five Tribes," and all western invaders afterwards, entered the country. The main flood found its way into the southern parts of the peninsula, and there, settling down and amalgamating with the local Niṣādas, gave birth in course of time to the celebrated *Drāviḍian Race*. Minor floods surged forth in other directions, eventually subsiding elsewhere—some, it is believed, even entering, and of course contributing to a further modification of the ethnic stock inhabiting the regions now called Bihār and Bengal.

Such, then, was the broad ethnographic aspect of "India" in pre-Āryan days—though of course, there were many special and local developments arising out of the general position. With these, however, we are not particularly concerned just now.

In previous lectures and papers I have already sufficiently shown who the Āryas were, and how they came

to be inhabitants of the regions round about Lake Zarah. The word *Zarah* would seem itself to mean "lake," as it probably comes from the Avestan *Zarayo*, which has that signification. In later Sāghian days (*circa* B.C. 600 *et seq.*), this region was inhabited by the people known to the Akhaimenidai as the Sarah-Angai, or Sara-Angai, usually written *Sarangai*, and sometimes *Zarangai*, or Angai of Zarah-Lake land. From these it got its name Sarangia, or Zarangia—subsequently, in Macedonian times, corrupted into Drangia, or Drangiana, owing, apparently, to a confusion of thought between the Persian letters *dāl* and *zāl*. Possibly connected with *Zarah* is the old Vedic word *Sarasvati*—the final *s* in *Saras* being the Āryan equivalent for the Avestan final *h* in *Zarah*. As a matter of fact, no less than 3, or possibly 4, Sarasvatis are traceable—one in Zarah-Lake land (Avestan *Harahvaiti*); another as a name applied to the upper Indus; a third identifiable with the stream midway between the Satlaj and the Jamnā, which once, with the Dṛishadvatī, formed the eastern boundary of Brahmāvarta; and a fourth was the Sarayū (the Dṛishadvatī itself), or upper Ghaghra. Thus, by these several Sarasvatis, we seem to be enabled to follow the Āryas (so-called) in their successive migrations eastwards. Another idea which may conveniently be referred to here, is that enshrined in the expression "Rivers'-Land," apparently, with more or less definiteness, associated with these two principal home-lands of the Vedic Āryas—that round Zarah-Lake land, and that on or in the vicinity of the Indus—and suggested in the Airyānian (or at least later Avestan) name, *Hapta-Hendū*, and its Indo-Āryan equivalent *Sapta-Sindhavaḥ*, now more usually rendered the *Panjāb*. In subsequent remarks I shall make a submission regarding what I believe to have been the real historical source of this idea.

Now let us travel in thought to a distant and very different part of the world—to Khem, as she was flourishing in the 12th century, B.C. The glories of the renowned 18th Dynasty were a dream of the past. The 19th Dynasty, too, had run its course, ending in anarchy so great that no reliable data exist which enable us satisfactorily to decide whether Set-Nekht, the restorer of order, should be regarded as the last king of the 19th, or the first king of the 20th, Dynasty.

In the days of the 18th Dynasty—principally owing to the energy, enterprise, wisdom, and military genius of Thothmēs III (Conv. B. C. 1479 $\frac{341}{480}$ —1425 $\frac{453}{480}$)—Khem had conquered the North, as far as the Euphratēs, and incorporated it into her empire. But, since then, the warlike and ambitious Khatti, Kheta, or Hittites, had issued from the interior of Asia Minor, and had not only established their power throughout *Naharīna*, or the “Rivers’-Land,” up by the Euphratēs (the region between the Euphratēs and Orontēs, in what we now call northern Syria, was specifically known to the Romiū as *Naharīn*), but had also pushed their outposts far forward to the south. Hostilities between Khem and the Hittites had followed: but, in the reign of Seti I of the 19th Dynasty (Conv. B. C. 1289 $\frac{475}{480}$ —1269 $\frac{385}{480}$), an agreement was arrived at whereby the Hittites recognised Khem’s imperial sway as far north as (roughly) the northern limits of Khārū, or Palestine, as it was afterwards called, or say as far north as the Dog River. Subsequently, however, in the 21st regnal year of Rāmēsēs II (Conv. B. C. 1249 $\frac{175}{480}$), the two high-contracting parties signed a Permanent Treaty of Peace. In this document the boundary between the two empires is nowhere demarcated: but probably it confirmed the arrangement formerly arrived at by Seti I and Metella. Put shortly,

this was that Khem retained Khārū at least, while all northern Syria was recognised either as in the possession of the Hittites, or as their legitimate sphere of influence.

Time rolled on, and Khem became incredibly rich, though most of her wealth was mistakenly showered upon the then dominant priesthood of Amon. Indeed, so great was her seeming material prosperity, that the whole outside Mediterranean World vibrated with the fact. Moreover, a radical change had come over the constitution of her fighting forces. Formerly the rank and file had been recruited from her own people—the Romiū. Now, they mostly, or largely, consisted of foreign mercenaries or other auxiliaries—principally Shardanian sea-rovers, Libyans from the west, and Negro levies from the south. All this was duly noted by Khem's watchful enemies. In short, the idea became fixed in their minds that she and all her wealth might become theirs. They therefore determined to attempt her overthrow. At that time Meren-Ptāh (Conv. B. C. $1201\frac{346}{480}$ — $1182\frac{206}{480}$) sat upon the throne—an aged man, and therefore, as they deemed, decrepit and feckless. The first great assault was made upon the western *rūd* of the Delta by the Libyans in the west, assisted by some sea-faring allies from the nations dwelling along the opposite, or Hanivūan (northern), limits of the Great Green Sea. It was delivered in B. C. $1197\frac{318}{480}$, the 5th regnal year of Meren-Ptāh, who successfully repulsed it, thereby revealing his character and capacity under a surprising and most unwelcome light.

In those days the Hittites were firmly established (as was thought) throughout Naharina and the northern parts of Syria. In virtue of the Peace concluded between Rāmēsēs II and Khetāsar in B. C. $1249\frac{175}{480}$, to which the Hittites seem to have remained perfectly true,

relations between them and Khem were entirely friendly. Amorites (a markedly Rosy-Blond ethnos) had always been everywhere throughout Khem's original Northern Empire, from Naharīn in the extreme north (and more especially in their old-time home-land there—*Yādai*), to Jezreel and Etam in the extreme south; but, about the time of Thohtmēs IV, as a result of the Hittite advance, they had become particularly strong in the Lebanon—with which, indeed, they eventually became specially identified, under the name of the "Old Lions of the Lebanon." Nevertheless, despite the repeated and very solid military successes of Thohtmēs III, they still remained in considerable force in and around their ancient haunts in the north—*Yādai*. Owing to the peace between Khem and the Hittites, they were obliged to keep fairly quiet; but in their hearts they cherished a seemingly undying animus against Khem—which showed itself openly in Meren-Ptāh's 3rd regnal year (B.C. 1199³³²/₄₈₀), when there occurred that rising in and around *Jezreel*, in the extreme south of Khārū, which Meren-Ptāh had to suppress, and which really forms the subject-matter of the so-called "Israel" (*Asr-ā-al*, or *Yasr-ā-al*) stela. The Mitannians had long since vanished eastward beyond the Zāgros, but in their stead was a congeries of other communities, all under the suzerainty of the Hittites. Finally, in Keft, or Kaft—all along the Kilikian coast, and probably away back in the Kappadokian hinterland—dwelt a numerous, powerful, and highly civilised folk, formerly known to the Romiū as the *Keftiū*, but then more commonly referred to as the *Pūra-Satiū*, or *Pūla-Satiū*, i.e., the *People of Pūl*, or *Pūr*. Though an inland community, and strong and well-organised in a military sense, they also, as we have seen, possessed a considerable stretch of coastland. Thus, they were also

a maritime race. Indeed, they appear to have been the head and front of the *Sea-roving Communities* of those times : so much so, in fact, that not only did their name become generic in that connection, but it is not impossible that it was really the historical etymon out of which eventually arose that vague and mysterious designation (not a *race*-name) which "Scholarship" has so long, without definitely understanding it, associated with early Greek origins—the *Pelasgoi*. All this can be enquired into later and as a side issue.

What more particularly concerns us now is the fact that, in the 8th regnal year of Rāmēsēs III of the 20th Romic Dynasty (say Conv. B.C. 1151, or thereabouts), the outside enemies of Khem decided that conditions were once more favourable for another assault upon her integrity. This time it was a very big and very resolutely attempted enterprise. Nevertheless, it is quite possible to look at what occurred from another point of view. For ages the sea-faring communities, of whom the Pūra-Satiū were certainly the leading spirits, had been struggling hard to effect a settlement, or settlements, on the coasts of Zāhi and Khārū. So far, therefore, as the Pūra-Satiū were concerned, and judging by what actually resulted in the end, there is some reason to believe that what at first had all the appearance of a determined invasion of Khem, was nothing but a gigantic bluff, intended to conceal the real objective of the Pūra-Satiū—the winning and permanent occupation of those sea-board territories in Khārū which they in fact did take and retain possession of, and which subsequently, from these same Pūra-Satiū, acquired the name, first apparently of *Ai-Keft* ("Remnant of Keft, or Kaft"), and then, as we know, of *Palestine*. Indeed, having regard to the fact that all Khārū (then a Romic Colony) was eventually associated with these names, are we not almost justified

in concluding that, if the whole of Khārū was not actually seized by the immigrant Pūra-Satiū, they at least looked upon it as their sphere of influence—nay, did not a little to reduce it for a time into more or less effective possession?

On the other hand, certain other considerations are forced upon us by the facts of subsequent history, which, if they do not oblige us to reject this view of the position, at least induce us to accept it only subject to reservations. These are that, from this epoch onwards, till say the rise of Nebuchadrezzar of Babylon (*II Kings* XXIV, 7), Khem certainly did revive her claims to suzerainty right up to the old northern boundary of the Euphratēs. True, under the later Rāmēssides, it degenerated into little more than a mere claim: but there can be little doubt that Rāmēsēs III actually penetrated, as conqueror and chastiser, as far north as Amorā, which he could very well do without breaking faith at all with his old allies the Hittites—for their power and rights then no longer existed in those parts. Yet how could Rāmēsēs III have got to Amorā, if the Pūra-Satiū, right on his flank, were really then in effective possession of the whole of Khārū? The only conclusion is that—whatever were the nature and extent of the Philistinic hold upon the country outside the eastern limits of Philistia proper—it was not achieved till later on in the days of Rāmēsēs III's notoriously feeble successors. How the Philistinic Over-lordship was finally and completely thrown off, belongs to the history of early "Israel," as recorded in the Old Testament.

To revert: the great emprise was actually organised, and even, in part, carried out. An enormous multitude set forth from Kilikia. It is said, in fact, to have resembled rather a nation on the move than an army. And it was

principally made up of the Pūra-Satiū, the Zākkarū, and the Dāiniūna. As all three ultimately settled permanently on the Khārian coast—the Pūra-Satiū as the Philistines, the Dāiniūna as the Danites, and the Zākkarū as the Issakharites—this lends support to the view above suggested that the real secret intention of the migrant host was to win a foothold on the littoral just mentioned—at least unless, by a miracle, the “invasion” bluff succeeded. Of the real character and attitude of the Amorites, the invaders were probably well aware. But, as regards the Hittites, they evidently looked upon them as more in sympathy with Khem than inclined to turn against her. At any rate, no attempt seems to have been made to induce the Hittites to throw their lot in with them. They simply attacked them—sweeping through Naharīna with the force and effect of a hurricane, completely destroying Hittite power, and also, incidentally, ejecting the Amorites from their aforesaid home-land, *Yādai*. Rāmēsēs gave them battle both by land and on the sea. Where the land-fight took place is not precisely known, but it is supposed to have occurred somewhere well up in the north. In both conflicts the Romic forces were successful—completely successful so far as the upheaval may be regarded as an attempted invasion of Khem; qualifiedly successful as regards the secondary (or perchance secretly primary) intentions of the Pūra-Satiū—the seizure of Philistia.

Nevertheless—though the facts cannot be extracted from our present data with anything like satisfactory detail or definiteness—certain broad results flowed from Rāmēsēs III’s “victory,” as, with a certain amount of reasonableness, the Romiū, and perhaps the whole then civilised world, always styled it.

True, before the irresistible onrush of the invaders, well-nigh the entire Amorite community in *Yādai*, and

the bulk of the "Old Lions of the Lebanon," together with remnants of the broken-up Hittites of Naharīna, were swept down south, like leaves and *débris* swirling helplessly in the forefront of a thunder-storm. Very far south were they driven, in fact to the most southerly territories of Khārū; and it would even seem that in the tumult of the times, a section of the Abramo-Josephites, or Hebro-Israelites, in Northern Khārū (that half Roman colony, afterwards known as the *Beth-Sakh*, which for centuries had been the special care of the Pharaohs), got chipped off, and was hustled down south with the rest of the stampeding ethnoid—and there (though always remaining *politically* attached to the Beth-Sakh) became eventually known as the "tribe" of Simeon. !

In my lectures I have shown that in *Yādai* of Amorā, on the Orontēs, we find nothing more or less than the ancient etymon of a much more familiar name—*Yahūdeh*, or *Judah*, which, with unshakable conviction, we have so long been accustomed to regard as something in the nature of that mysterious character, Melchizedek—a self-subsistent entity, "without father, without mother, without descent," etymologically, of course, in this case. Into this subject, however, beyond mentioning it, we need not further enter here.

But, as one result of the centrifugal forces set up, either by the tornado-like passage of the Pūla-Sāthian host through Naharīna, or by the land-"victory" achieved by Rāmēsēs III, as above-mentioned, *some of these expatriated peoples plunged off eastward*—never halting till they reached the confines of distant Airyāvō-Vaēja (then the homeland of the Rosy-Blond Airyānians, or main mass of the once migrant Rhodo-Leukochroi of the full blood), and Zarah-Lake land, then the home-land

of the Āryas, a seceded or at any rate separate division of the same ethnos. Be it specially noted that the region from which these fugitive peoples originally set out, and where they had previously dwelt for unnumbered centuries, was *Naharīna*, or the "Rivers'-Land." Strange to say, accompanying them was a very powerful body of an ethnos which could have been none other than the *Pūlasāthū*, *Pūla-Satiū*, or *Pūra-Satiū*, above referred to.

When these scattered ethnoi arrived in Central Asia, as we now call it; or Airyān, as it was afterwards called, from the Airyānians of Airyavō-Vaēja; they were found to consist of 5 distinct races, in subsequent Vedic literature called respectively (1) the *Pūrūs*, or *Pūravūs*, (2) the *Yādūs*, or *Yādavūs*, (3) the *Tūrvaśas* ("Clothed like the Tūr," or possibly "Dwelling with the Tūr"?), (4) the *Anūs*, and (5) the *Drūhyūs*. Also, from Avestan records we learn that, just as the upper stretches of the Indus Valley were once known as *Sapta-Sindhavaḥ*, or "Seven-Rivers' Land" (now altered to the *Panjāb*, or "Five-Rivers' Land"), so Airyavō-Vaēja, or Zarah-Lake land, or perhaps the entire area comprised under both these names, was once styled *Hapta-Hendū*, which is the Avestan equivalent of Vedic *Sapta-Sindhavaḥ*. Both Avestan and the language spoken by the Āryas when in Zarah-Lake land, be it remembered, were descended from the language spoken by the migrant Rosy-Blonds, or Rhodo-Leukochroi, of the full blood, when originally they settled down in Airyavō-Vaēja. Now, we need not pay much attention to the specifically stated number of these rivers. The main fact enshrined in all three names—whether *Panjāb*, *Sapta-Sindhavaḥ*, or *Hapta-Hendū*—is that the regions so-called were in the nature of "River-Lands." Is it not, therefore, reasonable to think that the Airyānian etymon from which Avestan *Hapta-Hendū* was derived,

or at any rate the idea of which both *Hapta-Hendū* and its older etymon were expressions, is really assignable for its origin to the days when these five races, *some of whom hailed from Naharīna or the "Rivers'-Land" in Western Asia*, arrived, as above stated, on the confines of Airyavō-Vaēja and Zarah-Lake land ?

It is fairly obvious that in the *Pūrūs*, or *Pūravās*, we have the "People of Pūra," or "People of Pūla," *i.e.*, the Pūra-Satiū, Pūla-Satiū, or Pūlasathū, of old Romic inscriptions; and in the *Yādūs*, or *Yūdavās*, that portion of the Amorite community who, ejected from *Yādai circa* B.C. 1151, went off in an easterly direction, accompanied by powerful bands of the invading host who had issued out of old Keft, or Kaft, and also, perhaps, by fugitive bodies of the disintegrated Hittite population in Naharīna and Naharīn. These latter may, in fact, have been the people styled in Vedic literature the *Tūrvaśas*, *i.e.*, either "Clothed like the Tūr," or "Dwelling with the Tūr." In this connection it should be noted that the wilderness and desert regions (*Tūrān*)—outside those more cultivated areas which were actually occupied by the Airyavō-Vaējans and the Zarah-Lake Āryas, or were under their control, and which afterwards acquired the distinctive name of *Airyān*—were in the possession or under the control of semi-wandering, semi-settled communities, some of whom lived the life of savages, in various degrees of development, while others strove to ape the civilisation of their cultured neighbours. Generically, all these outside peoples were of Kāssite descent, but more specifically they were known as the "Wolf-Folk" (in Avestan *Vehrkavō-Danghavō*), or the *Tokhs*, *i.e.*, "People of the Snows," or "People of the Hills." To the *Airyānians* and early *Aryas* they were known as the *Dahyūs* (a name that survived till Avestan times): but in Vedic India they were called the *Dasyūs*—some of whom were actually

found in India when the Āryas and the “Five *Janāhs*” got there. In much later times, in connection with events that happened in Central Asia, we hear of a division of them as the *Tokhāri*, i.e., the “Dominant Tokhs,” and the *Tokhārās*, i.e., the “Descendants of the Tokhs.” As, in India, *Tokh* became transmuted into *Tūsh*, there, instead of *Tokhārās*, we meet with the Sanskritised form *Tūshārās*. Being of Kāssite or Kūṣa descent, these Tokhs and their derivative branches (even when sometimes flaunting in the habiliments of Civilisation and Culture), were all innately barbarous. As Tokhārās and Tūshārās, they were ethnically identical with the Kūshāns, which latter was only another name that they acquired in comparatively late Indian and Central Asian history. Otherwise, the Tūrvaśas may have been some community that the Pūrasathan and Amorite fugitives from Naharīn and Yādai had picked up on their flight eastward. The Anūs, or Anavās, may also have been a community that joined up in much the same way—perhaps hailing from Anau. With our present data it appears impossible to identify them. As for the Drūhyūs, their name at once reminds us of the Avestan word *Drūj*, i.e., “Lie,” or “Deceit,” and the Sanskrit word *Drūh*, i.e., “Fiend.” Hence, these people most probably hailed from Tūrān, and were of the same undesirable stock as the Dahyūs, or something similar. However unsatisfactory may be our conclusions regarding the Tūrvaśas, the Anūs, and the Drūhyūs, I submit that we need harbour no doubts at all regarding the identity of the Pūrūs and the Yādūs. All five communities are sometimes said to be referred to in Vedic literature under such names as the *Pāñcha-Janāh*, the *Pāñcha-Kṛṣṭi*, and the *Pāñcha-Manūṣya-Jātani*. I much doubt this, however. These names often seem in the *R̥gveda* to have quite other significations.

As regards their complexions, the original Yādūs must have been pure Rosy-Blonds, like the Āryas and Airyānians ; the Pūrūs—who, as Pūra-Satiū, were undoubtedly of very mixed ethnic descent—may have displayed a certain amount of fairness, but probably they were for the most part Dark-Whites, or Melano-Leukochroi ; the Tūrvaśas, Anūs, and Drūhyūs, were most likely also Dark-Whites, though, so far as any of them may have been of Hittite origin, they must have had in them a strain of fairness, but of the Xanthochroic rather than the Rhodo-Leukochroic kind. Even the Dahyūs, or, as they were called in India, the Dasyūs, were not dark, *i.e.*, not at first, in the days before they began to intermarry with the black Niṣādas of India. Rather were they, at least originally, Dark-Whites, though doubtless with a strong strain of Xanthochroic blood in them.

On the arrival of these Five Races or *Janāhs* from the West on the western confines of the Āryan settlements round Lake Zarah, not only must there have been something aggressive in their attitude, but they were clearly a very multitudinous and well-armed host : for the entire Āryan community, instead of awaiting any attack and striving to repulse it, abandoned their home-land outright, and, streaming eastwards, settled down in another, which they established in the upper stretches of the valley of what was then simply called “the River” (*Sindhū*)—the whole riverain (for the country was covered with tributaries flowing into the main stream) receiving the name of *Sapta-Sindhavaḥ*. But whether that name was given to it then by the *śūkla* Āryas (which I venture to doubt), or later on by the Five *Janāhs*, or eventual *Varna* Communities, on their arrival there too (which I am inclined to think was the case), remains a matter open to discussion. Naturally, a

whole nation does not desert its ancient haunts for nothing. Hence, there must have been something very exceptionally alarming in the situation of the *sūkla* Āryas of Zarah-Lake land, when confronted with the menace that had thus suddenly sprung up on their western borders. Be this as it may, we know that they migrated eastwards. And we also know that the Five *Janāhs* followed in their wake—sooner or later settling down alongside of them somewhere in Sapta-Sindhavaḥ. This, there can be little doubt, is the real concrete fact to which Mr. Ramāprasād Chanda is unconsciously giving utterance in the opening sentences of his interesting book, *The Indo-Āryan Races*—

“ The dawn of history is heralded in India by the hymns sung by the Ṛṣis and enshrined in the *R̥gveda Samhitā*. These hymns reveal two hostile peoples in the land of the Seven Rivers now called the Punjab—the *deva*-worshipping Ārya and the *deva*-less and rite-less Dasyu or Dāsa. The first problem that demands the attention of students of the anthropological history of India is—who were these Dasyus or non-Āryas of Vedic India? ” (p. 1).

Note the words “ Dasyu or Dāsa.” Certainly there were *Dasyūs* in the land when the Āryas and the above Five Races from the distant West first dwelt there : and certainly also, in course of time, another community—the *Dāsas* just mentioned—made their appearance in sufficient numbers to be frequently noticed in the *Samhitās*. But *Dasyūs* and *Dāsas* were not convertible terms ; and this for the simple reason that the two communities so named were not one and the same *ethnos*. Indeed, the *Dāsas* were not an *ethnos* at all, in the ordinary sense of the word. They were a *class* ; and they were drawn from several distinct *ethnoi*. The *Dasyūs*, on the other hand, were a specific *ethnos*. They belonged to the same stock which, by the Rosy-Blonds of

Airyavō-Vaēja, the early Āryas of Zarah-Lake land, and the later Airyānians of Avestan times, were referred to under the name of the Dahyūs. In short, as already explained, they were a branch of the Tokhs, *i.e.*, they were of Kūṣa or Kāssite descent. *Dasyūs* was simply the Vedic equivalent for Airyavō-Vaējan and Avestan *Dahyūs*; and the *Dasyūs* found by the *śūkla* Āryas and the Five Races in Sapta-Sindhavaḥ were simply the representatives in India of this widely-diffused Melano-Leuko-Tūrānian ethnos. Who, then, were the *Dāsas*?

In the sacred books, with reference to these early days in Sapta-Sindhavaḥ, we read of more or less constant wars, both offensive and defensive, waged between the Āryas in the one camp, and their demon-like neighbours or "foes" (*vrtra*) in the opposite camps. In many, perhaps most, cases, these "foes" consisted of the *Dasyūs*, wherever found, and the everywhere surrounding black, and for the most part wildly savage and repulsive, aborigines, variously named, but all comprisable under the generic term *Niṣūdas*. Nevertheless, some of these wars are vaguely but obstinately understood to have been of an internecine nature—*i.e.*, Āryas *versus* Āryas. So, at least, they have been represented; and that is undoubtedly still the prevailing belief. This arises from the fact that hitherto—even in learned circles; and therefore how much more in popular belief?—the Five *Janūhs* above referred to have never been thought of otherwise than as belonging to the same ethnic stock as the *śūkla* Āryas proper. As a fact, however, they were *not* of that stock. *Their ethnic origins were very different.* Hence, those so-called internecine wars—hitherto regarded as struggles between various divisions of the Āryan community itself—were really hostilities from time to time carried on between the *śūkla* Āryas on the one side, and the non-Āryan, or Anāryan, *Pāñcha-Janūh*, or *Pāñcha-*

Kṛṣṭi, i.e., the Five Races above-named—Pūrūs, Yādūs, Tūrvasas, Anūs, and Drūhyūs—on the other side; or else between the various groups of these latter themselves. There was still another name for them—i.e., the *Pāñch'ālas*—but perhaps it will be well to regard that as having been in vogue in much later and more historical times, and much farther east.

Now, in the course of these wars, many *prisoners* were made on both sides. These captives, it seems, were usually reduced to *slavery*. It is obvious that amongst them would be representatives from *all* the various ethnic stocks then in Sapta-Sindhavaḥ. Some would have been Rākshāsas, or any other type of Niśādas; others would have been Dasyūs; others from any one of the Five *Janāhs*; and yet others even *śūkla* Āryas. Whatever they were, after capture they became slaves, i.e., *Dāsas*. In these circumstances, as Mr. Ramāprasād Chanda himself remarks in connection with his own arguments—

“It is unreasonable to hold that the Sūdras of the Vedic period were recruited from among the aborigines alone” (p. 3).

Thus, even the pink-and-white Yādūs, nay even the *śūkla* Āryas themselves, must have contributed their quota to what *eventually* developed into the Sūdra caste.

It is clear, therefore, that we must draw a very definite distinguishing line between *Dasyū* and *Dāsa*, as words; and also between the *Dasyūs*, as a specific ethnos, and the *Dāsas*, not as an ethnos at all, but as a social class. We must remember, however, that, in those early days in Sapta-Sindhavaḥ, Caste—that gigantic and all-dominant politico-socio-religious institution, as known to us historically, and as flourishing to-day throughout the length and breadth of India—did not exist at all.

These simple but hitherto wholly overlooked facts (if given the weight that is their due) completely revolutionise the ideas that "Scholarship" has heretofore been advocating regarding the ethnic conditions of Vedic times in India. For obviously the true picture of these times is very different from that usually painted.

Outlines of an Historical Grammar of the Bengali Language

BY

MUHAMMAD SHAHIDULLAH, M.A., B.L.,

Sarat Kumar Lahiri Research Assistant in Bengali Philology.

LECTURE I

Introduction : Historical Grammar, its scope, use and method.

Whether in ancient times or modern, whether in Greece or Rome, England or France, national awakening has been co-eval with literary renaissance. It is a happy sign of the times that Bengali, once despised by the learned in the first flush of their western culture, is now being cultivated by men who could have been a glory to any country. Bengali formerly scarcely recognised by our Alma Mater, has now the coveted position of being one of the subjects for the highest degree of the premier University in India. Need I tell through whose exertions ?¹ The name and fame of

¹ On the back of the pedestal of the marble bust of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee erected in 1912 by students (of whom this writer was one) are these two lines:

His noblest achievement, surest of all—

The place of his mother-tongue in step-mother's hall

Bengali instead of being confined to a few savants of Europe is now even on the lips of the men in the street, thanks to the genius of another son of Bengal. It is quite in keeping with the spirit of the age that a systematic and scientific study of such a language should engage our first attention.

In a series of lectures I propose to deal with the Historical Grammar of the Bengali Language and this lecture is intended to serve as introductory to those which follow. As this is an untrodden field, I am well aware of the difficulties besetting my path and my own short-comings, for which I crave indulgence of my learned critics.

Diversity is as much the creation of nature as uniformity¹ is her law. Since the species 'homo' has been a thinking animal, his mind has been ever busy in finding out uniformity in diversity. It was as much human mind as God that created cosmos out of chaos. In every field of mental activity, religion or superstition, philosophy or science, the main tendency of human mind has been to arrive at the general principle from particular instances, in order to explain the particular by means of the general. Descriptive grammar, which is ordinarily known simply as Grammar, is the outcome of such a tendency of human mind to hit upon a few general laws in a particular language. In spite of the best efforts of the grammarian, there must remain some grammatical facts which refuse to come under general rule and are conveniently labelled as exceptions which he is at a loss to explain.

Comparative Grammar goes still further and tries to find out similarity between a number of languages, descended from a common stock or family, by picking out their general features. Thus as we have grammatical works

by numerous authors, of Sanskrit, Greek, Latin and other languages belonging to what is called the Indo-Germanic or Indo-European family, we have a Comparative Grammar of Sanskrit, Zend, Greek, Latin, Lithuanian, Gothic, German and Slavonic Languages by Franz Bopp, Compendium of the Comparative Grammar of the Indo-European—Sanskrit, Greek and Latin—Languages by August Schleicher, Elements of the Comparative Grammar of the Indo-Germanic Languages by Karl Brugmann and other Comparative Grammars, of less extensive character, of Indo-European languages.

Historical Grammar on the other hand records the past history of a language by tracing the different stages through which the language has passed. Hera-kleitus of old said, "Every thing changes." This is specially the case with languages. Indeed "languages are not born but transmuted." Whereas Descriptive Grammar simply deals with the static aspect of a particular language at a particular period, Historical Grammar is concerned with its dynamic aspect. Like an accurate historian it describes the changes in a language or rather a language-stream through different periods of its existence. It accounts for the Grammatical facts left unexplained by the grammarian by referring to the past history of the language. It also traces the origin of a word to its earliest possible form by supplying the intermediate forms from records or otherwise.

Historical Grammar is also Comparative in as much as it must compare the different stages of a particular language-stream, which stages may themselves be different languages. Comparative Grammar comes to its aid, when in tracing the history of a grammatical form or a word the missing link is to be supplied by comparing other cognate languages. This is also useful

in verifying the results of Historical Grammar. An example of this combination of historical and comparative methods will make this clear.

The oldest Indo-Aryan form, as evidenced by Vedic, Classical Sanskrit, Pāli and Prākṛit, for the first person singular of the personal pronoun is अहम् *ahám* with the accent on the second syllable, whereas it is আমি *āmi* in Bengali. By no known phonetic law we can connect আমি *āmi* with अहम् *ahám*, for we know that the final *m* of Vedic, Classical Sanskrit, Pāli or Prākṛit does not survive in the Apabhraṃśas, from which Bengali and other modern Indo-Aryan vernaculars are descended, but is elided, sometimes nasalising the preceding vowel and sometimes without leaving any trace. Moreover *h* being accented cannot be elided in Apabhraṃśa. Now let us take the help of the Historical Grammar of the Bengali language. From old records we find the earlier forms of আমি *āmi* are আছি *āhmi* (Kṛṣṇa Kīrtan, 14th Cen.; Śūnya Purāṇ, 16th Cen.¹; Gorakṣa Vijay, 18th Cen.¹), আক্কে *āhme* (Kṛṣṇa-Kīrtan, Bauddha-Gān-O-Dohā, 12th Cen.), অক্কে *ahme*, অম্হে *amhe*, অম্বে *ambhe* (Bauddha-Gān). These lead us to the Apabhraṃśa, Prākṛit and Pāli form अमहे *amhe* 'we,' which points to the old Indo-Aryan form अस्मे *asmé*. In the Veda *asmé* has been found to be used in the dative and locative plural. We can trace the history of *asmé* still further back. Thus the Lesbian Greek 'αμμε' *amme*, 'we,' points to a Primitive Indo-European base अस्मा *asma* to which *e* was added in Indo-Aryan in analogy with pronominal plurals with *e* like सर्वे *sarve*, ये *ye*, ते *te*, &c. Thus we find আমি *āmi* is derived not from *aham* but from *asmé*, which is a plural form. How wonderful it is that with the help of Historical Grammar we are

¹ These are the probable dates of the Mss., the originals are very likely much earlier.

transported from the modern times to the old Vedic age and thence to the dim past when the Greeks and the Hindus lived together and spoke cognate dialects !

We may compare অমি *āmi* with other modern Indo-Aryan vernacular forms. Thus Oriya *āmhe*, Marathi *āmhi*, Gipsy *amēn*, Gujrati *ame*, Marwari *mhe*, Nepali *hāmi*, Northern Bengali *hāmi* (with unoriginal *h*), Hindi *ham* (**hame* **mhe*), Panjabi and Sindhi *asi*, Kashmiri *asi*, Sinhalese *api*. All these forms ultimately point to *asmé* as their original and can be phonetically derived from it. All these with the exception of Northern Bengali *hāmi* are plural forms meaning *we*, from this we conjecture that *āmi* was originally plural. This guess is proved to be correct by comparing it with Assamese *āmi* 'we' (*mai* 'I'), Chakma *āmi* 'we' (*mai* 'I'), Mayang *āmi* 'we' (*mi* 'I'). I may mention here that Chakma being ensconced in the hill tracts of Chittagong and Mayang insulated all around by Tibeto-Burmans in Manipore are two dialects of Bengali, which have preserved many traits of old Bengali. Thus 'to history, regarded as an instrument of philology, comparison must be added as a precious ally. By comparison theories are proved, hypotheses verified.' (Brachet).

Historical Grammar is as much dependent on Comparative Grammar as the latter is on the former. In order that comparison may be successful we must take the earliest form, which is the function of Historical Grammar. No one can suspect any connection between Bengali honorific second and third person, singular and plural করেন *karēn* with Oriya third person plural *karanti*; but the connection becomes evident when it is found from records that the old Bengali forms were *karanti*, *karenti*, *karenta* (Śunya Purāṇ, Gorakṣavijay; &c.), so that the Bengali honorific 2nd and 3rd person singular (and plural)

ending *en* is really the original 3rd person plural form equivalent to Vedic, Classical Sanskrit, Pāli, Prākṛit, and Apabhraṃśa *anti*. This is corroborated by the Chakma dialect and the Eastern Sylhet and Cachar dialect of Bengali in which the third person honorific form is the same as the third person plural form and has the characteristic personal ending *n*. Thus Sylhetia *tārā, tāin, or āpne jāin* and in Chakma *tārā jān* are equivalent to both তাহারা যায় *tāhārā jāy*, তিনি or আপনি যান *tini or āpani jān*, of modern standard Bengali. In Chakma *tumi* is used in place of standard Bengali both তোমরা *tomarā*, আপনি *āpani*.

Like the stream, language is ever in a state of change. With every generation and in every country, nay with every individual and in every village, there is change in a particular language, however slight or slow the change may be. As in all other natural phenomena, there is a law of change in all linguistic phenomena. To be ignorant of the law is to be puzzled and bewildered with the apparently unconnected facts and to know the law is to grasp and follow the facts easily and intelligently, like one who knows the plot of a big novel as opposed to him who is ignorant of it. Now to discover the law, it is necessary to observe the series of changes and to compare them with other known series. But linguistic phenomena are not at the beck and call of any one, so that they may be repeated at will like chemical phenomena. So observation in order to be varied and hence fruitful, must needs take cognizance of the past history of the language. Here comes the use of Historical Grammar.

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As we cannot understand a fact without knowing what fact preceded and conditioned it, so we cannot understand grammar without the help of Historical Grammar. A character in a popular Bengali drama very pertinently

asks “If *he, his, him*, in the case of males, why not *she, shis, shim* in the case of females?”¹ Only Historical Grammar can answer such queries. As only history can explain how it is that a particular country is divided into so many districts or shires of irregular shape and dissimilar area rather than of equal square areas, so Historical Grammar alone is in a position to explain how it is that we have a particular grammatical form or word. In short the whole function of the Historical Grammar of a language lies in answering the question “Why do we speak as we do?” (Whitney). A few examples will put this in clearer light.

In modern Bengali, to an inferior or to a very intimate we put the question তুই কি করিস্ *tui ki karis*? to an equal তুমি কি কর *tumi ki kara*? and to a superior আপনি কি করেন *āpani ki karen*? Fortunately the plural forms are not different from the singular. A language which has three forms for the second person may well seem to its speakers very courtly, but to a foreigner most perplexing indeed.

In tracing the history of তুই *tui* we find its earlier forms to have been তোএ *toe*, তৌএ *tōe* (Kṛṣṇa Kīrtan), তৌই *tāi* (Bauddha Gān), Apabhraṁśa तौ *tau*, Prākṛit *taī*, Pali *taṃ* which lead to the Vedic and Classical Sanskrit form त्वया *tvayā*, the agent form in the *Karmanī Vācya*. The Apabhraṁśa *tau* is also the nominative form. করিস *karis* in old records is করসি *karasi* (Kṛṣṇa Kīrtan, Śūnya Purāṇ, etc.) This is also the Apabhraṁśa and Prākṛit form. This leads to the Pāli *karosi*, Classical Sanskrit करोषि.

তুমি *tumi* in old records is *tuhmi, tokme, tuhme, tumhe* (Bauddha-Gān, Kṛṣṇa-Kīrtan, etc.). This latter form is also the Apabhraṁśa, Prākṛit and Pāli 2nd person plural

¹ রাম মাণিক্য। মর্দাগোর পেরলাউনে হি, হিজ, হিম অইছে, মাইয়াগোর নামে শি, হার, হার কইবে; যদি মর্দাগোর হি, হিজ, হিম অইল, তবে মাইয়াগোর শি, শিজ, শিম অইবে না ক্যান? (সধবার একাদশী)।

form. This helps us to reconstruct the old Indo-Aryan form *tuṣme* 2nd person plural built on the analogy of Vedic *yusme* and also used in the plural. কর *kara* in the old Mss. (18th Century and upwards) is করহ *karaha*, which is also the Apabhraṁśa and Prākṛit form; this leads us to the Pāli form *karotha*, equivalent to the Classical Sanskrit *kurutha*, the second person plural form of the present indefinite.

Tracing upwards we find the earlier forms of আপনি *āpani* were আপণে *ūpaṇe* (Bauddha-Gān) আয়ণে *āppaṇe* (Apabhraṁśa), আয়ণা *appaṇā* (Prākṛit). From *appaṇā* we pass to the Vedic and Classical Sanskrit *ātmanā* the agent form in the *Karmanī Vācya*. That Sanskrit *tm*=Prākṛit *pp* through an intermediate *tp* is established by phonology. We have shown before that করেন *karen* is descended from *karanti*, which leads to Pāli *karoni*, equivalent to Sanskrit कूर्वन्ति *kurvanti*. As for the use of a singular nominative in the third person with a verb in the plural to denote honour (*gaurave vahu-vacanam*) we find in Bauddha-Gān such uses as ভগ্নন্তি বিরুআ (p. 7), *Birupa says*, কহন্তি গুরু পরমার্থের বাট (p. 38), *Guru speaks of the way of salvation*, and in Kṛṣṇa Kīrtan বিনয় করিআঁ পুছন্তি দেবরাজে (p. 10), *the Lord of the Devas asks with humility*, হেন বিপরীত কথা কহন্তি কাহ্নাঞি (p. 87), *Kūnhāi speaks such unjust words*.

Thus from Historical Grammar, we infer that তুই *tui karis* was originally the singular and তুমি কর *tumi kara*, the plural, of the second person, and আপনি করেন *āpani karen*, the plural form of the third person.

If an additional corroboration is necessary some of the dialects of Bengali supply it. Thus Mayang *ti osōt*=Bengali তুই আছিস *tui āchis*, তুমি আছ *tumi ācha*; Mayang *tumi osō*=Bengali তোমরা আছ *tomarā ācha*; Chakma *tui mārās*=Bengali তুই মারিস *tui mārīs*, তুমি মার *tumi māra*; Chakma *tumi māra*=Bengali তোমরা মার *tomarā māra*. In Sylhetia the same personal ending of the verb is

used for তারা *tārū* and আপনি *āpani*, as I have shown before.

Historical Grammar places etymology on the sure basis of facts gleaned from actual records or inferred from unassailable phonetic laws, where old-fashioned philologists of the school of Horne Tooke and Ménage were content with the fantastic play of imagination in connecting two words generally of the same meaning but of totally different forms. This drew on philology the well-known satire of Voltaire who defined it as a science in which the vowels count for nothing and the consonants for very little. Brachet quotes an example from Ménage. "Thus Ménage derived the word *rat* from Latin *mus*: 'they doubtless first said *mus*, then *murtus*, then *ratus* and lastly *rat*!'" The spirit of Ménage is not dead even in the twentieth century, when we find a grave gentleman puts forward the derivation of Eng. *water* from Skt. *pāthas*, thus *pāthas*, *pāthūr*, *bāthūr*, *water*! And another undaunted pseudo-philologist seriously derives Arabic *kitāb* from Skt. *pustaka* by reading it from right to left as, *kastuk* and then *kattub* and finally *kitāb*! Historical Grammar has nothing to do with such imaginary intermediate forms. It demands strict historical proof of their existence. Even where it supplies an hypothetical form, it must justify every letter, vowel and consonant, of the hypothetical form in the light of the phonology and the history of the language. For example, it will not do to say that *r* the genitive suffix of Bengali is derived from *śya* or *visargr* of the sixth case ending of Skt. in such forms as *devasya*, *vidheḥ*, *vāriṇaḥ*, &c. It must be shown by unmistakable examples that in the intermediate stages from the old Indo-Aryan to modern Bengali through Vedic, Pāli, Prākṛit, Apabhraṃśa and old Bengali this *s* or *visargā* was not elided but regularly changed to *r*. A superficial philologist will

connect Skt. *mallikā* with Bengali *bel* (the *bela* flower); but a sound philologist without coming to any conclusion *a priori* will hunt for the earlier forms of *bel*. He will find it *veilla* (Hemacandra) which easily leads to late Skt. *vicakila*. He will go no further.

I may quote another example. Every reader of Bankim Candra remembers the song of Girijāyā—সাধের তরঙ্গী আমার কে দিল তরঙ্গে। কে আছে কাণ্ডারী হেন কে যাইবে সঙ্গে। (Mr̥ṇālīnī). In two of the best dictionaries of Bengali কাণ্ডারী *kāṇḍārī* has been derived as কাণ্ডার+ঈ and কাণ্ডার from Skt. कण्ड. Kavikāṇkan (16th Century) uses কাণ্ডার in the sense of কাণ্ডারী. Thus কাণ্ডারের বচন করিয়া অবগতি। ত্রিবেণীতে স্নান করে সাধু ধনপতি। Śūnya Purāṇ has also কাণ্ডার; thus রজতের লোকা হইল সুবর্ণ কেয়লাল। আপুনি ত ধর্ম্মরাজ হৈল কাণ্ডার। In Kṛṣṇa Kīrtan it is কাণ্ডার. Thus মনগমনে চলে না খানী তোঙ্গার। আপণে কাহ্নাঞিঁ তাত তৈল কাণ্ডার। In Bauddha Gān it is কণ্ঠহার, Thus চিত কণ্ঠহার স্তম্ভত মাজে। চলিল কাহ্ন মহাস্তম্ভ সঙ্গে। From these we can easily connect কাণ্ডার *kāṇḍār* with Skt. कर्णधार *karnādhāra* through the intermediate forms কাণ্ডার *kāṇḍhār*, কণ্ঠহার *kaṇṭhāhāra*, and কাণ্ডারী *kāṇḍārī* with Skt. कर्णधारী *karnādhārī*.

The preceding examples lead us to consider the method to be followed in Historical Grammar. Though Historical Grammar is generally compared with the Political History of a country, the method followed by Historical Grammar must be different from that followed by the Political History owing to the different nature of the subject-matter of each. Political History strictly follows the sequence of time beginning with the remotest known period of the country, whereas Historical Grammar begins with the present form of a language and traces its history backwards till it reaches the earliest possible stage which would satisfactorily explain all the subsequent stages of the language. This is known as the Historical method.

This method depends on the past records of a language. Where the records are wanting, we should take the help of Comparative Grammar and Phonology and reconstruct the missing links. The hypothetical forms thus reconstructed differ from the fanciful forms of the unscientific etymology-hunters in important points. Firstly, every letter of the form to be explained must be satisfactorily accounted for by the hypothetical form (which is supposed to precede it). Secondly, if the change of a letter is assumed in any word, it must be shown by at least one other convincing example of a similar change of the letter in the identical position, not even omitting the position of the accent, that such a change is allowed by the language. Thus, *water* cannot be derived from Skt. *pāthas*, through the intermediate hypothetical forms as *pāthar*, *bāthār*, because there no instance of the initial *p* in Skt. being ever changed to *b* or *w* in English, whereas the uniform rule is the change of the initial Sanskrit or Classical *p* to English *f*: cf. Skt. *pitar*, Eng. father; Skt. *pāda*, Eng. foot, etc.

In the foregoing I have indicated the line which I intend to follow in dealing with my subject. In conclusion I cannot help quoting the following observations made by the late Professor Max Müller in the preface to the 6th volume of his first edition of the Rig-Veda (p. 53): "With scholars and with all true men of science, who care for truth, the question is never who is right and who is wrong, but what is right and what is wrong. The life of a scholar would not be worth living if, in return for many things which he has to surrender, he did not secure for himself that one inestimable privilege of owing allegiance to no person, to no party, to no school or clique, but being able at all times to speak the truth, and nothing but the truth, about all things which concern him, convinced that all who deserve the name of scholars

will thank him where he has pointed out any of their mistakes. will forgive him even where he may have spoken rather freely or bluntly, and will defend him against the clamour of those who seem to think they are nothing unless they are infallible."

অদ্বৈত-বাদ ।

(শঙ্কর-মতের বিস্তৃত ব্যাখ্যা)

প্রথম অধ্যায় ।

ব্রহ্ম এবং তাঁহার স্বরূপ ।

প্রত্যেক বস্তু এবং জীবের, এক একটি নিজের নিজের স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব আছে । অল্প বস্তুর সহিত সম্পর্কে আসিলে, এই স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব হইতে কতকগুলি ধর্মের অভিব্যক্তি হয় । এই অভিব্যক্ত ধর্মগুলি, সেই সেই বস্তু বা জীবের গুণ, অবস্থা বা ক্রিয়া নামে আমাদের নিকটে পরিচিত । এই সকল অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম বা অবস্থার মধ্যে, বস্তু বা জীবের আপন আপন স্বরূপটি স্থির থাকিয়া যায় । ঐ ধর্ম বা অবস্থাগুলির মধ্যে, বস্তু বা জীবের স্বরূপটি আপনাকে হারায় না । এইরূপ, ব্রহ্মেরও একটি স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব আছে । এই জগৎ, ব্রহ্ম হইতে অভিব্যক্ত । জগৎ, তাঁহা হইতেই উৎপন্ন, — তাঁহারই বিকাশ, তাঁহারই অবস্থাবিশেষ । কিন্তু জগতের মধ্যে, ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপটি অবিকল স্থির রহিয়াছে । জগতের সকল নাম-রূপাত্মক বস্তুই পরিবর্তনশীল, উহার বিকারী, পরিণামী । সকল বস্তুই এক অবস্থা হইতে অবস্থান্তর ধারণ করিতেছে । কিন্তু সকল অবস্থান্তরের মধ্যে, ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপটি স্থির থাকিয়া যাইতেছে ; উহার কোন পরিবর্তন হয় না । এই জন্ম স্বরূপটিকে নিত্য বলা হয় এবং ঐ স্বরূপ হইতে অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম বা অবস্থান্তরগুলিকে অনিত্য বলা হয় । সকল বিকারের মধ্যে, সকল অবস্থাভেদের মধ্যে, ব্রহ্মের

ঐ স্বরূপ বা স্বভাবটিকে চিনিয়া লইতে পারা যায়; স্বরূপের একত্ব (Unity or identity) বুঝিতে পারা যায় ।—

“ নিত্যত্ব উপলব্ধিঃ, একরূপাত্বাৎ ।

অবস্থান্তরযোগেহপি, উপলব্ধিঃ

প্রত্যভিজ্ঞানাৎ ” (বেদান্ত হ্রত্ব, ৩৩৫৪) ।

শঙ্করাচার্য্য পুনঃ পুনঃ বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, “যে পদার্থের যে ‘স্বভাব’ বা স্বরূপ নিশ্চিত আছে, কোন প্রকারেই উহার সেই স্বভাবের পরিবর্তন বা অবস্থান্তর বা অগ্ৰথাভাব হয় না”* । “যে পদার্থের যে স্বরূপ বা যে ধর্ম সর্বপ্রকার প্রমাণের দ্বারা নির্দ্ধারিত হইয়াছে, সেই পদার্থের সেই ধর্ম বা স্বরূপ,—দেশ-কাল ও অবস্থার ভেদেও, অবিকল সেই ধর্ম বা স্বরূপ ঠিক থাকে;—তাহার কদাপি অগ্ৰথাচরণ হয় না”† । সুতরাং, জগদাকার ধারণ করাতেও, ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপের কোন হানি হয় নাই । এই জন্মই বেদান্ত-ভাষ্যে বলা হইয়াছে যে, “ব্রহ্ম, আপনস্বরূপে অবিকৃত থাকিয়াই, জগৎ-রূপে পরিণত হইয়া আছেন” এবং “পরমাত্মার স্বরূপ পূর্ব হইতেই নিত্যসিদ্ধ আছে; এই পূর্বসিদ্ধ (Presupposition) পরমাত্মারই, এই জগৎ পরিণামবিশেষ বা অবস্থাত্ত্বভেদ”—

“পূর্বসিদ্ধোপি হি সন্ আত্মা জগদাকারো পরিণময়ামাস আত্মানং” ।

“স্বরূপানুপমর্দেনৈব বিচিত্রাকার সৃষ্টিঃ পঠ্যতে” ।

অতএব ব্রহ্মের একটি নিত্য স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব আছে বলিয়াই, উহা তাঁহার বিকাশ এই জগৎ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র ও ভিন্ন (Transcendent) । এই স্বরূপটী স্বীকার না করিলে, এই জগৎটা ‘অসৎ’ হইতে—শূন্য হইতে—অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছে এবং ‘অসৎ’ বা শূন্যের উপরে অবস্থান করিতেছে—ইহাই বলিতে হয় ।

এই জগৎ, ব্রহ্মেরই স্বরূপের বিকাশ, একথা আমরা বলিয়া আসিয়াছি । তাঁহার স্বরূপ হইতেই এই অসংখ্য নাম-রূপাত্মক বিকারগুলি অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছে । এই জগৎ, তাঁহারই ‘স্বরূপের’ বিকার, পরিণাম বা অবস্থান্তর ।

* “ন হি বস্তু যঃ স্বভাবো নিশ্চিতঃ, স তং ব্যভিচারতি কদাচিদপি” (বৃহৎ ভাষ্য, ২।১।১৫) ।

† “বদ্ধধর্মকো যঃ পদার্থঃ প্রমাণেনাবগতোভবতি, স দেশকালাবস্থান্তরেষুপি তদ্ধর্মক এব ভবতি । স চেৎ তদ্ধর্মকত্বং ব্যভিচারতি, সর্বকঃ প্রমাণব্যবহারো লুপ্যতঃ” (বৃহৎ ভাষ্য, ২।১।২০) ।

কিন্তু এই সকল বিকারের মধ্যে তাঁহার স্বরূপটী ঠিকই আছে ; উহা অবিকৃত রহিয়াছে ।

আমরা এই যে জগৎ দেখিতেছি, ইহার কোন বস্তুই স্বতন্ত্র (Independent), স্বাধীন, স্বতঃসিদ্ধ নহে । প্রত্যেক বস্তু, প্রত্যেক বস্তুর সহিত সম্পর্ক-বিশিষ্ট । একটী, অন্তটীর সঙ্গে ঘনিষ্ঠ সম্বন্ধে সম্বন্ধ । এক বস্তুতে ক্রিয়া বা অবস্থাভেদ উৎপন্ন হইবা মাত্র, অপর বস্তুতে ক্রিয়া বা অবস্থাভেদ উৎপন্ন হয় । একের ক্রিয়াদ্বারা অপরের ক্রিয়া উদ্ভিক্ত হয় । কে এই সম্বন্ধ ঘটািল ? এতদ্বারা ইহাই প্রমাণিত হয় যে, সকল বস্তুই সকল বস্তুর সজাতীয় । ইহাই এতদ্বারা বুঝিতে পারা যায় যে, প্রত্যেক বস্তুতে ও প্রত্যেক জীবে একটী সাধারণ বিকার-জননী (common environment or common medium) শক্তি উপস্থিত আছে । উহাই প্রত্যেক বস্তু ও প্রত্যেক জীবকে পরস্পর সম্বন্ধে আনিয়াছে । বিশ্বব্যাপী প্রাণ-স্পন্দন সর্বত্র ক্রিয়াশীল । উহাই তিন জাতীয় বিকারে পরিণত হইয়াছে । আধিদৈবিক, আধিভৌতিক ও আধ্যাত্মিক—প্রাণেরই এই ত্রিবিধ বিকার । প্রাণস্পন্দন প্রথমে বায়ু, তেজ, অগ্নি প্রভৃতির আকারে বিবিধ cosmic forces বা আধিদৈবিক শক্তিরূপে অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছে । বিশ্ববাপ্ত এই শক্তিই প্রাণীবর্গের দেহ ও ইন্দ্রিয়াকারে পরিণত হইয়া রহিয়াছে । অতি ক্ষুদ্র প্রাণী হইতে মনুষ্য পর্য্যন্ত, স্থাবর জগ্ধম সর্বত্র, প্রত্যেক জীবের দেহ ও ইন্দ্রিয় এই প্রাণেরই পরিণাম* । তেজ, অগ্ন্যাদি আধিদৈবিক শক্তিগুলি, জীবের দেহ ও ইন্দ্রিয়ের ক্রিয়ার উদ্রেক করাইয়া থাকে । এইরূপে প্রত্যেক বস্তু, প্রত্যেক জীব, স্ব স্ব দেহ ও ইন্দ্রিয়াদি দ্বারা, প্রত্যেকের সঙ্গে সম্পর্কে আসিয়াছে এবং প্রত্যেকের ক্রিয়ার উদ্রেক ও অভিব্যক্তি করিয়া থাকে ।

শঙ্করাচার্য্য বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, “যাহারা পরস্পর, পরস্পরের ক্রিয়া ও প্রতিক্রিয়া উৎপাদন করিয়া, পরস্পর পরস্পরের উপকার করিয়া থাকে,

* “অধিদৈবমধ্যাক্ষমধিভূতক জগৎ সমস্তংবাপ্তঃ । নৈতেভ্যোহতিরিক্তং অন্তঃ কিঞ্চিদপি কার্য্যাকং করণাকং বা । সর্ব্বএতে ব্যাপ্তিমন্তঃ প্রাণাঃ যাবৎপ্রাণিণোচরংব্যবহিতাঃ । নহি কার্য্যকরণ-প্রত্যাখ্যানেন সংসারঃ অবগম্যতে ”—বৃ° ভা° ।

বুঝিতে হইবে যে, তাহারা একই কারণ হইতে উৎপন্ন হইয়াছে এবং তাহাদের প্রত্যেকের মধ্যে সেই একই কারণ অবস্থান করিতেছে”* । উহারা সকলেই “এক সামান্যাত্মকং” । অর্থাৎ উহারা সকলেই এক Common Medium এর মধ্যে অবস্থিত রহিয়াছে । উহারা সকলেই সেই প্রাণেরই অংশ । সকলেই একই বস্তুর অংশ বলিয়া, এক স্থানে ক্রিয়া হইলে, সর্বত্র প্রতিক্রিয়া উপস্থিত হয় । আমরা উপনিষদ্বুক্ত “মধু-বিছায়” এই তত্ত্বেরই উল্লেখ দেখিতে পাই । “পঞ্চভূত, জীবের দেহ-গঠনের দ্বারা জীবের উপকার করে এবং তদন্তর্গত প্রাণ, জীবের চক্ষুঃ-কর্ণাদি ইন্দ্রিয়ের নির্মাণ দ্বারা উপকার করে । এইরূপে একই প্রাণ-স্পন্দন, দেহের বাহ্যিক ভৌতিক অংশ (কার্য্যাংশ) এবং আন্তর ইন্দ্রিয় (করণাংশ) গুলির নির্মাণ দ্বারা পরস্পর পরস্পরের উপকার সাধন করিয়া থাকে”† ।

“সূর্য্যের আলোক এবং চক্ষুর দর্শনশক্তি পরস্পর পরস্পরের ক্রিয়া ও প্রতিক্রিয়া উৎপাদন দ্বারা, এক অন্তের আশ্রিত । এইরূপে ইহারা উভয়ে উভয়ের উপকার করিয়া থাকে বলিয়া, উহারা উভয়ে একই প্রাণের অংশ” ‡ । আবার, ইহাও বলা হইয়াছে যে, “শব্দাদি বিষয়বর্গ (অধিভূত), শ্রোত্রাদি ইন্দ্রিয়বর্গের (আধ্যাত্মিক) ক্রিয়ার উদ্রেক করিলে, মনে প্রবৃত্ত্যাদি ক্রিয়া জাগিয়া উঠে এবং তদ্বারা হস্ত-পদাদির বাহ্যিক চেষ্টা উৎপন্ন হয়”§ । এই সকল স্থলে আমরা এই তত্ত্ব পাইতেছি যে, আধিদৈবিক—তেজ, আলোকাদি ও আধিভৌতিক—বিষয়বর্গ, জীবদেহে আধ্যাত্মিক ইন্দ্রিয়বর্গের ক্রিয়া উত্তেজিত করিলে, আন্তর প্রবৃত্তি-নিবৃত্ত্যাদি যাবতীয় ক্রিয়া (Sensory and Motor activities) উৎপন্ন হয় । এবং এ সকল এক প্রাণ-স্পন্দনবই বিকার॥ ।

* “পরস্পরোপকার্য্যোপকারকভূতং জগৎ সর্বং পৃথিব্যাং । যচ্চ লোকে পরস্পরোপকার্য্যোপকারকভূতং, তৎ এককারণপূর্ব্বকং । একসামান্যাত্মকং, একপ্রলয়কং দৃষ্টং”—ইত্যাদি বৃহৎ ভা. ২।৫।২ ।

† “ভূতানাং শরীরান্তর্য্যম্ উপকারাৎ মধুত্বং ; তদন্তর্গতানাং তেজোময়াদীনাং করণত্বেন উপকারাৎ মধুত্বং”—ইত্যাদি বৃহৎ ভা. ২।৫।৫ ।

‡ “তো এতো আদিত্যাক্ষিহো পুরুষো (“অচেতনেনি পুরুষ-শব্দঃ প্রযুক্ত্যতে”)—একস্ত ‘সত্যস্ত’ ব্রহ্মণঃ (হিরণ্যগর্ভস্ত) অংশো, তস্মাৎ অস্ত্রোজ্ঞশ্চিন্মি প্রতিষ্ঠিতো অস্ত্রোজ্ঞোপকার্য্যোপকারকত্বাৎ” (বৃ. ভা. ৫।৫।২) ।

§ “শব্দেন (অধিভূত) শ্রোত্রেন্নিষে এদীপ্তে. মনসি বিবেক উপজায়তে, তেন মনসা বাহ্যং চেষ্টাং প্রতিপদ্যতে” । “গন্ধাদিত্তিরপি ত্রাণাদিষু অনুগৃহীতেষু প্রবৃত্তি-নিবৃত্ত্যানামোভবন্তি” । (৪।৬।৪) ।

॥ “প্রাণমন্তজত । তদ্ব্যপাখিয়ারা আত্মনি.. সর্ববিক্রিয়ালক্ষণঃ সং ব্যবহারঃ ।

আবার একথাও দেখিতে পাওয়া যায় যে, এক প্রাণস্পন্দনই, অগ্নি-সূর্যাদি আধিদৈবিক বস্তুগুলির তেজ, আলোকাদির মধ্যে এবং জীবের—বাক্, চক্ষুরাদি আধ্যাত্মিক ইন্দ্রিয়বর্গের মধ্যে—অনুগত হইয়া রহিয়াছে। এই জন্মই ইহারা পরস্পর পরস্পরের ক্রিয়ার উদ্রেক করিয়া থাকে”*।

অতএব, সকল জীবের দেহ ও ইন্দ্রিয়—এক প্রাণেরই অংশ এবং এই প্রাণই বাহিরে সূর্য্যচন্দ্রাদির তেজ, আলোকাদিরূপে অভিব্যক্ত হইয়া রহিয়াছে। একই প্রাণস্পন্দন, আপনাকে অংশতঃ বিভক্ত করিয়া সকল বস্তুতে ও সকল জীবে ক্রিয়াশীল। এই জন্মই, জীববর্গ, সাক্ষাৎভাবে একে অপরের উপরে ক্রিয়া করিতে পারে না; কিন্তু ইহারা আপন আপন দেহেইন্দ্রিয়দ্বারা ও বাহিরের বিশ্বব্যাপ্ত প্রাণ-স্পন্দনদ্বারা, পরস্পর পরস্পরের উপরে ক্রিয়া করিয়া থাকে†। অতএব আমরা এই সিদ্ধান্তে উপনীত হইতেছি যে, জগতের সকল বিকার, সকল ধর্ম, সকল ক্রিয়ার মূল—এই প্রাণ-স্পন্দন‡। ইহাই প্রত্যেক বস্তু ও প্রত্যেক জীবকে পরস্পর সম্বন্ধে আনিয়াছে এবং ইহাই সর্বত্র সকল প্রকার ক্রিয়া বা ধর্মের উদ্রেক (Stimulate) করিতেছে§।—আমরা এই উপলক্ষে একজন ইউরোপীয় পণ্ডিতের উক্তি উদ্ধৃত করিতেছি। পাঠক দেখিতে পাইবেন যে বহু শতাব্দী পূর্বে ভারতবর্ষের দার্শনিক-শিরোমণি শ্রীমৎ শঙ্করাচার্য্য যে সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়া গিয়াছেন, অধুনা ইউরোপের দার্শনিকগণও শনৈঃ শনৈঃ সেই সিদ্ধান্তেই উপনীত হইতেছেন।—

“In the case of a finite and dependent substance, its activity presupposes *interaction* with an environment which elicits the activity and to some extent sets limits to it. The phenomena of reaction on stimulus are a familiar illustration of the dependence of organic life on conditions beyond itself.”

* “যন্মাদেভদেব ব্রতং বাগাদিষু অগ্নাদিষু চ অনুগতং, যদেতৎ বায়োঃ প্রাণস্তচ পরিস্পন্দান্নকৃৎ সর্কৈর্দেবৈব রমুর্বর্ষ্যমানঃ ব্রতং”—ইত্যাদি (বৃহ' ভা' ১।৫।২৩)। “বাগাদয়ঃ অগ্নাদয়শ্চ মদান্নকৃ। এব অহং প্রাণ আত্মা সর্বপারিস্পন্দকৃৎ”।

† “ন তু সাক্ষাদেব তত্র ক্রিয়া সম্ভবতি । সর্বা ভূতভৌতিকমাত্রা অস্ত সংসর্গকার্ণকৃত্তা বিদ্যন্তে কার্য্যকরণবিষয়াকারপরিণতাঃ” (৫।৩)।

‡ “প্রাণমম্বজত । তদ্রূপাধিদ্বারা আত্মনি .সর্ববিক্রিয়ালক্ষণঃ সংঘবহারঃ”।

§ “যং পরস্পরোপকার্যোপকারকভূতং ..তৎ একসামান্তান্নকৃৎ দৃষ্টং”।

আমরা যে পূর্বে, বস্তু বা জীবের আপন আপন স্বরূপ হইতে অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম বা ক্রিয়াগুলির কথা বলিয়া আসিয়াছি এই প্রাণ-সম্পদনই সেই সকল ধর্ম বা ক্রিয়ার উদ্ভেকের মূল । এই প্রাণের সহিত সম্পর্কে না আসিলে, কোন বস্তুতে বা জীবে ঐ সকল ধর্ম বা ক্রিয়ার উদ্ভেক হইতে পারিত না । এই জন্যই, জগতের সর্বপ্রকার বিকার বা ধর্মের বা ক্রিয়ার মূলে এই প্রাণ ।

“সর্বে অখাদয়ঃ দেবাঃ, সর্বে
ভূবাদয়ো লোকাঃ, সর্বে প্রাণা বাগাদয়ঃ,
প্রতিশরীরানু প্রবেশিনঃ ” (বৃ° ভা°, ২।৫।১৫) ।

প্রাণই বাহিরে শব্দস্পর্শাদি বিষয়াকারে অভিব্যক্ত এবং প্রাণই জীবের দেহ ও ইন্দ্রিয়রূপে অভিব্যক্ত হইয়া আছে ।* এবং বিষয় ও ইন্দ্রিয়ে সম্বন্ধ হইলেই, জীবের আপন আপন স্বভাবানুরূপ ক্রিয়া বা ধর্মের অভিব্যক্তি হয় ।† সুতরাং জগতের নামরূপাত্মক সর্বপ্রকার বিকার—প্রাণদ্বারাই উদ্ভিক্ত ।

(Pantheism-মতের খণ্ডন)—

এস্থলে আমরা একটা মতের আলোচনা করিতে ইচ্ছা করি । মতটী Pantheism নামে পরিচিত । আমরা যে সর্বপ্রথমে, ব্রহ্মের একটা স্বতন্ত্র ‘স্বরূপের’ কথা বলিয়াছি, এই মতবাদীগণ ব্রহ্মের সেই স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপটী মানেন না । আমরা যে বস্তু ও জীবের একটা স্বতন্ত্র ‘স্বরূপের’ কথা বলিয়া আসিয়াছি, ইহারা তাহাও উড়াইয়া দেন । ইহারা বলিয়া থাকেন যে, ব্রহ্মের সমগ্র স্বরূপই এই জগৎ-রূপে বিকাশিত হইয়া রহিয়াছে । এ জগৎ ছাড়া আর ব্রহ্মের কোন স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপ নাই । যদি ব্রহ্মকে দেখিতে চাও, তবে এই নাম-রূপাত্মক জগতের দিকে চাহিয়া দেখ ; তাহা হইলেই ব্রহ্মকে

* “রূপগ্রহণায় হি রূপাত্মকঃ চক্ষুঃ, রূপেণ প্রযুক্তঃ (stimulated) । বৈহিরূপৈঃ প্রযুক্তঃ, তেঃ আত্মগ্রহণায় আরব্ধঃ চক্ষুঃ, রূপাকারেণ হি হৃদয়ঃ পরিণতঃ;— হৃদয়মিতি বুদ্ধি-মনসী একীকৃত্য নির্দেশঃ... শরীর-হৃদয়-প্রাণাঃ অন্তোন্ত-প্রতিষ্ঠাঃ ” (বৃ° ভা°, ৩।২।১০) ।

† “মাত্রাঃ—মীরস্তে আভিঃ শব্দাদয় ইতি শ্রোত্রাদীনী ইন্দ্রিয়াণি । মাত্রাণাঃ স্পর্শাঃ—শব্দাদিভিঃ সংযোগাঃ । তে শীতোষ্ণত্বদ্বঃপদাঃ”—গী° ভা°, ২।১৪ । “আগমাপায়িনো হি ‘স্পর্শশব্দো’ দৃষ্টঃ । নতু অগ্নেয়শব্দ-প্রকাশনোঃ স্বভাব ভূতয়োঃ অগ্নিনা স্পর্শ ইতি ভবতি”- ছা° ভা° ।

দেখা হইল । বস্তু বা জীববর্গেরও স্বতন্ত্র কোন ‘স্বরূপ’ নাই । অভিব্যক্ত কতকগুলি ধর্ম বা বিকার-সমষ্টিই জীব বা বস্তু ; এবং এই সকল পরস্পর-সম্বন্ধ বিকার বা ধর্মগুলির সমষ্টি করিলেই ‘জগৎ’ হইল । ব্রহ্মই— এই জগৎ । ইউরোপীয় পণ্ডিতগণ যখনই ভারতীয় ‘অদ্বৈতবাদ’ সম্বন্ধে কোন কথা বলিতে গিয়াছেন, তখনই তাঁহারা অদ্বৈতবাদের স্বন্ধে এই Pantheism চাপাইয়া দিয়াছেন । তাঁহারা বলেন যে, ভাষাকার শঙ্করাচার্য্যও নাকি এই Pantheism তাঁহার ভাষ্যে ব্যাখ্যা করিয়াছেন !!

“The later doctrine of *sankhara* may perhaps be named Pantheism—strange as its Pantheism is—for it says that *Brahma* is all, because all but *Brahma* is false” (Indian Theism).

“The process which created the Pantheistic speculation of the Upanishads and issued in the strict Pantheism of the Vedanta, had already entered on its course” (Philosophy of Religion).

“Pantheism offers a solution of the religious problem which leaves no room for a genuine religious bond ; and this because the difference of worshipper and worshipped is resolved into the colourless identity of the one real Being. The sole office of religion in a Pantheistic System would be to lift the veil of illusion under which the individual cherishes the belief that he has a being and destiny of his own.”

আমরা আর অধিক উদ্ধৃত করিয়া পাঠকের ধৈর্য্যচ্যুতি করিতে ইচ্ছা করি না । ইহা হইতেই পাঠক দেখিতে পাইবেন যে, জীবের ব্যক্তিস্ব লোপ করা এবং ঈশ্বরের স্বরূপ লোপ করাই Pantheism এর লক্ষ্য । এই জগৎ ব্যতীত আর ব্রহ্মের স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপ নাই এবং নাম-রূপাত্মক বিকার-সমষ্টিই এই জগৎ । শঙ্করাচার্য্যও নাকি এই Pantheism শিক্ষা দিয়া গিয়াছেন !! পাশ্চাত্য পণ্ডিতেরা সর্বত্র আমাদিগকে এই কথাই বলিয়া আসিতেছেন ।

যাঁহারা শঙ্কর-ভাষ্য পড়িয়াছেন, তাঁহারাই ইহা দেখিয়াছেন যে, পাশ্চাত্য পণ্ডিতেরা যে Pantheism এর কথা বলিতেছেন এবং যাহা তাঁহারা শঙ্করের স্বন্ধে চাপাইয়া দিতেছেন, এইরূপ একটা মত, শঙ্করাচার্য্যের বহুকাল পূর্ব্ব হইতেই ভারতে চলিয়া আসিতেছিল । শঙ্করাচার্য্য তাঁহার ভাষ্যের বহু স্থলে, ‘বৃত্তিকারের মত’ বলিয়া, এই Pantheism এর

উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন এবং যুক্তিদ্বারা এই Pantheism মতকে খণ্ড খণ্ড করিয়াছেন। এইরূপ খণ্ডন সত্ত্বেও, পাশ্চাত্য পণ্ডিতগণ এবং তাঁহাদের দেখাদেখি এতদ্বেশীয় শিক্ষিতগণের মধ্যেও কেহ কেহ, কি প্রকারে শঙ্করাচার্যের ঘাড়ে এই Pantheism চাপাইলেন, ইহা আমরা কিছুতেই বুঝিতে পারি না। বিষয়টা বড়ই গুরুতর। সেই জন্য আমরা, শঙ্করাচার্য তদীয় বিবিধ ভাষ্যে কোথায় কোথায় এবং কিরূপে, সেই Pantheism খণ্ডন করিয়াছেন, সেই অংশগুলি পাঠকবর্গের সম্মুখে উপস্থিত করিতেছি।

(১) শঙ্করাচার্য্য বেদান্তদর্শনের দ্বিতীয় অধ্যায়ের প্রথম পাদের ১৪ সূত্রের ভাষ্য লিখিতে গিয়া যাহা বলিয়াছেন, তাহা এইরূপ :—

“কেহ কেহ মনে করেন যে, কারণটাই ত কার্য্যাকারে ব্যক্ত হয়; সূত্রাং জগতের কারণরূপে ব্রহ্ম ‘এক’। সেই কারণই কার্য্যাকারে আপনাকে ‘অনেক’ অংশে বিভক্ত করিয়া, জগদাকারে অবস্থিত। সূত্রাং যাহা ‘এক,’ তাহাই ‘অনেক’ হইয়াছে। যেমন সমুদ্ররূপে যাহা এক, তাহাই ফেন-তরঙ্গ-বুদ্বুদাদিরূপে অনেক; মৃত্তিকারূপে যাহা এক, তাহাই ঘট-শরাবদিরূপে অনেক; বৃক্ষরূপে যাহা এক, তাহাই শাখা-পল্লব-ফলাদিরূপে অনেক। ব্রহ্মও তদ্রূপ ‘অনেকাত্মক’ হইয়া রহিয়াছেন। একই ব্রহ্মবস্ত্ত, নানাকারে বিভক্ত, সূত্রাং নানা ধর্ম্ম বিশিষ্ট হইয়া বিকাশিত। এ জগৎ, ব্রহ্মেরই বিকাশ; সূত্রাং ব্রহ্ম—‘জগদাত্মক’ হইতেছেন;—অর্থাৎ জগৎই ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপ; জগৎ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র তাঁহার কোন স্বরূপ নাই। জগতে নানা ধর্ম্ম, নানা বিকার, নানা ক্রিয়া অভিব্যক্ত। এই সকল ধর্ম্ম বা বিকারই, ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপ। কেন না, ব্রহ্ম আপনাকে নিঃশেষে (Entirely) এই সকল বিকাররূপে বিকাশিত করিয়াছেন।”

শঙ্করাচার্য্য এইরূপে বৃত্তিকারের মত বা Pantheism-এর বিবরণ দিয়া, এই স্থলেই তাহার খণ্ডন করিয়াছেন। সেই খণ্ডনের প্রণালী এইরূপ :—

“একই বস্ত্ত, যুগপৎ এক, অথচ অনেক;—ইহা হইতে পারে না। এক যদি সত্য হয়, তাহা হইলে উহাকেই আবার অনেক বলিতে পার না; অনেকটা মিথ্যা হইবেই। আবার যদি অনেককেই সত্য বল—বিবিধ বিকারাত্মক অবস্থাকেই সত্য বলিয়া মনে কর, তাহা হইলে এককে আর সত্য বলিতে পারিবে না। একই বস্ত্ত, নানা ধর্ম্মাকারে পরিণত হইলে, আর

তাহার একত্ব থাকে না ; উহা নানা-ধর্মবিশিষ্ট হইয়া উঠে । কেন না, যাহা এক, তাহাই ত আপনাকে অনেক আকারে বিভক্ত করিয়াছে ; সুতরাং উহা ত অনেক হইয়া উঠিয়াছে ; উহার আর সেই একত্ব থাকিল কোথায় ? সুতরাং তোমার মতে ব্রহ্ম—অনেকাত্মক, বিকারাত্মক, বিবিধ ধর্মবিশিষ্ট, হইয়া উঠিতেছে ।” এই যুক্তি দিয়া শঙ্করাচার্য্য আপন সিদ্ধান্তের উল্লেখ করিয়া বলিতেছেন যে—

“এই যে বিবিধ বিকার অভিযুক্ত হইয়াছে, এই বিকারগুলি লইয়াই ত জগৎ । কিন্তু ব্রহ্মবস্ত, এই বিকারগুলি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র, ভিন্ন । জগৎ হইতে ব্রহ্মের স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপ আছে । তিনি আপন স্বরূপে অবিকৃত রহিয়াই জগৎরূপে বিকাশিত হইয়াছেন । তিনি সর্বপ্রকার পরিণামের—বিকারের—অতীত । তাঁহার যে সমগ্র স্বরূপটাই জগদাকারে বিকারিত—পরিণত—হইয়াছে, তাহা নহে । জগদাকারে বিকাশিত হইয়াও, তিনি স্বরূপতঃ স্বতন্ত্র রহিয়াছেন । সর্বপ্রকার বিকার বা অবস্থাস্থরের মধ্যে তাঁহার স্বরূপের একত্ব (Identity) ফুটিয়া উঠিতেছে । সুতরাং ব্রহ্মকে ‘অনেকাত্মক’ বা ‘জগদাত্মক’ বা বিবিধ ধর্মবিশিষ্ট বলা যায় না”* । এইরূপ Pantheism মতে, জীবেরও স্বতন্ত্র কোন স্বরূপ নাই । জীবে (অণু বস্তুর সহিত সম্বন্ধে আসিয়া) যে সকল কাম-ক্রোধ দ্বুগালজ্ঞাদি বিকার বা ধর্ম অভিযুক্ত হইয়া থাকে, সেই সকল ধর্মবিশিষ্ট ও দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদিবিশিষ্ট যে, সেই ত জীব । সুতরাং Pantheism-মতে, জীব, অভিযুক্ত বিবিধ ধর্মবিশিষ্ট ব্যতীত ও দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদিবিশিষ্ট ব্যতীত আর কিছুই নহে । দেহ-ইন্দ্রিয় প্রভৃতি ও অভিযুক্ত ধর্ম প্রভৃতির সমষ্টিই জীব । তদ্ব্যতীত, জীবের স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপ

* “ননু অনেকাত্মকং ব্রহ্ম । যথা বৃক্ষোহনেকশাখঃ, এবমনেকশক্তি-প্রযুক্তিযুক্তং ব্রহ্ম । অতঃ একত্বং নানাত্বঞ্চ—উভয়মপি সত্যমেব । যথা বৃক্ষইত্যেকত্বং, শাখা ইতি চ নানাত্বং । যথা চ সমুদ্রায়না একত্বং, ফেন-বহুদায়না নানাত্বং । যথা চ মৃদায়না একত্বং, ঘট-শরাবাদ্যায়না নানাত্বং । . নৈবাত্মাং .. প্রকৃতিশাস্ত্রে দৃষ্টান্তে সত্যাবধারণাং । . একত্বমৈবৈকং পারমার্থিকং দর্শয়তি, মিথ্যাজ্ঞানবিজ্ঞানিতঞ্চ নানাত্বং । উভয়সত্যতামাং হি কথং ব্যবহার-গোচরোপি জন্তরনৃত্যভিসন্ধ ইত্যুচ্যতে । . (১) ন হি একত্ব ব্রহ্মণঃ পরিণামধর্মত্বং, তদ্রহিতত্বঞ্চ শক্যং প্রতিপত্ত্বং ন হি কূটস্থত্ব ব্রহ্মণঃ স্থিতিগতিবৎ অনেকধর্মীশ্রয়ত্বং সম্ভবতি । (২) ন চ যথা ব্রহ্মণঃ আত্মৈকত্বদর্শনং মোক্ষসাধনং, এবং জগদাকার পরিণামিত্বদর্শনমপি স্বতন্ত্রমেব কষ্টেচিৎ ফলায় অবকল্পতে ।.. ন হি পরিণামবদবিজ্ঞানাং পরিণামবদ মায়ানাং ফলাঃ শ্রাদ্ধিতি বজ্রং যুক্তং” ।

থাকিতেছে না । কিন্তু শঙ্করাচার্য্য ঐ স্থলে ইহাও দেখাইয়াছেন যে, অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম্মগুলি ব্যতীত, ঐ সকল ধর্ম্ম ইহাতে স্বতন্ত্র, জীবের আপন আপন ‘স্বরূপ’ আছে* । কিন্তু Pantheism মতে, সুখ-দুঃখ, হর্ষ-বিষাদাদি ধর্ম্ম এবং দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদি বিকার—এইগুলির সমষ্টিই ‘জীব’ । আবার এই সকল ধর্ম্ম বা বিকার-রূপে ব্রহ্মই ত অভিব্যক্ত । সুতরাং জীবের বা ব্রহ্মের কাহারই স্বতন্ত্র ‘স্বরূপ’ থাকিতেছে না । এইরূপে Pantheism বিকার-সমষ্টিকে জগৎ এবং জগৎকেই ব্রহ্ম বলিয়া সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়াছে । শঙ্কর এই Pantheism খণ্ডন করিয়াছেন । তথাপি কিরূপে শঙ্করের স্বন্ধে Pantheism আরোপিত হইয়াছে, ইহা বুঝিয়া উঠা দায় !

(২) বৃহদারণ্যকের চতুর্থ অধ্যায়, তৃতীয় ব্রাহ্মণে, ৩০ শ্লোকের ভাষ্যে শঙ্করাচার্য্য বলিয়াছেন—

“কেহ কেহ বলিয়া থাকেন যে, একই বস্তু, ধর্ম্মের ভেদে, ক্রিয়ার ভেদবশতঃ, অবস্থার ভেদে, ভিন্ন ভিন্ন ক্রিয়াবিশিষ্ট ও ভিন্ন ভিন্ন ধর্ম্মবিশিষ্ট হইয়া থাকে । একই অশ্ব—যখন দ্রুত গমন করে তখন উহার এক অবস্থা বা ক্রিয়া হয় ; আবার, ঐ অশ্বটীই যখন খাচ্ছ গ্রহণ করে, তখন উহারই আর এক অবস্থান্তর হয় । সুতরাং একই বস্তু, ক্রিয়া এবং ধর্ম্মের ভেদে, নানা প্রকার অবস্থা গ্রহণ করে । একই বস্তু, ক্রিয়ার ভেদে ও ধর্ম্মের ভেদে, নানা ধর্ম্মবিশিষ্ট হইয়া থাকে । জগতে অভিব্যক্ত নানা প্রকার জ্ঞান, ক্রিয়া এবং শক্তির ভেদে, একই ব্রহ্ম-বস্তু নানা আকারে, নানা অবস্থায়, ক্রিয়া করিতেছেন ; নানা অবস্থান্তর গ্রহণ করিয়া অবস্থান করিতেছেন । ইহাই ব্রহ্মের রূপ*” । শঙ্করাচার্য্য এইরূপে বিপক্ষের মত উল্লেখ করিয়া সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়াছেন যে,—“ক্রিয়ার ভেদে, শক্তির ভেদে, বস্তুর যেটী প্রকৃত স্বরূপ, তাহার ভেদ হয় না । বস্তুর স্বরূপটীই যে নানা ধর্ম্মবিশিষ্ট হয়, তাহা নহে । কেন না, বস্তুর স্বরূপটী, অবস্থা বা ক্রিয়ার ভেদে অবস্থান্তরিত হয় না । ব্রহ্মও তজ্জপ, জগতে অভিব্যক্ত বিকার বা অবস্থার মধ্যে, আপন স্বাতন্ত্র্য হারান না । অবস্থাভেদের মধ্যেও তাঁহার স্বরূপের একত্ব ঠিক থাকে ।

* “শারীরস্য ব্রহ্মস্বভাঃ উপদিষ্টতে । ব্রহ্মস্বভাঃ সত্যগম্যমাণঃ, স্বাভাবিকস্ত শারীরাস্বভাঃ বাধকঃ সম্পদ্যতে রজাদিবৃদ্ধয় ইব সর্পাদিবৃদ্ধীনাং । প্রতিপাদিতে আত্মকন্ঠে, . ন অনেকাস্বকব্রহ্মকল্পনাং বাক্য-শোভন্তি” ।

অন্য একটা বিষয় বা বস্তুর সহিত সম্বন্ধ ঘটিলে, ঐ সম্বন্ধের ফলে, আমাতে দর্শনাদি ক্রিয়া বা ধর্মের উদ্রেক হয়, অভিযুক্তি হয়। উহাতে আমার স্বরূপের ত কোন হানি হয় না। স্ফটিক, স্বচ্ছ নির্মল স্বভাব। অন্য বস্তুর সংযোগবশতঃ, উহাতে নীল-লোহিতাদিবর্ণের অভিযুক্তি হইল। ঐ সকল নীললোহিতাদি ধর্মদ্বারা কি স্ফটিকের নির্মলতায় কোন হানি হয়?” এই প্রকারে, শঙ্করাচার্য্য, Pantheism খণ্ডন করিয়া, ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপটী যে, তাঁহাতে অভিযুক্ত নাম-রূপাদি বিকার হইতে স্বতন্ত্র, তাহাই দেখাইয়াছেন। তথাপি লোকে বলে যে শঙ্করাচার্য্য Panthiest ছিলেন !!

(৩) বৃহদারণ্যকের দ্বিতীয় অধ্যায়ের, প্রথম ব্রাহ্মণের, ২০ শ্রুতির ব্যাখ্যা করিতে গিয়া শঙ্কর দেখাইয়াছেন যে—“জগতের বিকারগুলি ব্রহ্মেরই একদেশ বা অংশ, কেহ কেহ এইরূপ মত পোষণ করেন। তাঁহাদের মতে, কারণরূপে যে ব্রহ্মবস্তু এক, তাহাই যখন বিবিধ কার্য্যাকারে অভিযুক্ত ; তখন জগতে যাহা কিছু দেখিতেছে, তৎসমস্তই সেই ব্রহ্মবস্তুরই অংশ বা অবয়ব হইতেছে। তিনিই অংশতঃ আপনাকে বিভক্ত করিয়া বিকাশিত। জীবও, তাঁহার অংশ হইতেছে। ব্রহ্মকে যদি অংশী (whole) বল, তবে জগতের তাবৎ বস্তুই তাঁহার অংশ (parts) হয়। ব্রহ্মকে যদি অবয়বী বল, তবে তাবৎ বস্তুকে তাঁহার অবয়ব বলিতে হয়। কেন না, অংশগুলির সমষ্টি করিলেই অংশীকে পাওয়া যায়।” শঙ্করাচার্য্য এইরূপে Pantheism-এর বিবরণ দিয়া তাহার খণ্ডন করিয়াছেন। খণ্ডনের যুক্তিগুলি এস্থলে উল্লিখিত হইতেছে :—

“এক অবয়বী (The whole) যখন নানা অবয়বে বিভক্ত (The sum of the parts constitutes the whole) হইয়া রহিয়াছে, তখন এই

* “অত্র কেচিৎ ব্যাচক্ষতে—আত্মবস্তুনঃ স্বত এব একত্বং, নানাভেদঃ। যথা গোত্রব্যতীয়া একত্বং, সাত্বাদীনাম্ ধর্ম্মানাম্ পরস্পরভেদঃ...তথা নিববয়বেষু অমূর্ধ্ববস্তুষু একত্বং নানাভেদঃ অমুমেষং। তদ্বদেব দৃষ্টাদীনাম্ পরস্পরং নানাভেদঃ, আত্মনঃ চ একত্বমিতি। ন—অন্তপরত্বাৎ; নহি দৃষ্টাদি-ধর্ম্মভেদ-প্রদর্শন পরং ইদং বাক্যং। যথাহি লোকে স্বচ্ছবাস্তাব্যবৃক্তঃ স্ফটিকঃ তন্নিমিত্তমেব কেবলং হরিতনীললোহিতা-দ্ব্যপাধিভেদযোগাৎ তদাকারত্বং ভজতে; ন চ স্বচ্ছবাস্তাব্যবৃক্তিরেকং হরিতনীললোহিতাদিলক্ষণাঃ ধর্ম্মভেদাঃ স্ফটিকস্ত কল্পয়িতুং শক্যন্তে। ন চ নিববয়বেষু অনেকাত্মত্বাৎ শক্যতে কল্পয়িতুং। সা চ ক্রিয়া নৈব অবিশেষে সম্ভবতি; এবং ধর্ম্মভেদাঃ”—ইত্যাদি।

অবয়বগুলি ত সেই অবয়বীকে ছাড়িয়া থাকিতে পারে না ; তখন অবয়ব-গত দোষ ও গুণ, অবয়বীকেও স্পর্শ করিবেই । কেন না, অবয়বীটী ত, আপনার অবয়বগুলি হইতে পৃথক্ বা স্বতন্ত্র হইয়া থাকিতে পারে না । প্রত্যেক অংশের মধ্যেই ত, অংশীটী অংশতঃ উপস্থিত রহিবেই । জীবগুলিও যখন ব্রহ্মেরই অংশ, তখন জীবের সুখ-দুঃখে, ব্রহ্মকেও সুখ-দুঃখগ্রস্ত হইতেই হইবে । সুতরাং, Pantheism মতে, ব্রহ্মকে সুখ-দুঃখাদি বিকার পীড়িত বলা অনিবার্য্য হইয়া উঠে । ব্রহ্মকেই সংসারী জীব হইতে হয়”* ।

শঙ্কর বেদান্তদর্শনের চতুর্থ অধ্যায়, তৃতীয় পাদ, ১৪ সূত্রের ভাষ্য আর একটা কথা বলিয়া দিয়াছেন । তিনি বলিয়াছেন যে, “জীবকে—ব্রহ্মের বিকার বা অংশ বলিলে, জীবের ব্রহ্ম-প্রাপ্তিরূপ মুক্তিনাভ অসম্ভব হইয়া উঠে । কেননা, অভিব্যক্ত জগৎ হইতে ত ব্রহ্মের স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপ নাই তুমি বলিতেছ ; এই জগৎ-সংসারই ত ব্রহ্ম এবং জীব ত সেই সংসারেরই অংশ ; তাহা হইলে জীবের সংসারিত্ব চিরদিনই থাকিয়া যাইবে । আর যদি বল সংসারী জীবের অপূর্ণতা চলিয়া যাইয়া পূর্ণতালাভ ঘটবে ; তাহা হইলেও, যাহা অংশ-বিশেষ, তাহার পূর্ণতা ঘটিলে, উহা অংশীতে বিলীন হইয়া যাইবে । তাহা হইলেই জীবের যাহা আপন স্বরূপ, সেটী বিলুপ্ত হইয়া উঠিল !” এইরূপে ভাষ্যকার অতি স্পষ্ট ভাষায় Pantheism খণ্ডন করিয়াছেন† । এই সকল স্পষ্ট খণ্ডন সত্ত্বেও, কি প্রকারে পাশ্চাত্য পণ্ডিতেরা শঙ্করের অদ্বৈতবাদকে Pantheism নামে অভিহিত করিয়াছেন ইহা বুঝা যায় না ।

পাঠক এই সকল স্থল হইতে দেখিতে পাইতেছেন যে শঙ্করের মত Pantheism নহে । ব্রহ্ম আপন স্বরূপে অবিকৃত থাকিয়া, জগৎরূপে

* “তত্র বিকারপক্ষে এতাগত্যঃ । অনেকদ্রব্যসমাহারস্ত দাবয়বস্ত পরমান্বনঃ পূর্বসংস্থানাবস্থস্ত বা পরস্ত একদেশো বিক্রিয়তে । সর্ব্ব এব বা পবঃ পরিণমেৎ । অথ নিত্যায়ুর্ভস্কাবয়বানুগতঃ অবয়বী পর আত্মা তস্ত তদবস্থস্য একদেশো বিজ্ঞানাত্মা সংসারী—তদাপি সর্কাবয়বানুগতত্বাৎ অবয়বিন এব অবয়বগতো দোষো গুণোবেতি—বিজ্ঞানাত্মনঃ সংসারিত্বদোষণ পর এব আত্মা সম্বধ্যতে, ইয়মপানিষ্টা কল্পনা । ..পরস্য একদেশঃ ক্ষুটিতঃ বিজ্ঞানাত্মা সংসারতীতি চেৎ, তথাপি অবয়বক্ষুটেন দ্রুতপ্রাপ্তিঃ । আত্মাবয়বভূতস্য বিজ্ঞানাত্মনঃ সংসরণে ..পরমান্বনে দ্বঃখিতপ্রাপ্তিঃ”—ইত্যাদি ।

† “একদৈশৈকদেশিককল্পনা চ ব্রহ্মণি অমুপপন্না । বিকারপক্ষেপি এতত্ত্বল্যাৎ বিকারেণাপি বিকারিণোনিত্যপ্রাপ্তব্যাং । সর্ব্বেষেভেদে পক্ষেণ অনিমেজ্জপ্রসঙ্গঃ সংসারীত্বানিবৃতিঃ ; নিবৃত্তৌ বা স্বরূপনাশ-প্রসঙ্গঃ ব্রহ্মাত্মতানভ্যুপগমাচ্চ” ।

বিকাশিত হইয়াছেন। ইহাই শঙ্করের সিদ্ধান্ত। শঙ্করমতে, জীব ও, ব্রহ্মের অংশ নহে; জীবেরও নিজের নিজের স্বরূপ আছে। ব্রহ্ম, আপন প্রাণশক্তিদ্বারা সকল জীবকে পরস্পর সম্বন্ধে আনিয়াছেন। এই প্রাণ-স্পন্দনই সকল জীব, আপন আপন স্বরূপানুযায়ী, বিবিধ ধর্ম বা ক্রিয়ার উদ্রেক করিতেছে। ঐ সকল ধর্মের মধ্যে জীবের স্ব স্ব স্বরূপ ফুটিয়া উঠিতেছে। ইহাই ভাষ্যকারের সিদ্ধান্ত।

শঙ্করাচার্য আপন সিদ্ধান্তের দৃঢ়ীকরণার্থ, সর্ব প্রথমেই বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, যাহা কারণরূপে এক, তাহাই কার্য্যাকারে বিবিধ অবস্থায় অবস্থান্তরিত হইয়া অনেক হইয়া উঠে,—ইহা কখনই যুক্তিসঙ্গত হইতে পারে না। একটা বস্তু স্বরূপতঃ এক থাকিবে, অথচ তাহাই নানাকারে অবস্থান্তরিত হইয়া, নানাধর্মবিশিষ্ট হইয়া উঠিবে, ইহা কদাপি হইতে পারে না। যাহা নানা অবস্থায় অবস্থান্তরিত হয়, তাহার আর একত্ব থাকে না। যাহা স্বরূপতঃ এক, তাহা চিরকালই স্বরূপতঃ এক থাকে। একটা বস্তুর স্বরূপ, এক একবার, এক একরূপ হইতে পারে না। সর্বপ্রকার অবস্থান্তরের মধ্যে, বস্তুর যাহা প্রকৃত স্বরূপ, তাহা অবিকল একরূপই থাকিয়া যায়। একটা গো, যখন হাঁটিয়া বেড়ায় বা দাঁড়াইয়া থাকে, তখন উহার স্বরূপটি এক প্রকার; আবার ঐ গো যখন শয়ন করে, তখন উহার অন্য প্রকার স্বরূপ হয়,—তখন উহার স্বরূপটি অন্য প্রকার হইয়া উহা অশ্ব হইয়া উঠে,—ইহা কখনই সম্ভব হইতে পারে না*। ঐ গোর যতপ্রকার অবস্থার পরিবর্তন হউক না কেন, উহার স্বরূপটি অপরিবর্তিত রহিয়া যাইবে। উহার গো-স্বরূপ নষ্ট হইয়া, অশ্ব-স্বরূপ হইয়া উঠিবে না। এইরূপ, ব্রহ্মের যাহা প্রকৃত স্বরূপ, নাম-রূপাদি যত প্রকার বিকার বা ধর্ম অভিব্যক্ত হউক না কেন, সেই স্বরূপটি ঠিকই থাকিবে; উহার পরিবর্তন ঘটে না। কেন না, সকল প্রকার অবস্থাভেদেও, উহা আপনার স্বরূপটিকে ঠিক রাখে। কেন না, ব্রহ্মের যাহা স্বরূপ, তাহা সকল বিকারের অতীত, সকল অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম হইতে

* “অথাপি স্যাৎ—যো জাগরিতে শব্দাদিবুৎ বিজ্ঞানমযঃ, স এব হৃদ্বাখ্যমবস্থান্তরং গতঃ অসংসারী পরঃ অন্তঃ স্যাদিতি চেৎ—ন; অদৃষ্টত্বাৎ। ন হি নোকে গোঃ তিষ্ঠন বা গৌর্ভবতি; শরানন্ত অশ্বাদি-জাত্যন্তরমিতি!...বদ্ধধর্মকো যঃ পদার্থঃ প্রমাণেনাবগতো ভবতি, স দেশ-কালাবস্থান্তরেষুপি তদ্ধর্মক এব ভবতি। স চেৎ তদ্ধর্মকত্বং ব্যভিচারতি, সর্বঃ প্রমাণব্যবহাবো নুপ্যেত”।

স্বতন্ত্র । স্বরূপটাই বিকৃত হইয়া, নানা ধর্ম্মে পরিণত হয় না । ইহার কারণ এই যে, যেটী স্বরূপ, সেটী অব্যক্ত;—সেটী দেশ-কালে বিভক্ত নহে । আর, যাহা, কারণান্তর-যোগে, সেই স্বরূপের অভিব্যক্তি বা বিকাশ, তাহা দেশ-কালে বিভক্ত হইয়াই বিকাশিত হয় । Pantheism কেবলমাত্র অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম্মগুলির বিবরণ প্রদান করে ; কিন্তু যে স্বরূপ হইতে ঐ ধর্ম্মগুলি অভিব্যক্ত হয়, সেই স্বরূপ-সম্বন্ধে Pantheism নীরব ! ক্রিয়া হইতেছে, কিন্তু সেই ক্রিয়াগুলির কর্তা কে, তৎসম্বন্ধে Pantheism নীরব !

(ক) ।—শঙ্করাচার্য্য বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে,—অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম্মগুলি ত আত্মার ‘কর্ম্ম’-স্থানীয় ; উহারা ত আত্মার ‘বিষয়’রূপে অনুভূত হইয়া থাকে । কেন না, ঐ সকল ধর্ম্মত আত্মার স্বরূপেরই অভিব্যক্তি,—আত্মা হইতেই অভিব্যক্ত । আত্মা ঐ সকল ধর্ম্মের ‘কর্তৃ’-স্থানীয় । কেন না, আত্মার স্বরূপই ত, কারণান্তরদ্বারা উদ্ভিক্ত হইয়া, ঐ ধর্ম্মগুলিকে উৎপন্ন করিয়াছে । সুতরাং যাহা ‘কর্ম্ম’ বা ‘বিষয়,’—তাহাকেই তুমি ‘কর্তার’ স্বরূপ বলিবে কি প্রকারে ? অথচ Pantheism, ঐ অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম্ম বা বিকারগুলিকেই আত্মার স্বরূপ বলিয়া নির্দেশিত করে । কেন না, ঐ ধর্ম্মগুলি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র কোন স্বরূপ ত Pantheism স্বীকার করে না । আত্মার স্বরূপটাই নানা ধর্ম্মাকারে অভিব্যক্ত, ইহাই Pantheism-এর সিদ্ধান্ত* ।

(খ) ।—শঙ্করাচার্য্য এই উপলক্ষে, আরও একটী কথা বলিয়াছেন, তাহাও এস্থলে উল্লেখ-যোগ্য । ধর্ম্ম বা বিকারগুলি ত দেশ-কালে অভিব্যক্ত । সুতরাং ইহার এক অবস্থা হইতে অপর অবস্থায় পুনঃ পুনঃ রূপান্তরিত হইয়া থাকে । এবং, সুখদুঃখাদি বিকার হইতে বিমুক্ত হইয়া মুক্তি লাভ করাই ত জীবের উদ্দেশ্য । এখন কথা এই যে, এই ধর্ম্ম বা বিকারগুলিই যদি আত্মার স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব হয়; ইহাদের হইতে স্বতন্ত্র যদি আত্মার স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব না থাকে ; তাহা হইলে, যাহা যাহার স্বভাব বা স্বরূপ, তাহার ত

* “ কিং পুন স্তং ‘কর্ম্ম’ যৎ প্রাপ্তংপত্তেঃ ঈশ্বর-জ্ঞানস্ত বিষয়ো ভবতীতি । নামরূপে অব্যাকৃতে ব্যাচীকীৰ্ত্তিতে ইতি ব্রহ্মঃ । ” “ন চ...অনেকাংশবৎ বিজ্ঞানস্ত...বিজ্ঞানাংশদে চ সতি, অনুভূয়মানদ্বাং ব্যতিরিক্তবিষয়ঃ সদঃ । ” “তদর্শনস্ত বিষয়ো ভবতি, -কর্ম্মতাপ্যপত্তে । তৎ কথং কর্ম্মভূতং সৎ, কর্ম্মস্বরূপদৃশিবিষয়ঃ স্তাৎ । ” “আত্মসমবাসিহে দৃশ্যদ্রাব্যপত্তেঃ চক্ষুর্গতবিশেষবৎ । ত্রৈলোক্যং দৃশ্যং অর্থাস্তরভূতং ইতি । “(বে’ স্ত্র and বৃহ’ ভাষ্য) ।

পরিবর্তন বা রূপান্তর হইতে পারে না । যাহার যাহা স্বভাব, তাহা ত চির-নিত্য । স্বভাবের পরিবর্তন বা পুনঃ পুনঃ রূপান্তর-প্রাপ্তি সম্ভব হয় না ; আর, স্বভাব হইতে একেবারে বিমুক্ত করিয়া দেওয়াও সম্ভব হইতে পারে না । কেন না, বস্তুর যদি স্বভাব না থাকে বা স্বভাবটী সর্বদাই রূপান্তরিত হয়, তাহা হইলে বস্তুটীই ত শূন্য হইয়া পড়ে ; বস্তুটীকে ত চিনিতেও পারা যায় না । সুতরাং, যাহার যাহা স্বভাব বা স্বরূপ, তাহার লোপ সম্ভব নহে ; তাহার পরিবর্তনও সম্ভব নহে । পরিবর্তন সম্ভব হইলে, একই বস্তুর বহু স্বভাব হইয়া উঠে । সুতরাং এই অভিব্যক্ত ধর্মগুণলিকেই আত্মার স্বভাব বা স্বরূপ বলা নিতান্তই ভ্রমপূর্ণ* । ধর্ম বা বিকারগুলি ছাড়া, আত্মার স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব আছে । আপন স্বরূপে অবিকৃত থাকিয়াই, ঐ স্বরূপ হইতে বিবিধ ধর্ম বা বিকার বা ক্রিয়ার অভিব্যক্তি হয় । সুতরাং ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপটী, বিবিধ আকারে অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াও, নানা ধর্মবিশিষ্ট হইয়া উঠে না । যাহা এক, তাহা একই থাকে ; উহা অনেক হইয়া উঠে না । এই প্রকারে ভাষাকার, Pantheism খণ্ডন করিয়া আপন সিদ্ধান্ত স্থাপন করিয়াছেন । কিরূপে লোকে তাঁহার উপরে Pantheismএর দোষ অর্পণ করে, ইহা বুঝিয়া উঠা কঠিন ।

(গ) ।—শঙ্করাচার্য্য আর একটা স্থানে বলিয়াছেন যে, ব্রহ্মকে যদি স্বতন্ত্র না বলা যায় ; যদি মনে করা যায় যে, এক ব্রহ্মই জগতের যাবতীয় পদার্থাকারে অভিব্যক্ত হইয়া আছেন ;—তাহা হইলে পৃথিবী হইতে সকল ভেদ উঠিয়া যাইবে । কেন না, তুমি, আমি ; শিষ্য, গুরু ; কার্য্যের সাধন ও কার্য্যের ফল ;—সবই একাকার হইয়া উঠে । যেহেতু, ব্রহ্ম বর্তীত ত আর দ্বিতীয় বস্তু নাই ; ব্রহ্মহিত সর্বত্র আপনাকে অভিব্যক্ত করিয়া অবস্থিত । কারণরূপেও যে ব্রহ্মবস্তু ; কার্য্যরূপেও ত সেই ব্রহ্মবস্তু ; এবং এই এক ব্রহ্মবস্তু ছাড়া ত আর অন্য কোন বস্তুই নাই । উপদেষ্টাও—ব্রহ্ম ; আবার উপদেশ-গ্রহণকারীও—সেই ব্রহ্ম । এই প্রকারে, সকল ভেদ সংসার হইতে

* “একস্ত অনেক-বভাবব্রাহ্মণভ্যঃ” (বে' সূ', ৩২।২১) । “ন হি স্বভাবাং কচিৎ বিষজ্যতে ।... ন হি তদ্ধর্মদে সতি, তৈরেব সংযোগো বিযোগো বা যুক্তঃ ।” “ন তু স্বাভাবিকেন ধর্মেণ কন্তুচিৎ বিযোগো দৃষ্টঃ ; ন হি অগ্নেঃ স্বাভাবিকেন প্রকাশেন উষ্ণেন বা বিযোগো দৃষ্টঃ...তন্মাং গিন্ধমন্ত আঞ্জোতিবঃ অস্তব্ধং, কার্য্যকরণরূপেভ্যঃ পাপ্যভ্যঃ ; সংযোগবিযোগভ্যাং ।”—বৃহ ভা', ৪।৩।৮-৯ ।

উঠিয়া যায় । শঙ্কর কথাটা, বহিস্ত করিয়া, এই ভাবে বলিয়াছেন—“দেবদত্তের বাক্য এবং কর্ণ, দেবদত্তেরই ত ‘অংশ’ । সুতরাং বলিতে হয়—দেবদত্তের বাক্য—উপদেশদাতা ; আর কর্ণ—সেই উপদেশ গ্রহণকারী । কিন্তু ‘অংশী’ দেবদত্ত—উপদেষ্টাও নহে, উপদেশের গ্রহণকর্তাও নহে । কেন না, দেবদত্ত ত স্বতন্ত্র বস্তু নহে ; দেবদত্তইত বাক্য ও কর্ণাকার ধারণ করিয়াছে ।” এরূপ মনে করিলে, অংশ সকলের সমষ্টিকেই ত্রৈলোক্য স্বরূপ বলিতে হয় । সুতরাং ত্রৈলোক্য—সাবয়ব হইয়া উঠেন* ।

(ঘ) ।—যদি অভিব্যক্ত বিকার বা ধর্ম্মগুলি ব্যতীত, পরমাত্মার আর স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপ না থাকে, যদি পরম্পর সম্বন্ধযুক্ত এই সকল বিকারকেই পরমাত্মার স্বরূপ বলিয়া মনে করা যায়, তাহা হইলে আরো একটী গুরুতর দোষ হয় । ভাষ্যকার ‘বিজ্ঞানবাদ’ খণ্ডনের সময়ে সেই দোষটিরও উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন । এই বিকারগুলি দেশ ও কালে আবদ্ধ ; সুতরাং ইহারা একটীর পর একটী,—এই প্রকারে পরম্পর কার্য্য-কারণ-সূত্রে আবদ্ধ হইয়া ক্রিয়া করিতেছে । যদি ইহাদের হইতে স্বতন্ত্র পরমাত্মা না থাকে, তাহা হইলে, ইহারাই পরম্পর পরম্পরেব ‘জ্ঞাতা’ ও ‘জ্ঞেয়’ হইয়া উঠে । ইহাকে ভাষ্যকার,—“কর্ম্ম-কর্ত্ত-বিরোধ” শব্দে নির্দেশ করিয়াছেন । বর্তমানের বিকারটী, উহার পূর্ববর্ত্তীকালের বিকারটির কর্ম্ম বা জ্ঞেয় স্থানীয় । আবার বর্ত্তমানের বিকারটী, উহার পরবর্ত্তীকালের বিকারটির কর্ত্তৃস্থানীয় বা জ্ঞাতৃস্থানীয় হইয়া উঠে । এইরূপে, বিকারগুলি নিজেই নিজের জ্ঞাতা বা কর্ত্তা হইয়া উঠে । বিকারগুলি—আত্মা হইতে অভিব্যক্ত ; সুতরাং উহার সকলেই

* “একে বর্ণয়ন্তি...দ্বৈতাদ্বৈতাত্মকমেবং ব্রহ্ম ; যথা কিল সমুদ্রো জল তরঙ্গ-ফেন-বৃদ্ধদ্বাদ্বৈত-এব । ...ন হি ইয়ং স্ববিবক্ষিতা কল্পনা ।...যদাপি একংহি পরং ব্রহ্ম দ্বৈতাদ্বৈতাত্মকং, তৎ শৌকমোহাত্তীতত্বাৎ উপদেশঃ ন কাক্ষতি ; ন চ উপদেষ্টা অন্তঃব্রহ্মণঃ ; দ্বৈতাদ্বৈতরূপস্ত ব্রহ্মণঃ একশ্চৈব অভ্যুপগমাৎ ।... ন হি হস্তাদি-দ্বৈতাদ্বৈতাত্মকে দেবদত্তে, বাক্কর্ণয়োঃ দেবদত্তক দেশভূতয়োঃ, বাক্ উপদেষ্টা ; কর্ণঃ কেবল উপদেশ-গ্রহীতা ; দেবদত্তস্ত ন উপদেষ্টা নাপ্যুপদেশস্ত গ্রহীতা- ইতি কল্পয়িতুং শক্যতে”—বৃহৎ ভা°, ৪।১।১। “বিজ্ঞানাদর্শান্তরং বস্তু ন চৈতদ্যুপগম্যতে, ঘটঃ পটঃ ইত্যেবমাদীনাং পর্য্যায়শব্দভ্রমাপ্নোতি ; তথা সাধনানাং ফলস্ত চ একত্বে ভেদোপদেশানর্থক্য প্রসঙ্গঃ (বৃ ভা°, ৪।৩।৭) ।

+ “ন হি স্বান্বনৈব স্বমাম্বানং অবভাসয়তি...ব্যতিরিক্তচৈতন্যাবভাস্ত্বং ন ব্যভিচরন্তি ।...বর্ত্তমান-প্রত্যয় একঃ, অতীতশ্চ অপরঃ ; তৌ প্রত্যয়ো ভিন্নকালৌ । ততঃক্ষণদ্বয়ব্যাপিত্বং একস্ত বিজ্ঞানস্ত ক্ষণ

আত্মার ‘কৰ্ম্ম’-স্থানীয় বা ‘জ্যেয়’ (object),—ইহা বলাই সম্ভব । কেন না, বিকারগুলি যখন যখনই অভিব্যক্ত হয়, তখন তখনই আত্মা উহাদিগকে আপনার ‘বিষয়’রূপেই অশুভব করিয়া থাকে । জ্যেয় আছে, অথচ তাহার ‘জ্ঞাতা’ নাই ; ক্রিয়া বা কৰ্ম্ম উপস্থিত হইতেছে, অথচ উহার ‘কর্ত্তা’ নাই ;—ইহা মনে করা সুসঙ্গত হইতে পারে না । অতএব, জগতে অভিব্যক্ত নাম-রূপাদি বিকারগুলি, ব্রহ্ম হইতে অভিব্যক্ত হয় । সূতরাং ব্রহ্মকেই ইহাদের কর্ত্তা বা জ্ঞাতা বলিতে হয় । এখানেও আমরা দেখিতেছি যে,—শঙ্করের উপরে Pantheism চাপাইয়া দেওয়া অসম্ভব ।

(ঙ)।—শঙ্কর যে Pantheism খণ্ডন করিয়াছেন, তাহা পাঠক সর্বত্রই দেখিতে পাইতেছেন । Pantheismএর বিরুদ্ধে তিনি আরো একটী যুক্তির উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন, আমরা সেই যুক্তিটীর কথা বলিয়া এ সম্বন্ধে আমাদের বক্তব্য শেষ করিব । নানা স্থানে ভাষ্যকার বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, যাহা জড়, অচেতন, তাহা চেতন আত্মার প্রয়োজন সাধন করিয়া থাকে,—ইহাই সর্বত্র নিয়ম । যাহা চেতন, তাহাই কেবল আপন প্রয়োজন সাধনের নিমিত্ত ক্রিয়া করিয়া থাকে । এই যে বিকারগুলি পরস্পর মিলিতভাবে একই উদ্দেশ্যে ‘সংহত’ হইয়া ক্রিয়া করিয়া থাকে ; এতদ্বারা বুঝিতে হইবে যে, ইহাদের হইতে স্বতন্ত্র চেতন আত্মা আছেন । ইহারা তাঁহারই দ্বারা প্রেরিত হইয়া, তাঁহারই প্রয়োজন-সাধনার্থ পরস্পর মিলিত হইয়া ক্রিয়া করিতেছে । ইহা না বলিলে, বলিতে হয় যে, বিকারগুলি নিজেই নিজের প্রয়োজন সাধনার্থ ক্রিয়াশীল । বলিতে হয়—‘স্ব্থ স্বেধেরই নিমিত্ত এবং দুঃখ দুঃখেরই নিমিত্ত ক্রিয়া করিয়া থাকে’ । ভাষ্যকারের এই যুক্তিটী দ্বারাও, বিকার হইতে পরমাত্মার স্বতন্ত্র সত্তা প্রমাণ করিতেছে* ।

বাহানি: ।...ন তু বস্তুদর্শী একঃ, বস্তুদর্শনায় ক্ষণান্তরমবতিষ্ঠতে ; বিজ্ঞানস্ত কণিকদ্বাং সন্ধুস্তু দর্শনেনৈব ক্রোপপত্তে: । ..অনেকদর্শিন একস্ত অভাবাৎ” (বৃ° ভা°, ৪।৩।৭) । Vide also, ব্রহ্মসূত্রে ২।২।২৮ ভাষ্য ।

* “সংহতত্বাচ্চ পারার্থোপপত্তিঃ প্রাণস্ত...স্বাবয়বসমূহায়জাতীয়ব্যতিরিক্তার্থঃ সংহতত্ব ইত্যব গচ্ছামঃ” (বৃ° ভা°, ২।১।১৫) । “আদিত্যাদিজ্যোতিষাং পরার্থত্বাৎ...অচৈতন্ত্বে স্বার্থোপপত্তে: , স্বার্থজ্যোতিষ আত্মনঃ অভাবে...নাগ্নঃকার্য্যকরণ সংঘাত: ব্যবহারায় কল্পতে” (৪।৩।৭) ” সংহতস্ত বাগাদিলক্ষণস্ত কার্য্যস্ত পরার্থত্বঃ... পরমর্শিনবুপকার ভাজমন্তরণে ন ত্যাৎ” (৫ত° ভা°) ।

(Idealism বা ‘বিজ্ঞান-বাদ’ খণ্ডন)—

এই স্থলে আমরা পাঠকবর্গের সম্মুখে আর একটা মতের কথা উপস্থিত করিব। এই মতটী “বিজ্ঞানবাদ” নামে পরিচিত। ইহাই ইউরোপে Idealism নামে প্রখ্যাত। এটা Pantheism মতেরই একটা প্রকারভেদ মাত্র। অনেকে শঙ্করাচার্য্যকেও “বিজ্ঞান-বাদী” বলিয়া মনে করেন। শঙ্কর, বেদান্ত-ভাষ্যে ও বৃহদারণ্যক ভাষ্যে এই “বিজ্ঞানবাদের” বিস্তৃত খণ্ডন করিয়াছেন। কিন্তু তবুও কেমন করিয়া তাঁহাকে লোকে ‘বিজ্ঞানবাদী’ বলে, ইহা আমরা বুঝিয়া উঠিতে পারি না।

বিজ্ঞান-বাদটা এই প্রকারে উত্থিত হইয়াছিল :—আমরা সর্বদাই দেখিতে পাই যে, এ জগতের কোন বস্তুই আমাদের জ্ঞানের বিষয়ীভূত না হইয়া, উপস্থিত হয় না। যখনই যে বস্তু উপস্থিত হউক, উহাকে আমরা তখনই জানিতে পারি। আমাদের জ্ঞানের ক্ষেত্র হইয়াই বস্তুগুলি উপস্থিত হয়। ইহা দেখিয়া, আমাদের এই ধারণা বন্ধমূল হইয়া উঠিয়াছে যে, আমাদের জ্ঞানের বাহিরে কোন বস্তুরই অস্তিত্ব নাই। কিন্তু আমি বা তুমি—কেহই ত জগতের সকল বস্তুকে জানিতে পারি না। সুতরাং জগতের তাবৎ বস্তুগুলি কোন ব্যক্তিবিশেষের জ্ঞানে অবস্থান করিতেছে না। একটা সাধারণ-জ্ঞাতার জ্ঞানের মধ্যে (A general consciousness or a cosmic intelligence), জগতের তাবৎ বস্তু অবস্থিত। সেই জ্ঞাতার জ্ঞানের বাহিরে কোন ক্ষেত্র বস্তু থাকিতে পারে না। জ্ঞাতার জ্ঞানাকারে তাবৎ বস্তু রহিয়াছে। সুতরাং ‘ক্ষেত্র’ বলিয়া, জ্ঞাতার বাহিরে স্বতন্ত্র কোন বিষয়ই থাকিতেছে না।

আর একটু অগ্রসর হইলেই, আমরা আরো একটা কথা বুঝিতে পারিব। সেই জ্ঞাতারই জ্ঞানের মধ্যে, জ্ঞাতারই জ্ঞানাকারে, ত তাবৎ বস্তু অবস্থিত। তাহা হইলেই, ঐ জ্ঞান-গুলিকে ছাড়িয়া, ঐ জ্ঞানগুলি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র হইয়া—উহাদের বাহিরে—জ্ঞাতাই বা কি প্রকারে থাকিবে? কেন না, ঐ জ্ঞান-গুলিহইতে সেই জ্ঞাতার রূপ, সেই জ্ঞাতার বিকাশ। সুতরাং ‘জ্ঞাতা’ বলিয়া, ঐ সকল জ্ঞান হইতে বিযুক্ত হইয়া, উহাদের বাহিরে, স্বতন্ত্র কোন বিষয়ী থাকিতেছে না।

জ্ঞাতা ও জ্ঞেয়, বিষয় ও বিষয়ী—উড়িয়া গেল ; থাকিল কেবল পরস্পর-সম্বন্ধযুক্ত কতকগুলি বিজ্ঞান । এই সকল বিজ্ঞানের সমষ্টি—এই জগৎ ।

শঙ্কর এই বিজ্ঞানবাদের খণ্ডন করিতে গিয়া বলিয়াছেন যে, জ্ঞেয় বিষয়ই ত প্রথমে, জ্ঞাতার মধ্যে কতকগুলি জ্ঞানের উদ্বেক করায়* । যদি জ্ঞেয় বিষয়টাকে উড়াইয়া দেও, তাহা হইলে, জ্ঞানগুলির উদ্বেক করাইবে কে ? আবার, একটা জ্ঞান অপর একটা জ্ঞানের সদৃশ এবং উহা অপর একটা জ্ঞান হইতে ভিন্ন,—এই প্রকার বিচার ও তুলনা ব্যতীত কোন বিজ্ঞানকেই জানিতে পারা যায় না । জ্ঞাতাই এইরূপ বিচার ও তুলনা করিয়া থাকে । জ্ঞাতাকে যদি উড়াইয়া দেও, তাহা হইলে বিজ্ঞানগুলিকে ত জানিতেই পারা যাইবে না । সুতরাং জ্ঞাতা ও জ্ঞেয়—কাহাকেও উড়াইয়া দেওয়া যায় না ।

এই বিজ্ঞানবাদটা Pantheism এরই প্রকার ভেদ মাত্র । সুতরাং পূর্বে Pantheism খণ্ডনার্থ যে সকল যুক্তি প্রদর্শিত হইয়াছে, সেইগুলিই এই বিজ্ঞানবাদের বিরুদ্ধে প্রয়োগ করা যাইতে পারিবে ।

শঙ্কর, জ্ঞাতা ও জ্ঞেয়, বিষয় ও বিষয়ী,—এই উভয়ের সত্তা উড়াইয়া দেন নাই । জ্ঞাতা ও জ্ঞেয়, এবং ইহাদের পরস্পর সম্বন্ধ হইতেই যাবতীয় জ্ঞান লাভ হইয়া থাকে । ইহারই উপরে শঙ্কর আপন মতের প্রতিষ্ঠা করিয়াছেন । বেদান্ত ভাষ্যের বিশ্ববিখ্যাত ভূমিকায়, তাই তিনি বিষয় ও বিষয়ীর কথা লইয়াই, ভাষ্য আরম্ভ করিয়া ছিলেন । উহাদিগকে উড়াইয়া দিয়া যদি ‘বিজ্ঞানবাদ’ স্থাপনই তাঁহার উদ্দেশ্য হইত, তাহা হইলে, প্রারম্ভেই উহার স্থান পাইত না, ইহাই আমাদের বিশ্বাস ।

(জগতের সঙ্গে ব্রহ্মের সম্বন্ধ)—

প্রিয় পাঠক, শঙ্করাচার্য যে ভাবে Panthiesm খণ্ডন করিয়াছেন, তাহা আলোচিত হইল । সেই Panthiesm মতেরই প্রকার-ভেদ Idealism মত, তিনি কিরূপে খণ্ডন করিয়াছেন, তাহাও আমরা দেখিয়া আসিলাম । এই আলোচনা হইতেই পাঠক বুঝিতে পারিতেছেন যে, শঙ্করের মতকে

* “ন হি বিষয়সাক্ষ্যং বিষয়নাশে ভবতি, অসতি বিষয়ে বিষয়সাক্ষ্যাদুপপত্তেঃ” ইত্যাদি দেখুন ।

Panthiesm বলিয়া নির্দেশ করা কতদূর অসঙ্গত । একথা পরে আরো পরিস্ফুট হইয়া পড়িবে ।

আমরা পাইতেছি যে, উষ্ণতা ও প্রকাশ যেমন অগ্নির স্বতঃসিদ্ধ স্বভাব ; নীতলতা যেমন জলের স্বতঃসিদ্ধ স্বরূপ ; ব্রহ্মেরও তদ্রূপ একটা স্বতঃসিদ্ধ স্বভাব বা স্বরূপ আছে । ব্রহ্ম—নিঃস্বরূপ, বা শূন্য, বা অসৎ বস্তু নহেন । ব্রহ্মের এই স্বভাবটির কোন অবস্থাতেই রূপান্তর হয় না, বা বিকৃত হইয়াও পড়ে না । বেদান্ত, ব্রহ্মের এই স্বরূপটির কি প্রকার লক্ষণ নির্দেশ করিয়াছেন, তাহা আমরা পরে দেখিব । এখন আমরা, ব্রহ্ম হইতে অভিব্যক্ত এই জগতের সহিত, তাঁহার সেই স্বরূপটির কি প্রকার সম্বন্ধ, তাহারই আলোচনায় প্রবৃত্ত হইতেছি । এই সম্বন্ধ বুঝাইবার উদ্দেশ্যে বেদান্তে দুইটি শব্দ প্রযুক্ত হইয়াছে । একটা শব্দ—‘নিগুণ’ । অপর শব্দটি—‘সগুণ’ । এই বহুবিকারপূর্ণ, অভিব্যক্ত জগতের সঙ্গে তাঁহার দুই প্রকার সম্বন্ধ (Relation) কথিত হইয়াছে । ‘নেতি’ ‘নেতি’ প্রতিষেধ-মুখে—Negative ভাবে—এক প্রকার সম্বন্ধ । বিধি-মুখে—Positive ভাবে—আর একপ্রকার সম্বন্ধ উক্ত হইয়াছে । এই বিকারী, দেশ-কালে আবদ্ধ, প্রতিমূর্ত্তে রূপান্তর প্রাপ্ত, অনিত্য, দুঃখ যাতনা মুখরিত, বিধ্বংসী—জগৎ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র করিয়া লইয়া, সর্বপ্রকার বিকারের অতীত ভাবে ব্রহ্ম ‘নিগুণ’ বা গুণাতীত । যেহেতু, তিনি—নিত্য, নির্বিকার, জরামরণ-স্পর্শশূন্য, অপরিবর্তনীয় ও নিয়ত পূর্ণস্বরূপ । আবার, জগৎ যখন তাঁহারই বিকাশ, তাঁহারই পরিচায়ক এবং তিনিই যখন জগতের মূলে, তখন তিনি ‘সগুণ’;—তিনি জগতের সঙ্গে অচ্ছেদ্য সম্পর্কে নিত্য-সম্বন্ধ । প্রাণ, তাঁহারই শক্তি, তাঁহা হইতেই স্পন্দনাকারে অভিব্যক্ত, এবং তাঁহা দ্বারা প্রেরিত হইয়া সকল বস্তু ও সকল জীবকে পরস্পর সম্বন্ধে আনিয়াছে । জগতের হ্রায়, জীব-সকল সর্বতোভাবে তাঁহারই অধীন, তাঁহারই আশ্রিত । জগতের ও জীবের সঙ্গে ব্রহ্মের এই ঘনিষ্ঠ সম্বন্ধ বুঝাইবার জন্য তাঁহাকে ‘সগুণ’ বলা হইয়াছে* ।

* “যস্য নেতি নেতীতি অন্ত-প্রতিষেধদ্বারেন ব্রহ্মণো নির্দেশঃকৃতঃ, তস্য বিধিমুখেন কথ্যনির্দেশঃ কর্তব্য ইতি পুনঃ আহ—মূলং চ জগতো বক্তব্যং ইতি (বু, ভা, ৩১২৭) । শব্দর বুঝাইরাছেন যে, ব্রহ্মকে যদি বানী ধর্মবিশিষ্ট মনে কর, এই জন্য, তিনি সকল ধর্ম হইতে, সকল বিকার হইতে ভিন্ন—ইহাই

তিনি জগতের অতীত, জীবেরও অতীত ; কিন্তু তিনি নিঃসম্পর্কিত নহেন । জগৎ ও জীব—তাঁহারই মধ্যে পরস্পর সম্বন্ধে আসিয়া, আপন আপন উদ্দেশ্য সিদ্ধ করিতে পারিতেছে । তিনি জগতের অতীত হইয়াও, জগতের অবভাসক* । বেদান্তের এই নিগূ'ণ ব্রহ্মকে তাঁহার সর্বপ্রকার সম্পর্ক রহিত বলিয়া মনে করেন, তাঁহার নিতান্তই অবিচার করিয়াছেন । শঙ্করের নিগূ'ণ ব্রহ্মকে Absolute শব্দে নির্দেশ করিলে, নিতান্তই ভুল করা হইবে* ।

এই নিগূ'ণ বা সগুণশব্দ দুইটী ব্রহ্মের যে স্বতঃসিদ্ধ একটা স্বভাব বা স্বরূপ আছে, তাহা বুঝাইবার জন্য বেদান্তে ব্যবহৃত হয় নাই । জগৎ ও জীবের সঙ্গে ব্রহ্মের দুই প্রকার সম্বন্ধ বুঝাইবার জন্যই ব্যবহৃত হইয়াছে । পার্থক্য, আমরা শঙ্কর-ভাষ্য হইতে এ বিষয়ে যে সকল উক্তি উদ্ধৃত করিয়াছি, তদ্বারাই তাহা বুঝিতে পারিয়াছেন ।

কোন কোন পাশ্চাত্য পণ্ডিত এই তত্ত্বটী প্রাধান্য করিয়া দেখেন নাই । না দেখিয়াই, তাঁহার নিগূ'ণ ব্রহ্মকে সর্ব প্রকার সম্পর্ক রহিত, শূন্য বলিয়াই ধরিয়া লইয়াছেন । নিগূ'ণ ব্রহ্মকে তাঁহার Absolute অর্থে গ্রহণ করিয়া,

বুঝাইবার জন্য 'নিগূ'ণ' শব্দ ব্যবহৃত হইয়াছে । 'নেতি নেতি' শব্দভাণ্ডার সত্য সত্য নির্দিষ্টকৃতমিতি, উচ্যতে—সর্বোপাধিবিশেষাপোহেন ; যস্মিন্ ন কশ্চিৎ বিশেষোহস্তি...তথা অধারোপিত নামরূপকর্ম্মধারেণ নির্দিশ্যতে 'বিজ্ঞানমাননঃ' ইত্যাদি শব্দৈঃ । তথা প্রাপ্তনির্দেশ-প্রতিষেধধারেণ" (২।৩।৬) । "অস্মা সম্যক প্রবোধায় উপপত্তিস্থিতলয়াদিকল্পনা, ক্রিয়াকারকফলাধারোপনাচ আত্মনি কৃত্য (সগুণ) । তদুপোহেননেতি নেতীতি অধারোপিত বিশেষাপনয়নধারেণ পুনস্তত্ত্বমাবেদিতং (নিগূ'ণ)—৪।৩।২১ ।

* এই জন্য এই ভাবে ব্রহ্মকে নির্দেশ করা হইয়াছে—"কার্য্যকরণ-ব্যতিরিক্তং, কার্য্যকরণসংঘাতানু-প্রাহকঞ্চ জ্যোতিঃ অন্তঃস্থং" (বু', ভা', ৪.৩।৬) । "স্বতঃ কার্য্যকরণাদিসংসর্গরহিতঃ বিবিক্তঃখেন রূপেণ, কিন্তু কার্য্যকরণানি তদবভাসিতানি কণ্ঠস্থ ব্যাপ্রিয়স্তে" (৪।৩.১১) "সর্বমেতৎ যেন নিয়তং যস্মিন্ প্রতিষ্ঠিতং আকাশান্তঃ ওতপোতঞ্চ, তস্য নিরূপাধিকস্য 'নেতি' 'নেতীতি' নির্দেশঃ কর্তব্যঃ (৩।২।২৬) । এই জন্য, নিরূপাধিকঃ নেতিনেতীতি ব্যপদেশঃ আত্মাব্রহ্ম অক্ষরঃ অন্তর্ধামো, প্রশান্তো বিজ্ঞানমাননঃ ব্রহ্ম" (৪।৩।১) । একত্র একই বাক্যে, জগদতীত ও জগতের সঙ্গে সম্পর্ক দেখান হইয়াছে । বেদান্ত ভাষ্যও এইরূপ— "সর্বত্র বিশেষনিরাকরণরূপো ব্রহ্মপ্রতিপাদনপ্রকারঃ" (ব্রহ্ম সূত্র, ৩।৩।৩৩) । শঙ্কর সর্বত্র 'নিগূ'ণ' পদের এই অর্থই করিয়াছেন । অর্থাৎ জগতের সর্বপ্রকার অবস্থান্তরের মধ্যে ব্রহ্মের একত্ব ও স্বাতন্ত্র্য ঠিক থাকে । নিগূ'ণ শব্দ দ্বারা সেইটাই বুঝিতে হইবে ; তাঁহাকে অবস্থাবিশিষ্ট বলিয়া বুঝিতে হইবে না । এই সকল সূক্ষ্ম কথা স্বেচ্ছা, 'নিগূ'ণকে সর্বপ্রকার সম্বন্ধ বর্জিত শূন্য বলিয়া কেন লোকে বুঝে ? (বেদান্ত ভাষ্য ৪।১।২ দেখুন) ।

† Hamilton, Mansel, প্রভৃতি পণ্ডিত Absolute অর্থে জগতের সঙ্গে সকল সম্বন্ধ রহিত, অজ্ঞেয় বস্তু বুঝিয়াছেন । বেদান্তের ব্রহ্ম সেরূপ নহে ।

বেদান্ত-কথিত ব্রহ্মকে তাঁহার Empty and remote ব্রহ্ম এবং A rarefied abstract unity বলিয়া অভিহিত করিয়াছেন। আমরা নিম্নে তাঁহাদের দুই একটি উক্তি উদ্ধৃত করিতেছি:—

“In any case, within the reach of human understanding, the Vedantic Nirguna Brahma is *nothing*. For the mind of man can form no notion of matter or spirit apart from its attributes..... Nirguna Brahma exists without intellect, without intelligence, without even consciousness of its own existence.”

আবার—“The direction of Upanishad thought is towards an abstract and empty Brahma—a unity so rarefied and so remote that it can not be characterised and therefore can not be known.....It is reached and known by *emptying* all things of that which seems to give them being and strength.”

আমরা দেখিয়া আসিয়াছি যে, ব্রহ্মের নিজের একটি স্বরূপ আছে। এই জন্মই তিনি জগৎ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র। আপন স্বরূপে অবিকৃত থাকিয়াই, ব্রহ্ম জগদাকারে বিকাশিত হইয়া রহিয়াছেন।

“স্বরূপানুপমর্দেনৈব বিচিত্রাকারা সৃষ্টিঃ পঠ্যতে”—

তাঁহার সমগ্র স্বরূপটাই যে জগদাকার ধারণ করিয়াছে তাহা নহে। এই জগৎ, তাঁহার সংকল্প বা কামনাবশতঃ, তাঁহার স্বরূপ হইতেই অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছে; কিন্তু এই অভিব্যক্ত জগতের মধ্যে তাঁহার স্বরূপটী আপনাকে হারায় নাই। বিকারের মধ্যে, ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপের একত্ব ঠিক থাকে।

কি প্রকারে ভাষ্যকার এই তত্ত্বটী বুঝাইয়াছেন, এখন তাহাই দেখিতে আমরা অগ্রসর হইব।

১। ব্রহ্মের নিগুণতাব।

বেদান্ত দর্শনের দ্বিতীয় অধ্যায়, প্রথম পাদে ২৬ সূত্রে একটি প্রশ্ন উত্থাপিত হইল যে, ব্রহ্ম ত নিরবয়ব; তাঁহার ত অংশ নাই। সুতরাং তিনি অংশ-বিশেষে জগদাকারে বিকাশিত হইয়াছেন; আর তাঁহার অংশ-বিশেষ ঠিক আছে;—একথা বলা ত যায় না। তিনি যখন নিরবয়ব, তখন তাঁহার সমগ্র স্বরূপটাই জগদাকার ধারণ করিয়া রহিয়াছে, ইহাই বলিতে হয়। এ প্রশ্নের মীমাংসা কিরূপ? তবে কি ব্রহ্মের সমগ্র স্বরূপটাই নিঃশেষে জগদাকারে পরিণত হইয়া রহিয়াছে?

এই প্রশ্নের উত্তরে ভাষ্যকার যে সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়াছেন, তাহা উল্লিখিত হইতেছে—

(১) শ্রুতিতে ব্রহ্মকে জগতের ‘কারণ’ (cause) বলিয়া নির্দেশ করা হইয়াছে এবং এই জগৎকে সেই কারণ হইতে অভিব্যক্ত ‘কার্য্য’ (effect) বলিয়া নির্দেশ করা হইয়াছে। একের নাম—কারণ। অপরের নাম—কার্য্য। যাহা কার্য্য তাহা কারণ নহে; যাহা কারণ তাহাও কার্য্য নহে। উভয়ে ভিন্ন। ভিন্ন না হইলে, কার্য্যকারণ কথাটাই উঠিয়া যায়;—কারণটাই কার্য্য হইয়া উঠে। শ্রুতি ব্রহ্মকে জগতের কারণ বলিয়া নির্দেশ করায়, ব্রহ্ম যে জগৎ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র তাহাই পাওয়া যাইতেছে। সুতরাং যেমন ব্রহ্ম—বিকাররূপে অবস্থিত, তেমনি আবার ব্রহ্ম—বিকার হইতে স্বতন্ত্র হইয়াও অবস্থিত। এতদ্বারা, ব্রহ্ম যে বিকারাতীত, বিকার হইতে স্বতন্ত্র, তাহাই পাওয়া যাইতেছে* ।

(২) শ্রুতিতে আমরা আর একটা কথা পাই। ‘ব্রহ্মের একটা মাত্র পাদ জগদাকার ধারণ করিয়া রহিয়াছে; কিন্তু ইহা ছাড়া ব্রহ্মের অপর তিনটী পাদ অব্যক্ত রহিয়াছে’। এ কথাটার তাৎপর্য্য কি? ভাষ্যকার বলিয়াছেন যে এতদ্বারা ব্রহ্মকে ‘ব্যাপক’ এবং জগৎকে ‘ব্যাপ্য’ বলা হইয়াছে। অর্থাৎ, এই জগৎ ব্রহ্মের অন্তর্ভুক্ত; তিনি এই জগৎকে ব্যাপিয়া রহিয়াছেন; নিজেই নিজকে ব্যাপিয়া রাখা যায় না। ব্যাপ্য বস্তু হইতে, ব্যাপককে স্বতন্ত্র হওয়া আবশ্যিক। যেটা যাহার মধ্যগত, অন্তর্গত; সেটা অপেক্ষা তাহা স্বতন্ত্র হইবেই। স্বতন্ত্র না হইলে, একটা বস্তুকে আপনার মধ্যে সর্ব্বতোভাবে ব্যাপিয়া রাখা যায় না†। সুতরাং এই জগৎ যখন ব্রহ্মেরই মধ্যগত,—তাঁহারই মধ্যে বিকারগুলি ক্রিয়া করিতেছে, তখন ব্রহ্ম অবশ্যই এই বিকারগুলি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র। সুতরাং ব্রহ্ম যে সমগ্ররূপে, নিঃশেষে,

* “যথৈব হি ব্রহ্মণো জগদ্রূপন্তিঃ শ্রুতে” এবং বিকার-ব্যতিরেকেণাপি ব্রহ্মণোহবস্থানং প্ররূপে প্রকৃতি-বিকারয়ো র্তেদেন ব্যাপদেশাৎ” (বে সূত্র, ২।১।২৭) “অনন্তদ্বৈপি কার্য্যকারণয়োঃ, কার্য্যন্তকারণাভাবঃ, ন কারণন্ত কার্য্যাস্বতঃ”—ব্রহ্ম সূত্র, ২।১।৯ ।

† ব্যাপক—What pervades ব্যাপ্য—What is pervaded. “পাদোহস্ত বিবা ভূতানি, জিগা দোহ-স্তাযুস্তং দ্বিবীতি—ব্যাপ্যব্যাপকভাবাৎ” (ব্রহ্মপ্রভা, বে সূত্র, ২।১।২৭) । “কর্ষহি কর্ণক্ৰিয়য়া ব্যাপ্যমানঃ ভবতি। অস্তঃ চ ব্যাপাৎ, অস্তঃ ব্যাপকঃ। ন তেনৈব তৎ ব্যাপাতে। ...তদদর্শনন্ত বিবয়ো ভবতি—কর্ষতামাপন্ততে। তৎ কথং কর্ণভূতঃ সৎ, কর্ণস্বরূপদৃশি-বিশেষণস্তাৎ?”—বৃ ভাষ্য, ৪।৪।৬ ।

এই জগদাকারে পরিণত হইয়াছেন, তাহা পাওয়া যাইতেছে না। ‘কর্তার’ ক্রিয়া দ্বারা ব্যাপ্ত হইয়াই উহার ‘কর্ম’ প্রকাশিত হয়। এই জগৎ ব্রহ্মের কর্ম-স্থানীয় ; সুতরাং ব্রহ্ম জগতের অতীত ; জগৎ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র ।

(৩) আর একটা কথাও দ্রষ্টব্য। যাহা বিকার, তাহা দেশ-কালে অভিব্যক্ত। যাহা দেশ-কালে অভিব্যক্ত, তাহাই আমাদের ইন্দ্রিয়-গ্রাহ্য। কিন্তু যিনি এই বিকারগুলির অন্তরালে ইহাদের কারণরূপে অবস্থিত, তাহা দেশ-কালের অতীত ; সুতরাং তাহা ইন্দ্রিয়-গ্রাহ্য নহে। এই ব্যক্ত জগৎ ইন্দ্রিয়-গ্রাহ্য ; কিন্তু যিনি এই জগতের অব্যক্ত কারণ-বীজ, যে কারণবীজটি—এই বিকারগুলির মধ্যে অনুগত হইয়া রহিয়াছেন, তিনি নির্বিকার ; সুতরাং ইন্দ্রিয়ের অতীত। ইহা দ্বারাও বুঝা যাইতেছে যে, ব্রহ্মবস্তু এই জগতের অতীত ; এই জগৎ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র*। এই সঙ্গে অপর একটা তত্ত্ব মনে করিতে, হইবে। সেই তত্ত্বটি শ্রুতিতে এই ভাবে উক্ত হইয়াছে যে, জীব গাঢ় সুষুপ্তির সময়ে ব্রহ্মস্বরূপকে লাভ করিয়া থাকে। কিন্তু জাগরিত-কালে এবং স্বপ্ন দর্শন-কালে, এই স্বরূপটা আবৃত হইয়া পড়ে। শ্রুতির এই নির্দেশ দ্বারা আমরা কি বুঝিতে পারিতেছি ? আমরা বুঝিতে পারিতেছি যে, বিকার ব্যতীতও পরমাত্মার একটা নির্বিকার স্বরূপ আছে। সুতরাং পরমাত্মা এই অভিব্যক্ত, বিকৃত জগৎ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র। যদি মনে করা যায় যে, পরমাত্মার সমগ্র স্বরূপটাই এই জগৎরূপে অভিব্যক্ত হইয়া আছে ; যদি মনে করা যায় যে, আমাদের জাগরিত-কালে ও স্বপ্নদর্শনকালে আমরা যে বিকারবর্গের অনুভব করিয়া থাকি, ঐ বিকারবর্গই আত্মার স্বরূপ ; তদ্ব্যতীত তাঁহার আর স্বতন্ত্র কোন স্বরূপ নাই ; তাহা হইলে, গাঢ় সুষুপ্তির সময়ে,—যখন সর্বপ্রকার বিকার অব্যক্ত হইয়া যায়—তখন তাহা হইলে কেমন করিয়া আত্মা নির্বিকার স্বরূপকে লাভ করিবে ? কেন না, বিকার ব্যতীত ত আত্মার আর স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপই নাই। কিন্তু যখন প্রত্যহ আত্মা, গাঢ় সুষুপ্তিতে মগ্ন হইয়া, আত্মস্বরূপের অনুভব করিয়া থাকে, তখন বলিতেই হইবে যে, কেবল অভিব্যক্ত বিকারগুলিই তাঁহার স্বরূপ নহে ; বিকার ব্যতীতও তাঁহার

* “বিকারস্ত চ ইন্দ্রিয়গোচরত্বোপপত্তেঃ ; ইন্দ্রিয়গোচরত্ব-প্রতিষেধাৎ চ ব্রহ্মণঃ”—ব্রহ্ম সূত্র, ২।১।২৭।

“যস্মি করণগোচরং ব্যাকৃতং বস্তু তদগ্রহণ গোচরং ; তদ্বিপরীতমাত্মবস্তু”—বৃহৎ ভা, । “অব্যক্তং অনিন্দ্রিয়গ্রাহ্যং—সর্বদৃশ্যসাক্ষিহাং” (ব্রহ্ম সূত্র, ৬।২।৩৪)।

স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপ আছে । অতএব, বুঝা যাইতেছে যে, ব্রহ্ম এই বিকারী জগৎ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র । একটা কথা এ স্থলে মনে রাখিতে হইবে । জাগরিতকালে, যখন বাহ্য বিষয়বর্গ আমাদের ইন্দ্রিয়াদির বিবিধ ক্রিয়ার উদ্রেক করাইয়া, আত্মায় শব্দস্পর্শাদি বিবিধ জ্ঞানের অনুভব জাগাইয়া দেয়, তখন যে আত্মার প্রকৃত নির্বিবকার স্বরূপটাই বিকৃত হইয়া পড়ে, তাহা নহে । সেই স্বরূপটাই তখন ঐ সকল জ্ঞান ও ক্রিয়া দ্বারা আচ্ছন্ন হয় মাত্র ; উহার স্বাতন্ত্র্য পরিস্ফুট হয় না মাত্র । স্বপ্ন-দর্শন-কালেও, যখন আমাদের ইন্দ্রিয়বর্গের সহিত বাহ্য বিষয়ের সম্বন্ধ না থাকায়, ইন্দ্রিয়বর্গের স্ব স্ব ক্রিয়ার উদ্রেক জন্মে না বটে ; কিন্তু জাগরিতকালে যে সকল বাহ্য বিষয়ের অনুভব আমরা করিয়া থাকি, ঐ সকল অনুভব সংস্কার-রূপে আমাদের চিত্তে অঙ্কিত হইয়া বিলীন থাকে ; স্বপ্ন-দর্শন-কালে, চিত্তের সেই বিলীন সংস্কার-সমূহ পুনরায় জাগিয়া উঠে । জীব, স্বপ্ন-দর্শন-কালে তাহাই অনুভব করিয়া থাকে । এ সময়েও, জীবের যেটা নির্বিবকার স্বরূপ, তাহার সবটাই যে বিকৃত হইয়া উঠে, তাহা নহে । স্বপ্নে যে সকল বস্তু আমরা অনুভব করি, সেই সকল অনুভব দ্বারা স্বরূপটাই প্রচ্ছন্ন হইয়া পড়ে, এই মাত্র । কিন্তু গাঢ় সুষুপ্তির সময়ে, চিত্তের সর্বপ্রকার বিকার অব্যক্ত হইয়া যায় ; কেন না, ইন্দ্রিয়ের সহিত বিষয়ের সংযোগ না থাকায় এবং মনেরও ক্রিয়া স্তম্ভ হওয়ায়, তৎকালে কেবল মাত্র আত্মার প্রকৃত নির্বিবকার স্বরূপটাই পরিস্ফুট হইয়া উঠে ; কোন বিকার দ্বারা প্রচ্ছন্ন হয় না । এই জন্মই শ্রুতিতে সুষুপ্তির অবস্থায় জীবের ব্রহ্মস্বরূপ-প্রাপ্তির কথা বিশেষভাবে উল্লিখিত হইয়াছে । সকল অবস্থাতেই আত্মার যেটা প্রকৃত স্বরূপ, তাহার একত্ব ঠিকই থাকে ; উহা আপন স্বাতন্ত্র্য হারায় না । এই যুক্তির দ্বারা আমরা বুঝিতেছি যে, অভিব্যক্ত বিকার বা ধর্মগুণি হইতে আত্মার স্বতন্ত্র একটা স্বরূপ আছে ; সেই স্বরূপটাই, অল্প বস্তু সংযোগে, নানা ধর্ম্মে অভিব্যক্ত হয় । কিন্তু অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম্মগুলির মধ্যেও, স্বরূপের স্বাতন্ত্র্য ও একত্ব নষ্ট হইয়া যায় না । এইরূপে আমরা, পরমাত্মার একটা বিকারাতীত স্বরূপের পরিচয় পাইতেছি* ।

* “যদি চ কৃত্বং ব্রহ্ম কার্যভাবেন উপযুক্তং জ্ঞাৎ, ‘সত্য সৌম্য তদা সম্পন্নো ভবতি’ ইতি হৃষুগিতং বিশেষাৎ অমুপপন্নঃ জ্ঞাৎ, বিকৃতেন ব্রহ্মণা নিত্যসম্পন্নত্বাৎ, অবিকৃতস্ত চ ব্রহ্মণো হতাবাৎ”—ব্রহ্ম সূত্র, ২।৬।২৭ “ন কদাচিৎ জীবন্ত ব্রহ্মণঃ সম্পত্তির্নাস্তি, স্বরূপস্ত অনপারিহাৎ ; স্বপ্ন-জাগরিতয়োস্তে উপাধি-

(৪) জগতের বিকারগুলি, ধর্মগুলি, ব্রহ্ম হইতে উৎপন্ন হইয়াছে—অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছে দেখিয়াই, ব্রহ্মকে এই সকল বিকার-বিশিষ্ট—এই সকল ধর্ম-বিশিষ্ট মনে করা বড়ই অসঙ্গত। ব্রহ্মই ভিন্ন ভিন্ন বিকাররূপে উৎপন্ন বা অভিব্যক্ত হইয়া রহিয়াছেন,—ইহা মনে করা অত্যন্ত অসঙ্গত। যিনি নানা ধর্মাত্মক ; যিনি নানা বিকার-বিশিষ্ট, তিনিই ব্রহ্ম ; কেন না, তিনিই ত জগদাকারে পরিণত হইয়াছেন ; কেন না, এই বিকারগুলিই ত তাঁহার রূপ।—এরূপ মনে করা নিতান্তই অসঙ্গত। অসঙ্গত এই জন্য যে, ব্রহ্মের একটি নিজের স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব আছে এবং এই স্বরূপ হইতেই (তদীয় সংকল্প বশতঃ) নানা ধর্ম—নানা বিকার অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছে। এই বিকারগুলি হইতে তাঁহার স্বরূপটী স্বতন্ত্রই রহিয়াছে এবং প্রত্যেক বিকারের মধ্যে,—প্রত্যেক অবস্থান্তরের মধ্যে,—প্রত্যেক ভেদের মধ্যে—সেই স্বরূপটীর একত্ব ও স্বাতন্ত্র্য রক্ষিত হইয়া আসিতেছে ; সেই স্বরূপটীই বিকৃত হইয়া, অবস্থান্তরিত হইয়া পড়িতেছে না। তিনি অবিকৃত রহিয়াই, নানা আকারে অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছেন। তাঁহারই মধ্যে বিকারগুলি—আসিতেছে, যাইতেছে, অবস্থান্তরিত হইতেছে। সুতরাং ব্রহ্মই নানাধর্মবিশিষ্ট হইতেছেন, ইহা প্রকৃত কথা নহে। ব্রহ্ম, স্বরূপে অবিকৃত, ইহাই প্রকৃত কথা। জগতের তাবৎ বিকারই—নাম-রূপাত্মক। নাম-রূপ হইতে ব্রহ্ম স্বতন্ত্র। তিনি যখন নামরূপাদির অতীত, তখন এই নাম-রূপগুলি তাঁহাকে বিকৃত করিবে কিরূপে ? তাঁহার অবস্থান্তর ঘটাইবে কিরূপে ? এই নাম-রূপগুলি উৎপত্তি-বিনাশশীল ; আর তিনি নিত্য, নির্বিকার। নামরূপগুলিই কালে অভিব্যক্ত, সুতরাং এক অবস্থা হইতে অবস্থান্তর গ্রহণ করে। আর তিনি, কালের অতীত ; সুতরাং তাঁহার অবস্থান্তর সম্ভব নহে*। এই যুক্তিধারাও শঙ্কর, ব্রহ্ম যে জগতের অতীত, জগতের বাহিরে, তাহাই সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়াছেন।

সম্পর্কবশাৎ পররূপাণিবিব অপেক্ষা তদুপশমাৎ, হুঃপ্তে: “স্বরূপাণি বিবক্ষ্যতে”—ব্রহ্মহৃদ্র, ৩।২।৮ ‘দর্শন-(জাগরিতে)—স্মরণে (স্বপ্নে)—এবমি মনঃস্পন্দিতং ; তদভাবো—বহির্বিষয়দর্শনব্যাপারোপরমভাৎ, বাহ্যাদিস্মরণ-ব্যাপারোপরমে চ মনোব্যাপারভাবাৎ—অবিশেষণে প্রাণাঙ্কনাবস্থানাৎ, অব্যাকৃতঃ প্রাণঃ (হুঃপ্তে)।”—মাণ্ডুক্য ভাষ্য।

* “ন হি আত্মনঃ স্বতঃ ভেদপ্রতিপাদকং কিঞ্চিৎ লিঙ্গ মন্তি, যেন আত্মভেদঃ সাধ্যয়েৎ।...৫৭ ৫৭ পরঃ আত্মধর্মত্বেন অত্যাগচ্ছতি, তস্ত তস্ত নামরূপাত্মকভাড়াপগমাৎ। নাম-রূপাত্ম্যাক আত্মনো

(৫) জগৎ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র যে ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপ আছে, ইহা প্রমাণের জন্ত শঙ্কর, আর একটা যুক্তির অবতারণা করিয়াছেন । এই যুক্তিটা বড় সুন্দর, বড় সারগর্ভ । আমরা এইটীর আলোচনা করিয়া, ব্রহ্মের নিগুণভাব সম্বন্ধে আমাদের বক্তব্য শেষ করিব ।

শ্রুতিতে সর্বত্রই বলা হইয়াছে যে, এই জগৎ—ব্রহ্ম হইতে উৎপন্ন হইয়াছে । জগতে কত প্রকার শক্তি, কত রকম জ্ঞান, কত ক্রিয়া এবং কত প্রকার বৈচিত্র্য অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছে, ও হইতেছে । এ গুলি সবই ব্রহ্ম হইতে উৎপন্ন হইয়াছে । শঙ্কর, জিজ্ঞাসা করিতেছেন যে, এই যে শ্রুতিতে, ব্রহ্ম হইতেই এ জগৎ উৎপন্ন হইয়াছে বলা হইয়াছে ;—ইহার উদ্দেশ্য কি ? ইহা দ্বারা কি শ্রুতি বলিতে চান যে, যাহা কিছু শক্তি, জ্ঞান, ক্রিয়াদির বৈচিত্র্য ও সামর্থ্য ব্রহ্মের মধ্যে নিহিত ছিল, তৎসমস্তই নিঃশেষে জগতে অভিব্যক্ত হইয়া পড়িয়াছে ? সৃষ্টির বিবরণ দিয়া, শ্রুতি কি ইহাই দেখাইতে চান যে, একই ব্রহ্ম—বহু আকারে বিভক্ত হইয়া উপস্থিত ? শ্রুতির কি ইহাই দেখান তাৎপর্য যে, একই ব্রহ্ম—বহু ধর্ম্মবিশিষ্ট ; যাহা এক ছিল, তাহাই নানা জ্ঞান, নানা শক্তি, নানা বস্তু, নানা জীব, নানা অবস্থারূপে অবস্থান্তরিত হইয়া বিকাশিত ? শ্রুতিতে ব্রহ্ম হইতে জগৎ সৃষ্টির যে বিবরণ দেওয়া আছে, তাহার ইহাই কি তবে উদ্দেশ্য ?

শঙ্করার্চাৰ্য্য এই প্রশ্নের উত্থাপন করিয়া, ইহার উত্তরে যে কয়েকটা কথা বলিয়াছেন, সেই কথা কয়েকটা বিশেষ করিয়া প্রণিধান করিয়া দেখা কর্তব্য । এ বিষয়ে তাঁহার সিদ্ধান্ত এই :—

(i) একটা বস্তুর ‘স্বভাব’ এক, অথচ বহু—ইহা হইতে পারে না । একটা বস্তুর স্বভাব যদি এক হয়, তাহা হইলে উহা চিরকালই এক থাকিবে ; কোন অবস্থার মধ্যে সেই স্বভাবটীর পরিবর্তন হইবে না । উহা যদি এক হয়, তবে উহা কখনই অনেক বা বহুধর্ম্মবিশিষ্ট হইয়া উঠিবে না । আর

হস্তদ্ব্যত্ম্যপগমাৎ ‘আকাশো বৈ নাম নামরূপয়ো নির্বহিতা, তে যদাস্তরা, তৎস্বাক্ষ ইতি শ্রুতেঃ । ‘নাম-রূপে ব্যাকরবাণি’ ইতি চ । উৎপত্তিপ্রলয়ান্নকে নামরূপে, তদ্বিলক্ষণং ব্রহ্ম” ।—বৃ’ ভা’, ২।১।২০ “যদান্নকে নাম-রূপে...ব্যাক্রিয়েতে ; বশ্চ আভ্যাংনামরূপাভ্যাং বিলক্ষণঃ স্বতো নিত্যমুক্তস্বভাবঃ” (১।৪।৭) । “ন ক্ষীরস্ত সর্বোপমর্দেন দধিভাবাপত্তিবৎ . সর্বোপমর্দেন এতাবানাস । আন্নান ব্যবহিতস্তৈব...সত্য-সংকল্পদ্বাং আন্নব্যতিরিক্তং...বভূব” (১।৪।৪) ।

যদি উহার স্বভাবটী অনেক হয়, তাহা হইলে উহা অনেকই থাকিবে ; উহার আর একত্ব বজায় থাকিতে পারিবে না* । ব্রহ্মবস্তু সম্বন্ধেও তদ্রূপ । হয় তাঁহার স্বরূপ বা স্বভাবটী এক হইবে ; না হয়, বহু হইবে । এই সকল অভিব্যক্ত জ্ঞান, শক্তি, সামর্থ্যাদি যদি তাঁহার স্বরূপ হয়, তাহা হইলে এ সকল ছাড়া ত তাঁহার আর স্বরূপ থাকিতে পারে না । সুতরাং তাঁহার আর একত্ব থাকিল না ; তিনি নানা ধর্ম্মবিশিষ্টই হইলেন ।

(ii) যদি বল যে, যখন এক ব্রহ্মবস্তুই একমাত্র সত্য বস্তু ; আর সকলই মিথ্যা, অসত্য ; তখন যদিও ব্রহ্মবস্তু, নানা জ্ঞান-ক্রিয়া-বস্তু প্রভৃতির আকারে বিভক্ত হইয়াছেন ; তথাপি একমাত্র তিনিই সত্য । তাহা হইলেই, অনেক হইলেও ত ব্রহ্মের একত্ব বজায় থাকিতেছে । সুতরাং, যদিও তিনি বহুরূপে পরিণত, তথাপি তাঁহার একত্ব ঠিক থাকিতেছে । কেন না, একমাত্র ব্রহ্মই সত্য, অপর যাহাই প্রতিভাত হউক না কেন, তাহা অসত্য । সুতরাং ব্রহ্মের যে বহুরূপ, বহুধর্ম্ম, বহুক্রিয়াদি জগতে প্রতিভাত হইতেছে, এগুলিকে লোপ করিয়া দিয়া—অসত্য বলিয়া ভাবিয়া—এক ব্রহ্মবস্তুকেই

* “একস্ত অনেকস্বভাবদ্বানুপপত্তেঃ ।...নাপি উভয়লক্ষণমেব ব্রহ্ম ইতি শকাংবক্তুঃ ।” “ন তাবৎ স্বত এব পরস্য ব্রহ্মণ উভয়লিঙ্গত্ব মুপপদ্যতে । ন হি একং বস্তু স্বতএব রূপাদি বিশেষোপেতং, তদ্বিপন্নীতঞ্চ—ইত্যবধারয়িতুঃ শকাং বিরোধাত্ । অন্ত তর্হি স্থানতঃ, পৃথিব্যাচ্ছাদ্যধিযোগাৎ ? তদপি নোপপদ্যতে—ন হি উপাধিযোগাদপি অন্তাদৃশস্ত বস্তুনঃ অন্তাদৃশঃ স্বভাবঃ দস্তবতি”—ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৩২।২১ & ১১ । “ন নিরবয়বস্ত অনেকধর্ম্মবশে দৃষ্টান্তোহসি ৷...এতেন পরিণামভেদ-কল্পনা পবমান্ননি প্রত্যাভা” । “ন হি স্বভাবাৎ কশ্চিদ্বিমুচ্যতে...অতঃস্বতো নাস্য সংসারধর্ম্মিৎ ৷...স্বভাবশ্চেৎ অনিমেীক্ষ্যতৈব স্যাৎ” । “ন হিতৎস্বভাবত্বে, তৈরেব সংযোগা বিযোগো বা দৃষ্টঃ” ইত্যাদি—বৃ° ভা°, ৪।৩।৯-১৫ ।

+ অর্থাৎ বিপক্ষের উত্তির তাৎপর্য এই যে,—ব্রহ্মই জগৎ ; ব্রহ্মইত নানা বস্তুরূপে অভিব্যক্ত ; কোন বস্তুই ত ব্রহ্ম ভিন্ন অপর কিছু নহে । সুতরাং আমি জগতের যে কোন বস্তুই চাই না কেন, যে কোন সাধনই অবলম্বন করি না কেন ; আমার ত ব্রহ্মকেই চাওয়া হইল । কেন না, আমি ত আর কোন বস্তুকে চাহিতেছি না । ব্রহ্মই যখন সকল বস্তু, তখন যে কোন বস্তুকে চাওয়ার অর্থ—ব্রহ্মকেই চাওয়া । এই ভাবেই বস্তুকে ‘লোপ’ করার কথা বলা হইয়াছে ; বস্তুকে ‘অসত্য’ বলা হইয়াছে । ব্রহ্মই যখন জগৎরূপে পরিণত, তখন সকল বস্তুই তাঁহার এক একটা অংশ । এই অংশগুলির সমষ্টি করিলেই জগৎ হইল ; তাহাই ব্রহ্ম । এই সমষ্টির সহিত জীবের একত্ব প্রাপ্তিই মুক্তি । শঙ্করাচার্য্য অল্প স্থানে এই মতটীর খণ্ডনার্থে যে উত্তর দিয়াছেন, তাহাতে বলিয়াছেন যে, ‘এইরূপে যদি সকল বস্তুই ব্রহ্ম হন, তাহা হইলে, সংসারী লোক যে বাহার যেমন কামনা, তদনুরূপ সাধন গ্রহণ করে, সেই সাধনের ভেদ উঠিয়া যাইবে’ । “যদি হি অদ্বৈতার্থত্বমেব আসাং, গ্রামপশুস্বর্গাদ্ব্যর্থঃ নাস্তীতি গ্রামপশু-স্বর্গাদয়ো ন গৃহেরন ; গৃহস্তে

একমাত্র সত্য বলিয়া ভাবিতে হইবে । অতএব, ব্রহ্ম নানা আকারে পরিণত হওয়াতেও ত কোন ক্ষতি হইতেছে না । পাঠক বিপক্ষের কথা শুনিলেন । এখন শঙ্করাচার্য্য এই কথা-গুলির যে উত্তর দিয়াছেন, আমরা সেই উত্তরটী পাঠকবর্গকে শুনাইতেছি । শঙ্কর বলিতেছেন—

‘এই নানা বস্তু, নানা জীব, নানা ধর্ম্মসঙ্কুল বহুত্বপূর্ণ জগৎকে উড়াইয়া দিবে কিরূপে ? ইহাকে অসত্য বলিয়া লোপ করিবে কি প্রকারে ? যাহা আছে তাহাকে নাই বলিবে কিরূপে ? এই বিদ্যমান প্রপঞ্চকে—জগৎ-সংসারকে—কি নাই বলিয়া উড়াইয়া দেওয়া সম্ভব পর হয় ? জীবও ত এই জগৎ-সংসারেই অন্তর্ভুক্ত । জীবকেও ত তাহা হইলে অসত্য বলিয়া বিলুপ্ত করিতে হইবে ! জীবের যদি বিলোপ সাধন করিলে, তাহাহইলে জীব ত উড়িয়া গেল ! তুমি আমি কেহই থাকিলাম না । তবে কে আর এই জগৎ-সংসারকে অসত্য বলিয়া বিলুপ্ত করিবে ? সুতরাং তুমি যে বলিয়াছিলে যে, বহু আকারে পরিণত হইলেও, ব্রহ্মের একত্ব ঠিক থাকিতে পারে,—একথা আদৌ টিকিতেছে না * । অতএব দেখা যাইতেছে যে, একই ব্রহ্মবস্তু স্বরূপতঃ এক, অথচ বহু হইতে পারে না ।

সুতরাং ব্রহ্মের সমগ্র স্বরূপটাই যে জগৎরূপে পরিণত হইয়া, নানাদর্শ-বিশিষ্ট হইয়া পড়িয়াছে,—একথা স্বীকার করা যায় না । অতএব শ্রুতিতে যে সৃষ্টির বিবরণ আছে, তাহার তাৎপর্য্য এরূপ নহে । ইহার তাৎপর্য্য অন্য প্রকার ।

তু কস্মিন্ কলবৈচিত্র্যাবিশেষাঃ” (বৃ’ ভা’, ৩২।১) । “বিদ্বৈকদ্বৈপি, অধ্যাত্মাদিদৈবভেদাৎ প্রস্তুতিভেদো ভবতি ..তদ্বাভেদেপিধ্যোয়াংশ পৃথক্ভাঃ”—ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৩।৩।৪৩ ।

* “যদ্যপ্যাহঃ : অপ্রবিলাপিতে হি দ্বৈত প্রপঞ্চে, ব্রহ্মতদ্বাববোধো ন ভবতীত্যাতো ব্রহ্মতদ্বাববোধপ্রতানীক ভূতো দ্বৈতপ্রপঞ্চঃ প্রবিলাপ্যঃ—ইতি ।...অত্র বয়ং পৃচ্ছামঃ,—কোয়ং প্রপঞ্চবিলয়ো নাম ? কিং অগ্নি প্রতাপসম্পর্কায় যুত-কাঠিন্তপ্রবিলয় ইব প্রপঞ্চবিলয়ঃ কল্পব্যঃ, আহোশ্বিং অবিন্দুকৃতো ব্রহ্মনি নামরূপ প্রপঞ্চে (অধ্যারোপিতঃ) বিদ্যমা প্রবিলাপয়িতব্যঃ ইতি ? তত্র, যদি তাবৎ বিদ্যমানোয়ং প্রপঞ্চঃ দেহাদিলক্ষণঃ আধ্যাত্মিকঃ, বাহ্যশ্চ পৃথিব্যাদি লক্ষণঃ,—প্রবিলাপয়িতব্য ইত্যুচ্যেত, স পুরুষমাত্রেন অশক্যঃ প্রবিলাপয়িতুঃ ইতি তৎপ্রবিলয়োপদেশঃ অশক্যবিশেষ এব স্তাৎ । একেনচ আদিমুক্তেন পৃথিব্যাদি বিলয়ঃ কৃত ইতি ইদানীং পৃথিব্যাদি-গুণং জগদভবিষ্যৎ ।.....অপিচ, প্রপঞ্চাবস্থায়ং যোহিবগম্যতে জীবো নাম, স প্রপঞ্চপক্ষৈস্তেব স্তাৎ ; ততঃ পৃথিব্যাদিবৎ জীবস্তাপি প্রবিলাপিতদ্বাং কস্ত বা নিয়োগঃ, কস্ত বা মোক্ষ অবাপ্তব্য উচ্যেত ?—ব্রহ্ম সূত্র, ৩।২।২১ ॥

এই প্রকারে শঙ্করাচার্য্য, জগৎসৃষ্টি সম্বন্ধে বিপক্ষেরা শ্রুতির যে তাৎপর্য্য নির্ণয় করিয়াছিল, তাহার উত্তর দিয়া, আপন সিদ্ধান্তের উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন । এ সম্বন্ধে তাঁহার সিদ্ধান্ত এই প্রকার :—

(i) এই যে জগতে নানা প্রকার ধর্ম্মের ভেদ, ক্রিয়ার ভেদ, জ্ঞানের ভেদ, অবস্থার ভেদ দেখা যাইতেছে, ইহারা (অল্প কারণযোগে *) ব্রহ্মেরই স্বরূপ হইতে, স্ভাব হইতে উদ্ভিক্ত (stimulated) হইয়া অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছে ও হইতেছে । ইহাদের দ্বারা, সেই স্বরূপের স্বাতন্ত্র্য নষ্ট হইতেছে না । ব্রহ্মের সেই স্বরূপটী আপনার একত্ব হারাইতেছে না । সেই স্বরূপটীই যে আপন একত্ব হারাইয়া, ঐ সকল ক্রিয়া, জ্ঞান, ধর্ম্ম, অবস্থা প্রভৃতিরূপে পরিণত হইতেছে, তাহা নহে । এই সকল ধর্ম্ম, ক্রিয়া, জ্ঞানাদি—সেই স্বরূপ হইতেই অভিব্যক্ত ; কিন্তু সেই স্বরূপটী, ইহাদের মধ্যে আপন একত্ব বজায় রাখিতেছে ; কেননা, উহা এই সকল ধর্ম্ম, ক্রিয়া, জ্ঞানাদি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র । ব্রহ্ম-স্বরূপের এই একত্বের পরিচয় দিবার জন্মই, এই সকল ভিন্ন ভিন্ন ক্রিয়া, জ্ঞান, ধর্ম্মাদি অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছে । এক, দুই, তিন, চারি, শত, সহস্র প্রভৃতি সংখ্যাকে বুঝিবার নিমিত্ত, আমরা কতকগুলি চিহ্ন ব্যবহার করিয়া থাকি । চিহ্নগুলির নিজের কোন অর্থ নাই, কোন মূল্য নাই । ইহারা সংখ্যার স্বরূপ বুঝাইয়া দিবে বলিয়াই, ইহাদিগকে আমরা ব্যবহার করিয়া থাকি । এক সংখ্যা বুঝাইতে এক প্রকার চিহ্ন ; দুই সংখ্যা বুঝাইতে অল্প প্রকার চিহ্ন—ইত্যাদি । অতএব, এই চিহ্নগুলি, সংখ্যার স্বরূপবোধের উপায় মাত্র । এতদ্বারা, চিহ্নগুলিই সংখ্যা হইয়া উঠে না ; অর্থাৎ ইহা দ্বারা,—সংখ্যা কি ? না,—যাহা ভিন্ন ভিন্ন কতকগুলি চিহ্নরূপ ধর্ম্ম বা আকার বিশিষ্ট, তাহাই সংখ্যা ;—ইহা ত কখনই হয় না । এইরূপ, অক্ষরের স্বরূপ বুঝিবার নিমিত্ত আমরা কতকগুলি রেখার ব্যবহার করিয়া থাকি । ঐ রেখাগুলি অক্ষরকে বুঝাইবার উপায় মাত্র† । ইহা দ্বারা অক্ষরই কি, রেখাগুলি হইয়া উঠে ? অক্ষর কি ?

* ব্রহ্মের সংকল্প বা কামনাই—সেই ‘কারণ’ । ইহাই ‘নিমিত্ত কারণ’ (stimulating cause) । এসম্বন্ধে পরে বলা যাইবে ।

† “যথা এক-প্রভৃত্যাপর্য্যকসংখ্যাধরূপ-পরিজ্ঞানায় রেখাধারোপণং কৃৎস্না—একেষং রেখা, দশৈকং, শতৈকং ইতি গ্রাহয়তি, অবগময়তি সংখ্যা-ধরূপং কেবলং ; নতু সংখ্যায় রেখাস্বভবম্ । যথাচ অকারাদীনি অক্ষরাণি বিজ্ঞি গ্রাহয়ন্তুঃ পত্রমসীরেখাদি সংযোগোপায়মাস্থার বর্ণানং সতত্বং অববেদয়তি ; ন পত্রমস্তাভ্যাস্তাতাং

না, যাহা এই এই প্রকার রেখা বিশিষ্ট, তাহাই অক্ষর ;—ইহা ত কখনই হয় না । ব্রহ্মসম্বন্ধেও অবিকল এইরূপ । শ্রুতিতে ব্রহ্মকে জগতের সৃষ্টিস্থিতি প্রলয়কর্তা বলা হইয়াছে । ব্রহ্ম হইতে নানা প্রকার জ্ঞান, ক্রিয়া, শক্তি প্রভৃতি ধর্ম্য উৎপন্ন হইয়াছে । জ্ঞান, ক্রিয়া, শক্তি প্রভৃতি ধর্ম্য দ্বারা ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপ কতকটা বুঝিতে পারা যায় । ইহারা তাঁহার স্বরূপকে বুঝাইবার উপায় মাত্র । কিন্তু তাই বলিয়া কি ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপটাই, ঐ সকল ধর্ম্য-বিশিষ্ট হইয়া উঠে ? তাঁহার স্বরূপটাই কি ঐ সকল নানা ধর্ম্যে পরিণত* হইয়া উঠে ?

(ii) শঙ্কর বলিয়াছেন—জগতে অভিব্যক্ত জ্ঞান, শক্তি, ক্রিয়া, সামর্থ্যাদিকে বুঝিলেই যে যথেষ্ট হইল, তাহা নহে । ইহাদিগকে জানিলেই, আমাদের জানিবার আকাঙ্ক্ষা নিবৃত্ত হয় না । এই সকল অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম্য,—যে মূল বস্তু হইতে অভিব্যক্ত সেই মূল বস্তুটী কি এবং তাহার স্বরূপ কি প্রকার,—সেই আকাঙ্ক্ষা আমাদের চিত্তে উদ্ভিত করেন । জগতের মূলে একটা স্বতন্ত্র বস্তু আছেন, যাহা হইতে জগতের এই সকল জ্ঞান, ক্রিয়া, বস্তু প্রভৃতি বিবিধ বিকার উৎপন্ন হইয়াছে এবং যিনি এই সকল অবস্থাস্থরের মধ্যে আপন স্বাতন্ত্র্য ও একত্ব পরিস্ফুট করিয়া অনুগত রহিয়াছেন,—ইহারা সেই একত্বের সংবাদ প্রদান করে । যতক্ষণ পর্য্যন্ত সেই মূল বস্তুটীকে না জানা যাইতেছে, ততক্ষণ পর্য্যন্ত তাঁহাকে জানিবার আকাঙ্ক্ষা নিবৃত্তি পায় না । অভিব্যক্ত জগৎটাই যদি ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপ হইত, তাহা হইলে, এই জগৎকে

অক্ষরাণাং গ্রাহয়তি । তথা উৎপত্তিস্থিতিলয়াদিকল্পনা, ক্রিয়াকারকফলাধারোপণাচ আশ্বিনী কৃত্য ;—উৎপত্ত্যাগ্ননেকোপায় মাংসায় ব্রহ্মতত্ত্ব মাবেদিতং, পুনঃ তদ্বিশেষবর্ণনশোধানার্থং নেতি নেতীতি তত্ত্বোপসংহারঃ কৃতঃ”—ইত্যাদি (বৃহৎ ভা', ৪।৪।২৫) ।

* “নহি পরিণামবদ্বিজ্ঞানায় পরিণামবদ্ব্যবস্থানঃ কলংস্ত্রাং ইতি বক্তং যুক্তং ।...বস্তুত্র ক্রমতে ব্রহ্মণো জগদাকারপরিণামিত্বাদি, তৎ ব্রহ্মদর্শনোপায়ত্বেনৈব বিনিযুক্ত্যতে, নতু স্বতন্ত্রং ফলায় কল্যতে”—২।১।১৪ ॥

+ “নৈব মুৎপত্তাদি শ্রুতীনাং নিরাকাজ্জার্থপ্রতিপাদন-সামর্থ্যমস্তি । প্রত্যক্ষত্ব তাসামন্ত্যার্থত্ব সমন্বয়গম্যতে । তথাহি—‘তত্রৈতচ্ছব্দমুৎপত্তিতং সৌম্য বিজানীহি নেদমমূলং ভবিষ্যতি’ ইত্যুপপ্তস্য উদর্কে সত এব একস্ত জগদ্ব্যবস্থায় বিভেদঃ দর্শয়তি । ‘যতোবা ইমানি ভূতানি জায়ন্তে...তদ্বৃক্ষ’ ইতি চ ।...নহি আশ্বিন একত্বনিত্যশুদ্ধত্বাধ্যবগতো সত্যায় ভূয়ঃ কাচিদ্ আকাঙ্ক্ষা উপজায়তে, পূরুষার্থদমাণিবুদ্ধ্যুৎপত্তেঃ তদ্ব্যবচ বিদ্বদ্বাং তুষ্টিমুভবাদিদর্শনায় ।...অতঃ জগদ্ব্যবস্থাস্থিতি-প্রলয়হেতুত্ব-শ্রুতে রনেক শক্তিত্বং ব্রহ্মণঃ ইতি চেৎ, ন”—ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৪।৩।১৪

জানিলেই আমাদের সকল আকাঙ্ক্ষা নিবৃত্ত হইয়া যাইত ; এবং পরম তুষ্টি লাভ করিতে পারিতাম । আর কোন বস্তু জানিবার আকাঙ্ক্ষা উদিত হইত না এবং তুষ্টি লাভেরও চরম হইত । কিন্তু, জগৎকে দেখিয়া, এই জগতের যিনি মূল কারণ, তাঁহাকে জানিবার আকাঙ্ক্ষা যখন উদিত হয়, তাঁহাকে না জানা পর্য্যন্ত পরম সন্তোষ পাওয়াও যায় না ; তখন বুঝিতেই হইবে যে, জগৎটাই তাঁহার স্বরূপ নহে । তিনি এই জগতের অতিরিক্ত, জগৎ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র । অতএব, সৃষ্টিবিষয়ক শ্রুতির তাৎপর্য্য ইহা নহে যে, ব্রহ্ম নানা ধর্ম্মবিশিষ্ট ; বা ব্রহ্মের সমগ্র স্বরূপটাই জগতের জ্ঞান, ক্রিয়া, শক্তি প্রভৃতিরূপে পরিণত হইয়া আছে* ।

(iii) প্রশ্ন এই যে,—পরম-কারণ ব্রহ্ম হইতে নাম-রূপাদি বিকার উৎপন্ন হইয়াছে । সুতরাং নাম-রূপাদি বিকারবর্গ, তাঁহার স্বরূপেরই অভিব্যক্তি । জীবগুণিও, সেই পরমাত্মারই অংশ-বিশেষ । কেন না, কার্য—কারণেরই অবস্থান্তর ; কারণই ত কার্য্যাকারে পরিণত হয় । সুতরাং, শ্রুতিতে ব্রহ্মকে এই জগতের কারণ বলিয়া নির্দেশ করায়, এই জগৎ কি ব্রহ্মেরই অবস্থান্তর হইতেছে না ? তাহা হইলে ত ব্রহ্ম,—পরিণামী এবং নানা ধর্ম্মবিশিষ্ট হইয়াই পড়িতেছেন । শঙ্করাচার্য্য ইহার উত্তরে বলিতেছেন যে,—ব্রহ্মের অবস্থান্তর প্রতিপাদন করা শ্রুতির উদ্দেশ্য নহে । ব্রহ্মসত্তার একত্ববোধ দৃঢ় করিয়া দিবার উদ্দেশ্যেই, ব্রহ্ম হইতে জগতের সৃষ্টি, স্থিতি ও প্রলয়ের বিবরণ শ্রুতিতে প্রদত্ত হইয়াছে । ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপবোধের নিমিত্তই, নামরূপাদির বিকাশ । নামরূপাদি বিকার দ্বারা ব্রহ্মের একত্ব বুঝিতে পারা যায় । এই একত্ব বুঝাইবার জন্যই আবার বেদান্তে সমুদ্র ও ফেন-তরঙ্গাদির দৃষ্টান্ত এবং অগ্নি ও অগ্নিস্ফুলিঙ্গাদির দৃষ্টান্ত প্রদর্শিত হইয়াছে । সমুদ্র হইতে যেমন ফেন-তরঙ্গ-বুদ্বুদাদি নির্গত হয় ; ব্রহ্মস্বরূপ হইতেও তদ্রূপ নামরূপাদি বিকার বহির্গত হইয়াছে । অগ্নি হইতে যেমন সহস্র স্ফুলিঙ্গ নির্গত হয় ; পরমাত্ম-চৈতন্য হইতেও তদ্রূপ সহস্র সহস্র

* “নচ, যথা ব্রহ্মণঃ আত্মৈকত্বদর্শনং মোক্ষ সাধনং, এবং জগদাকারপরিণামিত্ব দর্শনমপি স্বতন্ত্র মেব কষ্টেচিৎ ফলায় অভিপ্রায়েতে ।.....নহি পরিণামবদ্বিজ্ঞানংপরিণামবদ্ব্যমায়নঃ ফলঃশ্রাদিতি বক্তুং যুক্তং”—ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।১।১৪ “এবং উৎপত্ত্যাди শ্রুতীনাং ঐকাত্ম্যাবগমপরিত্যক্তং, ন অনেকশক্তিযোগঃ ব্রহ্মণঃ” (বে° সূ, ৪।৩।১৪) ।

জীব-চৈতন্য বহির্গত হইয়াছে ।—এইরূপ দৃষ্টান্ত শ্রুতিতে উল্লিখিত হইয়াছে ।
আবার, ‘জীব, পরমাত্মারই অংশ’—এরূপ কথাও শ্রুতিতে দৃষ্ট হয় ।
শঙ্করাচার্য্য আমাদিগকে বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, এই সকল উক্তি এবং দৃষ্টান্তের
দ্বারা এ কথা বুঝিতে হইবে না যে, ব্রহ্ম বিকারী কারণ বা ব্রহ্মের অংশ বা
অবয়ব আছে । পরমাত্মচৈতন্য নিরবয়ব এবং নির্বিবকার । সূত্রাং জগৎ,
তাঁহার বিকার, বা জীব তাঁহার অংশ হইতে পারে না* । পরমাত্মার একত্ব-
বোধ দৃঢ় করিবার উদ্দেশ্যেই শ্রুতিতে এই সকল কথা ও দৃষ্টান্তের উল্লেখ
করা হইয়াছে । কি প্রকারে সেই একত্ববোধ দৃঢ় হয় ? আমরা জানি যে,
অগ্নি হইতে যে স্ফুলিঙ্গ বহির্গত হয়, উহা অগ্নি ভিন্ন ‘অগ্নি’ কোন বস্তু নহে ।
অগ্নি হইতে স্ফুলিঙ্গগুলি বহির্গত হইবার পূর্বে, উহারা অগ্নি-ভিন্ন স্বতন্ত্র
কোন বস্তু ছিল না । বহির্গত হইবার পরও, উহারা অগ্নিব্যতীত অন্য কিছু
ভিন্ন বস্তু হইয়া উঠে নাই । নামরূপাদি বিকারও, পরমকারণ ব্রহ্মসত্তা
হইতেই বহির্গত হইয়াছে । উহারা পূর্বেও ব্রহ্মসত্তা ভিন্ন অন্য কিছু ছিল না ;
এখনও উহারা ব্রহ্মসত্তা ব্যতীত স্বতন্ত্র কোন বস্তু হইয়া উঠে নাই । অংশ
সকলও, অংশী হইতে একান্ত স্বতন্ত্র কোন বস্তু হইতে পারে না । এই প্রকারে,
অগ্নি-স্ফুলিঙ্গাদি দৃষ্টান্ত দ্বারা ব্রহ্মবস্তুর একত্ববোধ দৃঢ় করিয়া দেওয়াই শ্রুতির
প্রকৃত উদ্দেশ্য । এ সকল দৃষ্টান্তদ্বারা, ব্রহ্ম যে নানাধর্ম্মবিশিষ্ট বা
বিকারাত্মক, অথবা ব্রহ্মের অংশ আছে—ইহা কখনই বুঝিতে হইবে না ।
ভাষ্যকার এই সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়াছেন । তথাপি কেমন করিয়া লোকে তাঁহার
ঘাড়ে Pantheism চাপাইয়া দেয়, ইহা বুঝিতে আমরা একান্ত অসমর্থ !!
জগৎ হইতে—নামরূপাদি বিকার হইতে, ব্রহ্ম-স্বরূপের একত্ব এবং স্বাতন্ত্র্য
বুঝাইবার জন্যই, শ্রুতিতে ব্রহ্ম হইতে জগৎ-সৃষ্টির কথা আছে বুঝিতে হইবে ।
উহার অপর কোন তাৎপর্য্য নাই ।

* “প্রাগ্গৈত্র্যংশং অগ্নিরেবাসীৎ...অগ্নেহি বিস্ফুলিঙ্গ অগ্নিরেবেতি—অংশোহি অংশিনা একত্বপ্রত্যয়ান্বিতো
দৃষ্টঃ”—ইত্যাদি । বৃহৎ ভাষ্য, ২।১।২০ দেখুন ।

২ । ব্রহ্মের সগুণভাব ।

ব্রহ্মের নিজের একটা স্বভাব বা স্বরূপ আছে, ইহা আমরা বলিয়া আসিয়াছি । এই জগৎ যখন সেই স্বরূপেরই অভিব্যক্তি, তখন, ব্রহ্ম নিশ্চয়ই এই জগতের সঙ্গে নিয়ত ঘনিষ্ঠ সম্বন্ধে সম্পর্কিত থাকিবেনই । কি প্রকারে ভাষ্যকার এই সম্পর্কের তত্ত্ব ব্যাখ্যা করিয়াছেন, এখন আমরা সেই কথাই বলিব । কিন্তু, এ সম্বন্ধেও নানা প্রকার অপসিদ্ধান্ত ও ভ্রান্ত ধারণা প্রচলিত হইয়া পড়িয়াছে । কেহ কেহ বলিয়াছেন যে, বেদান্তে দুইটা ঈশ্বর উপদিষ্ট হইয়াছে । একটার নাম ব্রহ্ম ; অপরটার নাম ঈশ্বর বা সগুণ ব্রহ্ম । তাঁহারা আরো বলেন যে, শঙ্করাচার্য্য নাকি এই ঈশ্বরকে, অসত্য মিথ্যা বস্তু বলিয়াও নির্দেশ করিয়াছেন ! একজন বলিয়াছেন—

“Theism can find no place in a system of such absolute monism as this isIf a place is found on a *lower plane* for *Iswar* as the creator of the *emperic* mind and useful for practical purposes, all the time he is recognised by the wise man as *unreal*. Theism of course can not recognise this pinchbeck deity. Such a device is far more *fraudulent* than the pragmatism, &c, &c. &c.” (Indian Theism).

আমরা অপব্যাক্যার দৃষ্টান্ত স্বরূপ, এই একটা মাত্র উক্তি উদ্ধৃত করিয়া দেখাইলাম । শঙ্করাচার্য্য কোথাও ঈশ্বরকে অসত্য বা মিথ্যা বস্তু বলেন নাই । তিনি ব্রহ্ম ও ঈশ্বরে প্রকৃতপক্ষে কোন ভেদ করেন নাই । ব্রহ্ম ও ঈশ্বর নামে, বেদান্তে, দুইটা ভিন্ন বস্তু নাই । ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপ এক ভিন্ন, দ্বিতীয় নহে । এই ব্রহ্মবস্তু জগতের অতীত হইয়াও, জগতের সঙ্গে, জীবের সঙ্গে, দৃঢ় সম্পর্কিত । তাঁহার এই জগদতীত ভাবকে ‘নিগুণভাব,’ এবং জগতের সঙ্গে সম্পর্ক বুঝাইতে, তাঁহারই ‘সগুণভাবের’ উল্লেখ বেদান্তে আছে । এতদ্বারা, বেদান্তে দুইটা ঈশ্বরের কথা বলা হয় নাই । বেদান্ত-ভাষ্যে পুনঃ পুনঃ, শঙ্করাচার্য্য ঈশ্বরকে ‘নিত্য’ বলিয়া নির্দেশ করিয়াছেন * । গীতাভাষ্যে, জগৎ এবং জীবকে, ঈশ্বরের ‘প্রকৃতি’ বলিয়া, কথিত হইয়াছে এবং বলা

* “কিম্ব বস্তবাং তত্ত নিত্যসিদ্ধন্ত ঈশ্বরন্ত হৃটিহিতিসং হৃতিবিবরণ নিত্যজ্ঞানং ভবতীতি” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ১।১।৫) । “কিংবা নিত্যসিদ্ধঃ পরমেশ্বরঃ ইতি” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ১।১।২০) । “বস্মাৎ ভোগমাত্রমেবৈবাঃ অনাদিসিদ্ধেন ঈশ্বরেণ সমান মিতি জ্ঞায়তে ” (৪।৪।২১ “নিত্যসিদ্ধেশ্বরায়ত্তমেব ইতরেবামৈবৰ্ণ্যং” (৪।৪।১৮) ।

হইয়াছে যে “ঈশ্বর যখন নিত্য, তখন তাঁহার এই প্রকৃতি-দ্বয়ও অবশ্যই নিত্য” । যাহা চির-নিত্য, তাহা ‘মিথ্যা,’ ‘অসত্য’ হইবে কিরূপে ?

আমরা ইতঃ পূর্বের বলিয়া আসিয়াছি যে, ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব হইতে, তাঁহারই ‘সংকল্প’ বশতঃ, প্রাণ-স্পন্দন অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছে । জগতে যত প্রকার নাম-রূপাদি বিকার দেখিতে পাওয়া যায়, এই প্রাণস্পন্দনই তাহার মূল * । কেন না, এই প্রাণ স্পন্দনই, প্রত্যেক বস্তু ও জীববর্গকে পরস্পর সম্বন্ধে আনিয়াছে, এবং প্রত্যেক বস্তুতে ও জীবে, উহাদের স্ব স্ব স্বরূপানুযায়ী, নানাবিধ ধর্ম বা গুণ বা বিকার উৎপন্ন করিয়াছে । এই প্রাণ, ব্রহ্মস্বরূপেরই অভিব্যক্তি । কিন্তু এই প্রাণ-স্পন্দনের মধ্যে, তাঁহার স্বরূপটি আপনার একত্ব হারায় না । উহা অবিকৃত থাকিয়াই, প্রাণ-স্পন্দনের মধ্যে অনুগত হইয়া রহিয়াছে † । প্রাণশক্তিকে বেদান্তে সর্বপ্রকার নামরূপাদি বিকারের ‘বীজ’ বলা হইয়াছে । এই বীজ, ব্রহ্মের মধ্যেই ছিল, ব্রহ্ম হইতেই স্পন্দনাকারে অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছে ‡ । সুতরাং এই বীজকে ব্রহ্ম হইতে স্বতন্ত্র কোন বস্তু বলা যায় না । শঙ্করাচার্য্য বলিয়াছেন—

“সাংখ্যকার যেমন তাঁহার ‘প্রকৃতি’ কে একটা স্বতন্ত্র, স্বতঃসিদ্ধ (Independent) শক্তি বলেন, আমরা এই প্রাণ-বীজকে সে প্রকার স্বতন্ত্র বস্তু বলি না । এই প্রাণশক্তি, —ব্রহ্মের নিত্যস্থ অধীন (Dependent on Brahma), ব্রহ্ম হইতে স্বতন্ত্র কোন বস্তু নহে । ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপ ব্যতীত, ইহার কোন স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপ নাই ; ব্রহ্মের সত্তা ব্যতীত, ইহার কোন স্বতন্ত্র সত্তা নাই । এই জন্ত ইহাকে ব্রহ্মের “আত্মভূত” বলা হইয়াছে¶ ৷”

“নিতোত্তরদ্ব্যং,—ঈশ্বরস্ত, তৎ-প্রকৃত্যোরপি যুক্তং নিত্যত্বেন ভবিতুং । প্রকৃতিব্রহ্মবস্তুমেব ঈশ্বরস্ত ঈশ্বরত্বং...যাভ্যাং জগদ্রূপভিত্তিস্থিতিলয় হেতুরীশ্বরঃ” (গীতা, ১৩।১৯) ।

* “স প্রাণ মনজত । তত্র চ আত্মচেতন্যজ্যোতিঃ সর্বদা অভিব্যক্ততরং । তদুপাধিধারা আয়নঃ... সর্ববিক্রিয়ালক্ষণঃ সংব্যবহারঃ...তদাত্মকং দ্বাদশবিধং করণং (বৃহৎ ভা’, ৪।৪।২)

† “আত্মা প্রাণেশু—ইতি ব্যতিরেক প্রদর্শনার্থা মণ্ডমী...প্রাণেশু—প্রাণেভ্যোব্যতিরিক্ত ইত্যর্থঃ । যে হি যেষু ভবতি স ত্যাবতিরিক্তো ভবত্যেব”—বৃহৎ ভা’, ৪।৩।৭ ।

‡ “তৎ সর্বাত্মকং প্রাণং প্রত্যগাত্মনি উপসংহৃত্য নেতি নেতীতি তুরীয়াং প্রতিপদ্যতে” ।...“সর্বমেতৎ যেন নিরন্তং যস্মিন্ প্রতিষ্ঠিতং আকাশান্তং ওতং প্রোতকং, তন্ত নিরূপাধিকস্ত নির্দেশঃ কৰ্তব্য ইতি সএব ‘নেতি নেতীতি’ নির্দিষ্টঃ” (বৃহৎ ভা’, ৪।২।৫ and ৩।৯।২৬) । “সংতেজোবান্নাদিগুণকারণং-বটবীজাণিমবৎ বিদ্যমান মেব” (ছাণ্ড ভাষ্য) ।

¶ “যদি বহু স্বতন্ত্রাংকাঙ্কিৎ প্রাগবহাং জগতঃ কারণত্বেন অভ্যুপগচ্ছেম, প্রসঙ্গয়েম তদা:প্রধানকারণ-বাধং । পরমেশ্বরাদীনাতু ইহমস্মাভিঃ প্রাগবহা জগতোহভ্যুপগম্যতে, ন স্বতন্ত্রা । সা চ অবশমভ্যুপগম্যত্যা”

ব্রহ্ম হইতে ইহাই স্পন্দনাকারে অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছে । ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপটাই এই স্পন্দনরূপে বিকৃত হইয়া পড়িয়াছে যদি মনে কর ; যদি স্পন্দনের মধ্যে, ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপটীর স্নাতক্য নাই মনে কর, তাহা হইলেই ভুল হইল । ব্রহ্ম, আপন স্বরূপে অবিকৃত থাকিয়াই, স্পন্দনাকারে অভিব্যক্ত,—ইহাই প্রকৃত কথা । সুতরাং বেদান্ত-কথিত “ঈশ্বর” ত, ব্রহ্ম হইতে কোন স্বতন্ত্র বস্তু হইতেছে না । সুতরাং বেদান্তে ‘দুইটা ঈশ্বর’ আসিবেন কোথা হইতে ? ঈশ্বর—অসত্য, মিথ্যাই বা হইবেন কিরূপে ?

বেদান্তে উল্লিখিত ‘ঈশ্বর’ যে নিগুণ ব্রহ্ম ব্যতীত অণু কেহই নহে, এই তত্ত্বটী বিশেষ করিয়া বুঝা আবশ্যক । আমরা নিম্নে ভাষ্যকারের উক্তি হইতে, এ সম্বন্ধে তাঁহার যাহা সিদ্ধান্ত, তাহা পাঠকবর্গের সম্মুখে উপস্থিত করিতেছি । এই আলোচনা হইতে, ব্রহ্ম যে জগতের ও জীবের সঙ্গে ঘনিষ্ঠ সম্পর্কে সম্বন্ধ, সে কথাটাও পরিস্ফুট হইয়া উঠিবে । বিষয়টী বড় গুরুতর । অদ্বৈতবাদের আলোচনা করিতে গিয়া, অনেক বৈদেশিক পণ্ডিত এ সম্বন্ধে বড় গোলযোগ করিয়াছেন, তাই আমরা পাঠকবর্গের মনোযোগ আকর্ষণ করিতেছি ।

(১) বেদান্তসূত্রে একটা প্রশ্ন উত্থাপিত হইল যে,—ব্রহ্মের কি সমগ্র স্বরূপটাই নাম-রূপাদি বিকারে পরিণত হইয়াছে ? ভাষ্যকার ইহার মীমাংসা করিতে গিয়া * বলিতেছেন—

“যদি ব্রহ্মের সবটাই কার্য্যাকারে—বিষয়াকাবে পরিণত হয়, ইহাই শ্রুতির অভিপ্রায় হইত, তাহা হইলে ‘জীব প্রত্যহ গাঢ় সুশুপ্তির সময়ে (যখন বিষয়ানুভূতি থাকে না) ‘সংস্বরূপতা’কে প্রাপ্ত হইয়া থাকে’—শ্রুতির এই নির্দেশটা ব্যর্থ হওয়া উচিত ।”

ব্রহ্মসূত্রভাষ্য, ১।৪।৩ আবার—‘সর্বজ্ঞস্ত ঈশ্বরস্ত ‘আনুভূতে’ইব অবিদ্যাকল্পিতে নামরূপে...মায়াশক্তিঃ প্রকৃতি রিতি চ অভিলপ্যোতে...যাভ্যামন্তঃ’ সর্বজ্ঞ ঈশ্বরঃ । একং বীজং বহুধা যঃ করোতি’ । ‘তে যদন্তরা তৎ ব্রহ্ম’—ইত্যাদি” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র ; ২।১।১৪) । “ইমাঃ ষোড়শকলাঃ পুরুষঃ প্রাপ্য ‘আনুভূতাব মাপত্তন্তে’ প্রশ্ন’ ভাষ্য) । ‘আনুভূত’ শব্দের অর্থ—‘অবিশেষতাং প্রাপ্তঃ’, ‘ব্রহ্মণা একীভূতঃ ‘বিবেকানহতাং গতঃ মধুনি রসবৎ’ । “সর্বঞ্চ নামরূপাদি—সদান্বনৈব সত্যং স্বতন্ত্র অনৃতমেব...ন হি যুদ্ধমনাক্রিয়া ঘটাদেঃ সৎ স্বতির্বা অস্তি...অতঃ স্থিতিকালেপি সর্বাঃ প্রভাঃ সদায়তনা এব”—ছান্দোগ্যভাষ্য ।—‘আনুভূত’ বলিবার ইহাই তাৎপর্য্য ।

* “সং-সম্পত্তিবচনাচ্চ । যদি চ কুৎস্নং ব্রহ্ম কার্য্যভাবেন উপগুপ্তং স্তাৎ, ‘সত্য সৌম্য তদা সম্পন্নো ভবতি’ ইতি সুশুপ্তিগতঃ বিশেষণং অনুপপন্নং স্তাৎ”—ইত্যাদি...পৃষ্ঠা দেখুন ।

সুষুপ্তি-সময়ে জীবের মন-প্রাণ ইন্দ্রিয়াদির সর্বপ্রকার ক্রিয়া ‘সদ্রূপে’ বিলীন হইয়া যায় । এখানকার এই ‘সদ্রূপ’ কে ? মাণ্ডুক্য-ভাষ্যে আমরা ইহার ব্যাখ্যা পাই । সুষুপ্তিকালে, মন-ইন্দ্রিয়াদির সর্বপ্রকার ক্রিয়া প্রাণ-বীজে বিলীন থাকে । আবার জাগিলে, এই প্রাণ-বীজ হইতেই সেই সকল ক্রিয়া পুনরায় উদ্ভূত হইয়া থাকে । প্রাণবীজ, তখন ‘অব্যক্ত’, ‘অবিভক্ত’, ‘নির্বিশেষ’ ভাবে থাকে । তখন বাহ্য বিষয়বর্গ আর চক্ষুরাদি ইন্দ্রিয়ের ক্রিয়ার উদ্রেক করে না । মনেরও বিষয়ানুভূতি ও ক্রিয়ার উদ্রেক হয় না । এই প্রকারে তখন, ইন্দ্রিয়ের স্পন্দন ও মনের স্পন্দন থাকে না । দেশ-কালে বিভক্ত স্পন্দন না থাকায়, ঐ সকল স্পন্দন অব্যক্তভাবে, অবিভক্তভাবে, প্রাণে বিলীন হইয়া যায় । সুতরাং প্রাণ তখন অব্যক্ত, নির্বিশেষ ভাব ধারণ করে * । অতএব আমরা দেখিতেছি যে, প্রাণ-বীজ তখন নির্বিশেষ হইয়া নির্বিশেষ আত্মায় একীভূত হইয়া যায় । ‘মধুতে রসের ন্যায়, ঘূতে মাধুর্যের ন্যায়, প্রাণ তখন আত্মায় অবিভক্ত, একীভূত, হইয়া থাকে’ † । ভাস্কর্য্যকার, জীবের সুষুপ্তির অবস্থার সঙ্গে, জগতের প্রলয়াবস্থার তুলনা করিয়াছেন এবং উভয় অবস্থাকেই এক রূপ বলিয়া নির্দেশ করিয়াছেন । সুতরাং নিগূর্ণ, নির্বিশেষ ব্রহ্ম—এই প্রাণবীজের আধার হইতেছেন । নির্বিশেষ ব্রহ্মে, প্রাণবীজ নির্বিশেষ হইয়া অব্যাকৃতভাবে বিলীন আছে । এই জগুই, এই অবস্থায়, প্রাণবীজকে ব্রহ্মের “আত্মভূত” বলা হইয়াছে ‡ । যখন আবার জীবের জাগরণে এবং জগতের সৃষ্টিকালে,

* “দর্শন-স্মরণে এব হি মনঃস্পন্দিতে, তদভাবে হৃদেব বিশেষেণ প্রাণাঙ্কনা অবস্থানাং প্রাণঃ ।...নহু ব্যাকৃতঃ প্রাণঃ সুষুপ্তে, তদাঙ্কানি কবণানি ভবন্তি ; কথং অব্যাকৃততা । নৈব দোষঃ ; অব্যাকৃতস্ত দৈশ-কাল-বিশেষাভাবাৎ ।...পরিচ্ছিন্ন বিশেষাভিমাননিরোধঃ প্রাণে ভবতীতি অব্যাকৃত এব প্রাণঃ”—মাণ্ডুক্যভাষ্য, আগম প্রকরণ ।

† একীভবন্তি, বিবেকানন্দং, আবেশেষতাং গচ্ছন্তি তস্মিন্ স্বপ্নকালে মণ্ডলে মরীচিবৎ, মধুনি বসবৎ, ঘূতে মাধূর্ঘবৎ । জিজাগরিষাক্ষ...প্রচরন্তি—স্বযাপারায় প্রতিষ্ঠন্তে—প্রমুখায়া, ৪।১-২ ।...“স্বাপেপি সংহতানাং পারতন্ত্র্যেনৈব কাম্মংশিৎ সঙ্গতন্যায়োতি...যস্মিন্ প্রদীনাঃ সুষুপ্ত-প্রলয়কালয়োঃ”—*Ibid*

‡ “সর্বজ্ঞস্ত ঈশ্বরস্ত “আত্মভূতে” ইব.....নামরূপে.....মায়াশক্তিঃ প্রকৃতি রিতি চ অভিলপোতে ...তাভ্যাং ‘অন্যঃ’ সর্বজ্ঞ ঈশ্বরঃ.....‘তে যদন্তরা তদ্বক্ষ’—ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।১।১৪ ।

“ইমাঃ বোদ্ধশকলাঃ পুঞ্চঃ প্রাপ্য অবিশেষতাং—আত্মভাব—মাপত্তন্তে (প্রমুখা ভা) । “আত্মতাদাত্মোক্ত্যা “স্বতন্ত্রত্বনিরাসেন” নান্বৈত প্রতিবিরোধঃ”—আনন্দগিরিঃ ।

উহাই স্পন্দিত ও স্ফুরিত হইয়া উঠিবে, তখন সেই নির্বিশেষ ব্রহ্মে থাকিয়াই উহা স্পন্দিত ও ক্রিয়াশীল হইবে। অতএব, নিগুণ ব্রহ্মই নামরূপাদি বিকারে অনুসৃত, ইহাই পাওয়া যাইতেছে। ইহাই ‘সৎ’ ব্রহ্ম। সূতরাং নির্বিশেষ কারণসত্তা—নিগুণব্রহ্মই হইতেছেন।

এই জন্তই অগ্ৰস্থানে, বিকারবর্গের মধ্যে অনুগত সত্তাকে “সামান্য” অর্থাৎ নির্বিশেষ শব্দে নির্দেশ করা হইয়াছে। ইহাকে “সৎ” শব্দেও নির্দেশ করা হইয়াছে। ইহাকে “নির্বিকার” ও বলা হইয়াছে * ।

এই প্রাণ-বীজ যখন “কার্য্য্যভিমুখ” হয়, যখন কিঞ্চিৎ “উচ্ছন্নভাব” ধারণ করে, তখন উহার মধ্যে নির্বিশেষ ব্রহ্মই অনুগত থাকেন। উহাকে বেদান্ত-ভাষ্যে “জায়মান অবস্থা” এবং “চিকীর্ষিত অবস্থা” বলা হইয়াছে। উহা কাহার ‘অবস্থা’ ? বিকারাভীত ব্রহ্মেরই উহা একটা উন্মুখাবস্থা† ।

নিগুণব্রহ্মকে তখন ঐ ‘কার্য্য্যভিমুখ’ প্রাণবীজের ‘দ্রষ্টা’ এবং ‘জ্ঞাতা’ বলা হইয়াছে। উহাকেই বেদান্তে “জ্ঞানের কর্ম্ম” (object) বলিয়া নির্দেশ করা হইয়াছে। এই প্রাণবীজের জ্ঞাতা বা কর্ত্তা—নিগুণ ব্রহ্ম এবং এই প্রাণবীজই তাঁহার জ্ঞেয় বা কর্ম্ম‡ ।

Compare also—“যস্মিন্ দ্যৌঃ পৃথিবী চাস্তরীক্ষ মোতঃ মনঃসহ প্রাণৈশ্চ সর্বৈঃ” ।

“অরাইবরধনাভো সংহতা যত্র নাভ্যঃ” ইত্যাদি ।

“বটকণিকার্য্য্য মিব বটবীজশক্তিঃ”—কঠভাষ্য ।

* “অপোচ্চ সর্ববিশেষত্বাৎ ব্রহ্মণো নাস্তিত্বং প্রতি আশঙ্ক্য, সর্বসামান্যত্বাৎ ব্রহ্মণঃ।...আকাশাদিকারণত্বাৎ ব্রহ্মণো নাস্তিতা।...বস্মাচ্চ জায়তে কিঞ্চিৎ তদন্তীতি দৃষ্টলোকে...তস্মাৎ ‘সদেব ব্রহ্ম’—তৈত্তিভাষ্য, “সর্বত্র যে বুদ্ধী সর্বৈকরূপলভ্যোতে সমানাধিকরণে। সন্মতঃ, সন্ম পটঃ...এবং সর্বত্র। তস্মো বুধ্যোক্ত” ঘটাদিবুদ্ধি ব্যভিচারঃ, নতু সম্বুদ্ধিঃ”—গীতা, ভাষ্য, ২।১৬ “সতো বিশেষঃ কারক্য্যপেক্ষঃ, বিশেষস্ত বিকারঃ। যদ্বি যন্ত ন অন্ত্যাপেক্ষং স্বরূপং তৎতন্ত তদ্বৎ—স্বরূপং; যদন্ত্যাপেক্ষং ন তদ্বৎ”—তৈত্তি ভাষ্য ।

† “ভূতযোনি অক্ষরং ব্রহ্ম...উৎপাদয়িত্বাদিদং জগৎ অঙ্কুরমিব বীজাৎ ‘উচ্ছন্নতাং’ গচ্ছতি, পুত্রমিব পিতা হর্ষেণ। অধ্যাকৃতঃ.....‘ব্যাপ্তিকীর্ষিতাবস্থা’-রূপেণ অভিজায়তে” (মণ্ডক ভা, ১।৮)। “সৎকার্য্য্যভিমুখং ঈষদ্রূপজাতপ্রবৃত্তি সৎ সমভবৎ”—হানো? ভা, । “জায়মান প্রকৃতিত্বেন নিদ্বিগ্ধ” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ১।২।২১) ।

‡ “কর্ম্ম্যাপেক্ষাসত্ত্ব ব্রহ্মণি ঈকিত্বশ্রুতমঃ সূতরাং মুপপন্নঃ। কিং পুনস্তৎ ‘কর্ম্ম’, যৎ শ্রাণ্ডংপত্তেঃ ঈষদ্রূপজ্ঞানস্ত ‘বিষয়ঃ’ (Object) ভবতীতি ? তদ্ব্যাক্ত্যভ্যামনির্বচনীয়ে নামরূপে অধ্যাকৃতঃ ব্যাপ্তিকীর্ষিতে ইতি ক্রমঃ” বেদান্ত সূত্র, ১।১।৫।

তাহা হইলেই, কথাটা ইহাই দাঁড়াইতেছে যে, নির্বিশেষ নির্বিকার ব্রহ্মের মধ্যে—জগতের সর্বপ্রকার বিকার (Differentiations) অবিত্ত হইয়া যায়। আবার সৃষ্টিকালে, সেই নিগুণ নির্বিশেষ ব্রহ্মে থাকিয়াই, ক্রমে বীজভাব, সূক্ষ্মভাব, স্থূলভাব—এই তিন অবস্থায় জগৎ অভিব্যক্ত হয়। নিগুণ নির্বিশেষ ব্রহ্ম—জগতের এই তিন অবস্থাতেই অনুসৃত থাকেন। এই জন্ম বলা হইয়াছে—

“জগতের নামরূপাদি বিকারগুলি সর্বাবস্থায় আত্মস্বরূপকে পরিত্যাগ না করিয়াই, অভিব্যক্ত হইয়া থাকে”* ।

“চৈতন্য হইতে স্বতন্ত্র না হইয়াই, পঞ্চভূত, প্রাণ, মন প্রভৃতি ‘কলা’ বা বিকারগুলি উৎপন্ন হয়, অবস্থান করে ও প্রলীন হইয়া যায়” † ।

“জগতের ‘প্রজা’ বা বিকারবর্গ, ‘সৎ’-মূল হইতে অভিব্যক্ত হয়, ‘সৎ’ ইহাদের আয়তন (অন্তরালে) এবং উহারা ‘সৎ’এর উপরেই প্রতিষ্ঠিত” ‡ ।

এই জন্মই বলা হইয়াছে যে,—

“প্রাকৃতিক বিকার দ্বারা ও বৈষয়িক বিজ্ঞান দ্বারা আত্ম-চৈতন্য প্রচ্ছন্ন হইয়া পড়িয়াছে” এবং “এই আত্মচৈতন্য কাল-ত্রয় দ্বারা পরিচ্ছিন্ন হয় না” § ।

এই সকল আলোচনা দ্বারা আমরা পাইতেছি যে, বিকারবর্গে যিনি অনুসৃত আছেন, তিনি নিগুণ ব্রহ্ম ব্যতীত অন্য কেহ নহেন। বেদান্তের ‘ঈশ্বর,’—জগতে অনুপ্রবিষ্ট (Immanent) নিগুণ-ব্রহ্ম ব্যতীত অন্য কেহ নহে।

(২) বেদান্ত-কথিত ‘ঈশ্বর’ এবং নিগুণ ব্রহ্ম—যে একই ; নিগুণ ব্রহ্মই যে জগতের সকল বিকারে অনুসৃত ;—এই তত্ত্বটা আমরা শঙ্করাচার্য্যের

“যদা হি সর্বং ‘জ্ঞেয়ং’ কল্পচিৎ, তদা তদ্ব্যতিরিক্তং জ্ঞানং জ্ঞানমেবেতি বিত্তীকো বিভাগঃ অভ্যুপগম্যতে এবং”—প্রথমভা° । “জ্ঞেয়ং জ্ঞেয়মেষং ; তথা জ্ঞাতাপি জ্ঞাতৈব, ন জ্ঞেয়ং ভবতি” -গী°, ১৩।২ ।

N.B.—এই জন্মই বৈশ্যাস্ত্রে জ্ঞাতা (Subject) ও জ্ঞেয়ের (Object) মধ্যস্থ Fundamental:

* তৈ° ভা°, ২।৩ ।

† প্র° ভা°, ৬।১ ।

‡ ছা° ভা° ৬।৮।৪ ।

§ কঠ° ভা°, ২।১২ and ২।১৪ ।

নিম্নলিখিত সিদ্ধান্ত হইতেও বুঝিতে পারিব। পাঠক সেই সিদ্ধান্তগুলি দেখুন :—

(i) মাণ্ডুক্য-ভাষ্যে ‘তুরীয়’ ব্রহ্মের সম্বন্ধে বলিতে গিয়া, ভাষ্যকার বলিতেছেন,—

“ব্রহ্ম, জগতের অতীত । সকল বিকারের বাহিরে । আমরা যে সকল শব্দ ও বাক্য ব্যবহার করিয়া থাকি, তদ্বারা জগতের বস্তুকে বুঝান যাইতে পারে ; কিন্তু যিনি সকলের অতীত, তাঁহাকে ত কোন শব্দ দ্বারা নির্দেশ করা সম্ভব হইতে পারে না । যাঁহাকে শব্দ দ্বারা নির্দেশ করা যায় না, তিনি কি তবে ‘শূন্য’ বস্তু হইতেছেন না ?” ভাষ্যকার এই প্রশ্ন উত্থাপন করিয়া, ইহার এই প্রকার সমাধান করিয়াছেন—“না, ব্রহ্মকে ‘শূন্য’ বলিতে পার না । কোন কল্পনা, কোন ধর্ম, কোন বিকার, কোন অবস্থা—শূন্যের উপরে দাঁড়াইয়া থাকিতে পারে না । রজ্জ্বকে আশ্রয় করিয়াই সর্পের প্রতীতি হইয়া থাকে । তৃষ্ণার্হ ব্যক্তি যে মরুভূমিতে জল দেখিতে পায় সেখানেও, সেই জলের প্রতীতি, মরুক্ষেত্র অবলম্বন করিয়াই উপস্থিত হয় ।”

এই প্রকার, শুদ্ধিকাতে, রজতের আপাততঃ অভিব্যক্তি ; একটা স্থাণুতে মনুষ্যাকৃতির অভিব্যক্তি ও, শুদ্ধিকা এবং স্থাণুকে অবলম্বন করিয়াই উপস্থিত হইয়া থাকে । এই সকল ভ্রম প্রতীতিও কোন শূন্য বস্তুর উপরে হয় না । এ সকল স্থলে যেমন, তেমনি জগতে অভিব্যক্ত প্রাণ-মন প্রভৃতি সর্বপ্রকার বিকার বা ধর্মগুলি,—সেই ‘তুরীয়’ ব্রহ্ম-বস্তুর আশ্রয়েই অভিব্যক্ত হয় ; সেই ব্রহ্ম বস্তুই এই সকল বিকারের “আম্পদ” । সুতরাং, প্রাণাদিবিকারগুলি যখন ব্রহ্মস্বরূপকে—ব্রহ্মসত্তাকে—আশ্রয় করিয়া অবস্থান করে, তখন তাঁহাকে ‘শূন্য’ বলিবে কি প্রকারে* ? ইহা না বলিলে, এই বিকারগুলির কোন ‘কারণ’ নাই, ইহাই বলিতে হয় । বিকারগুলি আপনা আপনি উৎপন্ন হয়,—ইহাই বলিতে হয় !! আমরা এস্থলে পাইতেছি যে, তুরীয় ব্রহ্ম কোন শূন্য বস্তু নহেন । সর্বপ্রকার বিকার সেই তুরীয়-সত্তার

* “সর্বশব্দপ্রযুক্তিনিমিত্তশূন্যত্বাৎ, তন্ত শব্দানভিধেয়ত্ব মিতি, বিশেষ-প্রতিষেধেনৈব তুরীয়ে নির্দিষ্টিকতি—‘নাস্ত্যঃপ্রজ্ঞ’ মিত্যাदि । শূন্যমেব তর্হি ? তন্ন । মিথ্যাবিকল্পস্ত নিমিত্তাহুপপত্তেঃ । নহি রজত-সর্প-পুংস-সুগন্ধিকাদি-বিকল্পাঃ, শুদ্ধিব-রজ্জ্ব-স্থাণুরাদি-বাতিরেকেন অবস্থাম্পাদাঃ শক্যাঃ কল্পয়িতুং । এবং তর্হি প্রাণাদি-সর্ববিকল্পাম্পদত্বং তুরীয়ন্ত ”—মাণ্ডুক্য-ভাষ্য ।

উপরেই প্রতিষ্ঠিত । নিগুণ-সত্তাই সকল বিকারে অনুসৃত । তবু লোকে বলে যে, বেদান্তের ব্রহ্ম দুইটা !!!

(ii) সর্বপ্রকার বিকারে যে সত্তা অনুগত হইয়া রহিয়াছে, উহা যে নিগুণ-ব্রহ্ম সত্তা এবং এতদ্ব্যতীত যে নিগুণ-ব্রহ্মকে বুঝিবার,—তাঁহাকে ধরিবার, ছুঁইবার—অন্য কোন উপায় নাই ; ভাব্যকার এইরূপে তাহা বলিয়াছেন—

“একটা রজ্জুকে তুমি সর্পধর্ম্মবিশিষ্ট বলিয়া মনে করিতেছ । একখণ্ড শুক্তিকাকে তুমি রজত-ধর্ম্মবিশিষ্ট বলিয়া মনে করিতেছ । কিন্তু প্রকৃত পক্ষে, তুমি রজ্জুর স্বাতন্ত্র্য ভুলিয়া গিয়াছ এবং উহাকে সর্প বলিয়া ধরিয়া লইতেছ* । এইরূপ, জাগরিতাবস্থা, স্বপ্নাবস্থা এবং গাঢ় সুষুপ্তাবস্থা—জীবের এই তিন অবস্থা । এই তিন অবস্থার মধ্যেই আত্মার যেটা স্বরূপ, তাহা অনুগত থাকে । আমরা আত্মার সেই স্বরূপটীর স্বাতন্ত্র্য ও একত্ব ভুলিয়া গিয়া, উহাকে ঐ তিনঅবস্থাবিশিষ্ট বলিয়া মনে করিয়া থাকি । মনে করি যে, ঐ অবস্থাত্রয়ই আত্মার স্বরূপ । অবস্থাত্রয়-ব্যতীত যে আত্মার স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপ আছে, যাহা ঐ অবস্থাত্রয়ের মধ্যে আপন একত্ব (Identity) হারায় না, একথাটা ভুলিয়া যাই । ঐ তিন অবস্থার মধ্যে যাহা অনুগত, তাহাই আত্মার স্বরূপ এবং উহাই ‘তুরীয়’ স্বরূপ । জীবের এই তিন অবস্থা অবলম্বন করিয়া, জীবের প্রকৃত স্বরূপটিকে বুঝিতে পারা যায় । এই অবস্থার সাহায্য ব্যতীত, আত্মার স্বরূপ বুঝিবার আর কোন উপায় নাই । সেই স্বরূপ হইতেই এই অবস্থাত্রয় অভিব্যক্ত । যাহা হইতে কিছু অভিব্যক্ত হয়, তাহাই উহার ‘কারণ’ । শূন্য হইতে ত আর উহারা অভিব্যক্ত হয় নাই । সুতরাং অভিব্যক্ত অবস্থার সাহায্য ব্যতীত যদি আত্মার স্বরূপকে বুঝিতে চাও, তাহা হইলে, উহা ‘শূন্য’ বলিয়াই প্রতীত হইবে।”

* বেদান্তে—রজ্জু-সর্প, শুক্তি-রজত —প্রভৃতি দৃষ্টান্ত অবলম্বন করার তাৎপর্য্য এই যে, রজ্জু বা শুক্তি—ইহারা কখনই ত বিকৃত হয় না । আত্মার স্বরূপটাও যে বিকৃত হয় না ;—তাহাই বুঝান উদ্দেশ্য ।

+ “মর্পাদিবিবর্ত্তপ্রতিষেধেনৈব রজ্জ্বস্বরূপ-প্রতিপত্তিৰ্ভবৎ, ত্র্যবস্থান্তৈব আত্মন স্তুরীয়ত্বেন প্রতিপাদয়িতব্যাৎ । যদি হি ত্র্যবস্থাস্ববিবর্ত্তকং তুরীয়মন্ততঃ,—তৎ-প্রতিপত্তিহারাভাবাৎ শাস্ত্রোপদেশানর্থক্যং, শূন্ততাপত্তিৰ্ভা । অতঃ তুরীয়াধিগমে প্রমাণান্তরং সাধনান্তরং বা ন দৃগ্যৎ”—মাছুকা-ভাষ্য ।

পাঠক দেখুন কতদূর সুস্পষ্ট কথা । ব্রহ্ম—‘এই বিকার হইতে ভিন্ন,’ ‘ওই বিকার হইতে ভিন্ন’—এই প্রকারে, সকল বিকার, সকল ধর্ম, সকল অবস্থা হইতে ভিন্ন (Distinguished) করিয়া লইয়া, সকল বিকারের মধ্যে অনুগত সত্তাটির ‘একত্বের’ ও ‘স্বাতন্ত্র্যের’ অনুভব করা যায় । এতদ্ব্যতীত, নিগুণ, সর্ববাতীত ব্রহ্মকে বুঝিবার আর অন্য উপায় নাই । নিগুণ ব্রহ্ম শূন্য বস্তু নহে । তিনি সকল বিকারে স্বতন্ত্র থাকিয়াই অনুগত রহিয়াছেন ।

(iii) অন্য স্থানেও এইরূপ কথাই বলা হইয়াছে । “রজ্জুকে যেমন সর্পাদি-ধর্মবিশিষ্ট বলিয়াই মনে হয় ; কিন্তু তথাপি, সর্পাদি-ধর্ম হইতে প্রকৃত পক্ষে রজ্জু স্বতন্ত্র ; এবং সেই রজ্জুকে আশ্রয় করিয়াই সর্পাদিধর্ম উৎপন্ন হয় । এইরূপ, তুরীয় ব্রহ্ম-সত্তা, জাগরিতাди অবস্থাত্রয়ের মধ্যে আপন একত্ব হারায় না । এই সকল অবস্থান্তর হইতে সেই সত্তাকে স্বতন্ত্র করিয়া লইয়া অনুভব করিতে হয় । এই প্রকারেই সেই সত্তাকে জানিতে পারা যায়* ।”

আবার—

(iv) “সুখ-দুঃখ-বুণা-লজ্জা প্রভৃতি বিবিধ প্রকার ধর্ম বা বিকার (states) গুলি, আত্মার স্বরূপেরই অভিব্যক্তি । সেই স্বরূপটি এই সকল বিকার বা ধর্মের মধ্যে অনুগত । এই সকল অবস্থান্তরের মধ্যে, আত্মার নির্বিশেষ স্বরূপটি আপন একত্ব হারাওয়া, অবস্থান্তরিত হইয়া উঠে না । ধর্মগুলি কালে আবদ্ধ ; কিন্তু স্বরূপটি কালাতীত । যাহা কাল-বিশেষে অভিব্যক্ত, তাহা এক অবস্থা হইতে অন্য অবস্থা প্রাপ্ত হয় । কিন্তু যাহা কালাতীত, তাহা নির্বিবকার ও নির্বিশেষণ ।”

* “জাগ্রদাধিনানেষু এক এবায়মাত্মা ইত্যব্যভিচারী যঃ প্রত্যয়ঃ, তেন অনুসরণীয়ঃ..... তুরীয়ঃ ব্রহ্ম ।”
“তুরীয়ঃ মস্তস্তে, প্রতীয়মান-পাদত্রয়বৈলক্ষণ্যঃ । স আত্মা, স বিজ্ঞেয় ইতি প্রতীয়মান-সর্প-দণ্ড-ভূচ্ছাদি-ব্যতিরিক্তা যথা রজ্জুঃ”—মাণ্ডুক্য ভাষ্য,

† “তস্মাৎ নির্বিশেষে এব আত্মনি স্থিতিাদি-বিশেষাঃ কল্পিতাঃ আত্মা এতেষু অনুগতঃ সর্বত্র অব্যভিচারঃ ; যথা সর্প-ধারাদিতেষু রজ্জুঃ”—মাণ্ডুক্য-ভাষ্য,

Here compare.—“There arises the idea of the *persistent* Ego to which both past and present belong—that we become aware of what is meant by *unity of being* throughout a change of *manifold states* and that such unity, can only the *distinct*

পাঠক দেখিতেছেন যে, কেমন স্পষ্ট করিয়া শঙ্করাচার্য্য, নিগুণ-ব্রহ্মকেই জগতের সকল অবস্থা ও সকল বিকারের মধ্যে অনুগত বলিয়াছেন । অতএব, বেদান্তের নিগুণ-ব্রহ্ম এবং ঐশ্বর্য,—দুইটা ভিন্ন বস্তু নহে । একই ব্রহ্মস্বরূপ, জগতের অতীত (Transcendent) হইয়াও, জগতের মধ্যে অনুগত (Immanent) রহিয়াছেন । ইহা বুঝাইবার জন্যই, ভাষ্যকার ব্রহ্মের নিগুণ-ভাব ও সগুণ-ভাবের বিবরণ দিয়াছেন* । না বুঝিয়া লোকে বলে, বেদান্তের নিগুণ ব্রহ্ম—‘শূন্য’ বস্তু এবং উহা জগতের সঙ্গে সর্বপ্রকার সম্পর্কবিহীন !!!

এখন আমরা, এই নিগুণ-ব্রহ্মের ‘স্বরূপ’ সম্বন্ধে বেদান্ত কি প্রকার নির্ণয় করিয়াছেন, তাহা দেখাইয়া ব্রহ্ম সম্বন্ধে আমাদের বক্তব্য শেষ করিব ।

from its states, if it distinguishes itself from its states. It can only be unity, if it opposes itself, as such, to the multiplicity of its states” —Lotze. “কথং হি অহমদো-হদ্রাকং, ইদং পশ্যামি, ইতি পূর্বোত্তরদর্শনি একস্মিন্নসতি প্রত্যভিজ্ঞাপ্রত্যয়ঃ স্তাৎ” —বেদান্ত সূত্র ।

* এই জগৎই বেদান্তে ব্রহ্মকে —‘নিমিত্ত কারণ’ ও ‘উপাদান কারণ’ উভয় বলা হইয়াছে । কেবল মাত্র নিমিত্ত কারণ বলিলে, ব্রহ্মের, জগতের সঙ্গে কোনই সম্পর্ক থাকিত না ; জগৎও একটা স্বাধীন, স্বতন্ত্র বস্তু হইয়া উঠিত । ‘উপাদান কারণ’ কেবল বলিলে, Pantheism মতের সকল দোষ আশ্রিত পড়িত ।

নিগুণ ব্রহ্মের ‘স্বরূপ’-নিরূপণ ।

এই জগৎ ব্রহ্ম-স্বরূপের বিকাশ । জগতে যে সকল জ্ঞান, ক্রিয়া, শক্তি প্রভৃতির বিকাশ হইয়াছে, আমরা তাহা হইতে কতকটা আংশিক পরিমাণে ব্রহ্মস্বরূপের আভাস প্রাপ্ত হই। “তিনি যদি জগদাকারে অভিব্যক্ত না হইতেন, তাহা হইলে জীব কি প্রকারে তাঁহার সেই সর্ববাসীত ‘প্রজ্ঞান-ঘন’ স্বরূপটিকে বুঝিতে পারিত ? তাঁহারই প্রাণশক্তি জীবের দেহেন্দ্রিয়রূপে পরিণত হওয়াতে, জীব তাঁহাকে জ্ঞানস্বরূপ, সামর্থ্য-স্বরূপ, আনন্দস্বরূপ বলিয়া বুঝিতে পারিতেছে” * । তাঁহারই শক্তি-সৌন্দর্য্য-জ্ঞান অভিব্যক্ত না হইলে, জীব কি অবলম্বন করিয়া তাঁহার পরিচয় পাইত ? ছান্দোগাভাষ্যেও এই কথাটা বড় সুন্দররূপে দেখান হইয়াছে।—

“যিনি উত্তরদিগকে প্রকাশিত করেন তিনি সূর্য্য ; দক্ষিণ দিকের যিনি প্রকাশক তিনি সূর্য্য । এইরূপ, যিনি পূর্ব্ব, পশ্চিম ও উর্দ্ধ—সকলদিকের সকল বস্তুকে প্রকাশিত করিয়া থাকেন, তিনি সূর্য্য । সকল দিকের সকল বস্তুর প্রকাশ করিয়া থাকেন দেখিয়া, আমরা, প্রকাশ করাই সূর্য্যের স্বভাব বা স্বরূপ,—ইহা বুঝিয়া থাকি । জীবও, বিষয়েন্দ্রিয় যোগে সর্ববদাই—শব্দজ্ঞান, স্পর্শজ্ঞান, রূপজ্ঞান,—নানা বস্তুর বিবিধ জ্ঞান লাভ করিয়া থাকে । ইহা দ্বারা, আত্মা যে জ্ঞান-স্বরূপ, তাহার পরিচয় পাওয়া যায় । আবার, জীব, চক্ষুরিন্দ্রিয়দ্বারা রূপদর্শন ক্রিয়া নির্বাহ করে ; শ্রাণেন্দ্রিয়দ্বারা গন্ধগ্রহণ ক্রিয়া সম্পাদন করে ;—এইরূপে বিবিধ ইন্দ্রিয়দ্বারা বিবিধ প্রকারের ক্রিয়া করিয়া থাকে । এতদ্বারা, আত্মা যে সামর্থ্য-স্বরূপ তাহার

* “কিমর্থং পুনঃ প্রতিরূপাগমনং তস্ত ইত্যাচ্যতে,—যদি হি নামরূপে ন ব্যাক্রিয়েতে, তদা অস্ত আক্সেনো নিরূপাধিকং রূপং প্রজ্ঞানঘনাখ্যং ন প্রতিখ্যায়তে । যদা পুনঃ কার্য্যকরণাঙ্গনো নামরূপে ব্যাক্রুতে তবতঃ, তদা অস্ত রূপং প্রতিখ্যায়তে”—বৃহৎ শাখা, ২।৫।১১ ।

পরিচয় পাওয়া যায় * ।” এইরূপে “সুখ-দুঃখাদির অনুভূতি দ্বারাও, আত্মাকে আনন্দ-স্বরূপ বলিয়া বুঝিতে পারা যায় ।” বিষয়েন্দ্রিয়-যোগে আত্মাতে এই সকল জ্ঞান, ক্রিয়া, সুখদুঃখাদির অভিব্যক্তি না হইলে, আত্মার প্রকৃত স্বরূপটী কি প্রকার, তাহা বুঝিতে পারা যাইত না । ব্রহ্মেরই প্রাণশক্তি, বিষয়েন্দ্রিয়াকারে পরিণত হইয়াছে । অতএব, প্রাণশক্তির অভিব্যক্তি না হইলে, জীব তাঁহার স্বরূপের পরিচয় পাইত না † ।

এই প্রকারে ব্রহ্মকে—জ্ঞান, সামর্থ্য, আনন্দ স্বরূপ বলিয়া বুঝা যায় । এই তিনটি—কেহই কাহাকে ছাড়িয়া থাকে না । একটা হইতে অপরটা ভিন্ন নহে । এই তিনই এক ; একই তিন‡ । যেখানেই জ্ঞান, সেইখানেই আনন্দ ; যেখানেই আনন্দ, সেইখানেই তাহার বোধ । অঙ্গান্বি-ভাবে ইহার ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপ ; ইহার ব্রহ্মের গুণ বা ধর্ম্য নহে । ইহারাই ব্রহ্মের স্বরূপ । এই স্বরূপটী নিত্য ; কোন বস্তুসংযোগে উৎপন্ন নহে ।

ব্রহ্মের এই স্বরূপ সম্বন্ধে ভাষ্যকারের মন্তব্য, আর একটু বিশেষ করিয়া, উল্লেখ করিতে ইচ্ছা করি । কেহ কেহ নিগুণ ব্রহ্মকে ‘শূন্য’ বলিয়া প্রতিপন্ন করিয়াছেন । তজ্জন্ত একটু বিশেষ আলোচনা আবশ্যক ।

(১) নিগুণ ব্রহ্ম—জ্ঞানস্বরূপ (self-conscious) :—

আমরা, আমাদের আত্মার স্বরূপটীকে যে ভাবে দেখিতে পাই, তদ্বারাই আমরা পরমাত্মার স্বরূপটীকেও বুঝিতে পারি । আমরা দেখিতে পাই—

(i) জ্ঞানই আত্মার স্বরূপ । ঐ জ্ঞান, কোন বিষয় সংযোগে উৎপন্ন হয় না । কেন না, উহা নিত্য ; এবং উহা নির্বিকার । যখনই যে বস্তু

* “যথা যঃ পূর্বস্তাৎ প্রকাশয়তি, স আদিত্যঃ । যো দক্ষিণতঃ, যঃ পশ্চাৎ, য উর্দ্ধং—প্রকাশয়তি স আদিত্য ইত্যুক্তে, প্রকাশ-স্বরূপঃ স গম্যতে । দর্শনাদিক্রিয়ানির্বৃত্তার্থানি তু চক্ষুরাদি-করণানি ;—ইদঞ্চ অস্ত আত্মনঃ সামর্থ্যাৎ অবগম্যতে । আত্মনঃ সত্ত্বামাত্র এব জ্ঞান-কর্তৃত্বং নতু ব্যাপৃততয়া”—ছা° ভাষ্য ৮।১২।৫। “অগ্নেঃ সর্বভূর্বা উষ্ণপ্রকাশবৎ, স্বরূপ ভূতস্ত আনন্দস্ত—সুখস্ত—নেহ প্রতিবেদ্যঃ (আগমাপরিনোঃ শরীর-সম্বন্ধিনোঃ শ্রিয়াপ্রিয়য়োঃ প্রতিবেদনস্ত বিবক্ষিতত্বাৎ)” —ছা, ভা, ৮।১২।১ ।

† “কার্য-করণ-বিষয়াকার পরিণতানি যানি এতানি নামরূপাঙ্গকানি ভূতানি” -বৃহ° ভা° ।

‡ “নচ সমানাত্মানাং একস্ত আত্মভূতানাং ধর্মাণাং ইতরেতর বিষয়-বিষয়িং সম্ভবতি । .ন অভিব্যক্তি-সাধনাপেক্ষতা, নিত্য্যভিব্যক্তত্বাৎ” (বৃহ°, ভাষ, ৪।৪।৬) । “ন চ—সত্তাব্যাবৃত্তেন বোধেন, বোধব্যাবৃত্ত্যা চ

বা বিষয় আমাদের ইন্দ্রিয়-পথে উপস্থিত হয়, তখনই উহাকে আমরা জানিতে পারি ; উহা আমাদের অজ্ঞাত থাকে না ; উহা আত্মার জ্ঞান দ্বারা জ্ঞাত হইয়াই উপস্থিত হয়* । উহা, আত্মজ্ঞানের ‘বিষয়ীভূত’ হইয়াই উপস্থিত হয় । আত্মার এই জ্ঞেয় বস্তুগুলি পরিবর্তিত হইতে পারে, একটা জ্ঞেয় বস্তুর বদলে অপর একটা জ্ঞেয় বস্তু আসিয়া উপস্থিত হইতে পারে ; কিন্তু উহাদের যিনি ‘জ্ঞাতা,’ তাঁহার কোন রূপান্তর হয় না । সুতরাং আত্মার যে জ্ঞান তাহা নিত্য† ।

(ii) প্রত্যেক জীবের এক একটা স্বরূপ আছে । উহা জ্ঞানস্বরূপ । আমাদের যে শব্দ-স্পর্শাদি বিশেষ বিশেষ বিজ্ঞানের অনুভূতি হয় ; উহারা আমাদের সেই স্বরূপেরই অভিযুক্তি । বাহ্য বিষয়বর্গ, আমাদের চক্ষুরাদি ইন্দ্রিয়ের সঙ্গে সম্বন্ধে আসিলে, আমাদের আত্মায় কতকগুলি বিজ্ঞানের উদ্রেক হয় । ইহারা আমাদের স্বরূপ হইতেই উদ্ভিক্ত—অভিযুক্ত—হয় । সুতরাং আত্মার স্বরূপভূত যে নিত্যজ্ঞান, তদ্বারা ‘ব্যাপ্ত’ হইয়াই উহারা উৎপন্ন হইয়া থাকে । অতএব ঐ সকল বিশেষ বিশেষ বিজ্ঞান,—আত্মারই অন্তর্ভুক্ত ; সেই জ্ঞানেরই মধ্যে থাকিয়া উহারা ক্রিয়া করে । সেই জ্ঞানেরই ‘জ্ঞেয়’ রূপে ; সেই জ্ঞানেরই ‘বিষয়ীভূত’ হইয়া ;—ঐ সকল বিজ্ঞান অনুভূত হয় ‡ ।

স্বৰূপ উপেতং ব্রহ্ম একম্ অনেকভাবদ্বানুপপত্তেঃ—ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৩.২.২১। “অনুভূয়তে তু অবিরুদ্ধার্থতা, ‘স্বার্থী অহং’ ইতি মুখ্যককমায়ানং স্বয়মেব বেদযতে” (ব্র, ভা, ৩.৯।২৭)

* “সর্ববস্তু নাং অজ্ঞাতসত্ত্বাংস্তাবাং” ।

† “স্বরূপব্যাভিচারিষু পদার্থেষু চৈতন্ত্যাব্যভিচারাং, যথা যথা যো যো পদার্থঃ বিজ্ঞায়তে, তথা তথা জ্ঞায়মানত্বাদেব তন্ত তন্ত চৈতন্ত্যন্ত অব্যভিচারিত্বং । ব্যভিচারতি তু জ্ঞানং জ্ঞেয়ং ন ব্যভিচারতি কদাচিদপি”—প্রশ্ন-ভাষ্য ।

‡ “আত্মনো স্বরূপং জ্ঞাপ্তি, ন ততো ব্যতিরচ্যতে । অতোনিত্যৈব । তথাপি বুদ্ধে রূপাধিলক্ষণাঃ চক্ষুরাদিদ্বারৈ বিযয়াকার-পরিণামিতা য়ে শব্দাঢ্যাকারাবভাসাঃ, আত্মজ্ঞানস্ত বিষয়ভূতা উৎপত্তমানা ... আত্মজ্ঞানেন ব্যাপ্তা উৎপত্তস্তে । এতৎ জ্ঞানং ‘স্বরূপ’ মেব নতৎ কারণান্তর সব্যপেক্ষং”—তৈত্তিরীয়াঃ ভাষ্য, ২।১ ।

(iii) বাহ্য বিষয় সংযোগে, আমাদের যে শব্দ-স্পর্শ-ক্রোধ-লজ্জাদি বিজ্ঞান গুলি (states of consciousness), উৎপন্ন হয় ; আমাদের আত্মা উহাদিগকে আপনার ‘বিষয়’ রূপে (object) অনুভব করিয়া থাকে । সুতরাং উহার আত্মার ‘জ্ঞেয়’ হইয়াই উৎপন্ন হয় । আত্মা উহাদের ‘জ্ঞাতা’ বা ‘দ্রষ্টা’ (subject). এই প্রকারে, প্রত্যেক জ্ঞেয় বস্তুর সঙ্গে সঙ্গে, উহাদের অন্তরালে, এক নির্বিচকার, জ্ঞান-স্বরূপ আত্মাকে বুদ্ধিতে পারা যায় । সকল ‘জ্ঞেয়’ পদার্থের যিনি ‘জ্ঞাতা’, তিনি নিশ্চয়ই নিত্য, একরূপ । এই প্রকারেই কেবল আত্মাকে জ্ঞান-স্বরূপ বলিয়া বুদ্ধিতে পারা যায় । তাঁহাকে বুদ্ধিবার আর অন্য উপায় নাই* ।

তাহা হইলেই আমরা ইহাই পাইতেছি যে, সর্বপ্রকার বিশেষ বিশেষ বিজ্ঞানের মধ্যে, ঐ নিত্য নির্বিচকার ‘জ্ঞাতা’ অনুসৃত হইয়া রহিয়াছেন † । এতদ্বারা আমরা ইহাও বুদ্ধিতে পারি,—জগতে যত প্রকার জ্ঞান উৎপন্ন হইতেছে, সমস্তই সেই নির্বিচকার ব্রহ্মস্বরূপেরই অভিব্যক্তি ; এবং উহাই, জগতের সকল বিজ্ঞানে অনুসৃত হইয়া রহিয়াছে ।

(২) নিগূণ ব্রহ্ম—প্রেরক, সকল ক্রিয়ার মূল (Directive Power):—

এ বিষয়ে আমরা সর্বপ্রথমে, বেদান্তের একটা অতি মূল্যবান সিদ্ধান্তের প্রতি পাঠকবর্গের মনোযোগ আকর্ষণ করিতেছি । লোকে এই সিদ্ধান্তটা প্রণিধান করিয়া দেখে না । যেখানেই বেদান্তে প্রাণ, মন, ইন্দ্রিয়াদি জড়ীয় ক্রিয়ার কথা আছে, সেইখানেই ইহাদিগের ক্রিয়াকে—“পরার্থ” বলা হইয়াছে । আর চেতনকে—“অর্থী” বা “উপকার-ভাক্” বলিয়া নির্দেশ করা হইয়াছে । পরার্থ শব্দটির অর্থ এই যে, উহারা নিজের কোন প্রয়োজন সাধন করেনা ; উহারা চেতনের প্রয়োজন সাধন করিয়া থাকে । অর্থাৎ,

* “সর্বের প্রত্যয়ঃ বিষয়ভবন্তি যন্ত. স আত্মা সর্বপ্রত্যয়দর্শী । . প্রত্যয়েরেব প্রত্যয়েষু অবিশিষ্টতয়া লক্ষ্যতে ; নাত্মং দ্বারমন্তি অন্তরাঙ্গনো বিজ্ঞানায় । সর্বপ্রত্যয় দর্শিছে চ, উপজ্ঞাপায়বর্জিত—দৃক্-স্বরূপতঃ।-নিত্যত্বং ... সিদ্ধং ভবেৎ”—কেন ভাষ্য, ২৪ ।

† “(ii) কেবলসামান্যবিজ্ঞানদ্বাং সর্বতো যাতিব । (i) যদা বিশেষবিজ্ঞানহঃ, তেন রূপেণ স্থিত এব সন,—মনাদিগতিষু দূরং ব্রজতীব”—কঠ ভাষ্য, ২।২১ ।

উহারা—*Means serving the Purpose of the self.* আর চেতন, ‘অর্থী’—অর্থাৎ, চেতন *An End unto itself.* বেদান্তে পুনঃ পুনঃ এই কথাটা বলিয়া দেওয়া হইয়াছে যে, যেখানেই অচেতন, জড় প্রাণাদির ক্রিয়া দেখিবে, সেইখানেই, উহাদের মূলে, স্বতন্ত্র চেতনের অস্তিত্ব অনুমান করিতে হইবে। এবং বুঝিতে হইবে যে, উহাদের অপেক্ষা স্বতন্ত্র কোন চেতনেরই প্রয়োজন সাধনার্থ, সেই চেতন দ্বারা প্রেরিত হইয়াই, এই জড়বর্ণ ক্রিয়া করিতেছে*। পাঠক দেখিবেন, বেদান্তের এটা একটা মূল্যবান সিদ্ধান্ত। এই জগৎ, প্রাণশক্তির পরিণতি। এই প্রাণ—ব্রহ্মেরই প্রয়োজন সাধনার্থ জগদাকারে অভিব্যক্ত। সুতরাং জগতের সর্বত্র ব্রহ্মেরই একটা প্রকাণ্ড উদ্দেশ্য—মঙ্গল অভিপ্রায়—*Purpose*—ক্রিয়া করিতেছে। জীব-সম্বন্ধেও এই একই কথা পাওয়া যাইতেছে। জীব-দেহেও, প্রাণ, মন, ইন্দ্রিয়াদি পরস্পর ‘সংহত’ হইয়া, মিলিয়া মিশিয়া, জীবেরই প্রয়োজন সাধনার্থ ক্রিয়া করিতেছে। সুতরাং প্রত্যেক জীবে একটা একটা অভিপ্রায় সিদ্ধ হইতেছে।

আমরা পাঠকবর্গের সুবিধার জন্ম নিম্নে কতকগুলি ভাষ্যাংশ উদ্ধৃত করিতেছি। পাঠক দেখিতে পাইবেন এ বিষয়ে ভাষ্যকারের সিদ্ধান্ত কত পরিষ্কার ও কত সুন্দর।

(৫) সৃষ্টির প্রথমে প্রাণবীজ স্পন্দনাকারে—সূত্ররূপে—অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছিল। এই সূত্র বা স্পন্দনই, সর্বপ্রকার ক্রিয়ার বীজ। ইহাই প্রাণীবর্গের দেহ ও ইন্দ্রিয়াকারে পরিণত হইয়াছে। জগতের কোন ক্রিয়াই অনিয়মিত দেখা যায় না। এই নিয়মিত ক্রিয়াদর্শনে, ঐ ক্রিয়ার মূলে, উহা হইতে স্বতন্ত্র—চেতনের প্রেরকতা অনুমান করিয়া লইতে হইবে। উহার মূলে চেতনের প্রেরণা আছে। নিয়মিত ভাবে যে ক্রিয়া চলিতেছে তাহাই, চেতনের প্রেরণার পরিচায়ক চিহ্ন (লিঙ্গ)। ব্রহ্ম-চৈতন্য ঐ স্পন্দনের নিয়ন্তা, অন্তর্ধামী। প্রাণের সর্বপ্রকার ক্রিয়ার কারণ সেই

* “অচেতন-প্রযুক্তিঃ চেতনাধিষ্ঠান-নিবন্ধনা, অচেতনপ্রযুক্তিৎবাৎ রথাদিবৎ”। “সংহতানাং পরার্থৎ দৃষ্টং”—ইত্যাদি। “অচেতনে স্বার্থানুপপত্তেঃ”—ইত্যাদি।

চেতনের প্রেরণা। ইহা স্বীকার না করিলে, প্রাণস্পন্দন, বিনা কারণে, শূন্য হইতে, উদ্ভূত হইয়াছে,—ইহাই স্বীকার করিতে হয়* ।

(b) গীতায়, নিগুণ ব্রহ্মকে সৎ বলিয়াও নির্দেশ করা যাইতে পারে না, আবার তাঁহাকে অসৎ বলিয়াও নির্দেশ করা যায় না, বলা হইল। তখনই একটা প্রশ্ন উঠিল যে, তবে কি ব্রহ্ম—“শূন্য”? যাহাকে কোন প্রকারেই নির্দেশ করার উপায় নাই, তাঁহাকে শূন্য ভিন্ন আর কি বলা যাইবে? এই প্রশ্নের উত্তরে ভাষ্যকার বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, “ব্রহ্ম সর্বপ্রকার বিশেষত্ব রহিত; ব্রহ্ম বাক্যও মনের অতীত; সূতরাং যদি কেহ এরূপ বস্তুকে শূন্য বলিয়াই ধরিয়া লয়, এই আশঙ্কা নিবারণের জন্য, তাঁহাকে দেহের ও ইন্দ্রিয়ের সর্বপ্রকার ক্রিয়ার মূল-প্রেরক বলিয়া নির্দেশ করা হইয়াছে। যিনি দৈহিক ও ঐন্দ্রিয়িক ক্রিয়ার মূল-প্রেরক, মূল-কারণ,—তিনি আর ‘শূন্য’ হইবেন কি প্রকারে?† ।

পাঠক এই সকল স্থলে দেখিতে পাইতেছেন যে, নিগুণ পরমাত্ম-চেতন্যকে সর্বপ্রকার জড়ীয় ক্রিয়ার মূল প্রেরক বলিয়াই বেদান্তে সিদ্ধান্ত করা হইয়াছে। আরও দুই একটা সিদ্ধান্ত দেখাইতেছি।

(c) “জীব মাত্রেই এক একটা উদ্দেশ্য লইয়া, অভিপ্রায় লইয়া, জগতে আবির্ভূত হইয়াছে। এই জীব, স্ব স্ব উদ্দেশ্য সিদ্ধির নিমিত্ত, আপন আপন প্রয়োজন সাধনার্থ, চক্ষুরাদি ইন্দ্রিয়বর্গকে স্ব স্ব কার্যে প্রেরণ করিয়া থাকে। বিনা প্রয়োজনে কোন ক্রিয়াই সম্ভব হয় না। সূতরাং

* “সর্বপ্রাণভূৎ-ক্রিয়াক্তকঃ, যদ্যত্রানি কার্যাকরণ জাতানি, যস্মিন্ (ব্রহ্মণি) ওতানি প্রোতানি চ, যৎ ‘হুত্ৰ’ সংজ্ঞকং জগতো বিধারয়িত্,—স মাতরিত্বা (প্রাণঃ)”—ঈশ-ভাষ্য, ৪। “হুত্ৰং বায়ুঃ—যদাত্মকং সপ্তদশবিধং লিঙ্গং... যন্তবাহ্যভেদাঃ সপ্ত সপ্ত মরুদাণাঃ সমুদ্রস্তেব উর্ধ্বঃ... তদন্তর্গতং তন্ত্ৰেব হুত্ৰস্ত নিমন্তারঃ অন্তর্ধানিনঃ ক্রহীত্বাক্তঃ আহ” (বৃহৎ ভা; ৩।৭।৩)। “তস্মাৎসিদ্ধ মস্ত অন্তিত্বমকরস্ত, অব্যভিচারি হি তৎ লিঙ্গং... নিয়তে বর্জ্যেতে, চেতনাবস্তং প্রশাসিতার মন্তরেণ নৈতং যুক্তং” (৩।৮।৯)।

† “সচ্ছন্দ-প্রত্যয়বিষয়ত্বাৎ অসদ্ব্যাপ্তকাং জ্ঞেয়স্ত সর্বপ্রাণি-করণোপাধিধারেন তদন্তিত্বং প্রতিপাদয়ন্ত তদাশঙ্কানিবৃত্তার্থমাহ.... সর্বত্র সর্বদেহাবয়বদ্বেন গম্যমানাঃ পাণিপাদাদয়ঃ জ্ঞেয়শক্তিসদ্ব্যবনিমিত্ত স্বকার্য্যাঃ ইতি জ্ঞেয়সদ্বাবে লিঙ্গানি”। “সর্ববিশেষরহিতস্ত অব্যক্তমনসগোচরস্য শূদ্রহে প্রাপ্তে, প্রত্যক্স্থেন ইন্দ্রিয়াদিশ্রবণহেতুদ্বেনসৎ দর্শয়মাহ”। গীতা, ১৩।১৩।

আত্ম-চৈতন্যকে যদি উহাদের প্রেরক না বল, তাহা হইলে ইন্দ্রিয়কর্মের ক্রিয়াই হইতে পারিত না । ইন্দ্রিয়গুলি একত্রে, একই উদ্দেশ্যে ক্রিয়া করিয়া থাকে । উহার জড় । উহারা চেতনের প্রয়োজন-সিদ্ধির নির্মিতই, ঐ প্রকারে ক্রিয়াশীল । উহাদের হইতে স্বতন্ত্র চেতন-জীবের প্রয়োজন সাধন করিবার জন্মই ইন্দ্রিয়গুলি ক্রিয়া করিয়া থাকে । জীবের প্রয়োজন না থাকিলে চক্ষুরাদি ইন্দ্রিয় ক্রিয়া করিত না” * ।

(d) “এরূপ কোথাও দেখিতে পাওয়া যাইবে না যে,—কতকগুলি জড়ীয় বিকার, পরস্পর মিলিয়া মিশিয়া, একই উদ্দেশ্যে ক্রিয়া করিতেছে;—অন্য উহারা চেতন-জীবের প্রয়োজন সিদ্ধি করিতেছে না এবং চেতন-জীব উহাদিগকে আপন উদ্দেশ্য সিদ্ধির জন্ম, পরস্পর মিলিত করেন নাই । যেখানেই জড়ীয় বিকারগুলি একই উদ্দেশ্যে, মিলিয়া মিশিয়া, ‘সংহত’ হইয়া কার্য্য করিতেছে দেখা যায়, সেইখানেই ‘অসংহত’, চেতন-জীবের প্রেরণা ও প্রয়োজন-সিদ্ধি অনুমান করিতে হইবে † ।

আমরা আর অধিক উদ্ধৃত করিয়া গ্রন্থের কলেবর বৃদ্ধি করিতে ইচ্ছা করি না । আমরা এই সকল তত্ত্ব একত্র করিয়া লইলে, বেদান্তের একটা মহান্ সিদ্ধান্ত প্রাপ্ত হই । প্রাণশক্তি, ব্রহ্ম হইতে অভিব্যক্ত । এই প্রাণশক্তি, তাঁহার মহান্ অভিপ্রায় সিদ্ধির উপায় বা সাধন ‡ । এই প্রাণ-স্পন্দন, বাহিরে সূর্য্য-চন্দ্রাদিতে তেজ, আলোকাদিরূপে এবং জীবে দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদিরূপে আপনাকে বিভক্ত করিয়া, পরস্পর পরস্পরের ক্রিয়া বা

* “অধীর্ণতা হি পূৰ্ব্বঃ । স্বতঃ প্রয়োজন-সিদ্ধার্থঃ বাণাদিকং প্রেরয়তি । তদভাবে, প্রেরকাতাবাৎ, বাণ্যব্যবহারাদিকং ভবেৎ । প্রয়োজন-প্রযুক্তত্বাৎ সৰ্ব্বপ্রযুক্তঃ” । “সংহতস্ত বাণাদিলক্ষণস্ত কার্য্যন্ত পরার্থব্যং, পরোপকাররূপাভিব্যাহরণাদিকং,—পরমর্ষিন যুগকার ভাষ্যমন্তরেণ ন ভাৎ” (ঐতং ভাষ্য) ।

† “স্বার্থের অসংহতের কারণ কেবলিৎ অপ্রযুক্তঃ সাহচর্য্যং অবস্থানং বা দৃষ্টং” (কঠ, ৫।৫) “কত একার্থ বৃত্তিযেন সংহতঃ তৎ অন্তরেণ অসংহতঃ বা ভবতি” (জৈমিণী ভাষ্য, ১২।৭) ।

‡ ভোক্তব্যবসে এই প্রাণকে এই জন্মই “স্বার্থকরবেনউপকরণকৃতঃ” বলাকইয়াছে (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।৩।১০) ইহা জীবের ‘উপকরণ’ (Means for serving its purpose) হওয়ার জীব হক্টে বস্তুত, ইহাও বলা হইয়াছে—“জীব-ব্যতিরিক্তানি তদ্ব্যাপি জীবোপকরণাদি ব্রহ্মণো জায়ন্তে” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৩।১।১) ।

উপেক্ষা করিতেছে * । নিষ্ঠুর পরমাত্মা, আপনি স্বতন্ত্র থাকিয়া, আপনি অবিকৃত রহিয়া, আপনাই মহান্ মঙ্গল-অভিপ্রায় সিদ্ধির জন্য, এই প্রাণ-সম্পন্ন স্বাধীন সকল বস্তুকে, সকল জীবকে পরম্পর সম্বন্ধে আনিয়াছেন । সকল জীবই, সেই মহান্ এক উদ্দেশ্যের অনুকূলে থাকিয়া আপন আপন জীবনের উদ্দেশ্য সুসিদ্ধ করিতেছে † । বেদান্তে ব্রহ্মকে ‘উপাদান-কারণ’ বলাতে, তাঁহারই আপন শক্তির গা বিকাশ বুঝাইতেছে । আবার তাঁহাকেই ‘নিমিত্ত কারণ’ বলাতে, এই বিকারবর্গের মধ্যে তাঁহার একই ও স্বাতন্ত্র্য অব্যাহত রহিয়া যাইতেছে ।

(৩) নিষ্ঠুর ব্রহ্ম—আনন্দস্বরূপ (The Good) :—

আত্মা যে আনন্দস্বরূপ, তাহাও বেদান্তে পুনঃ পুনঃ বলিয়া দেওয়া হইয়াছে । ছান্দোগ্যভাষ্যে আমরা দেখিতে পাই যে, “আত্মা আনন্দস্বরূপ । বিষয়েন্দ্রিয় সংযোগে, সেই স্বরূপ হইতেই সুখ-দুঃখাদির অভিব্যক্তি হয় । এই সুখ-দুঃখাদি—নিয়ত চঞ্চল, পরিবর্তনশীল, অস্থির । কিন্তু আনন্দ—এই সুখ-দুঃখাদি বিকারে অনুসূত থাকে” ॥ । তৈত্তিরীয় ভাষ্যেও অবিকল এইরূপ কথাই দেখিতে পাওয়া যায় § । আমাদের নিজের আত্মার স্বরূপ দৃষ্টে,

* “এষ মুখ্য প্রাণঃ, ইতরান্ চক্ষুরাদীন্ প্রাণান্, আত্মভেদাৎ, পৃথক্ পৃথগেব বধ্যস্থানং বিনিযুক্তং ; ... বাহ্যং আদিত্যাদিরূপেণ, অধ্যাত্মক চক্ষুরাদ্যাকারেণ অবস্থানঃ প্রাপত্ত” (প্রম ভাষ্য, ৩/৪) ।

† তাহা হইলে এই প্রাণসম্পন্নকে ব্রহ্মের Purposive activity বলিয়া নির্দেশ করিতে পারি । “প্রতিপ্রাণ বর্ধিনঃ প্রাপত্ত” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২/৪/১৩) । “শারীরেণৈব চ নিত্যঃ প্রাণানাং সম্বন্ধঃ” (২/৪/১৬) ।

‡ জীবের যে, শব্দর-মতে, স্ব স্ব স্বরূপ ও অভিপ্রায় আছে, সে কথা এই গ্রন্থের দ্বিতীয় অধ্যায়ে আলোচিত হইয়াছে ।

§ “শক্তির্দেহেন স্বতঃ সন্তাৎকংস্তাৎ । নেত্যাং—আত্ম শক্তির্দেহেন আত্মস্বত্বভাবঃ ... ন প্রধানবৎ স্বাতন্ত্র্যং—আনন্দ গিরি । বেদান্তদর্শনে ও, ইহার স্বাতন্ত্র্য নিবিষ্ট হইয়াছে—“আদি-শব্দেন সংহতত্বাচেননদ্বাদীন্ প্রাপত্ত স্বাতন্ত্র্যনিরাকরণং হেতুর্ন দর্শয়তি” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২/৪/১০) ।

। “ন বৈ সশরীরস্ত সতঃ, প্রিয়াপ্রিয়য়োঃ বাহুবিরয় সংযোগ বিরোগ-নিমিত্তদ্বোঃ উচ্ছেদঃ নাস্তীতি ... শরীর স্বাক্ষিনোঃ প্রিয়াপ্রিয়য়োঃ প্রতিবেশস্ত বিবক্ষিতত্বাৎ (স্বপ্তৌ ... অগ্নেঃ সবিভূবা উৎপ্রকাশবৎ স্বরূপভূতস্ত আনন্দস্য প্রিয়স্যাপি নেহ প্রতিবেশঃ” (১/১২/১১) ।

§ “কৌটিকোপি আনন্দঃ ব্রহ্মানন্দস্যেব মাত্রা ... বিবরাদিসাধনসম্বন্ধবশাৎ ... অনবহিতঃ সম্প্রসক্তঃ । ... অনেন আনন্দেন, ব্যবৃত্ত-বিবর-বৃদ্ধি-গম্য আনন্দঃ অহুগন্ত শক্যতে” তৈত্তি ভাষ্য,

নিগুণ-ব্রহ্মও যে আনন্দ স্বরূপ, তাহা বুঝিতে পারি * । মহাভারতের সুপ্রসিদ্ধ টীকাকার নীলকণ্ঠ,—নিগুণ ব্রহ্মকেই আনন্দস্বরূপ এবং প্রেরয়িতা বলিয়া মীমাংসা করিয়াছেন । এই নীলকণ্ঠ, ভাষ্যকার শ্রীমৎ শঙ্করাচার্য্যের নিতান্ত অনুগত শিষ্য † । তিনিও, শঙ্করোক্ত নিগুণ ব্রহ্মকে এই ভাবেই বুঝিয়াছিলেন ।

(ক্রমশঃ)

* “আনন্দমাত্রাবয়বধারেণ মাত্রিনঃ অবিলিপ্যমিবতি জীবঃ” (বৃহৎ ভা) ।

† “নহু কথং নিরূপাধেঃ প্রবর্তকত্বঃ উচ্যতে ? অধিষ্ঠানতয়েতি ক্রমঃ । তথাচ শ্রুতিঃ “যতো বা ইমানি ভূতানি জায়ন্তে” ইতি ব্রহ্মণো লক্ষণ মুক্তং ।মাণ্ডুক্যশ্রুতি-প্রসিদ্ধস্ত আনন্দ-ময়স্য ঈশ্বরস্ত কারণীভূতে আনন্দাখ্যে ব্রহ্মণি—‘আনন্দাখ্যোব ইমানি ভূতানি জায়ন্তে’ ইতি মুখ্যং কারণত্বং ব্যবস্থাপিতং । তথা ‘কোহেবাস্তাৎ’ ইত্যাদি শ্রুতিঃ—কারণে যদি আনন্দো নস্তাৎ, তর্হি তৎকার্য্যে দেহাদৌ কৃতঃ প্রাণনাদি স্তাৎ ইতি তত্রৈব মুখ্যং প্রবর্তকত্বঃ দর্শয়তি ।... .নিত্যসিদ্ধ আত্মা আনন্দাখ্য . ..আনন্দস্তেব নিত্য-সৈবর্থাৎ মায়য়া অভিব্যজ্যতে”—মহাভারত-টীকা, বনপর্ব, ২১৩ অধ্যায় ।

